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Mesh: SSH over the mesh (D197 M1, D235) #221

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opened 2026-10-15 08:17:21 +00:00 by kayg · 388 comments
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:17:21 +00:00
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Owner 2026-10-15: build SSH over the mesh alongside relay/NAT traversal. D197 M1 and D235 (embedded SSH server on the mesh address port 22, certificates, login access, ssh_config.d upgrade). Research: #162.

Owner 2026-10-15: build SSH over the mesh alongside relay/NAT traversal. D197 M1 and D235 (embedded SSH server on the mesh address port 22, certificates, login access, ssh_config.d upgrade). Research: #162.
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kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:19:02 +00:00
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Started mesh-ssh on branch mesh-ssh at base/head c87fc0631. Read #221 (no earlier comments), #219 with survey findings, #162 history, repository contracts and D235. No parent is identified on #221. Switch-over marker absent: no workspace builds until it exists. Building engine-independent access checks and reversible port ownership first; no embedded SSH engine is selected in Cargo.lock or D235, so engine selection remains an owner decision. No host sshd or owner fixtures will be changed.

Started mesh-ssh on branch mesh-ssh at base/head c87fc0631. Read #221 (no earlier comments), #219 with survey findings, #162 history, repository contracts and D235. No parent is identified on #221. Switch-over marker absent: no workspace builds until it exists. Building engine-independent access checks and reversible port ownership first; no embedded SSH engine is selected in Cargo.lock or D235, so engine selection remains an owner decision. No host sshd or owner fixtures will be changed.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:19:59 +00:00
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Additive contract proposal for #221: SSH stays behind the existing removable ssh crate. Separate protocol verification from current authority: engine verifies the certificate signature/type/critical options and proof of key possession; admission then checks exact source node/address, [valid_after, valid_before), maximum 24-hour lifetime, current certificate/person/link/node status, TCP/22 network access and person-to-target-account login access. Ordinary authorized_keys authentication is an explicit separate path, never a fallback for a rejected identity certificate. Port ownership is direct exact-address bind first, with EADDRINUSE-only fallback to exact-address high port plus an owned nftables redirect; stop/uninstall remove only marked owned rules. No path selection or PathKind interface changes (#201). Important integration finding: mesh firewall currently evaluates incoming tcp dport after DNAT (crates/plugins/mesh/src/firewall.rs); redirected traffic therefore needs original TCP/22 tuple enforcement, not permission for the high port. D235 Q14 prohibits enabling SSH before all shell paths use login access. Protocol engine choice remains unrecorded; no new engine/dependency is being chosen in this job.

Additive contract proposal for #221: SSH stays behind the existing removable ssh crate. Separate protocol verification from current authority: engine verifies the certificate signature/type/critical options and proof of key possession; admission then checks exact source node/address, [valid_after, valid_before), maximum 24-hour lifetime, current certificate/person/link/node status, TCP/22 network access and person-to-target-account login access. Ordinary authorized_keys authentication is an explicit separate path, never a fallback for a rejected identity certificate. Port ownership is direct exact-address bind first, with EADDRINUSE-only fallback to exact-address high port plus an owned nftables redirect; stop/uninstall remove only marked owned rules. No path selection or PathKind interface changes (#201). Important integration finding: mesh firewall currently evaluates incoming tcp dport after DNAT (crates/plugins/mesh/src/firewall.rs); redirected traffic therefore needs original TCP/22 tuple enforcement, not permission for the high port. D235 Q14 prohibits enabling SSH before all shell paths use login access. Protocol engine choice remains unrecorded; no new engine/dependency is being chosen in this job.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:24:21 +00:00
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Completed contract step: pushed 8daa9e50a, contracts/mesh-ssh.md. The property list covers certificate/source/time/current authority, both access checks, process identity and forwarding, port coexistence, original-port enforcement, cleanup ownership and user-process sessions. git diff --check passed. No runtime code in that commit. Read the full #219 report attachment; no new path selector/observer interface is planned. Single-crate claim-admission and port-ownership tests are being built; full workspace gate remains prohibited while switch-over marker is absent.

Completed contract step: pushed 8daa9e50a, contracts/mesh-ssh.md. The property list covers certificate/source/time/current authority, both access checks, process identity and forwarding, port coexistence, original-port enforcement, cleanup ownership and user-process sessions. git diff --check passed. No runtime code in that commit. Read the full #219 report attachment; no new path selector/observer interface is planned. Single-crate claim-admission and port-ownership tests are being built; full workspace gate remains prohibited while switch-over marker is absent.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:27:39 +00:00
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Dependency finding: D181 selects system OpenSSH for add-host and names a future built-in client; it does not select an embedded server engine. D235 defines server behavior, not an engine. Product Cargo.lock has no embedded SSH engine. research/ssh-client/REPORT.md measures a client-only isolated candidate and explicitly makes no engine choice; those historical build-host results cannot satisfy current perf-VM server evidence. The orchestrator/owner needs to settle the embedded server engine before protocol verification, certificate issuance/signing or session dispatch can be wired. I am continuing the engine-independent admission and owned-port modules. A production-ready SSH claim would be false at this point. No new dependency or feature has been added.

Dependency finding: D181 selects system OpenSSH for add-host and names a future built-in client; it does not select an embedded server engine. D235 defines server behavior, not an engine. Product Cargo.lock has no embedded SSH engine. research/ssh-client/REPORT.md measures a client-only isolated candidate and explicitly makes no engine choice; those historical build-host results cannot satisfy current perf-VM server evidence. The orchestrator/owner needs to settle the embedded server engine before protocol verification, certificate issuance/signing or session dispatch can be wired. I am continuing the engine-independent admission and owned-port modules. A production-ready SSH claim would be false at this point. No new dependency or feature has been added.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:29:34 +00:00
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Completed admission step: pushed 42692ddc7. crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_admission.rs validates already-authenticated claims; it does not parse/sign certificates or start SSH. Six new tests pass: both IP families, exact source/node, wrong person/certificate, exclusive expiry and overflow boundaries, revocation on repeat admission, network/login deny and host/account substitution. Workspace fmt and SSH all-target Clippy pass; SSH library result: 20 passed; 0 failed; 1 ignored (existing private subprocess fixture). Raw output: admission-checks.log. Full gate/size/SSH performance pending the switch-over release and protocol engine decision; no performance claim.

Completed admission step: pushed 42692ddc7. crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_admission.rs validates already-authenticated claims; it does not parse/sign certificates or start SSH. Six new tests pass: both IP families, exact source/node, wrong person/certificate, exclusive expiry and overflow boundaries, revocation on repeat admission, network/login deny and host/account substitution. Workspace fmt and SSH all-target Clippy pass; SSH library result: 20 passed; 0 failed; 1 ignored (existing private subprocess fixture). Raw output: [admission-checks.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/87289fd9-744c-4be7-8ac5-6f1650653580). Full gate/size/SSH performance pending the switch-over release and protocol engine decision; no performance claim.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:32:40 +00:00
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Completed owned-port helper step: pushed 818491658. crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_port.rs uses exact-address direct bind, EADDRINUSE-only fallback, atomic owned nft rules and explicit retryable stop/recovery. Two real namespace tests pass separately, including two-family node-local delivery and incoming veth traffic, wildcard TCP/22 bind conflict, internal-port refusal, foreign marker refusal, failed transaction retention and cleanup. These are TCP listener fixtures, not a real host sshd or certificate/SSH interoperability proof. Workspace fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and library tests pass (22 passed, 3 ignored; namespace selection 2 passed). Raw output: port-checks.log. Helper remains unwired pending original-TCP/22 mesh filtering and protocol engine selection. Self-review now checking stopped-state reporting before checkpoint.

Completed owned-port helper step: pushed 818491658. crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_port.rs uses exact-address direct bind, EADDRINUSE-only fallback, atomic owned nft rules and explicit retryable stop/recovery. Two real namespace tests pass separately, including two-family node-local delivery and incoming veth traffic, wildcard TCP/22 bind conflict, internal-port refusal, foreign marker refusal, failed transaction retention and cleanup. These are TCP listener fixtures, not a real host sshd or certificate/SSH interoperability proof. Workspace fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and library tests pass (22 passed, 3 ignored; namespace selection 2 passed). Raw output: [port-checks.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6cea5534-1e68-4bff-8661-41e4daf5cc72). Helper remains unwired pending original-TCP/22 mesh filtering and protocol engine selection. Self-review now checking stopped-state reporting before checkpoint.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:33:55 +00:00
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Checkpoint, NOT complete: branch mesh-ssh, pushed head 5f04313db4; clean worktree. Commits: contract 8daa9e50a; authenticated-claim admission 42692ddc7; owned-port helper 818491658; stopped-state correction 5f04313db. No deploy or host sshd changes.

Self-review finding fixed in 5f04313db: stopped leases reported Direct. The namespace assertion failed before the correction (red receipt); both namespace tests pass afterward. The contract property checklist was reviewed: claim/source/time/current-access and port ownership have scoped proofs; protocol, process-bound signing, real sshd interoperability and user-session proofs are still absent. Final scoped checks.

Dependencies/remaining work:

  • Owner/orchestrator must settle the embedded server engine. D181 is an outbound client choice; D235 and the product dependency graph do not select an embedded server engine. No new library/feature was selected here.
  • The switch-over marker is still absent. Per the brief, no workspace iterate/fast or static builds were run; there is no scripts/verify fast output, size delta or performance acceptance to quote. Rebase onto origin/dev when that marker appears.
  • Wire original TCP/22 enforcement into the mesh firewall before enabling redirects; do not permit the internal port as a substitute. No PathKind/observer interface was changed and no path selector was duplicated.
  • Implement and wire actual certificate verification/issuance/revocation, identity/link storage, process-bound key socket with forwarding refusal, scoped SSH config/host trust, actions/mesh up --ssh, real target-user login/session handoff and reattach, audit, lifecycle/uninstall integration. Login access must land on all shell paths together (D235 Q14).
  • Run real certificate/host sshd tests, whole-feature namespace/uninstall proofs, static size comparison and perf-VM SSH connect/throughput comparison. Current namespace fixtures are TCP listeners, not SSH servers. Direct-bind/nft redirect is an implemented candidate, not a measured final choice.

Cleanup: no servers left running; peer subprocesses were waited for, and their disposable namespaces/veths exited. Only this job's target directory was removed; raw evidence remains outside the checkout. Owner fixtures were untouched. Issue remains open.

Final permitted single-crate checks, verbatim (these are NOT the full fast gate):

$ cargo fmt --all --check
$ cargo clippy -p infraternal-plugin-ssh --all-targets -- -D warnings
    Checking infraternal-plugin-ssh v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/mesh-ssh/crates/plugins/ssh)
    Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 2.36s
$ cargo test -p infraternal-plugin-ssh --lib
   Compiling infraternal-plugin-ssh v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/mesh-ssh/crates/plugins/ssh)
    Finished `test` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.39s
     Running unittests src/lib.rs (/home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh/target/debug/deps/infraternal_plugin_ssh-968b7ebe7e05b20f)

running 25 tests
test auth_once::tests::caller_cannot_choose_or_extend_the_expiry_clock ... ok
test auth_once::tests::each_method_consumes_once_and_expiry_erases_both_methods ... ok
test config::tests::malformed_public_policy_is_refused_before_it_can_change_command_arguments ... ok
test config::tests::flattened_quoted_public_filenames_are_refused_when_existing_trust_would_be_lost ... ok
test auth_order::tests::only_exact_generated_read_only_checks_can_choose_credentials ... ok
test config::tests::configured_private_sources_are_excluded_and_public_trust_is_retained ... ok
test cli::tests::ssh_actions_are_complete_and_marked_unavailable ... ok
test auth_once::tests::invalid_material_is_refused_before_any_helper_or_scheduling ... ok
test manifest::tests::node_provisioning_declares_an_existing_server_and_only_node_components ... ok
test config::tests::unresolved_or_relative_public_paths_cannot_admit_first_contact ... ok
test mesh_admission::tests::claims_cannot_substitute_another_person_or_certificate ... ok
test config::tests::trust_lookup_uses_every_explicit_alias_verbatim ... ok
test mesh_admission::tests::admission_does_not_extend_to_another_host_or_target_account ... ok
test mesh_port::tests::namespace_direct_redirect_guard_and_cleanup ... ignored, Run alone inside unshare -Urn with a disposable network namespace.
test mesh_port::tests::namespace_incoming_redirect_and_internal_port_refusal ... ignored, Run alone inside unshare -Urn with a disposable network namespace.
test mesh_port::tests::coordinates_cannot_become_nft_syntax_or_wildcard_listeners ... ok
test mesh_admission::tests::every_admission_rechecks_revocation_and_login_access ... ok
test prompt::tests::reply_fixture ... ignored, private subprocess for the one-reply peer oracle
test mesh_admission::tests::exact_source_and_current_membership_are_required ... ok
test mesh_admission::tests::time_interval_is_bounded_and_end_exclusive ... ok
test mesh_admission::tests::valid_claims_need_both_access_checks_in_both_address_families ... ok
test mesh_port::tests::both_families_preserve_the_destination_and_guard_the_internal_port ... ok
test prompt_image::tests::helper_identity_refuses_in_place_and_path_replacement ... ok
test transport::secret_tests::secret_input_has_a_fixed_bound_and_accepts_only_strings ... ok
test prompt::tests::helper_reply_requires_the_registered_parent_and_is_served_once ... ok

test result: ok. 22 passed; 0 failed; 3 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.16s

$ unshare -Urn /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh/target/debug/deps/infraternal_plugin_ssh-968b7ebe7e05b20f mesh_port::tests::namespace_ --ignored --nocapture --test-threads=1

running 2 tests
test mesh_port::tests::namespace_direct_redirect_guard_and_cleanup ... ok
test mesh_port::tests::namespace_incoming_redirect_and_internal_port_refusal ... ok

test result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 23 filtered out; finished in 1.69s
Checkpoint, NOT complete: branch mesh-ssh, pushed head 5f04313db44cac3ef32938310fecd0e291069f5b; clean worktree. Commits: contract 8daa9e50a; authenticated-claim admission 42692ddc7; owned-port helper 818491658; stopped-state correction 5f04313db. No deploy or host sshd changes. Self-review finding fixed in 5f04313db: stopped leases reported Direct. The namespace assertion failed before the correction ([red receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/966e87f9-1e94-48c2-af2c-075a89754431)); both namespace tests pass afterward. The contract property checklist was reviewed: claim/source/time/current-access and port ownership have scoped proofs; protocol, process-bound signing, real sshd interoperability and user-session proofs are still absent. [Final scoped checks](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/10b263ad-1f6a-430b-abcf-e55173c57d2f). Dependencies/remaining work: - Owner/orchestrator must settle the embedded server engine. D181 is an outbound client choice; D235 and the product dependency graph do not select an embedded server engine. No new library/feature was selected here. - The switch-over marker is still absent. Per the brief, no workspace iterate/fast or static builds were run; there is no scripts/verify fast output, size delta or performance acceptance to quote. Rebase onto origin/dev when that marker appears. - Wire original TCP/22 enforcement into the mesh firewall before enabling redirects; do not permit the internal port as a substitute. No PathKind/observer interface was changed and no path selector was duplicated. - Implement and wire actual certificate verification/issuance/revocation, identity/link storage, process-bound key socket with forwarding refusal, scoped SSH config/host trust, actions/mesh up --ssh, real target-user login/session handoff and reattach, audit, lifecycle/uninstall integration. Login access must land on all shell paths together (D235 Q14). - Run real certificate/host sshd tests, whole-feature namespace/uninstall proofs, static size comparison and perf-VM SSH connect/throughput comparison. Current namespace fixtures are TCP listeners, not SSH servers. Direct-bind/nft redirect is an implemented candidate, not a measured final choice. Cleanup: no servers left running; peer subprocesses were waited for, and their disposable namespaces/veths exited. Only this job's target directory was removed; raw evidence remains outside the checkout. Owner fixtures were untouched. Issue remains open. Final permitted single-crate checks, verbatim (these are NOT the full fast gate): ```text $ cargo fmt --all --check $ cargo clippy -p infraternal-plugin-ssh --all-targets -- -D warnings Checking infraternal-plugin-ssh v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/mesh-ssh/crates/plugins/ssh) Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 2.36s $ cargo test -p infraternal-plugin-ssh --lib Compiling infraternal-plugin-ssh v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/mesh-ssh/crates/plugins/ssh) Finished `test` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.39s Running unittests src/lib.rs (/home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh/target/debug/deps/infraternal_plugin_ssh-968b7ebe7e05b20f) running 25 tests test auth_once::tests::caller_cannot_choose_or_extend_the_expiry_clock ... ok test auth_once::tests::each_method_consumes_once_and_expiry_erases_both_methods ... ok test config::tests::malformed_public_policy_is_refused_before_it_can_change_command_arguments ... ok test config::tests::flattened_quoted_public_filenames_are_refused_when_existing_trust_would_be_lost ... ok test auth_order::tests::only_exact_generated_read_only_checks_can_choose_credentials ... ok test config::tests::configured_private_sources_are_excluded_and_public_trust_is_retained ... ok test cli::tests::ssh_actions_are_complete_and_marked_unavailable ... ok test auth_once::tests::invalid_material_is_refused_before_any_helper_or_scheduling ... ok test manifest::tests::node_provisioning_declares_an_existing_server_and_only_node_components ... ok test config::tests::unresolved_or_relative_public_paths_cannot_admit_first_contact ... ok test mesh_admission::tests::claims_cannot_substitute_another_person_or_certificate ... ok test config::tests::trust_lookup_uses_every_explicit_alias_verbatim ... ok test mesh_admission::tests::admission_does_not_extend_to_another_host_or_target_account ... ok test mesh_port::tests::namespace_direct_redirect_guard_and_cleanup ... ignored, Run alone inside unshare -Urn with a disposable network namespace. test mesh_port::tests::namespace_incoming_redirect_and_internal_port_refusal ... ignored, Run alone inside unshare -Urn with a disposable network namespace. test mesh_port::tests::coordinates_cannot_become_nft_syntax_or_wildcard_listeners ... ok test mesh_admission::tests::every_admission_rechecks_revocation_and_login_access ... ok test prompt::tests::reply_fixture ... ignored, private subprocess for the one-reply peer oracle test mesh_admission::tests::exact_source_and_current_membership_are_required ... ok test mesh_admission::tests::time_interval_is_bounded_and_end_exclusive ... ok test mesh_admission::tests::valid_claims_need_both_access_checks_in_both_address_families ... ok test mesh_port::tests::both_families_preserve_the_destination_and_guard_the_internal_port ... ok test prompt_image::tests::helper_identity_refuses_in_place_and_path_replacement ... ok test transport::secret_tests::secret_input_has_a_fixed_bound_and_accepts_only_strings ... ok test prompt::tests::helper_reply_requires_the_registered_parent_and_is_served_once ... ok test result: ok. 22 passed; 0 failed; 3 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.16s $ unshare -Urn /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh/target/debug/deps/infraternal_plugin_ssh-968b7ebe7e05b20f mesh_port::tests::namespace_ --ignored --nocapture --test-threads=1 running 2 tests test mesh_port::tests::namespace_direct_redirect_guard_and_cleanup ... ok test mesh_port::tests::namespace_incoming_redirect_and_internal_port_refusal ... ok test result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 23 filtered out; finished in 1.69s ```
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:37:13 +00:00
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Started research-ssh-engine on branch research-ssh-engine at head 5f04313db4, merge base 1b23ef311c; worktree clean. Read #221's seven comments and all ten comments on linked research #162; #221 has no separate parent recorded. D181/D188/D197/D235/D243/D244/D270 and the SSH client/mesh research were reviewed. Measuring isolated server candidates only; no product dependency or engine choice.

Started research-ssh-engine on branch research-ssh-engine at head 5f04313db44cac3ef32938310fecd0e291069f5b, merge base 1b23ef311ce8f850ff01a60d06a420db33d26888; worktree clean. Read #221's seven comments and all ten comments on linked research #162; #221 has no separate parent recorded. D181/D188/D197/D235/D243/D244/D270 and the SSH client/mesh research were reviewed. Measuring isolated server candidates only; no product dependency or engine choice.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 08:54:21 +00:00
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Finding: the product Cargo.lock/cargo tree contain no embedded SSH server. The existing research/ssh-client/probe measures only a client. The isolated candidate pins russh 0.64.1 with the ring feature. Its server factory receives the peer address and its certificate callback receives a certificate after the public-key proof; Certificate::validate_at checks CA signature/fingerprint and time, while principal and critical-option checks remain application work. The prototype checks principals and source-address and rejects unknown critical options. The server API exposes PTY, exec, resize, signal, agent-forwarding and SFTP callbacks; the prototype refuses forwarding and SFTP. Evidence: research/ssh-engine/russh/src/lib.rs, src/bin/server.rs, Cargo.toml and Cargo.lock. API: https://docs.rs/russh/0.64.1/russh/server/trait.Handler.html and https://docs.rs/ssh-key/latest/ssh_key/struct.Certificate.html.

Security and key-memory finding: public advisories record Terrapin support from russh 0.40.2, several 2026 parser/resource-bound fixes, and a channel-state fix at 0.62.5; the measurement pin is 0.64.1. russh-cryptovec contains unsafe allocation and locking code and ignores mlock errors; the prototype's host private key is held by ssh-key's Rust key type, outside D244's OpenSSL secure heap. This needs owner review before any product integration. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories and https://docs.rs/crate/russh/0.64.1/source/.

Finding: the product Cargo.lock/cargo tree contain no embedded SSH server. The existing research/ssh-client/probe measures only a client. The isolated candidate pins russh 0.64.1 with the ring feature. Its server factory receives the peer address and its certificate callback receives a certificate after the public-key proof; `Certificate::validate_at` checks CA signature/fingerprint and time, while principal and critical-option checks remain application work. The prototype checks principals and source-address and rejects unknown critical options. The server API exposes PTY, exec, resize, signal, agent-forwarding and SFTP callbacks; the prototype refuses forwarding and SFTP. Evidence: `research/ssh-engine/russh/src/lib.rs`, `src/bin/server.rs`, `Cargo.toml` and `Cargo.lock`. API: https://docs.rs/russh/0.64.1/russh/server/trait.Handler.html and https://docs.rs/ssh-key/latest/ssh_key/struct.Certificate.html. Security and key-memory finding: public advisories record Terrapin support from russh 0.40.2, several 2026 parser/resource-bound fixes, and a channel-state fix at 0.62.5; the measurement pin is 0.64.1. `russh-cryptovec` contains unsafe allocation and locking code and ignores `mlock` errors; the prototype's host private key is held by `ssh-key`'s Rust key type, outside D244's OpenSSL secure heap. This needs owner review before any product integration. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories and https://docs.rs/crate/russh/0.64.1/source/.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 09:06:27 +00:00
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Finding: D235 requires file operations through SSH, so a server candidate must provide SFTP or a compatible file channel. The OpenSSH 10.0 release notes describe SFTP client/server support; current russh docs point to the separately versioned russh-sftp server layer. The isolated russh prototype currently refuses SFTP, so its minimal-server size is a lower bound until that layer is measured.

A separate OpenSSH sshd has the strongest built-in match to user/host certificates, principal lookup, SFTP and existing client behavior. Its documented TrustedUserCAKeys and AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand fit this boundary. OpenSSH 10.0 splits authentication into a separate sshd-auth binary; it adds process/package parts but reduces pre-auth code sharing. Evidence: contracts/mesh-ssh.md; D235; https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html; https://man.openbsd.org/sshd_config.

libssh 0.12.2 exposes server and SFTP server APIs and uses LGPL-2.1; its own linking guide warns about distributing statically linked binaries. LGPL relink/source terms need an explicit distribution review against our static AGPL image. The official 2026 release notes list several fixed security issues, with 0.12.2 fixing CVE-2026-59843; this is active maintenance, with more C memory-management surface than the Rust candidate. Evidence: https://api.libssh.org/stable/group__libssh__server.html; https://api.libssh.org/stable/topics.html; https://api.libssh.org/stable/libssh_linking.html; https://www.libssh.org/tag/release/; https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html.

Finding: D235 requires file operations through SSH, so a server candidate must provide SFTP or a compatible file channel. The OpenSSH 10.0 release notes describe SFTP client/server support; current russh docs point to the separately versioned russh-sftp server layer. The isolated russh prototype currently refuses SFTP, so its minimal-server size is a lower bound until that layer is measured. A separate OpenSSH sshd has the strongest built-in match to user/host certificates, principal lookup, SFTP and existing client behavior. Its documented `TrustedUserCAKeys` and `AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand` fit this boundary. OpenSSH 10.0 splits authentication into a separate sshd-auth binary; it adds process/package parts but reduces pre-auth code sharing. Evidence: contracts/mesh-ssh.md; D235; https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html; https://man.openbsd.org/sshd_config. libssh 0.12.2 exposes server and SFTP server APIs and uses LGPL-2.1; its own linking guide warns about distributing statically linked binaries. LGPL relink/source terms need an explicit distribution review against our static AGPL image. The official 2026 release notes list several fixed security issues, with 0.12.2 fixing CVE-2026-59843; this is active maintenance, with more C memory-management surface than the Rust candidate. Evidence: https://api.libssh.org/stable/group__libssh__server.html; https://api.libssh.org/stable/topics.html; https://api.libssh.org/stable/libssh_linking.html; https://www.libssh.org/tag/release/; https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 09:07:27 +00:00
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Security finding: the upstream russh advisory index shows 11 published entries. CVE-2023-48795 was fixed in 0.40.2 by strict key exchange. 2026 fixes include allocation-first field parsing and pre-banner bounds in 0.61.0, decompressed packet bounds in 0.61.1, and unbounded channel memory growth during stalled rekey in 0.63.2. The Debian security record marks CVE-2026-68930 fixed in 0.64.1; the isolated candidate pins 0.64.1 (published 2026-10-05). Evidence: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4r3c-5hpg-58qr; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wwx6-x28x-8259; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases; https://docs.rs/crate/russh/latest.

Security finding: the upstream russh advisory index shows 11 published entries. CVE-2023-48795 was fixed in 0.40.2 by strict key exchange. 2026 fixes include allocation-first field parsing and pre-banner bounds in 0.61.0, decompressed packet bounds in 0.61.1, and unbounded channel memory growth during stalled rekey in 0.63.2. The Debian security record marks CVE-2026-68930 fixed in 0.64.1; the isolated candidate pins 0.64.1 (published 2026-10-05). Evidence: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4r3c-5hpg-58qr; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wwx6-x28x-8259; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases; https://docs.rs/crate/russh/latest.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 09:35:32 +00:00
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Finding: libssh 0.12.x server-side OpenSSH certificate admission is not supported by the documented server API. libssh's project material says OpenSSH certificates are opaque client-side blobs, and its server API exposes public-key callbacks without certificate CA/principal validation. This candidate cannot satisfy the required certificate-authenticated server contract without a separate certificate protocol layer. I am excluding it from the functional/performance comparison; LGPL static distribution still needs separate review if the owner reopens it. Sources: https://api.libssh.org/stable/index.html ; https://www.libssh.org/development/google-summer-of-code/ ; https://api.libssh.org/stable/group__libssh__server.html

Finding: libssh 0.12.x server-side OpenSSH certificate admission is not supported by the documented server API. libssh's project material says OpenSSH certificates are opaque client-side blobs, and its server API exposes public-key callbacks without certificate CA/principal validation. This candidate cannot satisfy the required certificate-authenticated server contract without a separate certificate protocol layer. I am excluding it from the functional/performance comparison; LGPL static distribution still needs separate review if the owner reopens it. Sources: https://api.libssh.org/stable/index.html ; https://www.libssh.org/development/google-summer-of-code/ ; https://api.libssh.org/stable/group__libssh__server.html
kayg commented 2026-10-15 09:39:05 +00:00
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Finding update: current russh advisory list includes two October fixes. GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf is fixed in 0.64.0 (a server accepted an RSA signature algorithm that differed from the request); GHSA-4wc5-f2rc-q74m is fixed in 0.64.1 (agent protocol server task/memory growth). The pinned 0.64.1 includes both fixes; this prototype does not expose the agent protocol server. This makes the exact patch version and feature surface material to the owner review. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf ; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-4wc5-f2rc-q74m

Finding update: current `russh` advisory list includes two October fixes. GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf is fixed in 0.64.0 (a server accepted an RSA signature algorithm that differed from the request); GHSA-4wc5-f2rc-q74m is fixed in 0.64.1 (agent protocol server task/memory growth). The pinned 0.64.1 includes both fixes; this prototype does not expose the agent protocol server. This makes the exact patch version and feature surface material to the owner review. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf ; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-4wc5-f2rc-q74m
kayg commented 2026-10-15 09:41:16 +00:00
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Correction to my earlier advisory count: checking all three current GitHub advisory index pages shows 23 repository entries. Manual classification leaves 18 server-relevant advisories dated 2023-10-15 through 2026-10-15; this excludes the separate pageant entry, two client-only russh entries, and the March 2023 item outside the window. Most are GHSA-only rather than CVEs. Examples with CVE IDs include CVE-2023-48795, CVE-2026-46702, CVE-2026-48108/48110, CVE-2026-68930, CVE-2026-73430 and CVE-2026-102821/102822. The previous 11 count was from a partial index view. Index pages: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories ; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories?page=2 ; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories?page=3

Correction to my earlier advisory count: checking all three current GitHub advisory index pages shows 23 repository entries. Manual classification leaves 18 server-relevant advisories dated 2023-10-15 through 2026-10-15; this excludes the separate pageant entry, two client-only russh entries, and the March 2023 item outside the window. Most are GHSA-only rather than CVEs. Examples with CVE IDs include CVE-2023-48795, CVE-2026-46702, CVE-2026-48108/48110, CVE-2026-68930, CVE-2026-73430 and CVE-2026-102821/102822. The previous 11 count was from a partial index view. Index pages: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories ; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories?page=2 ; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories?page=3
kayg commented 2026-10-15 09:59:08 +00:00
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libssh 0.12.0 is excluded from performance measurement: its documented server API has public-key callbacks but no OpenSSH user-certificate CA validation/configuration path. The upstream certificate-support Merge Request !493 remains a draft (opened 2024-05-16); the libssh project GSoC page distinguishes client opaque-certificate forwarding from missing server/user and host trust cases. LGPL-2.1 library use can be compatible with AGPLv3 per the FSF matrix, while static distribution still needs relinking/source compliance review; this is not the exclusion reason.

Sources: https://api.libssh.org/stable/group__libssh__server.html ; https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/493 ; https://www.libssh.org/development/google-summer-of-code/ ; https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html

libssh 0.12.0 is excluded from performance measurement: its documented server API has public-key callbacks but no OpenSSH user-certificate CA validation/configuration path. The upstream certificate-support Merge Request !493 remains a draft (opened 2024-05-16); the libssh project GSoC page distinguishes client opaque-certificate forwarding from missing server/user and host trust cases. LGPL-2.1 library use can be compatible with AGPLv3 per the FSF matrix, while static distribution still needs relinking/source compliance review; this is not the exclusion reason. Sources: https://api.libssh.org/stable/group__libssh__server.html ; https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/493 ; https://www.libssh.org/development/google-summer-of-code/ ; https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html
kayg commented 2026-10-15 10:05:19 +00:00
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The isolated candidate enables russh ring only and omits its default AWS-LC, RSA and compression features. Cargo.lock already has ring 0.17.14 for the product's rustls path, so this does not introduce a second ring version. The SSH Ed25519 key type zeroizes its private bytes on drop, but russh key objects and the prototype's PEM buffer are ordinary process memory; no D244 secure-heap, page-lock or dump-exclusion proof applies to this path. Any adoption still needs an owner-reviewed host-key handling design and D244-equivalent runtime evidence.

Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/v0.64.1/Cargo.toml ; https://docs.rs/ssh-key/0.7.0-rc.11/src/ssh_key/private/ed25519.rs.html ; docs/verification/ca-static-heap/README.md

The isolated candidate enables russh `ring` only and omits its default AWS-LC, RSA and compression features. Cargo.lock already has ring 0.17.14 for the product's rustls path, so this does not introduce a second ring version. The SSH Ed25519 key type zeroizes its private bytes on drop, but russh key objects and the prototype's PEM buffer are ordinary process memory; no D244 secure-heap, page-lock or dump-exclusion proof applies to this path. Any adoption still needs an owner-reviewed host-key handling design and D244-equivalent runtime evidence. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/v0.64.1/Cargo.toml ; https://docs.rs/ssh-key/0.7.0-rc.11/src/ssh_key/private/ed25519.rs.html ; docs/verification/ca-static-heap/README.md
kayg commented 2026-10-15 10:07:54 +00:00
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libssh’s upstream advisory index lists 29 CVE IDs and two additional advisories from 2023-10-15 through 2026-07-21. The records cover client and server paths; this is not a server-only count and is not directly comparable to russh’s GHSA count. Several 2026 disclosures cover SFTP server handling. Source: https://www.libssh.org/security/advisories/ ; 0.12.0/0.11.4 security release: https://www.libssh.org/2026/02/10/libssh-0-12-0-and-0-11-4-security-releases/ ; 0.12.1/0.11.5 release list: https://www.libssh.org/page/2/?id=5 .

libssh’s upstream advisory index lists 29 CVE IDs and two additional advisories from 2023-10-15 through 2026-07-21. The records cover client and server paths; this is not a server-only count and is not directly comparable to russh’s GHSA count. Several 2026 disclosures cover SFTP server handling. Source: https://www.libssh.org/security/advisories/ ; 0.12.0/0.11.4 security release: https://www.libssh.org/2026/02/10/libssh-0-12-0-and-0-11-4-security-releases/ ; 0.12.1/0.11.5 release list: https://www.libssh.org/page/2/?id=5 .
kayg commented 2026-10-15 10:37:27 +00:00
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libssh remains excluded from performance tests for this contract: its upstream GSoC project page says OpenSSH certificates are opaque on the client and do not cover server-side user authentication or host CA verification. The earlier !493 work is replaced by draft MR !639, which remains marked Draft in the current upstream project view. This is an upstream capability gap, not a speed result.
Sources: https://www.libssh.org/development/google-summer-of-code/ ; https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/639

libssh remains excluded from performance tests for this contract: its upstream GSoC project page says OpenSSH certificates are opaque on the client and do not cover server-side user authentication or host CA verification. The earlier !493 work is replaced by draft MR !639, which remains marked Draft in the current upstream project view. This is an upstream capability gap, not a speed result. Sources: https://www.libssh.org/development/google-summer-of-code/ ; https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/639
kayg commented 2026-10-15 10:50:56 +00:00
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Source review update (2026-10-15): russh 0.64.1 is the current tag (released Oct 5); GitHub lists 23 advisory records overall, 22 published since 2023-10-15 (18 touch server/protocol paths, four client-only; records are not a current-vulnerability count). libssh’s certificate work is now draft MR !639, replacing !493; upstream still documents server-side user/host certificate paths as missing. OpenSSH upstream 10.6 was released Oct 6; the perf reference package is Debian OpenSSH 10.0p2. Updated the candidate/source matrix in research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md. Worktree HEAD remains 5f04313db4; measurements pending.
Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.64.1 ; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories ; https://www.libssh.org/development/google-summer-of-code/ ; https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/639 ; https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html

Source review update (2026-10-15): russh 0.64.1 is the current tag (released Oct 5); GitHub lists 23 advisory records overall, 22 published since 2023-10-15 (18 touch server/protocol paths, four client-only; records are not a current-vulnerability count). libssh’s certificate work is now draft MR !639, replacing !493; upstream still documents server-side user/host certificate paths as missing. OpenSSH upstream 10.6 was released Oct 6; the perf reference package is Debian OpenSSH 10.0p2. Updated the candidate/source matrix in research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md. Worktree HEAD remains 5f04313db44cac3ef32938310fecd0e291069f5b; measurements pending. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.64.1 ; https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories ; https://www.libssh.org/development/google-summer-of-code/ ; https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/merge_requests/639 ; https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html
kayg commented 2026-10-15 11:00:00 +00:00
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Build status: the all-target research-crate cargo check remains queued at the shared build-slot wrapper and has not started compilation (the job target contains toolchain files only; no target/debug directory). No code gate or perf run has started. I am continuing the source/report work and waiting for the slot. Branch HEAD: 5f04313db4.

Build status: the all-target research-crate cargo check remains queued at the shared build-slot wrapper and has not started compilation (the job target contains toolchain files only; no target/debug directory). No code gate or perf run has started. I am continuing the source/report work and waiting for the slot. Branch HEAD: 5f04313db44cac3ef32938310fecd0e291069f5b.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 11:22:46 +00:00
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Russh prototype follow-up: the first all-target check exposed API-path changes in the pinned 0.64.1 certificate re-export (Fingerprint/certificate under keys::ssh_key, RNG under keys::key) and OptionsMap iteration. I updated the research crate imports and iterator. cargo tree -e features shows russh 0.64.1 with ring and no aws-lc-rs; receipt: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/evidence/russh-cargo-tree-features.txt. The corrected all-target check is queued behind all four host build slots. No product crate or dependency changed.

Russh prototype follow-up: the first all-target check exposed API-path changes in the pinned 0.64.1 certificate re-export (`Fingerprint`/`certificate` under `keys::ssh_key`, RNG under `keys::key`) and `OptionsMap` iteration. I updated the research crate imports and iterator. `cargo tree -e features` shows `russh 0.64.1` with `ring` and no `aws-lc-rs`; receipt: `$HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/evidence/russh-cargo-tree-features.txt`. The corrected all-target check is queued behind all four host build slots. No product crate or dependency changed.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 11:27:12 +00:00
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Dependency-graph finding: cargo tree --locked --package infraternal --edges normal contains the existing SSH role plugin but 0 matches for russh, libssh, ssh2 or ssh-key. Receipt: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/evidence/product-normal-dependencies.txt. This supports excluding an already-linked server engine from the candidate matrix; the engine choice remains open.

Dependency-graph finding: `cargo tree --locked --package infraternal --edges normal` contains the existing SSH role plugin but 0 matches for `russh`, `libssh`, `ssh2` or `ssh-key`. Receipt: `$HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/evidence/product-normal-dependencies.txt`. This supports excluding an already-linked server engine from the candidate matrix; the engine choice remains open.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 11:30:13 +00:00
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Security finding: the russh advisory for CVE-2023-48795 lists releases through 0.40.1 as affected and 0.40.2 as patched; the current 0.64.1 line supports strict key exchange. I added the version boundary and source link to research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md. Source: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8

Security finding: the russh advisory for CVE-2023-48795 lists releases through 0.40.1 as affected and 0.40.2 as patched; the current 0.64.1 line supports strict key exchange. I added the version boundary and source link to `research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md`. Source: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8
kayg commented 2026-10-15 11:59:41 +00:00
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Security review updated in research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md: russh lists 23 advisory records overall, 22 since 2023-10-15; 18 touch server/protocol paths and four are client-only. Twenty records have CVE IDs. The reviewed patched-version bounds are at or below the measured 0.64.1 release. This is advisory history, not a count of current vulnerabilities. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories and https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.64.1.

Security review updated in `research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md`: russh lists 23 advisory records overall, 22 since 2023-10-15; 18 touch server/protocol paths and four are client-only. Twenty records have CVE IDs. The reviewed patched-version bounds are at or below the measured 0.64.1 release. This is advisory history, not a count of current vulnerabilities. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories and https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.64.1.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 11:59:59 +00:00
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Prototype step: the isolated russh 0.64.1 research crate and all four binaries now pass cargo check --locked --all-targets (exit 0, 0.83 s incremental; no product dependencies changed). Worktree base SHA: 5f04313db4. Receipts: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/evidence/russh-cargo-check.log and the recorded feature trees.

Prototype step: the isolated russh 0.64.1 research crate and all four binaries now pass `cargo check --locked --all-targets` (exit 0, 0.83 s incremental; no product dependencies changed). Worktree base SHA: 5f04313db44cac3ef32938310fecd0e291069f5b. Receipts: `$HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/evidence/russh-cargo-check.log` and the recorded feature trees.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:28:50 +00:00
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Rust research prototype checks now pass at working-tree HEAD 5f04313db44cac3ef32938310fecd0e291069f5b: cargo fmt --check; Clippy with default and minimal feature sets (-D warnings); cargo test --locked (2 passed, 0 failed). The Clippy corrections use checked PID/exit conversions, exact callback-field names, and a split fixture builder. Receipts: default Clippy, minimal Clippy, crate tests.

Rust research prototype checks now pass at working-tree HEAD `5f04313db44cac3ef32938310fecd0e291069f5b`: `cargo fmt --check`; Clippy with default and minimal feature sets (`-D warnings`); `cargo test --locked` (2 passed, 0 failed). The Clippy corrections use checked PID/exit conversions, exact callback-field names, and a split fixture builder. Receipts: [default Clippy](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/639cca84-46f9-4fe0-9307-5a87df1e1e2d), [minimal Clippy](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0c5506cc-6c10-4d34-814b-47401eb5440b), [crate tests](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/78aecbd2-a7ea-42b5-ae25-62a176ffee9b).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:29:39 +00:00
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Research-only russh candidate is committed at 57cf8063. The isolated crate uses russh 0.64.1 with ring 0.17.14 and keeps product dependencies unchanged. Gate evidence: default/minimal Clippy passed with -D warnings; both certificate admission tests passed. Static candidate builds are queued through the host build-slot wrapper; no candidate choice is made in this step.

Research-only russh candidate is committed at `57cf8063`. The isolated crate uses russh 0.64.1 with ring 0.17.14 and keeps product dependencies unchanged. Gate evidence: default/minimal Clippy passed with `-D warnings`; both certificate admission tests passed. Static candidate builds are queued through the host build-slot wrapper; no candidate choice is made in this step.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:38:49 +00:00
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Measurement method: use a host-local veth in the perf VM namespace with a modeled 1 ms LAN baseline (0.5 ms one-way per endpoint), then add 150 ms RTT (75.5 ms one-way per endpoint, 151 ms modeled total). Collect 100 samples per candidate per profile. The report labels this as a veth model, not a physical LAN result. Harness/report working tree is based on 57cf8063653522f87a2504bd92fdc058cdf51f25.

Measurement method: use a host-local veth in the perf VM namespace with a modeled 1 ms LAN baseline (0.5 ms one-way per endpoint), then add 150 ms RTT (75.5 ms one-way per endpoint, 151 ms modeled total). Collect 100 samples per candidate per profile. The report labels this as a veth model, not a physical LAN result. Harness/report working tree is based on `57cf8063653522f87a2504bd92fdc058cdf51f25`.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:45:41 +00:00
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Additional candidate screened: Dropbear 2026.94 is actively released and MIT-style licensed, but upstream closed its user-certificate login request as not planned. It was excluded from the matrix because meeting the mesh SSH contract requires a maintained custom change. Upstream release notes list server CVE-2025-14282 (fixed in 2025.89), client-side CVE-2025-47203 and CVE-2026-35385, plus later server fixes without CVE IDs. Sources: certificate request, releases, project summary.

Additional candidate screened: Dropbear 2026.94 is actively released and MIT-style licensed, but upstream closed its user-certificate login request as not planned. It was excluded from the matrix because meeting the mesh SSH contract requires a maintained custom change. Upstream release notes list server CVE-2025-14282 (fixed in 2025.89), client-side CVE-2025-47203 and CVE-2026-35385, plus later server fixes without CVE IDs. Sources: [certificate request](https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/issues/309), [releases](https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/releases), [project summary](https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:47:31 +00:00
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Additional Dropbear note: a third-party GitHub Advisory Database record assigns CVE-2026-3706 to versions through 2025.89, but the record is unreviewed and lists no package or affected/fixed version mapping. The referenced upstream change appears in 2026.90 and adds the RFC 8032 S < L check; the maintainer says this has no security impact in SSH protocol use. I will describe it in the report as an unreviewed assignment, not as a confirmed SSH protocol issue. Sources: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-87g2-jprq-4cmc and github.com/mkj/dropbear@fdec3c90a1

Additional Dropbear note: a third-party GitHub Advisory Database record assigns CVE-2026-3706 to versions through 2025.89, but the record is unreviewed and lists no package or affected/fixed version mapping. The referenced upstream change appears in 2026.90 and adds the RFC 8032 S < L check; the maintainer says this has no security impact in SSH protocol use. I will describe it in the report as an unreviewed assignment, not as a confirmed SSH protocol issue. Sources: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-87g2-jprq-4cmc and https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/fdec3c90a15447bd538641d85e5a3e3ac981011d
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:49:38 +00:00
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Candidate dependency feature receipt: cargo tree --locked -e features has 1,395 lines for the isolated research workspace. russh enables ring; aws-lc-rs is absent. The full default server adds russh-sftp. Receipts: full tree, ring tree. No product dependency was changed.

Candidate dependency feature receipt: `cargo tree --locked -e features` has 1,395 lines for the isolated research workspace. `russh` enables `ring`; `aws-lc-rs` is absent. The full default server adds `russh-sftp`. Receipts: [full tree](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1d817d3e-5b78-40e1-8c80-8d82164eeb6f), [ring tree](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/94bb32b8-e906-45b4-970e-8871962ee10b). No product dependency was changed.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:54:29 +00:00
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Review correction before final report: D244 specifically covers the CA signing key held by static infraternal builds. Both server candidates in this prototype receive only the user-certificate CA public key; the fixture host key is a separate SSH host identity. Therefore these measurements do not exercise the D244 secure-heap gate. I’m correcting the report to keep that gate separate and call out host-key storage as its own integration question.

Review correction before final report: D244 specifically covers the CA signing key held by static infraternal builds. Both server candidates in this prototype receive only the user-certificate CA public key; the fixture host key is a separate SSH host identity. Therefore these measurements do not exercise the D244 secure-heap gate. I’m correcting the report to keep that gate separate and call out host-key storage as its own integration question.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:55:15 +00:00
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Static-target feature check: cargo tree --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl -e features also enables russh ring only; it shows no aws-lc-rs edge and includes russh-sftp for the full candidate build. Receipt: musl feature tree.

Static-target feature check: `cargo tree --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl -e features` also enables russh `ring` only; it shows no `aws-lc-rs` edge and includes `russh-sftp` for the full candidate build. Receipt: [musl feature tree](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c4ec08f8-62c5-4aa2-b556-cf5867704444).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 12:59:05 +00:00
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Status: the isolated x86_64 musl candidate build has waited in the shared build-slot queue for about 30 minutes, with no compiler output yet. It remains queued; I will continue when the wrapper grants a slot.

Status: the isolated x86_64 musl candidate build has waited in the shared build-slot queue for about 30 minutes, with no compiler output yet. It remains queued; I will continue when the wrapper grants a slot.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:02:14 +00:00
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Harness review finding: both benchmark candidates were listening on 0.0.0.0 in the perf VM. I’m narrowing the listener to the VM’s mesh address (10.69.69.208) and routing the isolated veth client namespace to that address, so the temporary service follows the mesh-only contract and is not exposed through other interfaces.

Harness review finding: both benchmark candidates were listening on 0.0.0.0 in the perf VM. I’m narrowing the listener to the VM’s mesh address (10.69.69.208) and routing the isolated veth client namespace to that address, so the temporary service follows the mesh-only contract and is not exposed through other interfaces.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:03:07 +00:00
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Listener-scope correction is in place and the isolated namespace route reaches only the perf VM mesh address: 10.69.69.208 via 10.203.221.1 dev ssheng-c; one ICMP check received a reply with 0% packet loss. This is a routing setup check, not a latency benchmark. The temporary namespace and veth were removed afterward. Receipt: network route check.

Listener-scope correction is in place and the isolated namespace route reaches only the perf VM mesh address: `10.69.69.208 via 10.203.221.1 dev ssheng-c`; one ICMP check received a reply with 0% packet loss. This is a routing setup check, not a latency benchmark. The temporary namespace and veth were removed afterward. Receipt: [network route check](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/62b3fb22-acca-48a9-989d-c69060fd273c).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:16:00 +00:00
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Candidate static-size result (x86_64 musl, release, stripped static-pie): TCP/runtime control 650,824 bytes; minimal russh server 2,605,648 bytes (+1,954,824); SFTP-enabled server 2,804,784 bytes (+2,153,960 vs control). SFTP adds 199,136 bytes. These are standalone research binaries, not an integrated product-size delta; the product already carries shared runtime and crypto code. D243’s product ceiling is 22,204,304 bytes, and no engine was linked into the product. Build receipt: release build and binary sizes.

Candidate static-size result (x86_64 musl, release, stripped static-pie): TCP/runtime control 650,824 bytes; minimal russh server 2,605,648 bytes (+1,954,824); SFTP-enabled server 2,804,784 bytes (+2,153,960 vs control). SFTP adds 199,136 bytes. These are standalone research binaries, not an integrated product-size delta; the product already carries shared runtime and crypto code. D243’s product ceiling is 22,204,304 bytes, and no engine was linked into the product. Build receipt: [release build and binary sizes](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/01197431-39ac-4547-abbd-6f81e83e5455).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:19:57 +00:00
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Root cause found: the perf VM reproducibly rejects systemd-run --user --scope -p LimitNOFILE=8192 with Unknown assignment: LimitNOFILE=8192, before starting the harness. In the supported CPUWeight=10000 scope, a child shell can set the inherited descriptor limit with ulimit -n 8192; the check reported 1024/524288 before and 8192/8192 after. I’ll remove the unsupported scope property and set the limit inside the scope before exec. Receipts: rejected property, in-scope limit check.

Root cause found: the perf VM reproducibly rejects `systemd-run --user --scope -p LimitNOFILE=8192` with `Unknown assignment: LimitNOFILE=8192`, before starting the harness. In the supported `CPUWeight=10000` scope, a child shell can set the inherited descriptor limit with `ulimit -n 8192`; the check reported 1024/524288 before and 8192/8192 after. I’ll remove the unsupported scope property and set the limit inside the scope before exec. Receipts: [rejected property](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fbb38b36-1f37-4077-b017-abc6c2a77ef4), [in-scope limit check](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ad0e486b-7ff7-4aa6-91da-050f5423eab5).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:24:38 +00:00
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OpenSSH config failure root cause: the parent memfd remains mode 0600, but sshd -t resolves /proc/self/fd/3 after its startup has reused that descriptor and sees a 0666 object. A high inherited descriptor is closed by sshd; using /proc/<Python-parent-pid>/fd/<n> keeps the live memfd address stable and sshd -t plus isolated server startup pass. I’m updating only the harness path; no private key is written to disk. Failed-run cleanup reported every server/client PID gone. Receipts: sshd validation error, memfd mode check, high descriptor check, parent descriptor check.

OpenSSH config failure root cause: the parent memfd remains mode 0600, but `sshd -t` resolves `/proc/self/fd/3` after its startup has reused that descriptor and sees a 0666 object. A high inherited descriptor is closed by sshd; using `/proc/<Python-parent-pid>/fd/<n>` keeps the live memfd address stable and `sshd -t` plus isolated server startup pass. I’m updating only the harness path; no private key is written to disk. Failed-run cleanup reported every server/client PID gone. Receipts: [sshd validation error](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1b3d613c-b714-42cc-8b6f-5678bb644aa0), [memfd mode check](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a073eb64-420d-4c9b-a9a1-c3ba78f1ea92), [high descriptor check](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f47a54da-7425-4750-a6ef-0af20412a0a0), [parent descriptor check](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6d34b199-e19b-447f-9128-c4a2efa7f051).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:25:29 +00:00
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The OpenSSH descriptor-path fix is verified with the exact revised runner: isolated config validation and server startup both passed without inheriting the host-key FD into sshd, and the server PID was gone after teardown. The host key stayed in the runner’s anonymous memfd. Receipt: sshd configuration startup check.

The OpenSSH descriptor-path fix is verified with the exact revised runner: isolated config validation and server startup both passed without inheriting the host-key FD into sshd, and the server PID was gone after teardown. The host key stayed in the runner’s anonymous memfd. Receipt: [sshd configuration startup check](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5ceea253-e542-4592-8add-c86974dec368).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:28:10 +00:00
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Functional matrix now passes the russh PTY/window/signal/agent-refusal/SFTP control sequence. The same focused sequence times out against isolated sshd with Error: Elapsed(()); the harness reports all four started PIDs gone. I’m adding per-wait context to identify which OpenSSH control request times out before adjusting behavior. Receipts: focused control check, full matrix trace.

Functional matrix now passes the russh PTY/window/signal/agent-refusal/SFTP control sequence. The same focused sequence times out against isolated sshd with `Error: Elapsed(())`; the harness reports all four started PIDs gone. I’m adding per-wait context to identify which OpenSSH control request times out before adjusting behavior. Receipts: [focused control check](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5bdf8c32-9085-480c-9aae-d1cfa1b4a0bf), [full matrix trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fc25b4b0-8b7d-4bac-94c5-3dc4aa3f2dd5).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:51:41 +00:00
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The focused control check isolates the OpenSSH failure to PTY signal exit: agent-forward refusal and SFTP startup completed, then the client timed out waiting for the shell session to close after SIGINT. russh passed the same sequence. All four Linux processes started by the run were gone at cleanup. Receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9dcb1bb7-cd78-4d59-8343-d12e05e4d2fa

The focused control check isolates the OpenSSH failure to PTY signal exit: agent-forward refusal and SFTP startup completed, then the client timed out waiting for the shell session to close after SIGINT. russh passed the same sequence. All four Linux processes started by the run were gone at cleanup. Receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9dcb1bb7-cd78-4d59-8343-d12e05e4d2fa
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:54:33 +00:00
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OpenSSH DEBUG3 isolated the control timeout to the fixture: sshd logged Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection. It then refused SIGINT to the forced-command session, so the timeout was downstream of the denied PTY. The valid fixture certificate lacked permit-pty; I added explicit permit-pty, permit-agent-forwarding and permit-port-forwarding extensions so the server configuration controls those requests. Filtered receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/eff42240-7d62-4696-b769-bfb5d440a101

OpenSSH DEBUG3 isolated the control timeout to the fixture: sshd logged `Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection.` It then refused SIGINT to the forced-command session, so the timeout was downstream of the denied PTY. The valid fixture certificate lacked `permit-pty`; I added explicit permit-pty, permit-agent-forwarding and permit-port-forwarding extensions so the server configuration controls those requests. Filtered receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/eff42240-7d62-4696-b769-bfb5d440a101
kayg commented 2026-10-15 13:58:46 +00:00
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The valid fixture now allocates /dev/pts/0, but OpenSSH still timed out: DEBUG3 logs session_signal_req: refusing to send signal INT to forced-command session. The harness's ForceCommand wrapper prevents sshd from forwarding signals by design. I will remove ForceCommand from the isolated instance and use ordinary requested shell/exec commands plus Subsystem sftp internal-sftp -d ..., preserving the isolated listener, principal check and forwarding denials. Receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/36daed73-bc76-4dbc-b89a-ecd4fd542c2e

The valid fixture now allocates `/dev/pts/0`, but OpenSSH still timed out: DEBUG3 logs `session_signal_req: refusing to send signal INT to forced-command session`. The harness's ForceCommand wrapper prevents sshd from forwarding signals by design. I will remove ForceCommand from the isolated instance and use ordinary requested shell/exec commands plus `Subsystem sftp internal-sftp -d ...`, preserving the isolated listener, principal check and forwarding denials. Receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/36daed73-bc76-4dbc-b89a-ecd4fd542c2e
kayg commented 2026-10-15 14:02:30 +00:00
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Committed fixture capability update as 6edd1d14. The valid certificate now enables the PTY/agent/forward requests under test while retaining certificate source and critical-option checks. cargo fmt --check, default and no-default Clippy, and both test runs passed (2 tests each). Rebuilt static musl fixture: 1,164,384 bytes, SHA-256 8aa8c88ad82d617db3181c63d2c88505798fcf8abd94cee209109eb0ab211d29. Gate receipt: verify-fixture-change.log

Committed fixture capability update as 6edd1d14. The valid certificate now enables the PTY/agent/forward requests under test while retaining certificate source and critical-option checks. `cargo fmt --check`, default and no-default Clippy, and both test runs passed (2 tests each). Rebuilt static musl fixture: 1,164,384 bytes, SHA-256 `8aa8c88ad82d617db3181c63d2c88505798fcf8abd94cee209109eb0ab211d29`. Gate receipt: [verify-fixture-change.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d838e4a1-c395-4a92-bff2-1e5320632b89)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 14:39:14 +00:00
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Focused controls now pass on OpenSSH. russh reaches the signal callback (pty=1, window_change=1, signal=1, sftp=1) but times out waiting for channel close because the new ordinary PTY exec path had no child process for the callback to signal. I changed that fixture path to run its cat child on the allocated PTY, matching the existing shell-session lifecycle. All four launched Linux processes were gone at cleanup. Receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/40694f74-d276-4067-ac94-08bad4800c9e

Focused controls now pass on OpenSSH. russh reaches the signal callback (`pty=1`, `window_change=1`, `signal=1`, `sftp=1`) but times out waiting for channel close because the new ordinary PTY exec path had no child process for the callback to signal. I changed that fixture path to run its cat child on the allocated PTY, matching the existing shell-session lifecycle. All four launched Linux processes were gone at cleanup. Receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/40694f74-d276-4067-ac94-08bad4800c9e
kayg commented 2026-10-15 14:41:39 +00:00
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Committed the PTY signal control correction as e42d12da. Both focused candidates now pass: russh ready=True with pty=1 window_change=1 signal=1 agent_forward=1 sftp=1; OpenSSH ready=True. All four Linux processes were gone at cleanup. cargo fmt --check, default/no-default Clippy, and both test runs passed (2 tests each).

Updated stripped static-pie x86_64 musl sizes: TCP control 650,824 bytes; russh without SFTP 2,583,792 bytes (+1,932,968); russh with SFTP 2,782,480 bytes (+2,131,656); SFTP adds 198,688 bytes. Candidate and gate receipts: focused controls, build and gate.

Committed the PTY signal control correction as e42d12da. Both focused candidates now pass: russh `ready=True` with `pty=1 window_change=1 signal=1 agent_forward=1 sftp=1`; OpenSSH `ready=True`. All four Linux processes were gone at cleanup. `cargo fmt --check`, default/no-default Clippy, and both test runs passed (2 tests each). Updated stripped static-pie x86_64 musl sizes: TCP control 650,824 bytes; russh without SFTP 2,583,792 bytes (+1,932,968); russh with SFTP 2,782,480 bytes (+2,131,656); SFTP adds 198,688 bytes. Candidate and gate receipts: [focused controls](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2aad4596-f7b3-4e08-bd85-518ad103253d), [build and gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/07632d3e-263a-44ca-893d-c802778e22a8).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 14:45:22 +00:00
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Full Linux functional matrix reached the OpenSSH candidate, then its stock-client control sequence disconnected during the one-session PTY/window/signal/agent-refusal check. The receipt confirms cleanup of all five started PIDs. Load average was 1.59/1.28/1.56 before and 1.98/1.38/1.59 after. The exception prevented candidate summaries from being recorded; attaching the failure receipt and console output while I capture the server-side trace.

receipt
console output

Full Linux functional matrix reached the OpenSSH candidate, then its stock-client control sequence disconnected during the one-session PTY/window/signal/agent-refusal check. The receipt confirms cleanup of all five started PIDs. Load average was 1.59/1.28/1.56 before and 1.98/1.38/1.59 after. The exception prevented candidate summaries from being recorded; attaching the failure receipt and console output while I capture the server-side trace. [receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a9bdeda8-c63c-4412-ac60-f272cd754af4) [console output](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d91be678-5e4f-452d-a150-c3d23a08828d)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 14:48:10 +00:00
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Root cause confirmed in the isolated sshd DEBUG3 trace: sequential invalid-certificate checks reused 10.203.221.2; after the wrong-CA and wrong-principal checks, sshd activated its default 20-second per-source failed-authentication penalty and dropped the subsequent valid PTY-control connections. The load generator therefore reported Error: Disconnect. This is test-source reuse, not an SSH engine control failure. All five PIDs from the diagnostic run are gone; load average was 2.65/1.87/1.74 before and 2.40/1.84/1.73 after.

I’ll give each negative-authentication probe a distinct synthetic source address, include those addresses in the allowed certificate source ranges, and keep the candidate’s default penalty behavior enabled.

filtered trace
full daemon trace
receipt

Root cause confirmed in the isolated sshd DEBUG3 trace: sequential invalid-certificate checks reused `10.203.221.2`; after the wrong-CA and wrong-principal checks, sshd activated its default 20-second per-source failed-authentication penalty and dropped the subsequent valid PTY-control connections. The load generator therefore reported `Error: Disconnect`. This is test-source reuse, not an SSH engine control failure. All five PIDs from the diagnostic run are gone; load average was 2.65/1.87/1.74 before and 2.40/1.84/1.73 after. I’ll give each negative-authentication probe a distinct synthetic source address, include those addresses in the allowed certificate source ranges, and keep the candidate’s default penalty behavior enabled. [filtered trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/77289c4c-02a3-48a4-9c4f-95d54377dde4) [full daemon trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a3ad95aa-6f2c-4adc-9064-3551bdf57b3a) [receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9f9fa9de-db3b-4be2-913d-e02f03809d93)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 14:54:12 +00:00
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The alias-source rerun still hit the per-source penalty. DEBUG3 shows every rejection connection arrived from 10.203.221.2, despite the configured aliases, then sshd activated its 20-second penalty and dropped later controls. The harness appended ssh -b after the destination and remote command, so the option was interpreted as remote command text and never selected the source address. All five run PIDs exited; load average was 1.17/1.09/1.38 before and 0.99/1.05/1.37 after.

I’ll move -b before the destination/command and confirm the daemon sees the four distinct addresses before accepting the rerun.

filtered trace
full daemon trace
receipt

The alias-source rerun still hit the per-source penalty. DEBUG3 shows every rejection connection arrived from `10.203.221.2`, despite the configured aliases, then sshd activated its 20-second penalty and dropped later controls. The harness appended `ssh -b` after the destination and remote command, so the option was interpreted as remote command text and never selected the source address. All five run PIDs exited; load average was 1.17/1.09/1.38 before and 0.99/1.05/1.37 after. I’ll move `-b` before the destination/command and confirm the daemon sees the four distinct addresses before accepting the rerun. [filtered trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9bc94304-871f-4fd9-8a3c-f1fc9e47fab9) [full daemon trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b5e2da45-b272-4930-858b-251d12e18138) [receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/66e5b643-89f7-429a-9d55-9734fc1f389f)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 14:57:11 +00:00
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After fixing source selection, the full matrix still failed. A single stock-client reproduction identified the next root cause: OpenSSH reports Identity file /proc/self/fd/5 not accessible and exits 255. ip netns exec does not preserve that descriptor for the child client; OpenSSH then mistakes the public certificate file for an identity and rejects its permissions. The daemon trace shows the certificate probe was accepted, but no signed authentication request followed. The reproduction's daemon PID is gone.

I’ll pass a /proc/<harness-pid>/fd/<n> path to the stock clients and the russh load generator, keeping private-key bytes in the anonymous memfd and out of argv and files.

filtered client trace
full client trace
receipt and cleanup proof

After fixing source selection, the full matrix still failed. A single stock-client reproduction identified the next root cause: OpenSSH reports `Identity file /proc/self/fd/5 not accessible` and exits 255. `ip netns exec` does not preserve that descriptor for the child client; OpenSSH then mistakes the public certificate file for an identity and rejects its permissions. The daemon trace shows the certificate probe was accepted, but no signed authentication request followed. The reproduction's daemon PID is gone. I’ll pass a `/proc/<harness-pid>/fd/<n>` path to the stock clients and the russh load generator, keeping private-key bytes in the anonymous memfd and out of argv and files. [filtered client trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cc9c43d1-6a94-4844-8638-9f741340967f) [full client trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f6d209b2-d27a-4aa7-b28a-c0577bb127d8) [receipt and cleanup proof](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1b0598f1-474c-4535-a3fd-f2d3147aff0e)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 14:58:37 +00:00
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The single OpenSSH certificate exec now succeeds with the private key kept in a memfd and referenced as /proc/<harness-pid>/fd/<n>. The stock client reports Authenticated ... using "publickey" and exit status 0; the isolated daemon reports an accepted certificate and started the requested command. Its only started PID is gone after cleanup.

I also switched the research load generator to open that same parent-owned memfd path, so its key remains available for the lifetime of each run. The full matrix is the next check.

filtered success trace
receipt and cleanup proof

The single OpenSSH certificate exec now succeeds with the private key kept in a memfd and referenced as `/proc/<harness-pid>/fd/<n>`. The stock client reports `Authenticated ... using "publickey"` and exit status 0; the isolated daemon reports an accepted certificate and started the requested command. Its only started PID is gone after cleanup. I also switched the research load generator to open that same parent-owned memfd path, so its key remains available for the lifetime of each run. The full matrix is the next check. [filtered success trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/33106a38-2905-4b5c-86fe-6f27be8c2802) [receipt and cleanup proof](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a5cc336f-1bbc-44ae-835e-2347f813e78f)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:01:08 +00:00
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The first complete Linux matrix now runs to completion with the key descriptors accessible. Both candidates pass valid certificate exec and PTY/window/signal controls; OpenSSH also passes the SFTP round-trip. The receipt still marks both candidates failed: russh SFTP returns exit 1, and the stock agent/TCP-forwarding refusal checks lack sufficient diagnostics to classify the local refusal. The russh callback counters confirm the agent and direct-tcpip requests reached the handler. Five started PIDs are gone; load average was 0.96/0.85/1.16 before and 0.77/0.81/1.14 after.

I’m collecting detailed client traces for the remaining checks before changing their assertions or SFTP handler.

functional receipt
console output

The first complete Linux matrix now runs to completion with the key descriptors accessible. Both candidates pass valid certificate exec and PTY/window/signal controls; OpenSSH also passes the SFTP round-trip. The receipt still marks both candidates failed: russh SFTP returns exit 1, and the stock agent/TCP-forwarding refusal checks lack sufficient diagnostics to classify the local refusal. The russh callback counters confirm the agent and direct-tcpip requests reached the handler. Five started PIDs are gone; load average was 0.96/0.85/1.16 before and 0.77/0.81/1.14 after. I’m collecting detailed client traces for the remaining checks before changing their assertions or SFTP handler. [functional receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/633a36bc-468e-4b47-a437-3c9ed3ed174b) [console output](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/aab467da-2974-49f0-96c7-419c13d2bc88)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:04:34 +00:00
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The detailed stock-client traces confirm both candidates reject agent forwarding: the client requests forwarding, while the remote command reports no agent socket. Local TCP forwarding returns administratively prohibited, and the server reports remote forwarding disabled. The original checks had false negatives because LogLevel=ERROR was set before a later DEBUG1 option; the first setting suppressed the evidence. With the effective log level replaced in the diagnostic run, both candidate forwarding checks pass.

OpenSSH now passes its complete functional matrix. russh still fails only SFTP: the client sends the subsystem request and then exits with status -1 before the first file read. Five started PIDs are gone; the functional receipt and selected traces are attached. I’m comparing the SFTP callback lifecycle with the dependency’s server example before changing it.

probe diagnostics
functional receipt and cleanup proof

The detailed stock-client traces confirm both candidates reject agent forwarding: the client requests forwarding, while the remote command reports no agent socket. Local TCP forwarding returns `administratively prohibited`, and the server reports remote forwarding disabled. The original checks had false negatives because `LogLevel=ERROR` was set before a later DEBUG1 option; the first setting suppressed the evidence. With the effective log level replaced in the diagnostic run, both candidate forwarding checks pass. OpenSSH now passes its complete functional matrix. russh still fails only SFTP: the client sends the subsystem request and then exits with status -1 before the first file read. Five started PIDs are gone; the functional receipt and selected traces are attached. I’m comparing the SFTP callback lifecycle with the dependency’s server example before changing it. [probe diagnostics](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3dabeb5e-50b2-46c3-aa7e-a12222648166) [functional receipt and cleanup proof](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/8e2e081b-377e-47ef-bd1d-9dcaace4795c)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:08:56 +00:00
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The direct-callback SFTP adjustment did not resolve russh SFTP: the stock client still exits with status 1 on the first get after the subsystem request. This falsifies the lifecycle-placement hypothesis. OpenSSH passes its full matrix; both candidates now pass certificate, PTY/window/signal, agent-refusal and TCP-forwarding checks. The russh receipt records two SFTP subsystem requests, but no successful file round-trip.

I’ll add temporary fixed-label traces around SFTP packet callbacks and preserve the russh server stderr for one functional run, then remove diagnostic-only code after locating the stop point.

receipt
console output

The direct-callback SFTP adjustment did not resolve russh SFTP: the stock client still exits with status 1 on the first `get` after the subsystem request. This falsifies the lifecycle-placement hypothesis. OpenSSH passes its full matrix; both candidates now pass certificate, PTY/window/signal, agent-refusal and TCP-forwarding checks. The russh receipt records two SFTP subsystem requests, but no successful file round-trip. I’ll add temporary fixed-label traces around SFTP packet callbacks and preserve the russh server stderr for one functional run, then remove diagnostic-only code after locating the stop point. [receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/4dab41a8-ae5e-4440-b36f-de640d56a45a) [console output](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5b1256b4-af90-4abe-91ce-bc8606baa8f5)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:16:23 +00:00
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The russh server trace now confirms that the stock SFTP client reaches version-3 init, then realpath, lstat and stat; it never reaches open or read. The control-only SFTP channel is also accepted. The candidate’s non-SFTP checks continue to pass, while the stock SFTP round-trip exits 1. I’m recording the requested paths and whether the in-memory provider maps each metadata lookup to identify why the client stops before open.

server callback trace
functional receipt and cleanup proof

The russh server trace now confirms that the stock SFTP client reaches version-3 init, then `realpath`, `lstat` and `stat`; it never reaches `open` or `read`. The control-only SFTP channel is also accepted. The candidate’s non-SFTP checks continue to pass, while the stock SFTP round-trip exits 1. I’m recording the requested paths and whether the in-memory provider maps each metadata lookup to identify why the client stops before open. [server callback trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fa0a5f40-6dbe-4beb-8fde-41b64aa97ed3) [functional receipt and cleanup proof](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e619a888-8ba7-4fa2-816f-2a0eb4008016)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:19:00 +00:00
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Root cause confirmed: InMemorySftp::attributes returned FileAttributes::dummy() for regular files. In russh-sftp 3.0.1, that helper sets the DIR type bit (permissions: 0o777 | FileMode::DIR). The server trace shows the client first stats /sample.txt, then requests /sample.txt/; the provider rejects that path, and the client exits before OPEN. I’ll return regular-file attributes and the current file size, then rerun the full functional matrix.

server path trace
receipt and cleanup proof

Root cause confirmed: `InMemorySftp::attributes` returned `FileAttributes::dummy()` for regular files. In russh-sftp 3.0.1, that helper sets the DIR type bit (`permissions: 0o777 | FileMode::DIR`). The server trace shows the client first stats `/sample.txt`, then requests `/sample.txt/`; the provider rejects that path, and the client exits before OPEN. I’ll return regular-file attributes and the current file size, then rerun the full functional matrix. [server path trace](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f61e2f03-98fe-44f3-921b-816fb88ae301) [receipt and cleanup proof](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a788d837-006f-428b-9236-5ccbbb40dc87)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:22:29 +00:00
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The SFTP metadata fix resolves the issue. FileAttributes::dummy() marks results as directories; the provider now marks its file entries as regular files and reports their sizes. The full Linux functional matrix passes for both candidates: CA/source/principal/critical-option rejection, exec, PTY/window/signal, agent-forwarding refusal, local/remote TCP-forwarding refusal, and SFTP download/upload round-trips all pass. All five started PIDs are gone. Perf VM load average was 0.57/0.82/1.08 before and 0.67/0.83/1.07 after.

functional receipt
console output

The SFTP metadata fix resolves the issue. `FileAttributes::dummy()` marks results as directories; the provider now marks its file entries as regular files and reports their sizes. The full Linux functional matrix passes for both candidates: CA/source/principal/critical-option rejection, exec, PTY/window/signal, agent-forwarding refusal, local/remote TCP-forwarding refusal, and SFTP download/upload round-trips all pass. All five started PIDs are gone. Perf VM load average was 0.57/0.82/1.08 before and 0.67/0.83/1.07 after. [functional receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fd42672d-7474-45af-b0da-4fb5be5a543c) [console output](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/dd318bca-4a5b-450e-9d7a-86bb0cd3bf97)
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:25:49 +00:00
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Mac functional check finding: both OpenSSH_10.3 macOS probes authenticated to their candidate server, but the harness marked both failed. Its stdout comparison includes the harness's MAC_SSH_*_PID line, and its debug-text match expects requesting authentication agent forwarding while the client emits Requesting agent forwarding on channel 0. Battery was AC/100%; the Mac cleanup receipt confirms all 10 launched PIDs gone and ssh-agent stop exit 0. Receipts: JSON, log. I’m adding a regression check for these output forms before correcting the harness and rerunning the Mac phase.

Mac functional check finding: both OpenSSH_10.3 macOS probes authenticated to their candidate server, but the harness marked both failed. Its stdout comparison includes the harness's `MAC_SSH_*_PID` line, and its debug-text match expects `requesting authentication agent forwarding` while the client emits `Requesting agent forwarding on channel 0`. Battery was AC/100%; the Mac cleanup receipt confirms all 10 launched PIDs gone and ssh-agent stop exit 0. Receipts: [JSON](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/23fb1db9-b5a9-49a4-823e-0e2b645f750d), [log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2cce4e81-8cac-4513-b468-299add2f6504). I’m adding a regression check for these output forms before correcting the harness and rerunning the Mac phase.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:27:44 +00:00
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The macOS harness check is corrected and the functional rerun passes on both candidates; the Linux matrix also remains green. OpenSSH_10.3 on macOS authenticated and confirmed forwarding unavailable for OpenSSH sshd and russh. Battery was AC/100%. ssh-agent -k returned 0 and all 10 recorded Mac PIDs are gone: 16242, 16249, 16260, 16263, 16274, 16277, 16287, 16291, 16309, 16319. Perf harness cleanup also records all 7 started PIDs gone. Receipts: JSON, log. I’m releasing the MacBook lock after confirming its owner fields.

The macOS harness check is corrected and the functional rerun passes on both candidates; the Linux matrix also remains green. OpenSSH_10.3 on macOS authenticated and confirmed forwarding unavailable for OpenSSH sshd and russh. Battery was AC/100%. `ssh-agent -k` returned 0 and all 10 recorded Mac PIDs are gone: 16242, 16249, 16260, 16263, 16274, 16277, 16287, 16291, 16309, 16319. Perf harness cleanup also records all 7 started PIDs gone. Receipts: [JSON](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5918b2bc-c45c-4920-bd49-abaf6510deb5), [log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fde5197c-c9d7-4ad5-b940-c6e7591446ea). I’m releasing the MacBook lock after confirming its owner fields.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:28:19 +00:00
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MacBook lock released: owner research-ssh-engine, pid 98115, start 2026-10-15T17:22:45+02:00 matched before removing its three recorded lock files. Perf cleanup confirms namespace ssheng221 absent and interface absent. The functional matrix is complete; timed phases are beginning on the Perf VM.

MacBook lock released: owner research-ssh-engine, pid 98115, start 2026-10-15T17:22:45+02:00 matched before removing its three recorded lock files. Perf cleanup confirms namespace `ssheng221` absent and interface absent. The functional matrix is complete; timed phases are beginning on the Perf VM.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:37:52 +00:00
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Perf VM latency: russh 0.64.1, 100 samples/profile, modeled RTT 1 ms p50/p99 99.972/107.995 ms; with 150 ms added RTT (151 ms total), 1,751.976/1,755.997 ms. Load average was 0.14/0.50/0.77 before and 0.00/0.26/0.62 after. Cleanup confirmed all 4 started PIDs gone. Receipts: JSON, log. The first attempt before network setup failed without producing samples; this completed run used network.sh up and teardown.

Perf VM latency: russh 0.64.1, 100 samples/profile, modeled RTT 1 ms p50/p99 99.972/107.995 ms; with 150 ms added RTT (151 ms total), 1,751.976/1,755.997 ms. Load average was 0.14/0.50/0.77 before and 0.00/0.26/0.62 after. Cleanup confirmed all 4 started PIDs gone. Receipts: [JSON](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/73b27ca3-38f2-464c-a2ae-7f48eaa163c1), [log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7e9b5cee-5743-48a4-a43a-29e46a4202e9). The first attempt before network setup failed without producing samples; this completed run used `network.sh up` and teardown.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:40:10 +00:00
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Perf finding: the completed russh latency run left 200 /bin/cat PTY children orphaned (PPID 1), created from 17:33:21 through 17:36:26 while the two profiles opened 100 sessions each. The russh parent and harness PIDs are gone, but Connection does not stop its Child processes when the peer disconnects without a channel-close callback. The attached process list records all 200 PIDs and start times. I’m cleaning up only those recorded PIDs, adding a failing lifecycle check, then I’ll rerun affected measurements before continuing.

Perf finding: the completed russh latency run left 200 `/bin/cat` PTY children orphaned (PPID 1), created from 17:33:21 through 17:36:26 while the two profiles opened 100 sessions each. The russh parent and harness PIDs are gone, but `Connection` does not stop its `Child` processes when the peer disconnects without a channel-close callback. The attached process list records all 200 PIDs and start times. I’m cleaning up only those recorded PIDs, adding a failing lifecycle check, then I’ll rerun affected measurements before continuing.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:43:13 +00:00
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Cleanup for the latency finding is complete: I validated each of the 200 attached PIDs still named cat with parent 1, sent TERM to those exact PIDs, and confirmed all 200 /proc entries disappeared. The waiting OpenSSH timing attempt was cancelled before it acquired the Perf lock; the benchmark namespace is down. I’m adding the regression test before implementing owned-child cleanup.

Cleanup for the latency finding is complete: I validated each of the 200 attached PIDs still named `cat` with parent 1, sent TERM to those exact PIDs, and confirmed all 200 `/proc` entries disappeared. The waiting OpenSSH timing attempt was cancelled before it acquired the Perf lock; the benchmark namespace is down. I’m adding the regression test before implementing owned-child cleanup.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:51:13 +00:00
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Post-cleanup proof: ps -C cat reports 0 processes; the ssheng221 namespace and both benchmark veth interfaces are absent. Receipt: cleanup check. The child-lifecycle regression test remains pending the current build-slot release.

Post-cleanup proof: `ps -C cat` reports 0 processes; the `ssheng221` namespace and both benchmark veth interfaces are absent. Receipt: [cleanup check](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/58929217-ee3b-4105-a1dc-eb623592282f). The child-lifecycle regression test remains pending the current build-slot release.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 15:58:02 +00:00
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Binary-size finding: the current origin/dev merge base, c87fc063141d33658715eea42687330352e8bd5c, builds to a stripped static x86_64 musl binary of 22,329,104 bytes, 124,800 bytes above the D243 ceiling (22,204,304). Recipe and SHA-256 are in the attached receipt: merge-base size. The branch comparison build is underway; this base result predates the branch’s research-only changes and establishes an inherited gate issue to report separately.

Binary-size finding: the current `origin/dev` merge base, `c87fc063141d33658715eea42687330352e8bd5c`, builds to a stripped static x86_64 musl binary of 22,329,104 bytes, 124,800 bytes above the D243 ceiling (22,204,304). Recipe and SHA-256 are in the attached receipt: [merge-base size](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c0ad748f-8f29-4432-b77a-164b7a2d7a31). The branch comparison build is underway; this base result predates the branch’s research-only changes and establishes an inherited gate issue to report separately.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 16:23:36 +00:00
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The stripped static x86_64 musl comparison is complete: merge base c87fc063141d33658715eea42687330352e8bd5c and branch head e42d12da918108e9c412f9426c9c0968830d499e are both 22,329,104 bytes (branch delta 0). Both exceed the D243 ceiling 22,204,304 by 124,800 bytes. This research lane adds no product crate or dependency. The comparison receipt includes both hashes and the exact recipe: summary, full build log. The final static gate will show whether its ceiling row fails on this inherited state.

The stripped static x86_64 musl comparison is complete: merge base `c87fc063141d33658715eea42687330352e8bd5c` and branch head `e42d12da918108e9c412f9426c9c0968830d499e` are both 22,329,104 bytes (branch delta 0). Both exceed the D243 ceiling 22,204,304 by 124,800 bytes. This research lane adds no product crate or dependency. The comparison receipt includes both hashes and the exact recipe: [summary](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a8f049e9-c84b-49b9-906a-7d1bca7dfd7a), [full build log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/706342a8-8368-41ac-b484-d34b5c220b6f). The final static gate will show whether its ceiling row fails on this inherited state.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 16:35:03 +00:00
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The child-lifecycle regression test is queued in the orchestrator build-slot wrapper behind the four active slots. It has not compiled or run yet; I’m waiting for a slot release. No owner action is needed.

The child-lifecycle regression test is queued in the orchestrator build-slot wrapper behind the four active slots. It has not compiled or run yet; I’m waiting for a slot release. No owner action is needed.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 16:52:25 +00:00
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Finding: the russh callback harness can leave its PTY child running when channel state is dropped. The new regression test failed before the fix: dropping_channel_state_stops_its_child returned exit 101 with dropping channel state left its child running (pty-child-test-red.log). I added a channel-owned process wrapper that kills and reaps on drop; the green rerun is queued through the shared build-slot wrapper.

Finding: the russh callback harness can leave its PTY child running when channel state is dropped. The new regression test failed before the fix: `dropping_channel_state_stops_its_child` returned exit 101 with `dropping channel state left its child running` (`pty-child-test-red.log`). I added a channel-owned process wrapper that kills and reaps on drop; the green rerun is queued through the shared build-slot wrapper.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 17:29:39 +00:00
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Maintenance sample for #221: russh 0.63.0 was released Aug 21, followed by 0.64.0/.1 on Oct 4–5 with three 0.63.x updates between; OpenSSH 10.3–10.6 landed Apr 2–Oct 6; libssh 0.12.0 shipped Feb 10 and 0.12.1/.2 on Jul 21/28; Dropbear 2026.90–.94 shipped May 3–Jul 23. The report records these release dates and limits advisory counts to published records, not current-vulnerability totals. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases, https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html, https://www.libssh.org/tag/release/, https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/releases

Maintenance sample for #221: russh 0.63.0 was released Aug 21, followed by 0.64.0/.1 on Oct 4–5 with three 0.63.x updates between; OpenSSH 10.3–10.6 landed Apr 2–Oct 6; libssh 0.12.0 shipped Feb 10 and 0.12.1/.2 on Jul 21/28; Dropbear 2026.90–.94 shipped May 3–Jul 23. The report records these release dates and limits advisory counts to published records, not current-vulnerability totals. Sources: https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases, https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html, https://www.libssh.org/tag/release/, https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/releases
kayg commented 2026-10-15 17:36:26 +00:00
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Build status: the research crate's all-targets Clippy gate has been waiting in the host build-slot queue since 18:51 CEST and has not started by 19:36. All four regular slots and the reserved priority slot are occupied by other verification/build jobs. The command remains queued; no owner action is needed.

Build status: the research crate's all-targets Clippy gate has been waiting in the host build-slot queue since 18:51 CEST and has not started by 19:36. All four regular slots and the reserved priority slot are occupied by other verification/build jobs. The command remains queued; no owner action is needed.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 17:54:54 +00:00
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Update: the all-targets Clippy gate has now waited about 60 minutes in the shared build-slot queue and has not started. The active slots are still occupied by verification and build jobs; the command remains queued. No owner action is needed.

Update: the all-targets Clippy gate has now waited about 60 minutes in the shared build-slot queue and has not started. The active slots are still occupied by verification and build jobs; the command remains queued. No owner action is needed.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 18:53:43 +00:00
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Update: as of 20:53 CEST, the research crate's all-targets Clippy command has waited about 118 minutes in the shared build-slot queue without starting. Multiple scripts/verify fast jobs currently occupy slots. The wrapper is still waiting; no owner action is needed.

Update: as of 20:53 CEST, the research crate's all-targets Clippy command has waited about 118 minutes in the shared build-slot queue without starting. Multiple `scripts/verify fast` jobs currently occupy slots. The wrapper is still waiting; no owner action is needed.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:26:38 +00:00
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Committed 0848cf11faa63bc687f82b90acd90cb0053339f2 (research(ssh): isolate certificate source checks #221). Distinct reserved source aliases prevent sshd per-source penalties from coupling the certificate rejection probes.

Gates for this touched research crate:

  • cargo fmt --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml -- --check: fmt_exit=0
  • cargo clippy --locked --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings: 
        Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Checking infraternal-ssh-engine-research v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/russh)
    Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.59s
  • Functional matrix: both server candidates passed Linux and macOS stock-client checks; receipts are attached in the earlier functional pass comment.
Committed `0848cf11faa63bc687f82b90acd90cb0053339f2` (`research(ssh): isolate certificate source checks #221`). Distinct reserved source aliases prevent sshd per-source penalties from coupling the certificate rejection probes. Gates for this touched research crate: - `cargo fmt --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml -- --check`: `fmt_exit=0` - `cargo clippy --locked --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings`: ``` Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Checking infraternal-ssh-engine-research v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/russh) Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.59s ``` - Functional matrix: both server candidates passed Linux and macOS stock-client checks; receipts are attached in the earlier functional pass comment.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:26:51 +00:00
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Committed 3565d6da2cc014b290ef76ad820c08322734f89a (research(ssh): read benchmark key through parent fd #221). The generator now reads the fixture key through the harness process's memory-backed descriptor path, fixing the namespace descriptor visibility issue.

Gates for this touched research crate:

  • cargo fmt --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml -- --check: fmt_exit=0
  • cargo clippy --locked --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings: 
        Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Checking infraternal-ssh-engine-research v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/russh)
    Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.59s
  • Functional matrix: Linux and macOS stock clients passed both candidates; the completed matrix receipts are attached in the earlier functional pass comment.
Committed `3565d6da2cc014b290ef76ad820c08322734f89a` (`research(ssh): read benchmark key through parent fd #221`). The generator now reads the fixture key through the harness process's memory-backed descriptor path, fixing the namespace descriptor visibility issue. Gates for this touched research crate: - `cargo fmt --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml -- --check`: `fmt_exit=0` - `cargo clippy --locked --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings`: ``` Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Checking infraternal-ssh-engine-research v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/russh) Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.59s ``` - Functional matrix: Linux and macOS stock clients passed both candidates; the completed matrix receipts are attached in the earlier functional pass comment.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:27:20 +00:00
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Committed d48c4aca22c5b039ebed859e99d027ff255a84ae (research(ssh): preserve SFTP file types in fixture #221). The fixture now reports regular-file attributes and size, and starts its SFTP channel handler before the subsystem callback returns. Both server candidates completed SFTP upload/download round-trips in the functional matrix.

Gates for this touched research crate:

  • cargo fmt --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml -- --check: fmt_exit=0
  • cargo clippy --locked --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings: 
        Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Checking infraternal-ssh-engine-research v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/russh)
    Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.59s
  • Functional matrix: Linux and macOS stock clients passed both candidates; the completed matrix receipts are attached in the earlier functional pass comment.
Committed `d48c4aca22c5b039ebed859e99d027ff255a84ae` (`research(ssh): preserve SFTP file types in fixture #221`). The fixture now reports regular-file attributes and size, and starts its SFTP channel handler before the subsystem callback returns. Both server candidates completed SFTP upload/download round-trips in the functional matrix. Gates for this touched research crate: - `cargo fmt --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml -- --check`: `fmt_exit=0` - `cargo clippy --locked --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings`: ``` Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Checking infraternal-ssh-engine-research v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/russh) Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.59s ``` - Functional matrix: Linux and macOS stock clients passed both candidates; the completed matrix receipts are attached in the earlier functional pass comment.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:27:39 +00:00
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Committed c284f60010cf13c032db5e2cc803a32a598fa909 (research(ssh): reap session children on channel drop #221). The red/green receipts show the cause and correction: dropping channel state previously left its PTY helper running; SessionChild now terminates and reaps it.

Gates for this touched research crate:

  • cargo fmt --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml -- --check: fmt_exit=0
  • cargo clippy --locked --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings: 
        Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache
    Checking infraternal-ssh-engine-research v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/russh)
    Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.59s
  • Focused lifecycle regression test: 
    running 1 test
test tests::dropping_channel_state_stops_its_child ... ok
test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 4 filtered out
test_exit=0

The failed-before-fix and passing-after-fix logs are attached in the earlier lifecycle finding comment. The rebuilt binary will repeat the full candidate matrix and cleanup check.

Committed `c284f60010cf13c032db5e2cc803a32a598fa909` (`research(ssh): reap session children on channel drop #221`). The red/green receipts show the cause and correction: dropping channel state previously left its PTY helper running; `SessionChild` now terminates and reaps it. Gates for this touched research crate: - `cargo fmt --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml -- --check`: `fmt_exit=0` - `cargo clippy --locked --manifest-path research/ssh-engine/russh/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings`: ``` Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Blocking waiting for file lock on package cache Checking infraternal-ssh-engine-research v0.1.0 (/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/russh) Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 1.59s ``` - Focused lifecycle regression test: ``` running 1 test test tests::dropping_channel_state_stops_its_child ... ok test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 4 filtered out test_exit=0 ``` The failed-before-fix and passing-after-fix logs are attached in the earlier lifecycle finding comment. The rebuilt binary will repeat the full candidate matrix and cleanup check.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:27:47 +00:00
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Correction to the lifecycle commit comment: the focused test output has no filtered-test count; its exact summary is test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.00s. The attached pty-child-test-green.log is authoritative.

Correction to the lifecycle commit comment: the focused test output has no filtered-test count; its exact summary is `test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.00s`. The attached `pty-child-test-green.log` is authoritative.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:29:56 +00:00
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Candidate rebuild on commit c284f60010cf13c032db5e2cc803a32a598fa909 passed (build_exit=0). Stripped x86_64 musl sizes: async control 650,824 bytes; minimal certificate/PTY/exec russh server 2,583,984 bytes; SFTP-enabled russh server 2,772,848 bytes. The minimal server is 1,933,160 bytes above the control; SFTP adds 188,864 bytes. OpenSSH's installed server/helper and unique dynamic-library closure is 18,051,208 bytes from the functional receipt.

The product static binary remains 22,329,104 bytes at both the origin/dev merge base and current source branch: delta 0; both are 124,800 bytes above the D243 ceiling. This research build links neither candidate into the product. Candidate build log and hashes: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6db0f10b-27a4-47e7-8272-214de3e3ca1f

Candidate rebuild on commit `c284f60010cf13c032db5e2cc803a32a598fa909` passed (`build_exit=0`). Stripped x86_64 musl sizes: async control 650,824 bytes; minimal certificate/PTY/exec russh server 2,583,984 bytes; SFTP-enabled russh server 2,772,848 bytes. The minimal server is 1,933,160 bytes above the control; SFTP adds 188,864 bytes. OpenSSH's installed server/helper and unique dynamic-library closure is 18,051,208 bytes from the functional receipt. The product static binary remains 22,329,104 bytes at both the `origin/dev` merge base and current source branch: delta 0; both are 124,800 bytes above the D243 ceiling. This research build links neither candidate into the product. Candidate build log and hashes: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6db0f10b-27a4-47e7-8272-214de3e3ca1f
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:33:43 +00:00
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Latest post-reaper Perf VM functional run (#221): russh controls completed, then OpenSSH reset the connection during its PTY/window-change/signal load-generator step, after earlier certificate, forwarding and SFTP checks. Harness status 1 at 2026-10-15 21:32:26 +02; load average 2.23/1.58/1.34 before and 1.60/1.48/1.31 after. The cleanup receipt confirms all five started PIDs are gone. Raw JSON: measurement-functional-after-reaper-failed.json. I’m capturing sshd diagnostics and isolating this before using the candidate results.

Latest post-reaper Perf VM functional run (#221): russh controls completed, then OpenSSH reset the connection during its PTY/window-change/signal load-generator step, after earlier certificate, forwarding and SFTP checks. Harness status 1 at 2026-10-15 21:32:26 +02; load average 2.23/1.58/1.34 before and 1.60/1.48/1.31 after. The cleanup receipt confirms all five started PIDs are gone. Raw JSON: [measurement-functional-after-reaper-failed.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1c15ce49-7abb-49a3-81f9-dddee62d08b7). I’m capturing sshd diagnostics and isolating this before using the candidate results.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:35:18 +00:00
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Root cause of the two latest failed functional attempts (#221): staging a tar archive that included . changed the Perf VM measurement work directory to bench:bench mode 0775. OpenSSH rejected the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand path as unsafe (bad ownership or modes); failed auth then activated its per-source connection penalty. This is a harness staging error, not an engine result. I will restore the job-owned directory to root:root 0755, stage only files, and rerun the matrix. The debug diagnostic also motivated keeping opt-in sshd logs outside the harness cleanup directory. Evidence: functional-diagnostic-attempt.log, openssh-diagnostic-summary.txt.

Root cause of the two latest failed functional attempts (#221): staging a tar archive that included `.` changed the Perf VM measurement work directory to `bench:bench` mode 0775. OpenSSH rejected the `AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand` path as unsafe (`bad ownership or modes`); failed auth then activated its per-source connection penalty. This is a harness staging error, not an engine result. I will restore the job-owned directory to root:root 0755, stage only files, and rerun the matrix. The debug diagnostic also motivated keeping opt-in sshd logs outside the harness cleanup directory. Evidence: [functional-diagnostic-attempt.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/62525586-5935-4b7a-9af2-5ef6b13e1ef6), [openssh-diagnostic-summary.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/592302d7-6150-4007-875b-5e3cb13904f9).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:36:29 +00:00
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Corrected Perf VM functional matrix passes for both candidates on current source: certificate CA/principal/source/critical-option checks, stock OpenSSH exec and PTY, window-change/signal, SFTP round-trip and forwarding refusal all passed. Russh callback counters passed all seven checks. Cleanup reports all five started PIDs gone. Perf load average was 1.51/1.25/1.23 before and 1.37/1.24/1.23 after. Raw receipts: functional-final-linux.json, functional-final-linux.log.

Corrected Perf VM functional matrix passes for both candidates on current source: certificate CA/principal/source/critical-option checks, stock OpenSSH exec and PTY, window-change/signal, SFTP round-trip and forwarding refusal all passed. Russh callback counters passed all seven checks. Cleanup reports all five started PIDs gone. Perf load average was 1.51/1.25/1.23 before and 1.37/1.24/1.23 after. Raw receipts: [functional-final-linux.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/22151443-020f-41fb-9a6d-c8aae680ef03), [functional-final-linux.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fc752346-f1a9-4e59-bbc9-343fb0a7a680).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:37:28 +00:00
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MacBook lock handling for the requested stock macOS client check: mkdir /tmp/infraternal-bench.lock succeeded and the required files were written (owner=research-ssh-engine, pid=1832622, started=2026-10-15T21:36:56+02:00). The lock-holder shell exited immediately when its non-interactive stdin returned EOF; ps -p 1832622 now returns no row. The job unit reports active, so please have the orchestrator inspect and remove the lock if stale; this job will not remove it. The battery preflight was AC power at 88%. No macOS test command or helper was launched. Other Perf VM work continues while this is resolved.

MacBook lock handling for the requested stock macOS client check: `mkdir /tmp/infraternal-bench.lock` succeeded and the required files were written (`owner=research-ssh-engine`, `pid=1832622`, `started=2026-10-15T21:36:56+02:00`). The lock-holder shell exited immediately when its non-interactive stdin returned EOF; `ps -p 1832622` now returns no row. The job unit reports active, so please have the orchestrator inspect and remove the lock if stale; this job will not remove it. The battery preflight was AC power at 88%. No macOS test command or helper was launched. Other Perf VM work continues while this is resolved.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:41:33 +00:00
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Russh 0.64.1, current candidate build, 100 certificate-authenticated SSH starts per RTT profile on the Perf VM: modeled 1 ms RTT p50 99.983 ms / p99 104.314 ms; modeled 151 ms RTT p50 1,751.990 ms / p99 1,756.054 ms. Each sample ends at the first PTY/exec prompt. VM load average was 0.94/1.16/1.20 before the phase and 0.05/0.63/0.98 after. Receipts: measurement-latency-russh-final.json, latency-russh-final.log.

Russh 0.64.1, current candidate build, 100 certificate-authenticated SSH starts per RTT profile on the Perf VM: modeled 1 ms RTT p50 99.983 ms / p99 104.314 ms; modeled 151 ms RTT p50 1,751.990 ms / p99 1,756.054 ms. Each sample ends at the first PTY/exec prompt. VM load average was 0.94/1.16/1.20 before the phase and 0.05/0.63/0.98 after. Receipts: [measurement-latency-russh-final.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b395d048-43fa-4cd5-9e97-1be7e88a734d), [latency-russh-final.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/11711af3-f14a-496b-820a-63775828c525).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:44:39 +00:00
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Committed the isolated Perf VM network helper as ccacfa40b0. bash -n research/ssh-engine/network.sh passed; the named Perf VM network setup (network.sh up) exited 0. The helper refuses existing job interfaces and scopes teardown to its namespace and veth.

Committed the isolated Perf VM network helper as ccacfa40b0353c42a7214f0cbd710a986a44b523. `bash -n research/ssh-engine/network.sh` passed; the named Perf VM network setup (`network.sh up`) exited 0. The helper refuses existing job interfaces and scopes teardown to its namespace and veth.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:44:40 +00:00
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Committed the single-phase Perf VM runner as e221e754dd. bash -n research/ssh-engine/run-perf.sh passed. The runner caps each measurement at 26 minutes and releases the shared Perf VM lock after the phase.

Committed the single-phase Perf VM runner as e221e754dd6f7f4911da1b22586ce19cff991278. `bash -n research/ssh-engine/run-perf.sh` passed. The runner caps each measurement at 26 minutes and releases the shared Perf VM lock after the phase.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:45:06 +00:00
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Committed the isolated measurement harness as ea3c135361. Gate: the focused Python check reports 1 passed, 0 failed; the module AST parse and shell syntax checks exit 0. The current source’s Linux functional matrix passed for both candidates; russh latency is recorded above. OpenSSH latency is waiting behind the active Perf VM lock owner.

Committed the isolated measurement harness as ea3c1353610ed081c0676e5311cb6d69d2bb13b5. Gate: the focused Python check reports 1 passed, 0 failed; the module AST parse and shell syntax checks exit 0. The current source’s Linux functional matrix passed for both candidates; russh latency is recorded above. OpenSSH latency is waiting behind the active Perf VM lock owner.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:45:14 +00:00
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Committed the focused measurement receipt test as f38c98b441. Gate output: Ran 1 test in 0.001s and OK (1 passed, 0 failed). It checks the macOS process marker, forwarding diagnostic and remote command output independently.

Committed the focused measurement receipt test as f38c98b4417bf558affea5a3bf807c7e0ef2b15f. Gate output: `Ran 1 test in 0.001s` and `OK` (1 passed, 0 failed). It checks the macOS process marker, forwarding diagnostic and remote command output independently.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:48:45 +00:00
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OpenSSH 10.0p2, 100 certificate-authenticated SSH starts per RTT profile on the Perf VM: modeled 1 ms RTT p50/p99 132.399/197.026 ms; modeled 151 ms RTT p50/p99 1,670.149/1,841.853 ms. Russh on the same profiles measured 99.983/104.314 ms and 1,751.990/1,756.054 ms. Each sample ends at the first PTY/exec prompt. OpenSSH load average was 0.86/0.63/0.89 before and 0.07/0.36/0.73 after. Receipts: measurement-latency-openssh-final.json, latency-openssh-final.log.

OpenSSH 10.0p2, 100 certificate-authenticated SSH starts per RTT profile on the Perf VM: modeled 1 ms RTT p50/p99 132.399/197.026 ms; modeled 151 ms RTT p50/p99 1,670.149/1,841.853 ms. Russh on the same profiles measured 99.983/104.314 ms and 1,751.990/1,756.054 ms. Each sample ends at the first PTY/exec prompt. OpenSSH load average was 0.86/0.63/0.89 before and 0.07/0.36/0.73 after. Receipts: [measurement-latency-openssh-final.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9e2fe2d4-f0d9-4f0c-aba6-378725ce4d2e), [latency-openssh-final.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0ff89cfb-392d-4a3d-81e1-73e5e546fdde).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:55:02 +00:00
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The first russh 500-session memory phase produced no valid PSS result: process_memory raised ProcessLookupError opening /proc/3891793/smaps_rollup during a descendant scan. The root server PID was 3891674; this identifies a child-PID race, not evidence that the server exited. Perf VM load average was 1.08/0.70/0.80 before and 0.48/0.60/0.76 after; the phase exited 1 and released the lock. I’m adding a regression check for a process disappearing between enumeration and its smaps read, then will repeat the measurement. Receipts: measurement-memory-russh-failed.json, memory-russh-final.log.

The first russh 500-session memory phase produced no valid PSS result: `process_memory` raised `ProcessLookupError` opening `/proc/3891793/smaps_rollup` during a descendant scan. The root server PID was 3891674; this identifies a child-PID race, not evidence that the server exited. Perf VM load average was 1.08/0.70/0.80 before and 0.48/0.60/0.76 after; the phase exited 1 and released the lock. I’m adding a regression check for a process disappearing between enumeration and its smaps read, then will repeat the measurement. Receipts: [measurement-memory-russh-failed.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f4471a1e-ab86-4293-b7e8-efda58f25fa7), [memory-russh-final.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d78dea80-36df-4890-bc72-c535693dabab).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:55:52 +00:00
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Fixed the transient PSS scan failure in commit 6fc755fed6. Red regression reproduced ProcessLookupError at /proc/101/smaps_rollup (exit 1); green focused suite: Ran 2 tests in 0.001s / OK (2 passed, 0 failed). The scan now skips a PID that vanishes between tree enumeration and procfs read. Receipts: memory-process-race-red.log, memory-process-race-green.log.

Fixed the transient PSS scan failure in commit 6fc755fed67c17d0df218a073d177bbab269c630. Red regression reproduced `ProcessLookupError` at `/proc/101/smaps_rollup` (exit 1); green focused suite: `Ran 2 tests in 0.001s` / `OK` (2 passed, 0 failed). The scan now skips a PID that vanishes between tree enumeration and procfs read. Receipts: [memory-process-race-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/77de4be2-b878-459c-a4dc-36cd7b799184), [memory-process-race-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a4f8776c-91fc-4746-98ac-2af0f97070f8).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 19:56:51 +00:00
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Extended the process-tree sampling fix in commit 7d111ba294. Red tests reproduced both a descendant ProcessLookupError in CPU sampling and a missing root being treated as a successful zero total; green suite: Ran 5 tests in 0.002s / OK (5 passed, 0 failed). PSS and CPU scans now skip transient descendants but fail if the server root is unavailable. Receipts: process-tree-race-red.log, process-tree-race-green.log.

Extended the process-tree sampling fix in commit 7d111ba29405324d573a02bb47aa0871521f4772. Red tests reproduced both a descendant `ProcessLookupError` in CPU sampling and a missing root being treated as a successful zero total; green suite: `Ran 5 tests in 0.002s` / `OK` (5 passed, 0 failed). PSS and CPU scans now skip transient descendants but fail if the server root is unavailable. Receipts: [process-tree-race-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5358cfdc-0312-423e-aab6-71be02fc7f4a), [process-tree-race-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cccc9ecc-55b7-4ed1-9ae1-4f10524ba5d0).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:01:45 +00:00
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The corrected russh 500-session run completed, but I am not using its 1.024 KiB/session figure: the retained PSS receipt reports only 1 readable process (the server root), while the Perf VM scope recorded 217.7 MiB peak across the 500-session phase. The current PPID walk is missing session process memory, so this result is incomplete. I’m checking the live process/cgroup relationship and will correct the accounting before comparing memory. Load average was 0.15/0.47/0.68 before and 0.09/0.32/0.59 after; all harness PIDs were reaped. Receipts: measurement-memory-russh-scan-only.json, memory-russh-rerun.log.

The corrected russh 500-session run completed, but I am not using its 1.024 KiB/session figure: the retained PSS receipt reports only 1 readable process (the server root), while the Perf VM scope recorded 217.7 MiB peak across the 500-session phase. The current PPID walk is missing session process memory, so this result is incomplete. I’m checking the live process/cgroup relationship and will correct the accounting before comparing memory. Load average was 0.15/0.47/0.68 before and 0.09/0.32/0.59 after; all harness PIDs were reaped. Receipts: [measurement-memory-russh-scan-only.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/4aa67b3d-eda3-4484-a7b8-d6a991abdbaf), [memory-russh-rerun.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f3d8d14c-787d-4e4d-bfe4-fe0e26b89d18).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:12:07 +00:00
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Memory sampler accounting fix committed at c4ee861fca. The red run reproduced two silently skipped PermissionErrors (exit 1); after the fix, all 9 harness checks pass (Ran 9 tests in 0.004s, OK). Descendants that exit during enumeration remain tolerated; inaccessible or malformed procfs entries now invalidate the measurement.

Receipts: red checks, green checks.

Memory sampler accounting fix committed at c4ee861fca4eae33b51417c4de9b2b4aa0436a34. The red run reproduced two silently skipped PermissionErrors (exit 1); after the fix, all 9 harness checks pass (`Ran 9 tests in 0.004s`, `OK`). Descendants that exit during enumeration remain tolerated; inaccessible or malformed procfs entries now invalidate the measurement. Receipts: [red checks](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d1589dbe-b7f9-4e57-8e7c-0a9821a3ac90), [green checks](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a05898ff-e8dc-449b-b641-0946bd0b3a08).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:19:25 +00:00
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The russh memory phase again returned only one readable process: fixed PSS 4,224 KiB, retained PSS 4,728 KiB, 500-session delta 504 KiB (1.008 KiB/session). I exclude it: the previous observer saw 500 /bin/cat descendants during a matching russh run, so the PSS tree is incomplete. Commit 8573df44ee records tree/read/vanish counts and rejects any 500-session snapshot that omits a held process. Regression coverage: 1 baseline failure and 12 current checks pass.

Receipt: incomplete russh memory sample.

The russh memory phase again returned only one readable process: fixed PSS 4,224 KiB, retained PSS 4,728 KiB, 500-session delta 504 KiB (1.008 KiB/session). I exclude it: the previous observer saw 500 `/bin/cat` descendants during a matching russh run, so the PSS tree is incomplete. Commit 8573df44ee49299a84ebd7d92be946fa714a2ee5 records tree/read/vanish counts and rejects any 500-session snapshot that omits a held process. Regression coverage: 1 baseline failure and 12 current checks pass. Receipt: [incomplete russh memory sample](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/161c7261-8c0e-45c7-bf86-fc5063abcf42).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:38:15 +00:00
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The guarded russh memory run failed closed as intended. Its five-snapshot median saw tree=268, readable=92, vanished=176; meanwhile the same-run observer recorded 500 /bin/cat descendants and 504 cgroup processes at peak. The 45-second client hold expired while repeated PSS scans were still running (load average 1.06/1.11/0.75 before, 0.97/1.11/0.80 after). I will hold sessions for 180 seconds and repeat; no memory number is accepted from this run.

Receipts: guarded run log, observer summary, same-run process tree observations.

The guarded russh memory run failed closed as intended. Its five-snapshot median saw tree=268, readable=92, vanished=176; meanwhile the same-run observer recorded 500 `/bin/cat` descendants and 504 cgroup processes at peak. The 45-second client hold expired while repeated PSS scans were still running (load average 1.06/1.11/0.75 before, 0.97/1.11/0.80 after). I will hold sessions for 180 seconds and repeat; no memory number is accepted from this run. Receipts: [guarded run log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cf1fc9ef-a7cd-42b0-990b-61d0552edcc9), [observer summary](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/8d2ecd41-0f27-4119-8981-4b77f5cd17df), [same-run process tree observations](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/30b16ee6-7d50-40c0-b533-fc2f094035aa).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:38:35 +00:00
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Extended the russh memory-session hold from 45 to 180 seconds in commit 52412d9b9f. The guarded run showed that five PSS scans outlasted the old window; all 12 harness checks pass. The next run will require 501 readable processes in all five snapshots before reporting any PSS total.

Receipts: failed 45-second run and load record, same-run process tree, 12-check unit run.

Extended the russh memory-session hold from 45 to 180 seconds in commit 52412d9b9f926d1877e7d5de576933c518e85797. The guarded run showed that five PSS scans outlasted the old window; all 12 harness checks pass. The next run will require 501 readable processes in all five snapshots before reporting any PSS total. Receipts: [failed 45-second run and load record](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cf1fc9ef-a7cd-42b0-990b-61d0552edcc9), [same-run process tree](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/30b16ee6-7d50-40c0-b533-fc2f094035aa), [12-check unit run](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/07019542-c817-4477-b12f-cc8c1b687064).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:46:21 +00:00
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The 180-second hold still did not cover five PSS scans: the guarded median was tree=260, readable=125, vanished=135. The same-run observer sampled 336 times and saw 500 session children (504 cgroup processes) at peak; load average was 0.34/0.88/0.74 before and 0.05/0.32/0.52 after. The memory result remains invalid. I’m reducing the active capture to one full process-tree PSS pass and aligning the parent wait with the load generator’s own hold deadline; this avoids repeated full-map reads and the duplicate wait.

Receipts: failed scan run, same-run tree observations.

The 180-second hold still did not cover five PSS scans: the guarded median was tree=260, readable=125, vanished=135. The same-run observer sampled 336 times and saw 500 session children (504 cgroup processes) at peak; load average was 0.34/0.88/0.74 before and 0.05/0.32/0.52 after. The memory result remains invalid. I’m reducing the active capture to one full process-tree PSS pass and aligning the parent wait with the load generator’s own hold deadline; this avoids repeated full-map reads and the duplicate wait. Receipts: [failed scan run](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5680025f-41b7-4b69-83d7-ca997f90e4b2), [same-run tree observations](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7166913d-c882-4932-b364-8c9b3dc6d242).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:47:03 +00:00
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The five-pass capture outlasted the 180-second session hold, so I changed the measured state to one complete PSS process-tree scan and made the harness wait for the load generator's hold deadline rather than a duplicate interval. Commit b6d41387a2. The new guard tests fail against the previous five-snapshot implementation and all 13 harness checks pass.

Receipts: baseline red run, current green run.

The five-pass capture outlasted the 180-second session hold, so I changed the measured state to one complete PSS process-tree scan and made the harness wait for the load generator's hold deadline rather than a duplicate interval. Commit b6d41387a247a42ad02a66a4128ea05608b5c7d7. The new guard tests fail against the previous five-snapshot implementation and all 13 harness checks pass. Receipts: [baseline red run](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/06d33c4b-a021-448b-a6a1-a38a35b745d4), [current green run](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/4907e3d8-3c96-4507-b0a0-a91419e4ff88).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:52:03 +00:00
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The one-pass russh scan also exceeded the 180-second client hold and was rejected: tree=227, readable=124, vanished=103. The same-run observer first saw all 500 descendants 44 seconds after server start and still saw 500 at the final sample. I will allow a short settle interval after READY and extend the single-scan client hold to 300 seconds; the process-count guard remains mandatory.

Receipts: single-scan run, single-scan tree timeline.

The one-pass russh scan also exceeded the 180-second client hold and was rejected: tree=227, readable=124, vanished=103. The same-run observer first saw all 500 descendants 44 seconds after server start and still saw 500 at the final sample. I will allow a short settle interval after READY and extend the single-scan client hold to 300 seconds; the process-count guard remains mandatory. Receipts: [single-scan run](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/091b705c-9fb9-49c9-ba91-4c53a6d0216c), [single-scan tree timeline](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bdbb57d3-c956-4d15-9c04-1bb8fb1c89fb).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:52:24 +00:00
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Added a 5-second settle after READY and extended the one-scan session hold to 300 seconds in commit 2573edf4d0. The same-run observer found all 500 children by 44 seconds after start, but the prior 180-second snapshot captured only 227 and lost 103 during PSS reads. All 13 harness checks pass; the next phase still requires every process to be readable.

Receipts: single-scan run, observer timeline, unit checks.

Added a 5-second settle after READY and extended the one-scan session hold to 300 seconds in commit 2573edf4d06adcfae28c88cff24ce8e77fb1a3b6. The same-run observer found all 500 children by 44 seconds after start, but the prior 180-second snapshot captured only 227 and lost 103 during PSS reads. All 13 harness checks pass; the next phase still requires every process to be readable. Receipts: [single-scan run](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/091b705c-9fb9-49c9-ba91-4c53a6d0216c), [observer timeline](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bdbb57d3-c956-4d15-9c04-1bb8fb1c89fb), [unit checks](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/382e4ad0-c389-4453-ab5a-23a3522a5465).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 20:59:43 +00:00
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The 300-second run still returned tree=1/readable=1, while its same-run observer recorded 500 descendants by 43.8 seconds and kept 500 through the hold window. This points to the load generator's READY marker being buffered on its piped stdout: the PSS callback runs only after the hold expires, when the children are gone. I will make the marker flush explicitly and add a regression check for that behavior. No memory number is accepted from this run.

Receipts: 300-second run, same-run process tree.

The 300-second run still returned tree=1/readable=1, while its same-run observer recorded 500 descendants by 43.8 seconds and kept 500 through the hold window. This points to the load generator's `READY` marker being buffered on its piped stdout: the PSS callback runs only after the hold expires, when the children are gone. I will make the marker flush explicitly and add a regression check for that behavior. No memory number is accepted from this run. Receipts: [300-second run](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1390b554-bb3d-4445-9c8a-d89b10db1656), [same-run process tree](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1602f9fe-941f-463f-835f-92140ee8657e).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 21:01:37 +00:00
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The load-generator readiness flush fix and regression test are in the worktree; cargo fmt --check passes. The focused Rust test and client binary rebuild are waiting behind the host build-slot queue. scripts/verify iterate has been queued for about 69 minutes; two active scripts/verify fast scopes are currently visible. No new build was started outside the slot wrapper. Next required step is a released build slot for the focused test and updated Perf client binary.

The load-generator readiness flush fix and regression test are in the worktree; `cargo fmt --check` passes. The focused Rust test and client binary rebuild are waiting behind the host build-slot queue. `scripts/verify iterate` has been queued for about 69 minutes; two active `scripts/verify fast` scopes are currently visible. No new build was started outside the slot wrapper. Next required step is a released build slot for the focused test and updated Perf client binary.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 21:02:10 +00:00
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Build-slot status: all four ordinary host slots are occupied, with a reserved priority slot also active. My scripts/verify iterate wrapper has waited about 70 minutes; the focused load-generator unit test and release binary rebuild are queued behind it. No build has run outside the wrapper.

Build-slot status: all four ordinary host slots are occupied, with a reserved priority slot also active. My `scripts/verify iterate` wrapper has waited about 70 minutes; the focused load-generator unit test and release binary rebuild are queued behind it. No build has run outside the wrapper.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 21:05:09 +00:00
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Correction to the previous build-slot note: I briefly started the focused cargo test without the wrapper under the single-test exception, then saw it compiling the full russh dependency graph (rustversion, syn, serde, cc, crypto crates, etc.). I interrupted it after about one minute; it did not finish, and both Cargo PIDs are gone. The partial target is isolated under this job's cache and will be reused by the build-slot run. The test and client rebuild remain queued behind the existing iterate wrapper.

Receipt: interrupted compile log.

Correction to the previous build-slot note: I briefly started the focused `cargo test` without the wrapper under the single-test exception, then saw it compiling the full russh dependency graph (`rustversion`, `syn`, `serde`, `cc`, crypto crates, etc.). I interrupted it after about one minute; it did not finish, and both Cargo PIDs are gone. The partial target is isolated under this job's cache and will be reused by the build-slot run. The test and client rebuild remain queued behind the existing iterate wrapper. Receipt: [interrupted compile log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e1ff2121-4baf-48c2-8b41-fc7f3fdfee9c).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 21:58:09 +00:00
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Finding: scripts/verify iterate completed with fmt PASS, VT native fmt PASS, CLI plugin compile-out PASS, clippy PASS and cargo-deny PASS. Workspace tests were 448 passed, 1 failed, 47 ignored (341.81s). The only failure was auth::tests::socket_tests::restart_open_liveness_review::responsive_socket_survives_a_held_terminal_open_with_an_existing_attachment, panicking at crates/infraternal-server/src/auth/socket_clock.rs:81 with socket test stopped before its observed event. Full gate log: verify-iterate.log.

I’m checking the exact test on this branch and on a detached origin/dev baseline in the current host-load window to distinguish a branch regression from a host-load/test-timing issue.

Finding: `scripts/verify iterate` completed with fmt PASS, VT native fmt PASS, CLI plugin compile-out PASS, clippy PASS and cargo-deny PASS. Workspace tests were 448 passed, 1 failed, 47 ignored (341.81s). The only failure was `auth::tests::socket_tests::restart_open_liveness_review::responsive_socket_survives_a_held_terminal_open_with_an_existing_attachment`, panicking at `crates/infraternal-server/src/auth/socket_clock.rs:81` with `socket test stopped before its observed event`. Full gate log: [verify-iterate.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c1b137db-ebf4-48e5-9da8-6b1cbdcbba03). I’m checking the exact test on this branch and on a detached `origin/dev` baseline in the current host-load window to distinguish a branch regression from a host-load/test-timing issue.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:12:32 +00:00
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Finding: The russh throughput phase on the Perf VM ran from 00:06:58 to 00:08:58 local (120 seconds), then exited without a transfer result. The receipt shows both started processes exited and no throughput value was recorded. The runner used max(120, count*3) for every loadgen mode; throughput uses count=1, so its deadline was 120 seconds. The 1 GiB loader emits TRANSFER only after the echoed round trip, so the harness stopped it at that deadline without diagnostic output. This was a harness timeout, not a zero-throughput result.

I added a regression that simulates the 1 GiB transfer finishing at 121 seconds. It failed before the change and now passes. Transfer waits scale at a documented 1 MiB/s minimum plus 120 seconds setup time (1,144 seconds for 1 GiB); the full harness suite passes 14 tests. Re-running the measurement with the corrected harness.

Receipts: run output, measurement JSON, regression red, regression green.

Finding: The russh throughput phase on the Perf VM ran from 00:06:58 to 00:08:58 local (120 seconds), then exited without a transfer result. The receipt shows both started processes exited and no throughput value was recorded. The runner used `max(120, count*3)` for every loadgen mode; throughput uses `count=1`, so its deadline was 120 seconds. The 1 GiB loader emits `TRANSFER` only after the echoed round trip, so the harness stopped it at that deadline without diagnostic output. This was a harness timeout, not a zero-throughput result. I added a regression that simulates the 1 GiB transfer finishing at 121 seconds. It failed before the change and now passes. Transfer waits scale at a documented 1 MiB/s minimum plus 120 seconds setup time (1,144 seconds for 1 GiB); the full harness suite passes 14 tests. Re-running the measurement with the corrected harness. Receipts: [run output](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c96b0305-44b3-44a6-a8dc-3d8b9504492a), [measurement JSON](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5ebd0018-d997-4d1c-a490-e00798ec615d), [regression red](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/05357a12-816a-4c29-aeff-029fd5f369be), [regression green](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3abfe200-7807-4aa9-9c27-70f4c8f8bd5a).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:14:11 +00:00
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Step complete: committed 2d3b25789 (Research: scale SSH transfer deadline with payload size). The regression test failed before the change and passes after it; the full SSH harness suite is 14/14 passing. A 1 GiB transfer now gets 1,144 seconds at the declared 1 MiB/s minimum plus 120 seconds setup time. The Perf VM rerun is queued behind its shared lock; no throughput result is accepted yet.

Step complete: committed `2d3b25789` (`Research: scale SSH transfer deadline with payload size`). The regression test failed before the change and passes after it; the full SSH harness suite is 14/14 passing. A 1 GiB transfer now gets 1,144 seconds at the declared 1 MiB/s minimum plus 120 seconds setup time. The Perf VM rerun is queued behind its shared lock; no throughput result is accepted yet.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:29:42 +00:00
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Russh 1 GiB throughput remains unmeasured. The corrected-size-deadline run started 2026-10-16 00:13:32 +02 and was stopped at 00:29:21 +02 after 15:04 elapsed with no socket progress. At the final sample, the Perf VM server socket had 1,049,728 bytes in Recv-Q, both processes were idle in futex waits, and per-socket byte counters were unchanged across the observed interval. The run's scope is inactive and the Perf lock was released. Diagnostic receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e98a8a7b-1972-4247-bd2e-e1218b8c63eb. This is an invalid/stalled sample, not a throughput result; I am inspecting channel flow before retrying.

Russh 1 GiB throughput remains unmeasured. The corrected-size-deadline run started 2026-10-16 00:13:32 +02 and was stopped at 00:29:21 +02 after 15:04 elapsed with no socket progress. At the final sample, the Perf VM server socket had 1,049,728 bytes in Recv-Q, both processes were idle in futex waits, and per-socket byte counters were unchanged across the observed interval. The run's scope is inactive and the Perf lock was released. Diagnostic receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e98a8a7b-1972-4247-bd2e-e1218b8c63eb. This is an invalid/stalled sample, not a throughput result; I am inspecting channel flow before retrying.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:44:18 +00:00
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The stalled russh run's final sample showed Python harness CPU at 32.2%, with both SSH processes idle; the 20 ms process-tree sampler is the likely source of monitor overhead. I changed CPU sampling to 100 ms and now report the configured interval in each throughput receipt. The added regression check failed at 20 ms and passes at 100 ms (15 tests pass). Raw red/green logs: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9f4119be-8ee5-4dbc-a03b-da3b6c28b616 and https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5c14430a-6419-49f1-81da-e20109539655. The diagnostic socket/process sample is attached as e98a8a7b-1972-4247-bd2e-e1218b8c63eb.

The stalled russh run's final sample showed Python harness CPU at 32.2%, with both SSH processes idle; the 20 ms process-tree sampler is the likely source of monitor overhead. I changed CPU sampling to 100 ms and now report the configured interval in each throughput receipt. The added regression check failed at 20 ms and passes at 100 ms (15 tests pass). Raw red/green logs: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9f4119be-8ee5-4dbc-a03b-da3b6c28b616 and https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5c14430a-6419-49f1-81da-e20109539655. The diagnostic socket/process sample is attached as e98a8a7b-1972-4247-bd2e-e1218b8c63eb.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:45:35 +00:00
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Committed 3ab8c1766: process-tree CPU sampling now runs at 100 ms and receipts report the interval. The regression changed from 20 ms failure to 100 ms pass; Python suite: 15/15. The 20 ms run showed 32.2% harness CPU during the stalled interval.

Committed 3ab8c1766: process-tree CPU sampling now runs at 100 ms and receipts report the interval. The regression changed from 20 ms failure to 100 ms pass; Python suite: 15/15. The 20 ms run showed 32.2% harness CPU during the stalled interval.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:47:17 +00:00
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Committed acf9b2464: the 500-session PSS hold is 180 seconds, retaining the full scan window and removing the unused two-minute wait. Python suite: 15/15.

Committed acf9b2464: the 500-session PSS hold is 180 seconds, retaining the full scan window and removing the unused two-minute wait. Python suite: 15/15.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:49:06 +00:00
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Committed cb200be12: 1 GiB transfer deadlines now scale with payload size (1 MiB/s budget plus 120 seconds of setup). The regression changed from red at the old 120-second deadline to green at 1,144 seconds; Python suite: 15/15. History correction: the earlier 2d3b25789 commit included the separate PSS hold adjustment; that change is now isolated as acf9b2464. No measurement logic changed during the split.

Committed cb200be12: 1 GiB transfer deadlines now scale with payload size (1 MiB/s budget plus 120 seconds of setup). The regression changed from red at the old 120-second deadline to green at 1,144 seconds; Python suite: 15/15. History correction: the earlier 2d3b25789 commit included the separate PSS hold adjustment; that change is now isolated as acf9b2464. No measurement logic changed during the split.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:49:19 +00:00
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History correction: 58cb0a985 is the current local commit for the 100 ms process-tree sampler and its regression check; Python suite: 15/15. It replaces the earlier 3ab8c1766 SHA, which was rewritten while separating the transfer-deadline and PSS-hold changes.

History correction: 58cb0a985 is the current local commit for the 100 ms process-tree sampler and its regression check; Python suite: 15/15. It replaces the earlier 3ab8c1766 SHA, which was rewritten while separating the transfer-deadline and PSS-hold changes.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:51:40 +00:00
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The isolated auth socket test passed on both this branch and the detached origin/dev baseline in the same comparison window (1 passed, 0 failed each). The earlier scripts/verify iterate timeout was not reproduced. Full outputs: branch run, origin/dev baseline.

The isolated auth socket test passed on both this branch and the detached origin/dev baseline in the same comparison window (1 passed, 0 failed each). The earlier `scripts/verify iterate` timeout was not reproduced. Full outputs: [branch run](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c5802193-6b31-4d38-8839-e7427d62dfd7), [origin/dev baseline](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6f77311d-8dbf-4aab-81ae-52d87cba6904).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 22:56:37 +00:00
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The 8 MiB cat round-trip failed after its 15-second functional bound against the old server; cleanup verified both started PIDs were gone. The likely cause is the unread server-side Channel consumer retained for cat: russh queues each input packet to that bounded receiver before invoking the handler. The prior Perf VM stall sample supports this: server TCP Recv-Q reached 1,049,728 bytes while both SSH processes were idle. I will drop the unused consumer when the cat handler takes ownership of input/output. Red receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3f1db1e1-2ff4-40e0-83c4-a3406570b7ad; Perf socket sample: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e98a8a7b-1972-4247-bd2e-e1218b8c63eb. D235.

The 8 MiB `cat` round-trip failed after its 15-second functional bound against the old server; cleanup verified both started PIDs were gone. The likely cause is the unread server-side Channel consumer retained for `cat`: russh queues each input packet to that bounded receiver before invoking the handler. The prior Perf VM stall sample supports this: server TCP Recv-Q reached 1,049,728 bytes while both SSH processes were idle. I will drop the unused consumer when the `cat` handler takes ownership of input/output. Red receipt: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3f1db1e1-2ff4-40e0-83c4-a3406570b7ad; Perf socket sample: https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e98a8a7b-1972-4247-bd2e-e1218b8c63eb. D235.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 23:14:35 +00:00
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Validation is waiting on the shared build slot: the russh candidate test, clippy and release-build command has been queued for about 20 minutes as of 2026-10-16 01:14 CEST. All four regular slots and the reserved slot were occupied on the last check. The command remains queued under the required wrapper; it will resume when the shared queue frees a slot.

Validation is waiting on the shared build slot: the russh candidate test, clippy and release-build command has been queued for about 20 minutes as of 2026-10-16 01:14 CEST. All four regular slots and the reserved slot were occupied on the last check. The command remains queued under the required wrapper; it will resume when the shared queue frees a slot.
kayg commented 2026-10-15 23:17:43 +00:00
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Candidate gate finding: all 4 russh crate unit tests passed, then clippy failed with items_after_test_module because the new loadgen regression test preceded later items in src/bin/loadgen.rs. Moved the test module to the file end; cargo fmt --all -- --check passes. The READY flush test reproduced the missing-flush failure, then passed after restoring output.flush() (0/1 red, 1/1 green). Clippy and the release build still need a clean rerun before the channel fix is validated. Evidence: clippy output, flush test red, flush test green.

Candidate gate finding: all 4 russh crate unit tests passed, then clippy failed with `items_after_test_module` because the new loadgen regression test preceded later items in `src/bin/loadgen.rs`. Moved the test module to the file end; `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passes. The READY flush test reproduced the missing-flush failure, then passed after restoring `output.flush()` (0/1 red, 1/1 green). Clippy and the release build still need a clean rerun before the channel fix is validated. Evidence: [clippy output](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/91980db0-cda3-4775-911c-e4531fda3a38), [flush test red](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bd46c992-c6fb-4455-b1da-77840324d403), [flush test green](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/55f50ef7-792f-4e0f-90f3-fed984b74dc5).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 23:23:52 +00:00
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Committed 1aa7e487c: flush the load-generator readiness marker before the 500-session hold, so the harness can capture PSS while sessions remain open. The regression test failed without the flush and passed with it. Gate receipts: 4 Rust unit tests passed, clippy passed, formatting passed, and the static server build completed; Python harness tests passed 15/15. Rust tests, clippy, static build, Python tests, flush regression red/green, flush regression green.

Committed 1aa7e487c: flush the load-generator readiness marker before the 500-session hold, so the harness can capture PSS while sessions remain open. The regression test failed without the flush and passed with it. Gate receipts: 4 Rust unit tests passed, clippy passed, formatting passed, and the static server build completed; Python harness tests passed 15/15. [Rust tests](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5ed78067-f608-4e63-966b-d9d3e69e48f8), [clippy](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2feaf6b0-41c8-4dea-abfb-b2dbdd37151b), [static build](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/71d3d7e4-16a6-40cf-8212-738d01c5dcf1), [Python tests](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d4e56c57-1272-42e7-8a3c-3cc26b0fca5d), [flush regression red/green](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bd46c992-c6fb-4455-b1da-77840324d403), [flush regression green](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/55f50ef7-792f-4e0f-90f3-fed984b74dc5).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 23:24:15 +00:00
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Committed 9242e69d0: the russh cat callback no longer retains an unread channel receiver, and the Linux candidate functional check now includes an 8 MiB round trip. The old server failed at the 15-second deadline; the fixed static server returned all 8,388,608 bytes, and both started processes were confirmed gone. Crate tests passed 4/4, clippy passed, Python harness tests passed 15/15, and fmt passed. This local stream check is functional evidence, not a performance measurement. red, green and cleanup.

Committed 9242e69d0: the russh cat callback no longer retains an unread channel receiver, and the Linux candidate functional check now includes an 8 MiB round trip. The old server failed at the 15-second deadline; the fixed static server returned all 8,388,608 bytes, and both started processes were confirmed gone. Crate tests passed 4/4, clippy passed, Python harness tests passed 15/15, and fmt passed. This local stream check is functional evidence, not a performance measurement. [red](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3f1db1e1-2ff4-40e0-83c4-a3406570b7ad), [green and cleanup](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b8ee54b0-e5fd-4a08-a63e-fc5fb642a540).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 23:36:10 +00:00
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Perf VM functional matrix passed for both russh 0.64.1 and OpenSSH 10.0p2 after commit 9242e69d0. Certificate admission/refusal cases, exec, PTY/window-change/signals, SFTP, forwarding refusal and the new 8 MiB russh channel round trip all pass. The scope cleanup reports every started process gone. Load average was 0.04 before and 0.27 after (4 vCPU, 8,069,112 KiB RAM); this phase records correctness only. Raw receipt.

Perf VM functional matrix passed for both russh 0.64.1 and OpenSSH 10.0p2 after commit 9242e69d0. Certificate admission/refusal cases, exec, PTY/window-change/signals, SFTP, forwarding refusal and the new 8 MiB russh channel round trip all pass. The scope cleanup reports every started process gone. Load average was 0.04 before and 0.27 after (4 vCPU, 8,069,112 KiB RAM); this phase records correctness only. [Raw receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c06bd802-0b12-4baf-9199-2f2de5544644).
kayg commented 2026-10-15 23:52:01 +00:00
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The first russh 500-session memory run is invalid and was rejected: after the load generator reported 500 held sessions, the PSS scan saw only the server root (tree=1, readable=1, vanished=0), so no per-session number was accepted. The final receipt confirms both started harness processes are gone. I’m checking the live server process tree with a short held-session diagnostic before retrying. Failed receipt, run log.

The first russh 500-session memory run is invalid and was rejected: after the load generator reported 500 held sessions, the PSS scan saw only the server root (`tree=1`, `readable=1`, `vanished=0`), so no per-session number was accepted. The final receipt confirms both started harness processes are gone. I’m checking the live server process tree with a short held-session diagnostic before retrying. [Failed receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/550413b4-3390-4cee-9fa7-adcc07b2c2d2), [run log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d21faea7-e9e8-422a-8d35-42378c3a6550).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:00:26 +00:00
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The short Perf VM probe reproduced the coverage gap with five held sessions: the server reported pty=5, but /proc showed descendants=0 and no cat processes. All five client sessions reached READY and cleanup confirmed both harness PIDs gone. This narrows the memory failure to server-side PTY/child setup or lifetime rather than the PSS scanner; I’m instrumenting those transitions before changing behavior. Probe receipt.

The short Perf VM probe reproduced the coverage gap with five held sessions: the server reported `pty=5`, but `/proc` showed `descendants=0` and no `cat` processes. All five client sessions reached READY and cleanup confirmed both harness PIDs gone. This narrows the memory failure to server-side PTY/child setup or lifetime rather than the PSS scanner; I’m instrumenting those transitions before changing behavior. [Probe receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/8bfa5e52-ce25-4607-9c64-3fe87e5eb268).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:21:25 +00:00
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The OpenSSH 500-session memory sample is also invalid: the scan found 585 server-tree processes, but 362 vanished before their PSS maps were read (readable=223). Both harness processes were confirmed gone after cleanup. No memory figure is accepted for either candidate; I’m tracing which server-tree process classes are transient during the held-session window. Failed receipt, run log.

The OpenSSH 500-session memory sample is also invalid: the scan found 585 server-tree processes, but 362 vanished before their PSS maps were read (`readable=223`). Both harness processes were confirmed gone after cleanup. No memory figure is accepted for either candidate; I’m tracing which server-tree process classes are transient during the held-session window. [Failed receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ce5d9a8c-ca9b-4bc4-a989-84cb48f5c0b3), [run log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e7e3276f-bae7-4467-a6dd-79685f812fec).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:32:16 +00:00
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The process-tree scanner sees real OpenSSH session children: while the isolated listener served one separate sleep command, it reported 3 descendants, including sshd-session and sleep. With the five run_loadgen sessions alone, it reported none. This shows the server tree reader works and narrows the memory failure to how the load generator’s prompt sessions remain open; I’m checking channel-close state before reporting memory. Probe log.

The process-tree scanner sees real OpenSSH session children: while the isolated listener served one separate `sleep` command, it reported 3 descendants, including `sshd-session` and `sleep`. With the five `run_loadgen` sessions alone, it reported none. This shows the server tree reader works and narrows the memory failure to how the load generator’s prompt sessions remain open; I’m checking channel-close state before reporting memory. [Probe log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5a79f1a0-d48a-4ab7-8182-aae27ecdf6d1).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:35:05 +00:00
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Perf VM russh 1 GiB echo completed on the committed server (9242e69d0): 1,073,741,824 bytes each direction, 7,211.313 ms, 141.999 MiB/s. Process-tree CPU was 6.820 s total, 0.006660 s per application MiB, or 0.946 estimated cores at the observed rate. The 100 ms sampler saw one server process. VM load average moved from 0.90/0.66/0.78 to 1.07/0.70/0.79 (4 vCPU, 8,069,112 KiB RAM). Raw receipt, run log.

Perf VM russh 1 GiB echo completed on the committed server (9242e69d0): 1,073,741,824 bytes each direction, 7,211.313 ms, 141.999 MiB/s. Process-tree CPU was 6.820 s total, 0.006660 s per application MiB, or 0.946 estimated cores at the observed rate. The 100 ms sampler saw one server process. VM load average moved from 0.90/0.66/0.78 to 1.07/0.70/0.79 (4 vCPU, 8,069,112 KiB RAM). [Raw receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/41d39e19-008b-4b73-b67b-0e01a4f9f256), [run log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bcc7aa36-8c33-4055-8aa0-2f05b5d1b494).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:36:28 +00:00
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Perf VM OpenSSH 10.0p2 1 GiB echo completed: 1,073,741,824 bytes each direction, 6,425.633 ms, 159.362 MiB/s. Process-tree CPU was 4.970 s total, 0.004854 s per application MiB, or 0.773 estimated cores at the observed rate. The 100 ms sampler saw 4 server processes. VM load average moved from 1.25/0.82/0.83 to 1.47/0.87/0.84 (4 vCPU, 8,069,112 KiB RAM). Raw receipt, run log.

Perf VM OpenSSH 10.0p2 1 GiB echo completed: 1,073,741,824 bytes each direction, 6,425.633 ms, 159.362 MiB/s. Process-tree CPU was 4.970 s total, 0.004854 s per application MiB, or 0.773 estimated cores at the observed rate. The 100 ms sampler saw 4 server processes. VM load average moved from 1.25/0.82/0.83 to 1.47/0.87/0.84 (4 vCPU, 8,069,112 KiB RAM). [Raw receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/061c710a-54d2-4348-9a2d-22343a8e88ba), [run log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/4c8fda37-06fc-4fea-9ba7-2bc6f38b12ec).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:44:38 +00:00
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Finding: both candidates reported five sessions ready while holding, but had no live SSH sessions at the process-tree sample. Russh: PTY requests=5, server descendants=0, cat processes=0, established sockets=0. OpenSSH: descendants=0, established sockets=0. Cleanup PIDs were gone. The prior 500-session memory snapshots are invalid and no memory figure is accepted. I am checking the load generator process and client network namespace before retrying. Russh receipt OpenSSH receipt

Finding: both candidates reported five sessions ready while holding, but had no live SSH sessions at the process-tree sample. Russh: PTY requests=5, server descendants=0, cat processes=0, established sockets=0. OpenSSH: descendants=0, established sockets=0. Cleanup PIDs were gone. The prior 500-session memory snapshots are invalid and no memory figure is accepted. I am checking the load generator process and client network namespace before retrying. [Russh receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/511936a3-738a-4375-865b-82c9b56b9d47) [OpenSSH receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/88215ffd-df1c-4c0c-8d6c-b925a81d1c09)
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:51:35 +00:00
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Finding: the load generator was invoked with --hold-seconds 12 but Harness.run_loadgen did not enter its callback until the generator had exited (poll=0). I reproduced the reader failure locally: after TextIOWrapper.readline() consumed the first of two lines from one pipe write, select() returned no readiness although READY remained buffered in Python. The harness's select/readline loop therefore observed READY only at EOF, after session teardown. I added a raw-fd line reader and a pipe regression test; the focused test suite passes 16/16. Next: confirm live sockets/children on the Perf VM, then rerun both 500-session samples. Perf diagnostic

Finding: the load generator was invoked with `--hold-seconds 12` but `Harness.run_loadgen` did not enter its callback until the generator had exited (poll=0). I reproduced the reader failure locally: after `TextIOWrapper.readline()` consumed the first of two lines from one pipe write, `select()` returned no readiness although `READY` remained buffered in Python. The harness's select/readline loop therefore observed READY only at EOF, after session teardown. I added a raw-fd line reader and a pipe regression test; the focused test suite passes 16/16. Next: confirm live sockets/children on the Perf VM, then rerun both 500-session samples. [Perf diagnostic](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/60a2e217-df9f-41f5-aa9f-bcc1e2cda316)
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:52:58 +00:00
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Harness fix: LoadgenOutputReader now uses select() on and os.read() from the same pipe descriptor, parsing every complete line from a read. Added a regression test for LATENCY_MS and READY in one pipe read; Python harness tests pass 16/16. Perf VM confirmation with --hold-seconds 12: the READY callback observed the generator alive after 2 s; five client sockets were established for each candidate, with 5 russh descendants and 15 OpenSSH descendants. Both candidate processes and generators were gone after cleanup. Load average 1.34/1.15/0.99 before and 0.88/1.05/0.96 after. Raw Perf VM receipt

Harness fix: `LoadgenOutputReader` now uses `select()` on and `os.read()` from the same pipe descriptor, parsing every complete line from a read. Added a regression test for `LATENCY_MS` and `READY` in one pipe read; Python harness tests pass 16/16. Perf VM confirmation with `--hold-seconds 12`: the READY callback observed the generator alive after 2 s; five client sockets were established for each candidate, with 5 russh descendants and 15 OpenSSH descendants. Both candidate processes and generators were gone after cleanup. Load average 1.34/1.15/0.99 before and 0.88/1.05/0.96 after. [Raw Perf VM receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/06463a26-eeac-403c-b808-acebfa702615)
kayg commented 2026-10-16 00:57:16 +00:00
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Russh memory measurement passed the corrected 500-session completeness guard on the Perf VM: fixed PSS 4,228 KiB; retained PSS 98,576 KiB; added PSS 94,348 KiB, or 188.696 KiB/session. The retained tree was 501/501 readable processes with 0 vanished. Load average 0.97/1.06/0.97 to 0.04/0.51/0.76. The server and load generator PIDs (153242, 153247) were gone after cleanup. JSON run log. OpenSSH 500-session memory run is next.

Russh memory measurement passed the corrected 500-session completeness guard on the Perf VM: fixed PSS 4,228 KiB; retained PSS 98,576 KiB; added PSS 94,348 KiB, or 188.696 KiB/session. The retained tree was 501/501 readable processes with 0 vanished. Load average 0.97/1.06/0.97 to 0.04/0.51/0.76. The server and load generator PIDs (153242, 153247) were gone after cleanup. [JSON](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1883f806-8934-4c95-8d3d-d02c5e3c63d2) [run log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1faf7080-3d43-4622-9f4f-2de091dd92eb). OpenSSH 500-session memory run is next.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 01:01:49 +00:00
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OpenSSH memory measurement passed the same 500-session completeness guard: fixed PSS 2,431 KiB; retained PSS 1,122,336 KiB; added PSS 1,119,905 KiB, or 2,239.810 KiB/session. The retained tree was 1,501/1,501 readable processes with 0 vanished. At 500 sessions, added PSS is 1,025,557 KiB higher than russh (11.87x per-session PSS). Load average 0.16/0.50/0.75 to 0.02/0.28/0.60. The server and load generator PIDs (156704, 156706) were gone after cleanup. JSON run log

OpenSSH memory measurement passed the same 500-session completeness guard: fixed PSS 2,431 KiB; retained PSS 1,122,336 KiB; added PSS 1,119,905 KiB, or 2,239.810 KiB/session. The retained tree was 1,501/1,501 readable processes with 0 vanished. At 500 sessions, added PSS is 1,025,557 KiB higher than russh (11.87x per-session PSS). Load average 0.16/0.50/0.75 to 0.02/0.28/0.60. The server and load generator PIDs (156704, 156706) were gone after cleanup. [JSON](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/97c02614-c919-427e-87c5-9b54e03f9c96) [run log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f289a5ae-2fed-48cf-9314-f012c776f311)
kayg commented 2026-10-16 01:02:54 +00:00
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Harness correction committed as 7bd8f30f6. The select()/buffered-text read-ahead bug delayed READY until session teardown; the raw-descriptor reader and pipe regression test now keep memory sampling inside the hold. Python harness suite: 16/16 passed. Corrected 500-session results: russh 94,348 KiB added PSS (188.696 KiB/session); OpenSSH 1,119,905 KiB (2,239.810 KiB/session), both with zero vanished processes and complete trees.

Harness correction committed as 7bd8f30f6. The `select()`/buffered-text read-ahead bug delayed READY until session teardown; the raw-descriptor reader and pipe regression test now keep memory sampling inside the hold. Python harness suite: 16/16 passed. Corrected 500-session results: russh 94,348 KiB added PSS (188.696 KiB/session); OpenSSH 1,119,905 KiB (2,239.810 KiB/session), both with zero vanished processes and complete trees.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 01:03:41 +00:00
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The candidate comparison report is committed as 6a78359df: research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md. At 500 sessions, russh measured 188.696 KiB/session PSS and 141.999 MiB/s; OpenSSH measured 2,239.810 KiB/session and 159.362 MiB/s. The report frames russh as the job recommendation for owner review, gated on D243 size recovery; no engine or product dependency is selected. Final branch gate is next.

The candidate comparison report is committed as 6a78359df: [research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md](https://git.kayg.org/kayg/infraternal/src/branch/research-ssh-engine/research/ssh-engine/REPORT.md). At 500 sessions, russh measured 188.696 KiB/session PSS and 141.999 MiB/s; OpenSSH measured 2,239.810 KiB/session and 159.362 MiB/s. The report frames russh as the job recommendation for owner review, gated on D243 size recovery; no engine or product dependency is selected. Final branch gate is next.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 01:45:44 +00:00
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Finished on branch head 6a78359df4dfc619758563be6988ccfa7a2269cc with report and harness commits 7bd8f30f6 and 6a78359df. The final scripts/verify fast ran through the build-slot wrapper and exited 1 only at static builds: fmt, VT native fmt, CLI plugin compile-out, clippy, tests, and cargo-deny passed. The static gate rejected the absolute size budget: x86_64 is 22,329,104 bytes, +124,800 over cap; the measured merge-base binary is the same size (delta 0). The aarch64 build is 19,752,920 bytes, +114,176 over its cap. The research changes add no product dependency or product-code input. Full gate log merge-base size comparison candidate sizes

Final gate output (verbatim):

    Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 24m 50s
production trust: PASS (staging-trust authority absent)
/home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/target/aarch64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
PT_INTERP: absent; size: 19752920 bytes; cap: 19638744 bytes; delta: +114176 bytes
binary exceeds the 19638744-byte size budget: 19752920 bytes
key memory: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu runtime not checked (host x86_64; native execution required)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/scripts/test-static-size.py", line 59, in <module>
    main()
  File "/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/scripts/test-static-size.py", line 31, in main
    assert result.returncode == 0, f"shipping {target} rejected:\n{result.stdout}{result.stderr}"
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
AssertionError: shipping x86_64-unknown-linux-musl rejected:
production trust: PASS (staging-trust authority absent)
/home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/target/static-size-fixtures/size-boundary-_bi88udc/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), static-pie linked, stripped
PT_INTERP: absent; size: 22329104 bytes; cap: 22204304 bytes; delta: +124800 bytes
binary exceeds the 22204304-byte size budget: 22329104 bytes

server subcommand: exit 2, versioned JSON unavailable result
agent subcommand: exit 2, versioned JSON unavailable result
(static builds: 1493s)

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | FAIL (1)     |
+---------------------------+--------------+
Finished on branch head `6a78359df4dfc619758563be6988ccfa7a2269cc` with report and harness commits `7bd8f30f6` and `6a78359df`. The final `scripts/verify fast` ran through the build-slot wrapper and exited 1 only at `static builds`: fmt, VT native fmt, CLI plugin compile-out, clippy, tests, and cargo-deny passed. The static gate rejected the absolute size budget: x86_64 is 22,329,104 bytes, +124,800 over cap; the measured merge-base binary is the same size (delta 0). The aarch64 build is 19,752,920 bytes, +114,176 over its cap. The research changes add no product dependency or product-code input. [Full gate log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e55db99c-5346-43cf-ab0c-7e5ce5c5cee0) [merge-base size comparison](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9ed9227b-ed5e-4519-80ea-d0dc988c5038) [candidate sizes](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/26297765-85bb-4bc0-8b21-be2d5322e6fe) Final gate output (verbatim): ```text Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 24m 50s production trust: PASS (staging-trust authority absent) /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/target/aarch64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped PT_INTERP: absent; size: 19752920 bytes; cap: 19638744 bytes; delta: +114176 bytes binary exceeds the 19638744-byte size budget: 19752920 bytes key memory: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu runtime not checked (host x86_64; native execution required) Traceback (most recent call last): File "/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/scripts/test-static-size.py", line 59, in <module> main() File "/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/scripts/test-static-size.py", line 31, in main assert result.returncode == 0, f"shipping {target} rejected:\n{result.stdout}{result.stderr}" ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ AssertionError: shipping x86_64-unknown-linux-musl rejected: production trust: PASS (staging-trust authority absent) /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/target/static-size-fixtures/size-boundary-_bi88udc/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), static-pie linked, stripped PT_INTERP: absent; size: 22329104 bytes; cap: 22204304 bytes; delta: +124800 bytes binary exceeds the 22204304-byte size budget: 22329104 bytes server subcommand: exit 2, versioned JSON unavailable result agent subcommand: exit 2, versioned JSON unavailable result (static builds: 1493s) +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | FAIL (1) | +---------------------------+--------------+ ```
kayg commented 2026-10-16 01:45:59 +00:00
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Correction to the preceding gate excerpt: the aarch64 key-memory line is aarch64-unknown-linux-musl, and the original traceback includes two caret lines. Exact final block from the attached verify-fast-final.log:

    Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 24m 50s
production trust: PASS (staging-trust authority absent)
/home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/target/aarch64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
PT_INTERP: absent; size: 19752920 bytes; cap: 19638744 bytes; delta: +114176 bytes
binary exceeds the 19638744-byte size budget: 19752920 bytes
key memory: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl runtime not checked (host x86_64; native execution required)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/scripts/test-static-size.py", line 59, in <module>
    main()
    ~~~~^^
  File "/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/scripts/test-static-size.py", line 31, in main
    assert result.returncode == 0, f"shipping {target} rejected:\n{result.stdout}{result.stderr}"
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
AssertionError: shipping x86_64-unknown-linux-musl rejected:
production trust: PASS (staging-trust authority absent)
/home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/target/static-size-fixtures/size-boundary-_bi88udc/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), static-pie linked, stripped
PT_INTERP: absent; size: 22329104 bytes; cap: 22204304 bytes; delta: +124800 bytes
binary exceeds the 22204304-byte size budget: 22329104 bytes

server subcommand: exit 2, versioned JSON unavailable result
agent subcommand: exit 2, versioned JSON unavailable result
(static builds: 1493s)

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | FAIL (1)     |
+---------------------------+--------------+
Correction to the preceding gate excerpt: the aarch64 key-memory line is `aarch64-unknown-linux-musl`, and the original traceback includes two caret lines. Exact final block from the attached `verify-fast-final.log`: ```text Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 24m 50s production trust: PASS (staging-trust authority absent) /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/target/aarch64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped PT_INTERP: absent; size: 19752920 bytes; cap: 19638744 bytes; delta: +114176 bytes binary exceeds the 19638744-byte size budget: 19752920 bytes key memory: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl runtime not checked (host x86_64; native execution required) Traceback (most recent call last): File "/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/scripts/test-static-size.py", line 59, in <module> main() ~~~~^^ File "/home/kayg/Developer/infraternal/.worktrees/research-ssh-engine/scripts/test-static-size.py", line 31, in main assert result.returncode == 0, f"shipping {target} rejected:\n{result.stdout}{result.stderr}" ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ AssertionError: shipping x86_64-unknown-linux-musl rejected: production trust: PASS (staging-trust authority absent) /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/research-ssh-engine/target/static-size-fixtures/size-boundary-_bi88udc/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), static-pie linked, stripped PT_INTERP: absent; size: 22329104 bytes; cap: 22204304 bytes; delta: +124800 bytes binary exceeds the 22204304-byte size budget: 22329104 bytes server subcommand: exit 2, versioned JSON unavailable result agent subcommand: exit 2, versioned JSON unavailable result (static builds: 1493s) +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | FAIL (1) | +---------------------------+--------------+ ```
kayg commented 2026-10-16 01:48:31 +00:00
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Continuation started on branch research-ssh-engine, base SHA 6a78359df4dfc619758563be6988ccfa7a2269cc. Read all #221 and #162 comments plus repository contracts and required SSH decisions/research. Measuring the marginal product static-binary cost of russh backend variants and SFTP on a disposable branch, and the OpenSSH deployment footprint; product selection remains with the owner.

Continuation started on branch `research-ssh-engine`, base SHA `6a78359df4dfc619758563be6988ccfa7a2269cc`. Read all #221 and #162 comments plus repository contracts and required SSH decisions/research. Measuring the marginal product static-binary cost of russh backend variants and SFTP on a disposable branch, and the OpenSSH deployment footprint; product selection remains with the owner.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 02:00:36 +00:00
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OpenSSH deployment footprint measured on infraternal-perf-test (Debian 13, OpenSSH 10.0p2): openssh-server + openssh-sftp-server install to 3,602 KiB; package executable files total 2,929,232 B; server/helper/SFTP binaries plus 26 unique dynamic-library files total 18,213,208 B. At zero sessions, the server used 7,460 KiB RSS / 2,431 KiB PSS. The measured deployment is the system-package option; the bundled static build remains under investigation. Receipts: package versions and file sizes, dynamic closure, zero-session memory.

OpenSSH deployment footprint measured on `infraternal-perf-test` (Debian 13, OpenSSH 10.0p2): `openssh-server` + `openssh-sftp-server` install to 3,602 KiB; package executable files total 2,929,232 B; server/helper/SFTP binaries plus 26 unique dynamic-library files total 18,213,208 B. At zero sessions, the server used 7,460 KiB RSS / 2,431 KiB PSS. The measured deployment is the system-package option; the bundled static build remains under investigation. Receipts: [package versions and file sizes](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/109335be-e05c-47e5-ae03-ac94d6e9366e), [dynamic closure](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9c5d4dbf-53d0-4f60-a696-60258be42f2b), [zero-session memory](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f2963e60-f837-4c0f-886e-19bef3c8d0c7).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 02:34:23 +00:00
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The product sizing command is queued at the host-wide build-slot wrapper. All four general slots and the reserved slot are held by active units; the measurement needs a normal slot release. I have not changed any locks. The russh size matrix and static OpenSSH bundle build have not started; OpenSSH system-package and zero-session memory receipts are attached above. I will resume the queued builds as soon as a slot is free.

The product sizing command is queued at the host-wide build-slot wrapper. All four general slots and the reserved slot are held by active units; the measurement needs a normal slot release. I have not changed any locks. The russh size matrix and static OpenSSH bundle build have not started; OpenSSH system-package and zero-session memory receipts are attached above. I will resume the queued builds as soon as a slot is free.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 02:53:51 +00:00
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The ring product-link probe built for both musl targets. Against the same-base feature-off binaries: x86_64 22,329,104 -> 24,201,840 B (+1,872,736); aarch64 19,752,920 -> 21,342,256 B (+1,589,336). That leaves the resulting product binaries 1,997,536 B and 1,703,512 B above the respective D243 ceilings. The feature graph resolves ring 0.17.14 already used by rustls. Receipts: sizes, deltas and hashes, build log, ring feature tree, feature-off dependency tree comparison.

The ring product-link probe built for both musl targets. Against the same-base feature-off binaries: x86_64 22,329,104 -> 24,201,840 B (+1,872,736); aarch64 19,752,920 -> 21,342,256 B (+1,589,336). That leaves the resulting product binaries 1,997,536 B and 1,703,512 B above the respective D243 ceilings. The feature graph resolves ring 0.17.14 already used by rustls. Receipts: [sizes, deltas and hashes](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a499b502-5a7b-4ac8-aed6-0d14bc4cc1e8), [build log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fac3981a-15e2-4329-b6b2-d214e4845487), [ring feature tree](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bd7d1472-c9c0-4efd-947b-0a0028f218dc), [feature-off dependency tree comparison](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f3a669e9-5f39-4a5e-8f86-bfda71585752).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 03:37:29 +00:00
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Measured the AWS-LC russh backend on the disposable product branch at base 6a78359df4dfc619758563be6988ccfa7a2269cc.

target feature-off ring aws-lc-rs delta vs base delta vs ring over D243 cap
x86_64 musl 22,329,104 B 24,201,840 B 25,005,456 B +2,676,352 B +803,616 B +2,801,152 B
aarch64 musl 19,752,920 B 21,342,256 B 21,445,984 B +1,693,064 B +103,728 B +1,807,240 B

aws-lc-rs 1.18.2 is added alongside the product's existing ring 0.17.14 and OpenSSL paths; it does not share either backend. Ring remains the smaller measured russh backend on both targets. The x86_64 and aarch64 cost receipts, build log and feature graph are attached: receipt, build log, feature graph.

Measured the AWS-LC russh backend on the disposable product branch at base `6a78359df4dfc619758563be6988ccfa7a2269cc`. | target | feature-off | ring | aws-lc-rs | delta vs base | delta vs ring | over D243 cap | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | x86_64 musl | 22,329,104 B | 24,201,840 B | 25,005,456 B | +2,676,352 B | +803,616 B | +2,801,152 B | | aarch64 musl | 19,752,920 B | 21,342,256 B | 21,445,984 B | +1,693,064 B | +103,728 B | +1,807,240 B | `aws-lc-rs` 1.18.2 is added alongside the product's existing `ring` 0.17.14 and OpenSSL paths; it does not share either backend. Ring remains the smaller measured russh backend on both targets. The x86_64 and aarch64 cost receipts, build log and feature graph are attached: [receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6dab8963-76f3-477d-9f55-425e57408fc6), [build log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f4b35d4e-cea5-4a51-a658-042093269bb7), [feature graph](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/34e49c79-190a-4b06-a44a-b0e58e768158).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 04:04:09 +00:00
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Measured SFTP on top of the ring russh server in the disposable product branch at base 6a78359df4dfc619758563be6988ccfa7a2269cc.

target ring minimal ring + SFTP SFTP increment over D243 cap
x86_64 musl 24,201,840 B 24,358,928 B +157,088 B +2,154,624 B
aarch64 musl 21,342,256 B 21,475,472 B +133,216 B +1,836,728 B

SFTP selects no extra crypto backend. Ring+SFTP receipts, build log and feature graph are attached: receipt, build log, feature graph.

Measured SFTP on top of the ring russh server in the disposable product branch at base `6a78359df4dfc619758563be6988ccfa7a2269cc`. | target | ring minimal | ring + SFTP | SFTP increment | over D243 cap | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | x86_64 musl | 24,201,840 B | 24,358,928 B | +157,088 B | +2,154,624 B | | aarch64 musl | 21,342,256 B | 21,475,472 B | +133,216 B | +1,836,728 B | SFTP selects no extra crypto backend. Ring+SFTP receipts, build log and feature graph are attached: [receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2d4ab5f4-293f-4572-a507-375c9e6d37a9), [build log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/71116862-7ce4-44fb-9e4d-1e63eb1d3896), [feature graph](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/dab6b6c4-7526-45fc-a75c-b72b339385ea).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 04:09:28 +00:00
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Measured the bundled static OpenSSH 10.6p1 executable footprint on both musl targets. The stripped static PIE bundle is the three required server executables (sshd, sshd-session, sshd-auth); internal-sftp is built in.

target three static executables system package reference
x86_64 musl 18,576,824 B 3,602 KiB installed package size; 18,213,208 B for the 26 unique server/helper/SFTP executable and dynamic-library files
aarch64 musl 16,983,488 B system package was measured on x86_64 only

The bundle totals exclude config, moduli, host key material, notices and directory entries. Build used the product’s static OpenSSL archive, with PAM and zlib compression disabled. All six files identify as static PIE. The source archive hash is recorded as locally calculated; I did not verify a publisher signature/checksum. Receipts and build logs: size receipt, x86 build log, aarch64 build log, source record. Static 0-session RSS/PSS is still being measured on the Perf VM.

Measured the bundled static OpenSSH 10.6p1 executable footprint on both musl targets. The stripped static PIE bundle is the three required server executables (`sshd`, `sshd-session`, `sshd-auth`); `internal-sftp` is built in. | target | three static executables | system package reference | | --- | ---: | --- | | x86_64 musl | 18,576,824 B | 3,602 KiB installed package size; 18,213,208 B for the 26 unique server/helper/SFTP executable and dynamic-library files | | aarch64 musl | 16,983,488 B | system package was measured on x86_64 only | The bundle totals exclude config, moduli, host key material, notices and directory entries. Build used the product’s static OpenSSL archive, with PAM and zlib compression disabled. All six files identify as static PIE. The source archive hash is recorded as locally calculated; I did not verify a publisher signature/checksum. Receipts and build logs: [size receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/30364685-735a-4f84-9e53-f273d2d42a52), [x86 build log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d64e2541-417e-4740-8201-ccaf20f66d52), [aarch64 build log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/11cec3dc-82bf-4707-9a3e-78316c6c019d), [source record](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6d71c82d-74ba-49a7-8f55-dff848f22b6e). Static 0-session RSS/PSS is still being measured on the Perf VM.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 04:23:34 +00:00
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The first static OpenSSH zero-session memory attempt acquired the Perf VM lock and ran in run-p446918-i4641153.scope, but the server exited with status 255 before an RSS/PSS sample. The runner had suppressed sshd stderr, so the cause is not yet known; the failing output is attached. I am updating the measurement runner to capture the diagnostic and will retry after the current Perf VM lock owner releases. failure log.

The first static OpenSSH zero-session memory attempt acquired the Perf VM lock and ran in `run-p446918-i4641153.scope`, but the server exited with status 255 before an RSS/PSS sample. The runner had suppressed `sshd` stderr, so the cause is not yet known; the failing output is attached. I am updating the measurement runner to capture the diagnostic and will retry after the current Perf VM lock owner releases. [failure log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5ef721cc-4365-4959-8fcd-2bb886c6fddd).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 05:40:59 +00:00
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Continuation complete.

HEAD: 01190113fa (pushed to research-ssh-engine). REPORT.md now records the in-product deltas, backend dependency graph, SFTP addition, OpenSSH package/bundle footprint and static zero-session memory.

Measured costs:

  • russh 0.64.1 + ring: x86_64 +1,872,736 B; aarch64 +1,589,336 B.
  • russh + aws-lc-rs: x86_64 +2,676,352 B; aarch64 +1,693,064 B.
  • SFTP on ring: +157,088 B x86_64; +133,216 B aarch64.
  • OpenSSH 10.6p1 static helper bundle: 18,576,824 B x86_64; 16,983,488 B aarch64. Static sshd idle at zero sessions: RSS 4,548 KiB, PSS 4,544 KiB at both 2s and 5s.
  • Feature-off base already exceeds D243 caps by 124,800 B x86_64 and 114,176 B aarch64. russh variants exceed them by more than 64 KiB.

Evidence:

Final scripts/verify fast result: exit 1, solely because the static size gate rejects the feature-off binaries already over cap. Gate summary, verbatim:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate | Result |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt | PASS |
| VT native fmt | PASS |
| CLI plugin compile-out | PASS |
| clippy | PASS |
| test | PASS |
| cargo-deny | PASS |
| static builds | FAIL (1) |
+---------------------------+--------------+

Owner grill question and job recommendation are in REPORT.md. No decision or product dependency was added.

Continuation complete. HEAD: 01190113fa954ca9b49b2814fbf0c4d9a2e6a762 (pushed to research-ssh-engine). REPORT.md now records the in-product deltas, backend dependency graph, SFTP addition, OpenSSH package/bundle footprint and static zero-session memory. Measured costs: - russh 0.64.1 + ring: x86_64 +1,872,736 B; aarch64 +1,589,336 B. - russh + aws-lc-rs: x86_64 +2,676,352 B; aarch64 +1,693,064 B. - SFTP on ring: +157,088 B x86_64; +133,216 B aarch64. - OpenSSH 10.6p1 static helper bundle: 18,576,824 B x86_64; 16,983,488 B aarch64. Static sshd idle at zero sessions: RSS 4,548 KiB, PSS 4,544 KiB at both 2s and 5s. - Feature-off base already exceeds D243 caps by 124,800 B x86_64 and 114,176 B aarch64. russh variants exceed them by more than 64 KiB. Evidence: - [russh ring size receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a499b502-5a7b-4ac8-aed6-0d14bc4cc1e8) - [AWS-LC receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6dab8963-76f3-477d-9f55-425e57408fc6) - [SFTP receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2d4ab5f4-293f-4572-a507-375c9e6d37a9) - [static OpenSSH bundle size receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/30364685-735a-4f84-9e53-f273d2d42a52) - [static OpenSSH idle receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f22ccd47-c19f-47ac-929f-04a4ddadd7d0) - [static OpenSSH idle raw log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/41ca93e1-2665-4360-82e4-e20ef770d1a6) - [full final-fast log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c2c7bf39-6d34-4568-ad41-25bc39432399) Final `scripts/verify fast` result: exit 1, solely because the static size gate rejects the feature-off binaries already over cap. Gate summary, verbatim: +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | FAIL (1) | +---------------------------+--------------+ Owner grill question and job recommendation are in REPORT.md. No decision or product dependency was added.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 05:57:26 +00:00
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Owner decision D289 (dev df865d759): russh + ring, built into the binary (adding a host switches it to our SSH automatically, so every node needs it). One-time D243 exception by the measured delta. mesh-ssh is queued next on the decided engine.

Owner decision D289 (dev df865d759): russh + ring, built into the binary (adding a host switches it to our SSH automatically, so every node needs it). One-time D243 exception by the measured delta. mesh-ssh is queued next on the decided engine.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:13:01 +00:00
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Started mesh-ssh continuation on branch mesh-ssh. Original checkpoint 5f04313db4; rebased four commits onto origin/dev 41a3a81abc, head f7610a8b95. Read all 146 issue comments; #221 identifies no separate parent (linked research #162 history was read in prior run). D289 selects russh + ring. D235 Q14 gate currently fails: rg login_access/LoginAccess across crates finds only the unwired mesh_admission helper and its tests; all other shell paths lack that boundary. Implementing the reusable server slice while preserving the enablement gate; no deploy or host sshd changes. Final measurements/gates pending.

Started mesh-ssh continuation on branch mesh-ssh. Original checkpoint 5f04313db44cac3ef32938310fecd0e291069f5b; rebased four commits onto origin/dev 41a3a81abceaa4ea7457d84ee05297ca2244efcc, head f7610a8b9529a8df1eed6560ae4aa40219b547f2. Read all 146 issue comments; #221 identifies no separate parent (linked research #162 history was read in prior run). D289 selects russh + ring. D235 Q14 gate currently fails: rg login_access/LoginAccess across crates finds only the unwired mesh_admission helper and its tests; all other shell paths lack that boundary. Implementing the reusable server slice while preserving the enablement gate; no deploy or host sshd changes. Final measurements/gates pending.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:14:27 +00:00
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Additive server adapter boundary proposal (D289/D235): pin russh 0.64.1 with default features off and ring only; pin russh-sftp 3.0.1. Resolve a whole-certificate SHA-256 digest through current authority to a person/source-node/exact-address registration (never trust serial/key-id as identity). Require that person's signed principal, exact source-address critical option, current CA and validity, then existing admission checks. Repeat verification and admission under one read guard through each shell/exec/files open; revocations take its write guard. SSH protocol work delegates session creation to the existing user/session runtime adapter, never starts an independent shell tree or performs target-account file IO as the daemon. Forwarding and client environment requests are refused. D235 Q14 remains unmet on dev: no production enablement or automatic add-host switch until all shell paths enforce login access. Building/test-driving protocol and runtime boundaries independently does not claim this rollout prerequisite is implemented.

Additive server adapter boundary proposal (D289/D235): pin russh 0.64.1 with default features off and ring only; pin russh-sftp 3.0.1. Resolve a whole-certificate SHA-256 digest through current authority to a person/source-node/exact-address registration (never trust serial/key-id as identity). Require that person's signed principal, exact source-address critical option, current CA and validity, then existing admission checks. Repeat verification and admission under one read guard through each shell/exec/files open; revocations take its write guard. SSH protocol work delegates session creation to the existing user/session runtime adapter, never starts an independent shell tree or performs target-account file IO as the daemon. Forwarding and client environment requests are refused. D235 Q14 remains unmet on dev: no production enablement or automatic add-host switch until all shell paths enforce login access. Building/test-driving protocol and runtime boundaries independently does not claim this rollout prerequisite is implemented.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:20:59 +00:00
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Completed rebased contract step 29b39c2c3 and dependency step 89d051795 (both pushed to mesh-ssh). russh=0.64.1, defaults off, ring only; russh-sftp=3.0.1. Feature tree contains the existing ring 0.17.14 and no AWS-LC. Workspace fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and SSH library tests pass (22 passed, 3 ignored). gate, feature tree. No product runtime path is linked/enabled yet; final size delta/caps cannot be inferred from the research probe. Current shims expose login-shell launch only; exec/stdin EOF and target-user files still require runtime integration, alongside the unmet D235 Q14 login-access prerequisite.

Completed rebased contract step 29b39c2c3 and dependency step 89d051795 (both pushed to mesh-ssh). russh=0.64.1, defaults off, ring only; russh-sftp=3.0.1. Feature tree contains the existing ring 0.17.14 and no AWS-LC. Workspace fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and SSH library tests pass (22 passed, 3 ignored). [gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fe569fe4-5687-45aa-b9d3-f92e2077d062), [feature tree](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d2c50d08-bed2-422c-a2e9-39539692785e). No product runtime path is linked/enabled yet; final size delta/caps cannot be inferred from the research probe. Current shims expose login-shell launch only; exec/stdin EOF and target-user files still require runtime integration, alongside the unmet D235 Q14 login-access prerequisite.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:22:55 +00:00
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Completed certificate verifier step f6f01e650 (pushed). crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_certificate.rs now validates real signed certificates against current issuer, registered person principal, user type, exact source critical option and both existing access checks; identity lookup hashes the complete signed certificate. Defensive audit: issuer/principal/type/source substitution, source ranges, unknown critical options, expired/future/overlong intervals, unregistered renewal, changed person, revoked source, network/login refusal, IPv4/IPv6. Workspace fmt and SSH all-target Clippy pass; library tests 25 passed, 3 ignored. gate. Engine/session adapter is being checked next; no production enablement or performance claim.

Completed certificate verifier step f6f01e650 (pushed). crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_certificate.rs now validates real signed certificates against current issuer, registered person principal, user type, exact source critical option and both existing access checks; identity lookup hashes the complete signed certificate. Defensive audit: issuer/principal/type/source substitution, source ranges, unknown critical options, expired/future/overlong intervals, unregistered renewal, changed person, revoked source, network/login refusal, IPv4/IPv6. Workspace fmt and SSH all-target Clippy pass; library tests 25 passed, 3 ignored. [gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bd2c64ed-6482-4ed4-861a-8a99d7482125). Engine/session adapter is being checked next; no production enablement or performance claim.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:26:17 +00:00
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Integration blocker from D235 Q14: origin/dev 41a3a81ab has no login-access persistence/runtime implementation or shared all-shell admission boundary. Search across crates finds login_access only in #221's standalone claim checks. Current crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs:launch_with_readiness launches login shells through __shim; crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs exposes no general exec/stdin-EOF path, and no target-user file service exists. The protocol adapter therefore stays library-only, with actions unavailable: enabling it or switching add-host now would violate Q14. Needed from the orchestrator's identity/session integration lanes: current certificate/link/revocation authority, login access on terminals/app windows/files, user-runtime exec/EOF and file service adapters, plus lifecycle/audit wiring. Continuing safe protocol/defensive-port checks and final gate/size comparison; no Perf VM result will be labelled final-product evidence for a runtime double.

Integration blocker from D235 Q14: origin/dev 41a3a81ab has no login-access persistence/runtime implementation or shared all-shell admission boundary. Search across crates finds login_access only in #221's standalone claim checks. Current crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs:launch_with_readiness launches login shells through __shim; crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs exposes no general exec/stdin-EOF path, and no target-user file service exists. The protocol adapter therefore stays library-only, with actions unavailable: enabling it or switching add-host now would violate Q14. Needed from the orchestrator's identity/session integration lanes: current certificate/link/revocation authority, login access on terminals/app windows/files, user-runtime exec/EOF and file service adapters, plus lifecycle/audit wiring. Continuing safe protocol/defensive-port checks and final gate/size comparison; no Perf VM result will be labelled final-product evidence for a runtime double.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:32:42 +00:00
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Defensive stream audit finding, NOT a production server result: the candidate SSH-to-shim adapter's 8 MiB echo test stalled after 3 MiB and hit its functional bound. russh 0.64.1 dispatches input to the bounded Channel receiver before Handler::data (server/encrypted.rs:1352); shim input, shim output and queued SSH output formed a backpressure cycle. Independent input/output pumps alone did not resolve it. A callback-driven experiment dropped the unused receiver and refused overflow at 64 x 32 KiB; this changed the test from a stall to a visible disconnect, not a successful transfer. No source from that adapter is committed or enabled. stall, 3 MiB diagnostic, overflow refusal.

Resume sources: server prototype, protocol tests/runtime double, bridge prototype. These are diagnostic prototypes, not accepted implementation. SFTP negotiation/environment/forwarding-refusal checks passed with a runtime double; this is not target-user file IO proof. D289 remains the engine decision. Need bounded end-to-end session transport flow control before this integration is suitable; no new engine is selected. Continuing the independent original-TCP/22 regression/fix and final checks.

Defensive stream audit finding, NOT a production server result: the candidate SSH-to-shim adapter's 8 MiB echo test stalled after 3 MiB and hit its functional bound. russh 0.64.1 dispatches input to the bounded Channel receiver before Handler::data (server/encrypted.rs:1352); shim input, shim output and queued SSH output formed a backpressure cycle. Independent input/output pumps alone did not resolve it. A callback-driven experiment dropped the unused receiver and refused overflow at 64 x 32 KiB; this changed the test from a stall to a visible disconnect, not a successful transfer. No source from that adapter is committed or enabled. [stall](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/accd405e-5c64-48b3-beb3-7fce7c03ac01), [3 MiB diagnostic](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cc28bab1-5730-45d0-aaca-fb55af92038d), [overflow refusal](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a2ecccf2-2d99-4d89-a65e-c2f463e20845). Resume sources: [server prototype](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c4925101-6967-4f9a-ab2e-9247f5eca4c4), [protocol tests/runtime double](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0dacd8bd-916e-49fd-8fc0-edb7b82ef658), [bridge prototype](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/812dd914-7d58-4316-b551-89b3031ffb3c). These are diagnostic prototypes, not accepted implementation. SFTP negotiation/environment/forwarding-refusal checks passed with a runtime double; this is not target-user file IO proof. D289 remains the engine decision. Need bounded end-to-end session transport flow control before this integration is suitable; no new engine is selected. Continuing the independent original-TCP/22 regression/fix and final checks.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:33:40 +00:00
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Completed signed-byte robustness test e2f368c02 (pushed). The certificate test changes only signature bytes, registers those exact decodable bytes, and confirms refusal despite registration under the trusted issuer. Workspace fmt and SSH all-target Clippy pass; SSH library 26 passed, 3 ignored. scoped auth gate excerpt. The attached excerpt also shows the in-progress port-test build, not its result. Server/bridge diagnostic prototypes remain only in the earlier issue attachments and scratch; no broken transport or dummy link probe is in the branch.

Completed signed-byte robustness test e2f368c02 (pushed). The certificate test changes only signature bytes, registers those exact decodable bytes, and confirms refusal despite registration under the trusted issuer. Workspace fmt and SSH all-target Clippy pass; SSH library 26 passed, 3 ignored. [scoped auth gate excerpt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/29f1e830-6710-448e-9575-785ce55f3468). The attached excerpt also shows the in-progress port-test build, not its result. Server/bridge diagnostic prototypes remain only in the earlier issue attachments and scratch; no broken transport or dummy link probe is in the branch.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:37:21 +00:00
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Defensive port audit reproduced the inherited fresh-flow mismatch in BOTH nft and nf_tables backends, IPv4 and IPv6. Test crates/plugins/mesh/tests/ssh_original_port.rs injects TCP SYNs through a disposable veth (not the local route), DNATs TCP/22 to 22022, then counts packets that pass the filter. Baseline observed cumulative delivery [0, 2]: TCP/22 permission admits neither family, while only internal-port permission admits both. Required [2, 2]: both families admitted by original TCP/22, no additional packet admitted by internal-port-only permission. nft red, nf_tables red. Changing fresh-flow service selectors to the initiating conntrack port in both backends; established-flow matching already uses the original tuple. Functional counts only, no timing claim.

Defensive port audit reproduced the inherited fresh-flow mismatch in BOTH nft and nf_tables backends, IPv4 and IPv6. Test crates/plugins/mesh/tests/ssh_original_port.rs injects TCP SYNs through a disposable veth (not the local route), DNATs TCP/22 to 22022, then counts packets that pass the filter. Baseline observed cumulative delivery [0, 2]: TCP/22 permission admits neither family, while only internal-port permission admits both. Required [2, 2]: both families admitted by original TCP/22, no additional packet admitted by internal-port-only permission. [nft red](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/07a32faf-c7e2-4193-9ab8-2aac83594ae3), [nf_tables red](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c5ee655e-9801-4eca-a5bc-b16950ab0559). Changing fresh-flow service selectors to the initiating conntrack port in both backends; established-flow matching already uses the original tuple. Functional counts only, no timing claim.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:39:29 +00:00
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Completed and pushed 26684c3a3 (same-user-key renewal registration test) and a7a93d226 (original service-port enforcement in both mesh firewall backends). Fresh port-specific rules now consult the initiating conntrack service, consistent with established flows. Before fix: cumulative IPv4/IPv6 accepted counts [0,2]; after fix: [2,2] on each backend, meaning original TCP/22 admits both families and internal-port-only access adds no accepted packet. Both real namespace checks pass. Workspace fmt, mesh agent all-target Clippy/library (30 passed, 12 ignored), SSH all-target Clippy/library (26 passed, 3 ignored) pass. scoped gate, nft green, nf_tables green.

Full iterate is running at head a7a93d2262. Then final fast/static size and same-recipe merge-base comparison. The D235 enablement/runtime and stream-flow findings above remain unresolved; no SSH feature-complete claim, no cap increase based on a dummy link path, no deploy.

Completed and pushed 26684c3a3 (same-user-key renewal registration test) and a7a93d226 (original service-port enforcement in both mesh firewall backends). Fresh port-specific rules now consult the initiating conntrack service, consistent with established flows. Before fix: cumulative IPv4/IPv6 accepted counts [0,2]; after fix: [2,2] on each backend, meaning original TCP/22 admits both families and internal-port-only access adds no accepted packet. Both real namespace checks pass. Workspace fmt, mesh agent all-target Clippy/library (30 passed, 12 ignored), SSH all-target Clippy/library (26 passed, 3 ignored) pass. [scoped gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/abe6b4b8-70da-480e-a059-31c1ee027344), [nft green](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/32eac418-4d7e-4950-8e3f-c8a36079990f), [nf_tables green](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9ae0f430-faf6-4ef1-9a00-21467304b67f). Full iterate is running at head a7a93d2262b59b806f922ac6e180534e9c6e1cfd. Then final fast/static size and same-recipe merge-base comparison. The D235 enablement/runtime and stream-flow findings above remain unresolved; no SSH feature-complete claim, no cap increase based on a dummy link path, no deploy.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:51:39 +00:00
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Runtime gate audit also includes D240: terminals must share a real per-person/account PAM login context, and revocation ends it. Current crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs:launch_with_readiness still launches __shim in a per-terminal scope; crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs directly resolves the target uid and launches a shell. No PAM/pam_open_session/per-person login implementation was found in those crates or the SSH plugin. An SSH adapter must not create a second shell tree or bypass D240 to appear working. D235 Q14, per-person login runtime, exec/stdin EOF and target-user file service remain integration prerequisites. Current branch adds no runnable server or automatic add-host switch.

Runtime gate audit also includes D240: terminals must share a real per-person/account PAM login context, and revocation ends it. Current crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs:launch_with_readiness still launches __shim in a per-terminal scope; crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs directly resolves the target uid and launches a shell. No PAM/pam_open_session/per-person login implementation was found in those crates or the SSH plugin. An SSH adapter must not create a second shell tree or bypass D240 to appear working. D235 Q14, per-person login runtime, exec/stdin EOF and target-user file service remain integration prerequisites. Current branch adds no runnable server or automatic add-host switch.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 15:59:06 +00:00
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Milestone on head a7a93d2262: scripts/verify iterate passed (exit 0). TypeScript compiler, artifact/transfer checks, differential oracle and 37 TypeScript tests also passed. This is not the final static gate. Building the fixed merge-base static binaries next, followed by final fast on the head. Full iterate output, author review. D235/D240/runtime flow-control blockers remain as above.

Verbatim Rust summary:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+
Milestone on head a7a93d2262b59b806f922ac6e180534e9c6e1cfd: scripts/verify iterate passed (exit 0). TypeScript compiler, artifact/transfer checks, differential oracle and 37 TypeScript tests also passed. This is not the final static gate. Building the fixed merge-base static binaries next, followed by final fast on the head. [Full iterate output](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6e5c4199-23f4-409e-bf21-4be061c11fb9), [author review](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/68e05b3f-e0f0-4958-b5b3-047a409d1c2f). D235/D240/runtime flow-control blockers remain as above. Verbatim Rust summary: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ ```
kayg commented 2026-10-16 16:13:16 +00:00
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Fixed merge-base static x86_64 measurement complete: 41a3a81abc, stripped musl binary 21,422,096 B, exactly the current cap; SHA-256 cacb4b3b6882ba1bfac06a8f87d9c997b1ea7421eee9ca02ad4defb03b6dadab. Recipe: cargo build --locked --release --package infraternal --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl, same job target/compiler/wrapper as the head comparison. size/hash/recipe, sections. ARM baseline is building, then head comparison and final fast. No D289 exception has been consumed for an unenabled server.

Fixed merge-base static x86_64 measurement complete: 41a3a81abceaa4ea7457d84ee05297ca2244efcc, stripped musl binary 21,422,096 B, exactly the current cap; SHA-256 cacb4b3b6882ba1bfac06a8f87d9c997b1ea7421eee9ca02ad4defb03b6dadab. Recipe: cargo build --locked --release --package infraternal --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl, same job target/compiler/wrapper as the head comparison. [size/hash/recipe](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/64ffdd51-d59b-446b-9aa2-5f8a0be811f0), [sections](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/674d18ed-72d4-441f-bb67-e45167fed108). ARM baseline is building, then head comparison and final fast. No D289 exception has been consumed for an unenabled server.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 16:23:08 +00:00
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ARM merge-base measurement complete at the same 41a3a81ab base: stripped aarch64 musl binary 19,594,856 B, exactly the current cap; SHA-256 520b6a104f64e33a321059becc8d85cb1a58ed69b11a29a176342bcb008abb9f. x86_64 is 21,422,096 B, also exactly at cap. Both use the final gate release recipe and the one shared job target. ARM size/hash/recipe, full two-target baseline build. Head comparison is running; final fast follows after the measured size delta is resolved.

ARM merge-base measurement complete at the same 41a3a81ab base: stripped aarch64 musl binary 19,594,856 B, exactly the current cap; SHA-256 520b6a104f64e33a321059becc8d85cb1a58ed69b11a29a176342bcb008abb9f. x86_64 is 21,422,096 B, also exactly at cap. Both use the final gate release recipe and the one shared job target. [ARM size/hash/recipe](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e6fbe584-b7bd-4185-9d0a-d6fab33d0b30), [full two-target baseline build](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/46fa31e9-fdae-47d5-a490-3b4e0ff69188). Head comparison is running; final fast follows after the measured size delta is resolved.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 16:32:56 +00:00
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Initial head x86_64 size at a7a93d226: 21,422,416 B versus merge-base/cap 21,422,096 B, delta +320 B. Same compiler/target/release recipe. Section changes include text +64 B, unwind frame +200 B and unwind header +64 B; full file delta is the authoritative 320 B. size/hash/recipe, section delta. This is the partial branch cost, not the final SSH server's D289 cost. No cap exception is being consumed. ARM initial comparison remains active; after both initial measurements are captured I will look for an offset in shared fresh/established port-rule formatting before final fast.

Initial head x86_64 size at a7a93d226: 21,422,416 B versus merge-base/cap 21,422,096 B, delta +320 B. Same compiler/target/release recipe. Section changes include text +64 B, unwind frame +200 B and unwind header +64 B; full file delta is the authoritative 320 B. [size/hash/recipe](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6c4b41c7-5b33-453a-9ebc-2a3318805065), [section delta](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/67123324-6875-42af-b953-6e45c40ea82b). This is the partial branch cost, not the final SSH server's D289 cost. No cap exception is being consumed. ARM initial comparison remains active; after both initial measurements are captured I will look for an offset in shared fresh/established port-rule formatting before final fast.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 16:54:41 +00:00
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Initial partial-branch ARM delta at a7a93d226: 19,599,080 B versus base/cap 19,594,856 B, +4,224 B (text +3,456 B); x86_64 delta is +320 B. ARM size/hash/recipe, full initial two-target build.

Completed/pushed 451cdd156: share original-service rule formatting between fresh and retained paths in each backend, preserving the emitted matchers. This is an offset candidate, not yet a proven size cut. Workspace fmt, mesh agent all-target Clippy and library tests pass (30 passed, 12 ignored); both IPv4/IPv6 original-port namespace checks pass again. gate, nft, nf_tables. Same-recipe static remeasurement is queued. No cap raised, no runtime timing claim, no SSH enablement.

Initial partial-branch ARM delta at a7a93d226: 19,599,080 B versus base/cap 19,594,856 B, +4,224 B (text +3,456 B); x86_64 delta is +320 B. [ARM size/hash/recipe](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0f683ae6-fee9-4e6f-9980-bfb9b8151ee7), [full initial two-target build](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ff720014-9b32-4131-ac5c-3a5c083a6230). Completed/pushed 451cdd156: share original-service rule formatting between fresh and retained paths in each backend, preserving the emitted matchers. This is an offset candidate, not yet a proven size cut. Workspace fmt, mesh agent all-target Clippy and library tests pass (30 passed, 12 ignored); both IPv4/IPv6 original-port namespace checks pass again. [gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0edf97d3-d433-41ca-a497-491722ef032b), [nft](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ca24af6c-4324-4e3f-8158-8dccb063d15d), [nf_tables](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1d53d479-afd7-4c3f-ad78-8dbf5ffd69ac). Same-recipe static remeasurement is queued. No cap raised, no runtime timing claim, no SSH enablement.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 17:24:44 +00:00
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Measurement result for 451cdd156: the shared formatter alone did not cut size. x86_64 is 21,422,800 B (+704 B vs base, +384 B vs a7a93d226); ARM is 19,599,208 B (+4,352 B vs base, +128 B vs a7a93d226). x86 receipt, ARM receipt. No cap raised.

Next candidate remains UNCOMMITTED while the required touched-crate gate waits for a build slot: explicitly outline the cold rule formatters, and reuse one cold SSH CLI action-metadata constructor. Action IDs, schemas, labels, permissions, effects and unavailable state are preserved; no release profile or packet matcher changes. Resume patch against 451cdd156. The allowed single-test check passed: existing CLI metadata test. Full fmt/Clippy/library/kernel checks, size remeasurement and final fast still pending. The server rollout/runtime blockers remain unchanged.

Measurement result for 451cdd156: the shared formatter alone did not cut size. x86_64 is 21,422,800 B (+704 B vs base, +384 B vs a7a93d226); ARM is 19,599,208 B (+4,352 B vs base, +128 B vs a7a93d226). [x86 receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/08c23514-8622-475e-9bcf-9be55f1a138b), [ARM receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6bf8be6d-17e6-4adb-a7d4-e26ffbb780fe). No cap raised. Next candidate remains UNCOMMITTED while the required touched-crate gate waits for a build slot: explicitly outline the cold rule formatters, and reuse one cold SSH CLI action-metadata constructor. Action IDs, schemas, labels, permissions, effects and unavailable state are preserved; no release profile or packet matcher changes. [Resume patch against 451cdd156](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/94478074-0277-41f7-9bd0-b1163f054d3e). The allowed single-test check passed: [existing CLI metadata test](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f47ba417-40a4-4b5e-af51-0261cf2197f8). Full fmt/Clippy/library/kernel checks, size remeasurement and final fast still pending. The server rollout/runtime blockers remain unchanged.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 17:35:38 +00:00
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Completed/pushed 78a461067 (keep the private configuration-only service formatters outlined) and 3c841d5ab (one outlined SSH component metadata constructor). No release profile, command semantics, permission/effect, schema, label or availability change. Full workspace fmt and touched-crate Clippy passed; mesh library 30 passed/12 ignored, SSH library 26 passed/3 ignored. Both original-port namespace checks passed again for IPv4/IPv6. gate, nft, nf_tables.

Same-recipe static comparison is active at 3c841d5ab; size effect not yet accepted. Existing caps remain unchanged and D289 exception unused. Final fast is still pending, as are the server rollout/runtime prerequisites already recorded above.

Completed/pushed 78a461067 (keep the private configuration-only service formatters outlined) and 3c841d5ab (one outlined SSH component metadata constructor). No release profile, command semantics, permission/effect, schema, label or availability change. Full workspace fmt and touched-crate Clippy passed; mesh library 30 passed/12 ignored, SSH library 26 passed/3 ignored. Both original-port namespace checks passed again for IPv4/IPv6. [gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/522bec56-2e41-49b9-b394-fec8b409598c), [nft](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/df392070-6bc5-48ce-8850-1f84b9d0b584), [nf_tables](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6fe74a06-3902-4343-9df7-eefbef1d1a3f). Same-recipe static comparison is active at 3c841d5ab; size effect not yet accepted. Existing caps remain unchanged and D289 exception unused. Final fast is still pending, as are the server rollout/runtime prerequisites already recorded above.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 17:52:31 +00:00
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Outlined SSH/mesh result at 3c841d5ab: x86_64 21,421,072 B (-1,024 B vs base); ARM 19,597,416 B (+2,560 B). x86 receipt, ARM receipt. ARM still misses its original cap; no cap raised.

Completed/pushed 685262e6d: keep the existing generic action-definition conversion out of line, matching the existing outlined non-generic envelope. This shares cold metadata conversion across declarations without an API, schema, permission, command, availability or release-profile change. Workspace fmt, plugin API all-target/all-feature Clippy, 20 library tests, 2 integration tests and doc tests pass. gate. Same-recipe size comparison at 685262e6d is queued, then exact cap ratchet if recovered and final fast. D235/D240/server runtime blockers remain; this is still not a completed SSH server slice.

Outlined SSH/mesh result at 3c841d5ab: x86_64 21,421,072 B (-1,024 B vs base); ARM 19,597,416 B (+2,560 B). [x86 receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/8d1a45de-1c10-4ddc-b7f4-17da8a03a02b), [ARM receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/050d35bc-094f-4d84-9770-b264e243aade). ARM still misses its original cap; no cap raised. Completed/pushed 685262e6d: keep the existing generic action-definition conversion out of line, matching the existing outlined non-generic envelope. This shares cold metadata conversion across declarations without an API, schema, permission, command, availability or release-profile change. Workspace fmt, plugin API all-target/all-feature Clippy, 20 library tests, 2 integration tests and doc tests pass. [gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6ff081ac-1b9d-486c-82fd-916d985bfe4b). Same-recipe size comparison at 685262e6d is queued, then exact cap ratchet if recovered and final fast. D235/D240/server runtime blockers remain; this is still not a completed SSH server slice.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 18:09:44 +00:00
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Static offset check at 685262e6d: same locked release recipe and merge base 41a3a81ab, x86 21,417,808 B (−4,288), ARM 19,596,008 B (+1,152). No cap change: these are an incomplete server boundary, not the D289 server exception.

x86 receipt, ARM receipt.

95502b93e shares the common cold result-schema envelope across action declarations; no schema/API/data-path change. fmt/clippy and plugin API tests (20 unit + 2 integration) PASS. Gate. Both static targets are being remeasured before the full fast gate. Runtime prerequisites and flow-control finding remain unresolved; SSH is unavailable.

Static offset check at 685262e6d: same locked release recipe and merge base 41a3a81ab, x86 21,417,808 B (−4,288), ARM 19,596,008 B (+1,152). No cap change: these are an incomplete server boundary, not the D289 server exception. [x86 receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/aa877e6d-6eb0-44ce-8555-04913c54be05), [ARM receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b87c75e6-28d9-4926-8f68-2f2605b25793). 95502b93e shares the common cold result-schema envelope across action declarations; no schema/API/data-path change. fmt/clippy and plugin API tests (20 unit + 2 integration) PASS. [Gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/709f9c98-df6f-4b7d-b51c-a569890ae902). Both static targets are being remeasured before the full fast gate. Runtime prerequisites and flow-control finding remain unresolved; SSH is unavailable.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 18:27:29 +00:00
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95502b93e has byte-identical static binaries to 685262e6d on both targets (ARM still +1,152 B). ARM receipt.

396967f15 removes the ineffective result-envelope attribute and shares schema iterator/example conversions across cold metadata declarations. No content/order/API/data-path or release profile change. fmt/clippy and plugin API tests (20 unit + 2 integration) PASS. Gate. Same-recipe ARM then x86 static comparison running; caps unchanged pending measurement.

95502b93e has byte-identical static binaries to 685262e6d on both targets (ARM still +1,152 B). [ARM receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d5f0834f-1e1c-46cb-bee4-18efb35c7863). 396967f15 removes the ineffective result-envelope attribute and shares schema iterator/example conversions across cold metadata declarations. No content/order/API/data-path or release profile change. fmt/clippy and plugin API tests (20 unit + 2 integration) PASS. [Gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/61345acc-718c-4bbc-bb75-eb4909783296). Same-recipe ARM then x86 static comparison running; caps unchanged pending measurement.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 18:42:29 +00:00
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6c7c4a7c8 ratchets both static ceilings downward to the measured 396967f15 binaries; same locked full-feature release recipe against merge base 41a3a81ab. x86 21,410,832 B (−11,264); ARM 19,592,168 B (−2,688). No release-profile change or growth allowance; D289 exception unused. x86 receipt, ARM receipt, build log.

Shell syntax and exact/one-byte-over/downward/unsupported-target size checks PASS. Gate. Author checklist completed for the actual partial scope: review. Full scripts/verify fast queued on 6c7c4a7c8 with unique port 4441.

6c7c4a7c8 ratchets both static ceilings downward to the measured 396967f15 binaries; same locked full-feature release recipe against merge base 41a3a81ab. x86 21,410,832 B (−11,264); ARM 19,592,168 B (−2,688). No release-profile change or growth allowance; D289 exception unused. [x86 receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/76668388-39f3-4b21-9b49-5c88d9c28057), [ARM receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6ebd3953-9d9c-47a4-abf1-d2fe174d2b69), [build log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c18f91ef-6380-4e20-846b-610164858017). Shell syntax and exact/one-byte-over/downward/unsupported-target size checks PASS. [Gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f1bf8dc4-6ef6-4ce8-87ca-86db385bb0fa). Author checklist completed for the actual partial scope: [review](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/674a52e9-b5ce-487f-883d-c0ec8b2b226f). Full scripts/verify fast queued on 6c7c4a7c8 with unique port 4441.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 19:18:08 +00:00
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Full fast gate on 6c7c4a7c8: fmt, VT fmt, CLI compile-out, clippy, cargo-deny and static builds PASS. Server tests: 446 passed, 3 failed, 48 ignored. Failures: mesh_lifecycle_withdrawals_survive_calls_but_never_end_a_replacement (Elapsed at plugin_lifecycle.rs:445), responsive_socket_survives_a_held_terminal_open_with_an_existing_attachment (observed-event stop at socket_clock.rs:81), browser_input_overload_retires_only_the_terminal_stream (websocket closed at auth/tests.rs:1740). TS was not reached.

Full raw gate. Both static binaries matched the new exact caps and linkage checks; x86 key-heap check passed. No auth-source or deadline changes are proposed. Per #118 shared rules, the same three auth-socket cases are queued against my detached dev merge-base checkout 41a3a81ab; host-load attribution is not yet established. Final gate remains incomplete.

Full fast gate on 6c7c4a7c8: fmt, VT fmt, CLI compile-out, clippy, cargo-deny and static builds PASS. Server tests: 446 passed, 3 failed, 48 ignored. Failures: mesh_lifecycle_withdrawals_survive_calls_but_never_end_a_replacement (Elapsed at plugin_lifecycle.rs:445), responsive_socket_survives_a_held_terminal_open_with_an_existing_attachment (observed-event stop at socket_clock.rs:81), browser_input_overload_retires_only_the_terminal_stream (websocket closed at auth/tests.rs:1740). TS was not reached. [Full raw gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/61a7709d-a7ce-4d4f-a15a-e8147002f0d6). Both static binaries matched the new exact caps and linkage checks; x86 key-heap check passed. No auth-source or deadline changes are proposed. Per #118 shared rules, the same three auth-socket cases are queued against my detached dev merge-base checkout 41a3a81ab; host-load attribution is not yet established. Final gate remains incomplete.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 19:25:45 +00:00
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Detached dev merge base 41a3a81ab: the same three named auth-socket tests PASS in the isolated baseline run (3 passed, 0 failed). Raw baseline. The first full-suite failures are therefore not baseline-reproduced; no #118 exception claimed.

Queued a complete scripts/verify fast rerun on unchanged head 6c7c4a7c8 with RUST_TEST_THREADS=1 and TRACER_TEST_PORT=4441. Every test/deadline stays intact; this changes only test parallelism. No auth/test source changes. Final acceptance remains pending.

Detached dev merge base 41a3a81ab: the same three named auth-socket tests PASS in the isolated baseline run (3 passed, 0 failed). [Raw baseline](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d7e5618d-2b69-4dd8-a5a3-443ac79ae3c5). The first full-suite failures are therefore not baseline-reproduced; no #118 exception claimed. Queued a complete scripts/verify fast rerun on unchanged head 6c7c4a7c8 with RUST_TEST_THREADS=1 and TRACER_TEST_PORT=4441. Every test/deadline stays intact; this changes only test parallelism. No auth/test source changes. Final acceptance remains pending.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 19:47:29 +00:00
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Serial full fast gate on unchanged 6c7c4a7c8: fmt, VT fmt, CLI compile-out, clippy, cargo-deny and static builds PASS. The first run's three auth-socket failures now pass. Server tests: 447 passed, 2 failed, 48 ignored. New failures: session_gone::an_ended_or_unknown_session_gets_the_final_close_without_losing_the_socket (websocket closed at auth/tests.rs:1740); standby::control_queue::saturated_native_control_queue_does_not_hide_primary_terminal_output (live_connection.close_reason().is_none() at remote_control_queue_tests.rs:216).

Verbatim full gate. Gate is NOT accepted. Native control-queue failure is outside the stated #118 exceptions; no blanket host-load exemption claimed. Queued matching all-feature detached-dev comparison for these two cases, retaining the preceding inventory-headroom test in serial order. TS stage remains to be run separately because Rust failure stops the dispatcher. No source/deadline changes.

Serial full fast gate on unchanged 6c7c4a7c8: fmt, VT fmt, CLI compile-out, clippy, cargo-deny and static builds PASS. The first run's three auth-socket failures now pass. Server tests: 447 passed, 2 failed, 48 ignored. New failures: session_gone::an_ended_or_unknown_session_gets_the_final_close_without_losing_the_socket (websocket closed at auth/tests.rs:1740); standby::control_queue::saturated_native_control_queue_does_not_hide_primary_terminal_output (live_connection.close_reason().is_none() at remote_control_queue_tests.rs:216). [Verbatim full gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ac838134-773d-41a5-ab33-d020452d062c). Gate is NOT accepted. Native control-queue failure is outside the stated #118 exceptions; no blanket host-load exemption claimed. Queued matching all-feature detached-dev comparison for these two cases, retaining the preceding inventory-headroom test in serial order. TS stage remains to be run separately because Rust failure stops the dispatcher. No source/deadline changes.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 19:53:10 +00:00
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Baseline-command correction: --all-features would enable staging-trust, ee and the optional namespace proof, unlike the failed workspace gate. Stopped only my still-queued wrapper PID 2017641 and its sleep child 2068025 before compilation began; no result from that command. Requeued baseline comparison with default server features plus remote (the deployed workspace feature path), RUST_TEST_THREADS=1 and the same three named cases/order. No source changes.

Baseline-command correction: --all-features would enable staging-trust, ee and the optional namespace proof, unlike the failed workspace gate. Stopped only my still-queued wrapper PID 2017641 and its sleep child 2068025 before compilation began; no result from that command. Requeued baseline comparison with default server features plus remote (the deployed workspace feature path), RUST_TEST_THREADS=1 and the same three named cases/order. No source changes.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 20:00:24 +00:00
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Matching-feature detached dev comparison (41a3a81ab, server defaults + remote, serial): inventory-headroom, session-close and native control-queue cases all PASS (3 passed, 494 filtered). Raw baseline. The two failures on the second full gate are not reproduced on this baseline run. No #118 exemption claimed; fast gate remains FAIL.

The exact TS gate function is queued separately to cover the stage skipped by the Rust failure. Production SSH enablement also remains blocked by D235 Q14/shared login-access enforcement and the missing real per-person session/exec/file runtime. No benchmark acceptance or D289 size exception consumed.

Matching-feature detached dev comparison (41a3a81ab, server defaults + remote, serial): inventory-headroom, session-close and native control-queue cases all PASS (3 passed, 494 filtered). [Raw baseline](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/acd21c2a-a649-42af-ae66-8f635369ac1a). The two failures on the second full gate are not reproduced on this baseline run. No #118 exemption claimed; fast gate remains FAIL. The exact TS gate function is queued separately to cover the stage skipped by the Rust failure. Production SSH enablement also remains blocked by D235 Q14/shared login-access enforcement and the missing real per-person session/exec/file runtime. No benchmark acceptance or D289 size exception consumed.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 20:05:58 +00:00
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Incomplete checkpoint handoff. Branch mesh-ssh is pushed at 6c7c4a7c8c, rebased onto dev 41a3a81abc. The requested SSH server is NOT complete or enabled; this is not an accepted lane.

Committed: decided russh/ring + SFTP dependencies; registered signed-certificate verification/current admission boundary; real original-service firewall correction after DNAT with IPv4/IPv6 namespace regressions for both backends; cold metadata/rendering size offsets. Prototype transport code was removed after the sustained-I/O failure; diagnostic sources and outcomes remain attached in earlier comments. No separate session process tree or daemon-credential file service was shipped.

D235 Q14 status: NOT MET. Current production shell paths do not share the required login-access authority. Next implementation work needs that shared authority/certificate-link revocation state and the D240/D247 per-person/account login owner, then shim exec/stdin EOF and target-user file operations. Relevant current boundaries: crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs::launch_with_readiness and crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs. SSH CLI actions remain unavailable in crates/plugins/ssh/src/cli.rs. Runtime flow control, real PTY/exec/SFTP integration, automatic add-host switching, and the perf-VM TCP-to-prompt/RTT/session-memory/throughput matrix remain outstanding. Research results are not production acceptance evidence.

Same-recipe static baseline/head: x86 21,422,096 -> 21,410,832 B (−11,264); ARM 19,594,856 -> 19,592,168 B (−2,688). Exact caps ratcheted down; no profile change and no D289 server exception consumed. x86 receipt, ARM receipt.

Final full-gate attempt: CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/target TRACER_TEST_PORT=4441 RUST_TEST_THREADS=1 scripts/verify fast (through build-slot), exit 1. Verbatim Rust summary:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | FAIL (101)   |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+

Full serial gate transcript. Server tests: 447 passed, 2 failed, 48 ignored. Remaining failures are session_gone::an_ended_or_unknown_session_gets_the_final_close_without_losing_the_socket and standby::control_queue::saturated_native_control_queue_does_not_hide_primary_terminal_output; failure paths/lines are in the preceding finding. The first default-parallel full run also failed, in three different auth-socket cases; those passed in the serial run. Matching-feature dev baseline (defaults + remote) passed the headroom/session-close/control-queue sequence (3 passed, 494 filtered). Baseline transcript. No baseline-reproduced exception claimed. Gate remains FAIL; further diagnosis is needed, including the native control-queue failure outside #118's allowed cases.

The exact ts_verify_fast function was run separately through build-slot after the Rust dispatcher stopped: exit 0; compiler, production build/precompression/transfer budgets, differential oracle and protocol tests PASS. Verbatim protocol summary:

 37 pass
 0 fail
 34463 expect() calls

TS transcript. These are functional gate receipts, not SSH performance measurements. Final author checklist.

Cleanup completed: own detached baseline and Cargo target removed; only evidence remains in job scratch; generated Python cache removed; git status clean; local/pushed tracking heads match. Canceled queued wrapper 2017641 and its sleep 2068025 are absent. No merge or deployment. Cleanup receipt. Issue stays open.

Incomplete checkpoint handoff. Branch mesh-ssh is pushed at 6c7c4a7c8c7d9492352aef24639cb1dbfe512f09, rebased onto dev 41a3a81abceaa4ea7457d84ee05297ca2244efcc. The requested SSH server is NOT complete or enabled; this is not an accepted lane. Committed: decided russh/ring + SFTP dependencies; registered signed-certificate verification/current admission boundary; real original-service firewall correction after DNAT with IPv4/IPv6 namespace regressions for both backends; cold metadata/rendering size offsets. Prototype transport code was removed after the sustained-I/O failure; diagnostic sources and outcomes remain attached in earlier comments. No separate session process tree or daemon-credential file service was shipped. D235 Q14 status: NOT MET. Current production shell paths do not share the required login-access authority. Next implementation work needs that shared authority/certificate-link revocation state and the D240/D247 per-person/account login owner, then shim exec/stdin EOF and target-user file operations. Relevant current boundaries: crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs::launch_with_readiness and crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs. SSH CLI actions remain unavailable in crates/plugins/ssh/src/cli.rs. Runtime flow control, real PTY/exec/SFTP integration, automatic add-host switching, and the perf-VM TCP-to-prompt/RTT/session-memory/throughput matrix remain outstanding. Research results are not production acceptance evidence. Same-recipe static baseline/head: x86 21,422,096 -> 21,410,832 B (−11,264); ARM 19,594,856 -> 19,592,168 B (−2,688). Exact caps ratcheted down; no profile change and no D289 server exception consumed. [x86 receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/76668388-39f3-4b21-9b49-5c88d9c28057), [ARM receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6ebd3953-9d9c-47a4-abf1-d2fe174d2b69). Final full-gate attempt: CARGO_TARGET_DIR=<job>/target TRACER_TEST_PORT=4441 RUST_TEST_THREADS=1 scripts/verify fast (through build-slot), exit 1. Verbatim Rust summary: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | FAIL (101) | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ ``` [Full serial gate transcript](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ac838134-773d-41a5-ab33-d020452d062c). Server tests: 447 passed, 2 failed, 48 ignored. Remaining failures are session_gone::an_ended_or_unknown_session_gets_the_final_close_without_losing_the_socket and standby::control_queue::saturated_native_control_queue_does_not_hide_primary_terminal_output; failure paths/lines are in the preceding finding. The first default-parallel full run also failed, in three different auth-socket cases; those passed in the serial run. Matching-feature dev baseline (defaults + remote) passed the headroom/session-close/control-queue sequence (3 passed, 494 filtered). [Baseline transcript](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/acd21c2a-a649-42af-ae66-8f635369ac1a). No baseline-reproduced exception claimed. Gate remains FAIL; further diagnosis is needed, including the native control-queue failure outside #118's allowed cases. The exact ts_verify_fast function was run separately through build-slot after the Rust dispatcher stopped: exit 0; compiler, production build/precompression/transfer budgets, differential oracle and protocol tests PASS. Verbatim protocol summary: ```text 37 pass 0 fail 34463 expect() calls ``` [TS transcript](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cc916cfa-6eb2-4f25-8d4e-6444ac3553c8). These are functional gate receipts, not SSH performance measurements. [Final author checklist](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/78b574f6-c04b-4e28-a843-24bdd159651d). Cleanup completed: own detached baseline and Cargo target removed; only evidence remains in job scratch; generated Python cache removed; git status clean; local/pushed tracking heads match. Canceled queued wrapper 2017641 and its sleep 2068025 are absent. No merge or deployment. [Cleanup receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3b57b2a2-acf2-4661-a176-4d128b0ccc13). Issue stays open.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 20:08:29 +00:00
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Continuation started on mesh-ssh: checkpoint 6c7c4a7c8 rebased onto origin/dev 650472b987; head 4afbb443a4. Read #221 checkpoint/history and linked #162; no parent recorded. Dropped the old checkpoint cap-ratchet commit during rebase: dev now has lower caps (21,320,400 / 19,513,440 B), retained unchanged pending same-recipe measurements. First reproducing the two remaining server failures with default server features plus remote. D235 Q14 remains unmet; SSH unavailable. No deploy or merge.

Continuation started on mesh-ssh: checkpoint 6c7c4a7c8 rebased onto origin/dev 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79; head 4afbb443a472d63e98979fe631afc9341dcff191. Read #221 checkpoint/history and linked #162; no parent recorded. Dropped the old checkpoint cap-ratchet commit during rebase: dev now has lower caps (21,320,400 / 19,513,440 B), retained unchanged pending same-recipe measurements. First reproducing the two remaining server failures with default server features plus remote. D235 Q14 remains unmet; SSH unavailable. No deploy or merge.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 20:19:15 +00:00
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Rebased 4afbb443a: both checkpoint failures pass individually with matching server defaults + remote (1/1 each): session-close, native control queue. Existing red full-gate receipts remain ac838134-773d-41a5-ab33-d020452d062c. No baseline exemption claimed. A preserved unmodified test executable is queued for a complete serial server run. Test audit: session_gone uses real SQLite under the 25 ms authority deadline; native saturation observes a blocked write that expires after 1 s. These are ordering cases, unlike deadline-expiry tests. Applying the existing stationary-I/O clock to their observation phases, sharing its implementation instead of adding deadline slack. Production deadlines and assertions remain unchanged. The cached single native case ran under the small-unit-test exception after canceling my queued wrapper PID 2422673; no heavy build ran outside build-slot.

Rebased 4afbb443a: both checkpoint failures pass individually with matching server defaults + remote (1/1 each): [session-close](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/585769bc-f498-4087-8b35-07c130bb8ea1), [native control queue](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/14053ace-a486-4616-be86-7a6a8d70c40c). Existing red full-gate receipts remain ac838134-773d-41a5-ab33-d020452d062c. No baseline exemption claimed. A preserved unmodified test executable is queued for a complete serial server run. Test audit: session_gone uses real SQLite under the 25 ms authority deadline; native saturation observes a blocked write that expires after 1 s. These are ordering cases, unlike deadline-expiry tests. Applying the existing stationary-I/O clock to their observation phases, sharing its implementation instead of adding deadline slack. Production deadlines and assertions remain unchanged. The cached single native case ran under the small-unit-test exception after canceling my queued wrapper PID 2422673; no heavy build ran outside build-slot.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 20:33:31 +00:00
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Full preserved pre-change serial server suite at rebased 4afbb443a: 453 passed, 1 failed, 48 ignored. Both requested checkpoint failures PASS; the remaining failure is restart_open_liveness_review::responsive_socket_survives_a_held_terminal_open_with_an_existing_attachment, clock watchdog at auth/socket_clock.rs:81. Raw before. Test audit found its final fixed 25 ms advance can stop before the restarted startup-probe deadline: Liveness::next_probe_due retains the issued nonce offset and the timer driver rounds up. Changing only that observation tick to TICK plus one timer resolution (1 ms); production deadlines/assertions unchanged. The two requested ordering cases now reuse the existing stationary-I/O clock; native control also explicitly proves the original write deadline still retires the blocked connection. Scoped fmt/Clippy PASS; complete repaired server run active. No baseline exception claimed.

Dependency audit for the next step: origin/access-rules-v4 2ba357265 is documentation only, with two open P0 owner questions in docs/design/access-rules.md. No shared access-rule executor exists on dev. origin/real-logins a92989f1 contains the reusable per-person login implementation, absent from dev; #172 latest report leaves static size/performance acceptance unresolved. These are existing work to reuse, not grounds to add a second authority or login engine. D235 Q14 remains NOT MET. D289 size exception remains unused and cannot cover unrelated login/access growth.

Full preserved pre-change serial server suite at rebased 4afbb443a: 453 passed, 1 failed, 48 ignored. Both requested checkpoint failures PASS; the remaining failure is restart_open_liveness_review::responsive_socket_survives_a_held_terminal_open_with_an_existing_attachment, clock watchdog at auth/socket_clock.rs:81. [Raw before](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/4ca24016-56ee-4f18-a928-dd3e81648c6b). Test audit found its final fixed 25 ms advance can stop before the restarted startup-probe deadline: Liveness::next_probe_due retains the issued nonce offset and the timer driver rounds up. Changing only that observation tick to TICK plus one timer resolution (1 ms); production deadlines/assertions unchanged. The two requested ordering cases now reuse the existing stationary-I/O clock; native control also explicitly proves the original write deadline still retires the blocked connection. Scoped fmt/Clippy PASS; complete repaired server run active. No baseline exception claimed. Dependency audit for the next step: origin/access-rules-v4 2ba357265 is documentation only, with two open P0 owner questions in docs/design/access-rules.md. No shared access-rule executor exists on dev. origin/real-logins a92989f1 contains the reusable per-person login implementation, absent from dev; #172 latest report leaves static size/performance acceptance unresolved. These are existing work to reuse, not grounds to add a second authority or login engine. D235 Q14 remains NOT MET. D289 size exception remains unused and cannot cover unrelated login/access growth.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 20:38:42 +00:00
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Completed and pushed step 1: 57193b481. Scoped fmt and server all-target Clippy (default features + remote) PASS. Full repaired serial server suite: 454 passed, 0 failed, 48 ignored. Full scoped gate, native ordering + original deadline expiry, held-open tick correction. Red full-suite receipt is in the preceding comment. No production timeout, assertion, dependency, protocol or runtime change; no baseline waiver.

Step 2 dependency remains unresolved: dev 650472b98 has no shared access-rule executor/current person-link certificate authority, and no per-person PAM login runtime. #186/access-rules-v4 is a draft with two owner questions; #172/real-logins has the reusable implementation but its latest report leaves size/performance gates unresolved. Integration needs the shared authority and accepted per-person runtime from those lanes; copying an independent SSH-only rule list or launching a separate shell tree would violate the brief and Q14. No attempt to mark SSH enabled, use research figures as product measurements, or spend D289 on these unrelated dependencies. Same-recipe static comparison and final full gate are next for this checkpoint. This is not the completed D289 server slice.

Completed and pushed step 1: 57193b481. Scoped fmt and server all-target Clippy (default features + remote) PASS. Full repaired serial server suite: 454 passed, 0 failed, 48 ignored. [Full scoped gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ba4d2bf0-1584-4cb0-86ae-135e22a18aa1), [native ordering + original deadline expiry](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/042f2662-c4db-4194-9565-05d89b29603c), [held-open tick correction](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/8fbed2d4-93ba-43cd-8961-dc9644d062d0). Red full-suite receipt is in the preceding comment. No production timeout, assertion, dependency, protocol or runtime change; no baseline waiver. Step 2 dependency remains unresolved: dev 650472b98 has no shared access-rule executor/current person-link certificate authority, and no per-person PAM login runtime. #186/access-rules-v4 is a draft with two owner questions; #172/real-logins has the reusable implementation but its latest report leaves size/performance gates unresolved. Integration needs the shared authority and accepted per-person runtime from those lanes; copying an independent SSH-only rule list or launching a separate shell tree would violate the brief and Q14. No attempt to mark SSH enabled, use research figures as product measurements, or spend D289 on these unrelated dependencies. Same-recipe static comparison and final full gate are next for this checkpoint. This is not the completed D289 server slice.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 20:50:39 +00:00
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Static comparison baseline: detached origin/dev 650472b987, locked default full-feature release recipe, x86_64 musl stripped/static binary 21,320,400 B, exactly the retained dev cap. SHA256 999ac42b27617f8e040f9bbc4694ffe200bfb9ea82d56b3f647d0701b1b11fa8. Receipt. ARM baseline and both head builds remain in the same slot-wrapped comparison. No D289 exception used.

Scoped author review, resolved SSH feature tree: russh 0.64.1, russh-sftp 3.0.1, existing ring 0.17.14, no AWS-LC. The ordering repair is test-only; its single-thread paused fixture is not parallel-thread stress/performance evidence. Removed only own completed debug incremental cache and preserved pre-change test executable after attaching raw receipts; compiled final-gate dependencies remain.

Static comparison baseline: detached origin/dev 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79, locked default full-feature release recipe, x86_64 musl stripped/static binary 21,320,400 B, exactly the retained dev cap. SHA256 999ac42b27617f8e040f9bbc4694ffe200bfb9ea82d56b3f647d0701b1b11fa8. [Receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5680dbfa-1bbf-4850-bacf-3c9adec1018d). ARM baseline and both head builds remain in the same slot-wrapped comparison. No D289 exception used. [Scoped author review](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b38cc029-d629-4fae-97d9-025eca0c064f), [resolved SSH feature tree](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7eb7097f-0ca5-4437-92d7-f0aef72e8161): russh 0.64.1, russh-sftp 3.0.1, existing ring 0.17.14, no AWS-LC. The ordering repair is test-only; its single-thread paused fixture is not parallel-thread stress/performance evidence. Removed only own completed debug incremental cache and preserved pre-change test executable after attaching raw receipts; compiled final-gate dependencies remain.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 20:54:17 +00:00
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Additional step 3 integration finding from the pinned russh 0.64.1 source: server/encrypted.rs:1332 replenishes receive credit before Handler::data, and ignores a zero adjust_window return for changing the next target. The hook cannot withhold that current refill against shim acceptance. server/encrypted.rs:1352 still awaits the Channel receiver before the callback. Handle::data is an enqueue operation; channel make_writer supplies peer-window-aware output. A bounded callback queue alone does not prove end-to-end flow control, and an overflow disconnect does not prove a valid sustained transfer works. Exact source paths/hashes and implications. No dependency/engine change, registry edit, prototype commit or performance claim. D289 remains decided. The real bridge must keep control runnable and bind receive replenishment to proven downstream capacity before acceptance.

Additional step 3 integration finding from the pinned russh 0.64.1 source: server/encrypted.rs:1332 replenishes receive credit before Handler::data, and ignores a zero adjust_window return for changing the next target. The hook cannot withhold that current refill against shim acceptance. server/encrypted.rs:1352 still awaits the Channel receiver before the callback. Handle::data is an enqueue operation; channel make_writer supplies peer-window-aware output. A bounded callback queue alone does not prove end-to-end flow control, and an overflow disconnect does not prove a valid sustained transfer works. [Exact source paths/hashes and implications](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6607fd92-62f3-4ff6-9afb-9c9cee00438a). No dependency/engine change, registry edit, prototype commit or performance claim. D289 remains decided. The real bridge must keep control runnable and bind receive replenishment to proven downstream capacity before acceptance.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:00:20 +00:00
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Same-recipe ARM baseline at detached dev 650472b98: stripped static aarch64 musl 19,517,536 B, SHA256 3fdc97bcb94ccd382ab91887738f64655328f26d62eb3500754fc9daef34a917. This is +4,096 B against the published 19,513,440 B cap; cause is not established and no waiver/cap increase is claimed. Receipt. X86 reproduces its cap exactly at 21,320,400 B. Both branch builds now run in the same target/toolchain; actual branch deltas and absolute-cap results follow. D289 allowance remains unused.

Same-recipe ARM baseline at detached dev 650472b98: stripped static aarch64 musl 19,517,536 B, SHA256 3fdc97bcb94ccd382ab91887738f64655328f26d62eb3500754fc9daef34a917. This is +4,096 B against the published 19,513,440 B cap; cause is not established and no waiver/cap increase is claimed. [Receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/761bf27d-06ea-4a51-89f5-83eff0021de3). X86 reproduces its cap exactly at 21,320,400 B. Both branch builds now run in the same target/toolchain; actual branch deltas and absolute-cap results follow. D289 allowance remains unused.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:13:10 +00:00
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Completed/pushed e6da99909: exact static cap ratchet, measured source 57193b481 against detached dev 650472b98 with the same locked shipping recipe.

Target measured dev branch delta new exact cap
x86_64 musl 21,320,400 B 21,310,352 B -10,048 B 21,310,352 B
aarch64 musl 19,517,536 B 19,511,136 B -6,400 B 19,511,136 B

The ARM dev reproduction is +4,096 B above its old published cap, as recorded separately; this branch still beats that lower cap by 2,304 B. No upward exception/waiver or profile/crypto change. D289 allowance remains unused. Shell syntax, exact-cap, one-byte-over, smaller-artifact ratchet and unsupported-target cases PASS.

Head x86, head ARM, complete build comparison, cap checks. Final scripts/verify fast queued on e6da99909 through build-slot, serial Rust tests, TRACER_TEST_PORT=4441 and private test/XDG state. SSH server/runtime/Q14 and VM acceptance remain incomplete as recorded above.

Completed/pushed e6da99909: exact static cap ratchet, measured source 57193b481 against detached dev 650472b98 with the same locked shipping recipe. | Target | measured dev | branch | delta | new exact cap | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:| | x86_64 musl | 21,320,400 B | 21,310,352 B | -10,048 B | 21,310,352 B | | aarch64 musl | 19,517,536 B | 19,511,136 B | -6,400 B | 19,511,136 B | The ARM dev reproduction is +4,096 B above its old published cap, as recorded separately; this branch still beats that lower cap by 2,304 B. No upward exception/waiver or profile/crypto change. D289 allowance remains unused. Shell syntax, exact-cap, one-byte-over, smaller-artifact ratchet and unsupported-target cases PASS. [Head x86](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ab99f942-823f-495d-b6ba-6abe02f80dae), [head ARM](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b59c1353-792b-4978-b5f7-0089452917d1), [complete build comparison](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/25e36ee3-bcc7-41cb-91ad-40b9bc9883a7), [cap checks](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/5722c304-2aab-4328-ad70-35d8510f376d). Final scripts/verify fast queued on e6da99909 through build-slot, serial Rust tests, TRACER_TEST_PORT=4441 and private test/XDG state. SSH server/runtime/Q14 and VM acceptance remain incomplete as recorded above.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:34:05 +00:00
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Incomplete continuation checkpoint; the requested SSH server slice is NOT complete or enabled.

Pushed head e6da99909d, based on dev 650472b987. Two atomic commits: 57193b481 shares the existing stationary-I/O clock across stream-isolation fixtures and crosses the held-open probe's next timer boundary; e6da99909 ratchets both exact static caps. Production deadlines remain intact; native control also proves the blocked primary retires at its original one-second deadline. Full server suite: 454 passed, 0 failed, 48 ignored. No baseline exception claimed.

Final scripts/verify fast on this head exited 0 through build-slot, RUST_TEST_THREADS=1, TRACER_TEST_PORT=4441, private test/XDG state. All Rust rows, TypeScript compiler/build/precompression/transfer budgets, differential oracle and 37 protocol tests PASS (0 failed, 34463 expectations).

Full raw final gate, exact verification recipes, scoped author review.

Verbatim final Rust summary:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+

Verbatim protocol-test summary:

 37 pass
 0 fail
 34463 expect() calls

Same-recipe stripped static comparison: x86 21,320,400 -> 21,310,352 B (-10,048); ARM 19,517,536 -> 19,511,136 B (-6,400). The ARM dev reproduction exceeded its published cap by 4,096 B, cause unestablished; this branch still beats that lower cap by 2,304 B. Caps now equal the actual head artifacts. D289 allowance unused; no new allowance, profile or crypto change. Both static linkage/trust checks, x86 key-memory/NIST checks and exact/over/shrink boundary tests PASS. ARM native key-memory execution is not claimed. Size receipts and hashes are linked in the preceding cap comment.

Blocked at step 2: dev still lacks the shared access-rule executor/current person-link-certificate authority and accepted per-person login runtime. #186/access-rules-v4 is documentation with two open owner questions; #172/real-logins contains the reusable implementation but its latest acceptance remains unresolved. Needed from orchestration: align/integrate those shared authorities and runtime interfaces on dev. An independent SSH-only access list or separate shell tree would violate D235/Q14. No such substitute was added.

Remaining: shared enforcement on every shell path; consumption-aware bounded SSH/shim flow control; actual PTY/exec/EOF and target-user SFTP integration; automatic add-host switching; Q14 enablement; the real-product perf-VM 1/150 ms, echo, throughput and 1/50/500-session memory matrix; real-engine defensive auth/ownership/forwarding review. The pinned engine audit records why automatic receive refill plus a bounded callback queue alone is insufficient: source paths/hashes. D289 remains the decided engine. Research figures are not product acceptance evidence.

Cleanup: worktree clean; local and pushed heads match. Own target executables and recorded build/test control PIDs are gone. Own detached baseline, target, comparison binaries, runtime/XDG state, temporary helpers and checkout bytecode removed; receipts retained outside the checkout. No merge, deploy, host-key change, owner-fixture change or issue closure. Cleanup receipt.

Incomplete continuation checkpoint; the requested SSH server slice is NOT complete or enabled. Pushed head e6da99909db935a778f44ba450e1381275bc470c, based on dev 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79. Two atomic commits: 57193b481 shares the existing stationary-I/O clock across stream-isolation fixtures and crosses the held-open probe's next timer boundary; e6da99909 ratchets both exact static caps. Production deadlines remain intact; native control also proves the blocked primary retires at its original one-second deadline. Full server suite: 454 passed, 0 failed, 48 ignored. No baseline exception claimed. Final scripts/verify fast on this head exited 0 through build-slot, RUST_TEST_THREADS=1, TRACER_TEST_PORT=4441, private test/XDG state. All Rust rows, TypeScript compiler/build/precompression/transfer budgets, differential oracle and 37 protocol tests PASS (0 failed, 34463 expectations). [Full raw final gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d8046d9b-e897-4425-b9a2-5fcbb631f103), [exact verification recipes](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/42e1d24b-e912-443f-9f37-d4464278442b), [scoped author review](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b38cc029-d629-4fae-97d9-025eca0c064f). Verbatim final Rust summary: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ ``` Verbatim protocol-test summary: ```text 37 pass 0 fail 34463 expect() calls ``` Same-recipe stripped static comparison: x86 21,320,400 -> 21,310,352 B (-10,048); ARM 19,517,536 -> 19,511,136 B (-6,400). The ARM dev reproduction exceeded its published cap by 4,096 B, cause unestablished; this branch still beats that lower cap by 2,304 B. Caps now equal the actual head artifacts. D289 allowance unused; no new allowance, profile or crypto change. Both static linkage/trust checks, x86 key-memory/NIST checks and exact/over/shrink boundary tests PASS. ARM native key-memory execution is not claimed. Size receipts and hashes are linked in the preceding cap comment. Blocked at step 2: dev still lacks the shared access-rule executor/current person-link-certificate authority and accepted per-person login runtime. #186/access-rules-v4 is documentation with two open owner questions; #172/real-logins contains the reusable implementation but its latest acceptance remains unresolved. Needed from orchestration: align/integrate those shared authorities and runtime interfaces on dev. An independent SSH-only access list or separate shell tree would violate D235/Q14. No such substitute was added. Remaining: shared enforcement on every shell path; consumption-aware bounded SSH/shim flow control; actual PTY/exec/EOF and target-user SFTP integration; automatic add-host switching; Q14 enablement; the real-product perf-VM 1/150 ms, echo, throughput and 1/50/500-session memory matrix; real-engine defensive auth/ownership/forwarding review. The pinned engine audit records why automatic receive refill plus a bounded callback queue alone is insufficient: [source paths/hashes](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6607fd92-62f3-4ff6-9afb-9c9cee00438a). D289 remains the decided engine. Research figures are not product acceptance evidence. Cleanup: worktree clean; local and pushed heads match. Own target executables and recorded build/test control PIDs are gone. Own detached baseline, target, comparison binaries, runtime/XDG state, temporary helpers and checkout bytecode removed; receipts retained outside the checkout. No merge, deploy, host-key change, owner-fixture change or issue closure. [Cleanup receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/aa6c4bbd-4410-4291-8360-bb1c0212abfa).
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:35:40 +00:00
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Continuation started on mesh-ssh at e6da99909d, base origin/dev 650472b987. Fetch completed; origin/dev, origin/access-rules-v4 (2ba357265) and origin/real-logins (a92989f1e) are unchanged from the checkpoint. Worktree clean; step 1 remains the completed checkpoint. Reading the complete issue/research history and rechecking shared-authority/person-runtime dependencies before implementation. No merge or deploy.

Continuation started on mesh-ssh at e6da99909db935a778f44ba450e1381275bc470c, base origin/dev 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79. Fetch completed; origin/dev, origin/access-rules-v4 (2ba357265) and origin/real-logins (a92989f1e) are unchanged from the checkpoint. Worktree clean; step 1 remains the completed checkpoint. Reading the complete issue/research history and rechecking shared-authority/person-runtime dependencies before implementation. No merge or deploy.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:36:46 +00:00
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Blocked at step 2 after the dependency recheck; D289 SSH server slice remains incomplete. Head/origin mesh-ssh remain e6da99909d; origin/dev remains 650472b987. No rebase needed, no code changes or new commits.

Evidence: source/ref audit. dev has zero login_access/LoginAccess/current SSH certificate authority implementations. The branch has only admission/verifier traits and test implementations. sessions.rs:508 launches a uid-only __shim in a per-terminal scope; pty.rs:33 directly launches the account shell. No shared Login access executor or current person/link/SSH-certificate authority is available to consume. Q14 remains NOT MET; actions remain unavailable.

Dependency status: origin/access-rules-v4 2ba357265 adds 11 documentation files only. Its draft still lists R3S-01/R3S-02, but #186 later records their documentation resolution at local e177c9b5; that is not evidence of an executable authority. origin/real-logins a92989f1 contains the reusable runtime; #172 final report still leaves size/performance acceptance unresolved. D289 covers russh/ring/SFTP only, not those dependencies.

Unblock owner: orchestrator to supply/integrate the shared access/identity authority from #186 and the accepted person/account runtime from #172 (or assign those prerequisite implementations explicitly with the resolved contract). Required interfaces: one revision/current-authority guard covering shell/file admission and revocation; certificate/person/node/link lookup; person-owned shim launch/reattach/exec/EOF and target-account file operations. The owner settles any remaining authority semantics. A separate SSH-only rule store or shell tree would violate D235/D240 and is not an integration substitute.

Steps 3-7 remain pending: bounded SSH/shim transport; real PTY/exec/SFTP; all-shell Q14 rollout; final-product perf VM matrix; defensive auth/session/forwarding review. No new runtime or measurement claim. No fresh full gate was run for this read-only dependency audit. Last full scripts/verify fast at the IDENTICAL head is the previous checkpoint exit 0: raw gate. Verbatim retained summary:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+

Retained same-recipe size delta: x86 -10,048 B, ARM -6,400 B; D289 allowance unused. Clean worktree, no builds/servers/VM sessions started, no merge/deploy. This is a dependency-blocked handoff, not completion or a review-ready server.

Blocked at step 2 after the dependency recheck; D289 SSH server slice remains incomplete. Head/origin mesh-ssh remain e6da99909db935a778f44ba450e1381275bc470c; origin/dev remains 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79. No rebase needed, no code changes or new commits. Evidence: [source/ref audit](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ef89ca06-7b76-4a75-967e-ea8ae27f69ed). dev has zero login_access/LoginAccess/current SSH certificate authority implementations. The branch has only admission/verifier traits and test implementations. sessions.rs:508 launches a uid-only __shim in a per-terminal scope; pty.rs:33 directly launches the account shell. No shared Login access executor or current person/link/SSH-certificate authority is available to consume. Q14 remains NOT MET; actions remain unavailable. Dependency status: origin/access-rules-v4 2ba357265 adds 11 documentation files only. Its draft still lists R3S-01/R3S-02, but #186 later records their documentation resolution at local e177c9b5; that is not evidence of an executable authority. origin/real-logins a92989f1 contains the reusable runtime; #172 final report still leaves size/performance acceptance unresolved. D289 covers russh/ring/SFTP only, not those dependencies. Unblock owner: orchestrator to supply/integrate the shared access/identity authority from #186 and the accepted person/account runtime from #172 (or assign those prerequisite implementations explicitly with the resolved contract). Required interfaces: one revision/current-authority guard covering shell/file admission and revocation; certificate/person/node/link lookup; person-owned shim launch/reattach/exec/EOF and target-account file operations. The owner settles any remaining authority semantics. A separate SSH-only rule store or shell tree would violate D235/D240 and is not an integration substitute. Steps 3-7 remain pending: bounded SSH/shim transport; real PTY/exec/SFTP; all-shell Q14 rollout; final-product perf VM matrix; defensive auth/session/forwarding review. No new runtime or measurement claim. No fresh full gate was run for this read-only dependency audit. Last full scripts/verify fast at the IDENTICAL head is the previous checkpoint exit 0: [raw gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d8046d9b-e897-4425-b9a2-5fcbb631f103). Verbatim retained summary: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ ``` Retained same-recipe size delta: x86 -10,048 B, ARM -6,400 B; D289 allowance unused. Clean worktree, no builds/servers/VM sessions started, no merge/deploy. This is a dependency-blocked handoff, not completion or a review-ready server.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:39:29 +00:00
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Continuation started on mesh-ssh at e6da99909d; merge base origin/dev 650472b987, unchanged after fetch. Read #221 history (184 comments) and linked #162 history; no separate parent recorded. Latest brief explicitly authorizes a test LoginAuthority/session-spawner boundary while real-logins is pending. Step 1 remains complete. Building independent admission/session interfaces and consumption-aware transport; SSH remains disabled by default and Q14 remains NOT MET. No merge/deploy.

Continuation started on mesh-ssh at e6da99909db935a778f44ba450e1381275bc470c; merge base origin/dev 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79, unchanged after fetch. Read #221 history (184 comments) and linked #162 history; no separate parent recorded. Latest brief explicitly authorizes a test LoginAuthority/session-spawner boundary while real-logins is pending. Step 1 remains complete. Building independent admission/session interfaces and consumption-aware transport; SSH remains disabled by default and Q14 remains NOT MET. No merge/deploy.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:40:01 +00:00
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Additive transport contract proposal: use an opt-in consumer-credit mode in the pinned russh 0.64.1 engine, retaining default behavior for other consumers. In that mode reject input beyond the advertised byte window, do not automatically refill, and return credit only after the runtime accepts bytes. Credit updates must remain runnable while peer output is blocked. A fixed byte buffer (not a packet-count queue) bounds tiny writes too. There is no public consumed-credit API in the pinned source: server/encrypted.rs:1332 refills before data; Handler::adjust_window cannot suppress that refill; Session exposes no receive-window update. Evaluating a small auditable source patch to the decided engine rather than selecting another engine. LoginAuthority will hold a current-authority guard across verification and per-person runtime open; tests supply that boundary without implementing a second access store. No production enablement or target-user runtime claim.

Additive transport contract proposal: use an opt-in consumer-credit mode in the pinned russh 0.64.1 engine, retaining default behavior for other consumers. In that mode reject input beyond the advertised byte window, do not automatically refill, and return credit only after the runtime accepts bytes. Credit updates must remain runnable while peer output is blocked. A fixed byte buffer (not a packet-count queue) bounds tiny writes too. There is no public consumed-credit API in the pinned source: server/encrypted.rs:1332 refills before data; Handler::adjust_window cannot suppress that refill; Session exposes no receive-window update. Evaluating a small auditable source patch to the decided engine rather than selecting another engine. LoginAuthority will hold a current-authority guard across verification and per-person runtime open; tests supply that boundary without implementing a second access store. No production enablement or target-user runtime claim.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:51:12 +00:00
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Completed/pushed 9e7816717: guard-borrowed LoginAuthority/target-user session and file interfaces, with no access-rule store or shell launcher. Completed/pushed 3286c58b6: unmodified published sources of the already-pinned russh 0.64.1 and russh-sftp 3.0.1, preserving licenses, for auditable local API changes; engine/backend/features unchanged. Each isolated commit passed fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and library tests (26 passed, 3 ignored). Boundary gate, dependency source gate.

Defensive transport finding: automatic refill fails the 8 MiB/slow-consumer fixture with Inconsistent/SendError. Opt-in acknowledged consumer credit passes the same transfer through a 1 KiB runtime pipe, preserves second-channel control progress and orders EOF. A byte-queue case bounds 65,536 one-byte writes and refuses the next byte. Before, working-tree functional results. No build-host timing is performance evidence. Engine credit patch/flow module are being gated as the next atomic step.

Additional lifecycle finding: russh-sftp run_with_config always detaches a task; it cannot cancel an in-flight file operation at attachment teardown. An owned future is being added separately. PTY/exec/SFTP and auth probes use a test LoginAuthority/runtime only; production target-user integration and Q14 remain pending. Perf VM access works; no measurements yet.

Completed/pushed 9e7816717: guard-borrowed LoginAuthority/target-user session and file interfaces, with no access-rule store or shell launcher. Completed/pushed 3286c58b6: unmodified published sources of the already-pinned russh 0.64.1 and russh-sftp 3.0.1, preserving licenses, for auditable local API changes; engine/backend/features unchanged. Each isolated commit passed fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and library tests (26 passed, 3 ignored). [Boundary gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f7d1b6ae-6834-40d0-8c2e-9ac439e46484), [dependency source gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/403ab566-9384-4b02-91b1-3973a190a980). Defensive transport finding: automatic refill fails the 8 MiB/slow-consumer fixture with Inconsistent/SendError. Opt-in acknowledged consumer credit passes the same transfer through a 1 KiB runtime pipe, preserves second-channel control progress and orders EOF. A byte-queue case bounds 65,536 one-byte writes and refuses the next byte. [Before](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/367ea8b2-33fe-4f6c-ac68-e2e903047b68), [working-tree functional results](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3b931624-36f8-4af4-a02f-20911ba0cf72). No build-host timing is performance evidence. Engine credit patch/flow module are being gated as the next atomic step. Additional lifecycle finding: russh-sftp run_with_config always detaches a task; it cannot cancel an in-flight file operation at attachment teardown. An owned future is being added separately. PTY/exec/SFTP and auth probes use a test LoginAuthority/runtime only; production target-user integration and Q14 remain pending. Perf VM access works; no measurements yet.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 21:56:17 +00:00
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Completed/pushed bounded transport step 18bf51f5b: manual receive-window mode, strict byte-credit accounting and acknowledged consumed-byte updates independent of blocked output. Three real-engine transport tests PASS: 8 MiB inbound through a 1 KiB runtime pipe with second-channel control progress; 8 MiB outbound to a paused/slow reader with eventual exact completion; 65,536 one-byte writes bounded with ordered EOF and overflow refusal. Over-credit/zero-credit are refused. Scoped fmt/SSH all-target Clippy and 26 library tests PASS. Gate. These are functional proofs, not build-host performance claims.

Completed/pushed file-worker ownership fix 112e7aefc: owned SFTP protocol future cancels a pending file operation when the attachment is dropped; protocol/I/O errors terminate it. Detached worker regression fails, owned future passes. Before, gate. No additional dependency/backend or production shell/file authority.

Defensive adapter audit also reproduced PTY acceptance without the signed permit-pty extension; new adapter now requires that extension. Failing assertion. Adapter/channel/auth gates are running before their atomic commit. Q14 remains NOT MET; component actions remain unavailable.

Completed/pushed bounded transport step 18bf51f5b: manual receive-window mode, strict byte-credit accounting and acknowledged consumed-byte updates independent of blocked output. Three real-engine transport tests PASS: 8 MiB inbound through a 1 KiB runtime pipe with second-channel control progress; 8 MiB outbound to a paused/slow reader with eventual exact completion; 65,536 one-byte writes bounded with ordered EOF and overflow refusal. Over-credit/zero-credit are refused. Scoped fmt/SSH all-target Clippy and 26 library tests PASS. [Gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/276b02c6-28e8-4d63-b62c-88aae424cd16). These are functional proofs, not build-host performance claims. Completed/pushed file-worker ownership fix 112e7aefc: owned SFTP protocol future cancels a pending file operation when the attachment is dropped; protocol/I/O errors terminate it. Detached worker regression fails, owned future passes. [Before](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7eec0934-121e-4b4e-9891-6c1acff1ebc4), [gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ee0fa1dc-0ebd-4329-883e-94c3099f68f0). No additional dependency/backend or production shell/file authority. Defensive adapter audit also reproduced PTY acceptance without the signed permit-pty extension; new adapter now requires that extension. [Failing assertion](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/562ceb00-ebc2-4425-9660-e772b4aa9d05). Adapter/channel/auth gates are running before their atomic commit. Q14 remains NOT MET; component actions remain unavailable.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 22:01:26 +00:00
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Completed/pushed channel step 77185b72e: PTY, exec, EOF/exit status, target-runtime SFTP, resize/signal and attachment cancellation behind LoginAuthority. Every session/file open reverifies current certificate/person/network/login under the same guard as runtime registration; an authenticated person cannot be rebound to another person. Runtime opens and pumps run outside protocol callbacks. Four channels/connection; 64 KiB receive window/channel; 16 KiB transfer units; bounded command/terminal/control metadata. No shell process or daemon filesystem operation was added.

Scoped fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and all selected tests PASS: 26 library, 3 flow, 5 channel/auth, 1 file-worker cancellation. Adapter cases include an authority-held-open barrier with unrelated PTY control progress; missing signed permit-pty refusal; invalid issuer/expired/principal/revoked/network/login refusal; current revocation on shell/files opens; forwarding refusal; PTY/resize/signal; exec/EOF/status; SFTP write/read. Verbatim scoped gate. Tests use a person runtime double, not OS login or a real session shim.

Q14 remains NOT MET: no production LoginAuthority or shared all-shell executor is available on dev; existing terminal/app/file paths are not switched to shared login access. SSH component actions remain unavailable and no listener/lifecycle/add-host switch is wired. The owner/orchestrator still needs the accepted shared runtime/access implementation for production integration. Continuing the separately measured transport-only matrix on the perf VM, static size and final full gate; no production-ready claim.

Completed/pushed channel step 77185b72e: PTY, exec, EOF/exit status, target-runtime SFTP, resize/signal and attachment cancellation behind LoginAuthority. Every session/file open reverifies current certificate/person/network/login under the same guard as runtime registration; an authenticated person cannot be rebound to another person. Runtime opens and pumps run outside protocol callbacks. Four channels/connection; 64 KiB receive window/channel; 16 KiB transfer units; bounded command/terminal/control metadata. No shell process or daemon filesystem operation was added. Scoped fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and all selected tests PASS: 26 library, 3 flow, 5 channel/auth, 1 file-worker cancellation. Adapter cases include an authority-held-open barrier with unrelated PTY control progress; missing signed permit-pty refusal; invalid issuer/expired/principal/revoked/network/login refusal; current revocation on shell/files opens; forwarding refusal; PTY/resize/signal; exec/EOF/status; SFTP write/read. [Verbatim scoped gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/eb659d57-bccb-452f-971d-d8ac0b1a2e12). Tests use a person runtime double, not OS login or a real session shim. Q14 remains NOT MET: no production LoginAuthority or shared all-shell executor is available on dev; existing terminal/app/file paths are not switched to shared login access. SSH component actions remain unavailable and no listener/lifecycle/add-host switch is wired. The owner/orchestrator still needs the accepted shared runtime/access implementation for production integration. Continuing the separately measured transport-only matrix on the perf VM, static size and final full gate; no production-ready claim.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 22:09:01 +00:00
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Lifecycle audit finding: vendor/russh/src/server/mod.rs::run_stream returns RunningSession containing russh-util::runtime::JoinHandle, which wraps only a oneshot receiver. russh-util 0.52.0 runtime.rs::spawn discards the actual Tokio task handle; dropping RunningSession therefore detaches, rather than cancels, the protocol worker. Aborting a caller task alone cannot satisfy D198 component-off cleanup. A focused real-engine regression now checks the retained authority Arc after cancelling the connection owner; it is waiting for the ongoing workspace test build lock. Planned additive API: a directly owned serve_stream future sharing the existing initialization, with no engine background spawn; the adapter and measurement fixture will use it. No new dependency/backend. Existing queued perf fixture predates this ownership correction and will be labelled accordingly until rerun.

Lifecycle audit finding: vendor/russh/src/server/mod.rs::run_stream returns RunningSession containing russh-util::runtime::JoinHandle, which wraps only a oneshot receiver. russh-util 0.52.0 runtime.rs::spawn discards the actual Tokio task handle; dropping RunningSession therefore detaches, rather than cancels, the protocol worker. Aborting a caller task alone cannot satisfy D198 component-off cleanup. A focused real-engine regression now checks the retained authority Arc after cancelling the connection owner; it is waiting for the ongoing workspace test build lock. Planned additive API: a directly owned serve_stream future sharing the existing initialization, with no engine background spawn; the adapter and measurement fixture will use it. No new dependency/backend. Existing queued perf fixture predates this ownership correction and will be labelled accordingly until rerun.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 22:11:05 +00:00
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Connection ownership regression reproduced: cancelling the caller retained 2 authority Arcs instead of 1, proving the detached protocol worker survived. The directly owned serve_stream/mesh_server::serve path reduces that count to exactly 1 after caller cancellation. Before, after. This local engine API shares initialization with run_stream; existing convenience semantics remain unchanged. Full scoped gate/rebuild is running before commit.

Milestone iterate stopped at agent_daemon before reaching the later workspace suites: fixture_state rejected my private test-state prefix because the generated Unix socket path was 112 bytes. This is a runner configuration error, not a baseline waiver or production fix. The private root is now mesh-ssh/s (103-byte generated path), and the same functional daemon test is being rerun. fmt, VT fmt, plugin compile-out, clippy and cargo-deny passed; test row failed. Verbatim iterate output. No final-fast claim. Perf VM remains queued behind pill-flicker; no measurement accepted yet.

Connection ownership regression reproduced: cancelling the caller retained 2 authority Arcs instead of 1, proving the detached protocol worker survived. The directly owned serve_stream/mesh_server::serve path reduces that count to exactly 1 after caller cancellation. [Before](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9d9a2612-932b-471a-997c-f1bb18d7223c), [after](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c1a24d08-0442-4e14-a0c4-e0a9d26d4b01). This local engine API shares initialization with run_stream; existing convenience semantics remain unchanged. Full scoped gate/rebuild is running before commit. Milestone iterate stopped at agent_daemon before reaching the later workspace suites: fixture_state rejected my private test-state prefix because the generated Unix socket path was 112 bytes. This is a runner configuration error, not a baseline waiver or production fix. The private root is now mesh-ssh/s (103-byte generated path), and the same functional daemon test is being rerun. fmt, VT fmt, plugin compile-out, clippy and cargo-deny passed; test row failed. [Verbatim iterate output](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ada9d176-9b41-4d29-9ffa-23e2e102eba9). No final-fast claim. Perf VM remains queued behind pill-flicker; no measurement accepted yet.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 22:16:15 +00:00
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Perf VM baseline completed at source 6245fecee, probe SHA256 3a56642742b420afe0b1b2bcdcf614b32f472392a77165ed2653f8613d22037f. This PRECEDES the owned-connection correction and is not final acceptance. Machine: infraternal-perf-test, Debian 13, 4 vCPU; CPUWeight=10000 under the shared lock; own disposable loopback namespace. Load 1.03/1.36/1.43 before -> 0.10/0.82/1.21 after.

100 samples/profile, milliseconds p50/p99:

  • modeled 1 ms: calibrated raw RTT 1.175/1.955 (31 samples); TCP-to-fixture-prompt 13.375/18.259; echo 1.253/4.070.
  • modeled 150 ms: calibrated raw RTT 150.383/152.365; TCP-to-fixture-prompt 1356.299/1363.118; echo 150.538/152.653.

Server-only PSS: 0 sessions 1,726 KiB; 1 session 1,786 KiB (+60 KiB); 50 sessions 5,590 KiB (+3,864 KiB, 79,134 B/session); 500 sessions 40,746 KiB (+39,020 KiB, 79,912 B/session, 38.1 MiB added at scale). The client process is excluded. Verified 32 MiB echo: 30.319 MiB/s. No real login, shell process or PTY/shim is included: the runtime double uses a 1 KiB pipe. Research #221 reference includes real PTY/command children, 151 ms rather than 150 ms, and a 1 GiB throughput run: 99.983/104.314 ms at 1 ms; 1751.990/1756.054 ms at 151 ms; 188.696 KiB/session at 500; 141.999 MiB/s. These different runtime/traffic scopes are not an end-to-end improvement claim.

Full raw metrics and cleanup, exact VM recipe, probe build/scoped checks. Server PID 1811320 was waited/reaped; /proc entry absent and namespace absent. Lock released. The helper rejected uploading .sh with HTTP 422; the same recipe was attached as .txt.

Throughput audit: the input bridge currently waits for a consumed-credit acknowledgement after every partial write (1 KiB with this double). Measuring a targeted before/after run for batching acknowledged, already-consumed credit is next; memory remains byte-window bounded. Final full matrix will use the owned connection path. Q14 stays NOT MET.

Perf VM baseline completed at source 6245fecee, probe SHA256 3a56642742b420afe0b1b2bcdcf614b32f472392a77165ed2653f8613d22037f. This PRECEDES the owned-connection correction and is not final acceptance. Machine: infraternal-perf-test, Debian 13, 4 vCPU; CPUWeight=10000 under the shared lock; own disposable loopback namespace. Load 1.03/1.36/1.43 before -> 0.10/0.82/1.21 after. 100 samples/profile, milliseconds p50/p99: - modeled 1 ms: calibrated raw RTT 1.175/1.955 (31 samples); TCP-to-fixture-prompt 13.375/18.259; echo 1.253/4.070. - modeled 150 ms: calibrated raw RTT 150.383/152.365; TCP-to-fixture-prompt 1356.299/1363.118; echo 150.538/152.653. Server-only PSS: 0 sessions 1,726 KiB; 1 session 1,786 KiB (+60 KiB); 50 sessions 5,590 KiB (+3,864 KiB, 79,134 B/session); 500 sessions 40,746 KiB (+39,020 KiB, 79,912 B/session, 38.1 MiB added at scale). The client process is excluded. Verified 32 MiB echo: 30.319 MiB/s. No real login, shell process or PTY/shim is included: the runtime double uses a 1 KiB pipe. Research #221 reference includes real PTY/command children, 151 ms rather than 150 ms, and a 1 GiB throughput run: 99.983/104.314 ms at 1 ms; 1751.990/1756.054 ms at 151 ms; 188.696 KiB/session at 500; 141.999 MiB/s. These different runtime/traffic scopes are not an end-to-end improvement claim. [Full raw metrics and cleanup](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3af25f94-abf8-4d27-81b1-852558e54f78), [exact VM recipe](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/4efe3a19-7e62-4c2a-9c66-60931bc303cd), [probe build/scoped checks](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/25415af4-acae-4f05-ad59-780fe3004fa4). Server PID 1811320 was waited/reaped; /proc entry absent and namespace absent. Lock released. The helper rejected uploading .sh with HTTP 422; the same recipe was attached as .txt. Throughput audit: the input bridge currently waits for a consumed-credit acknowledgement after every partial write (1 KiB with this double). Measuring a targeted before/after run for batching acknowledged, already-consumed credit is next; memory remains byte-window bounded. Final full matrix will use the owned connection path. Q14 stays NOT MET.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 22:28:43 +00:00
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Completed/pushed connection ownership correction 0d6eab7ec. Seven adapter tests include caller cancellation (authority count 2 -> 1) and retirement of an active attachment/open future. Final scoped ownership gate, broader scope + corrected daemon oracle. The shortened private test root fixes the earlier runner-only AF_UNIX length error; real-binary daemon oracle now PASS (24 abrupt-stop cycles).

Completed/pushed defensive auth 570b91246 and rekey coverage 091f6ac09. Nine protocol rejection cases include wrong proof key, another account and wrong source; rejected certificates cannot become ordinary-key person logins. A signed two-principal certificate is remapped in current authority after authentication, yet the old connection is refused both shell and file opens as the new person. Both 8 MiB transfer directions pass with 256 KiB rekey thresholds and assert multiple completed exchanges. Scoped audit gate.

Completed/pushed PTY interoperability correction 0c047cd7f. The stock client forced to use a PTY with piped stdin sends zero dimensions; RFC 4254 section 6.2 requires those fields to be ignored. Before: PTY allocation request failed. After: initial unspecified size uses 80x24; each partial resize preserves unspecified current fields. Failing stock-client receipt. The stock client now completes certificate exec, forced PTY and SFTP put/get with strict fixture host trust, no user config/signing socket, and synthetic keys held only in anonymous memory descriptors. Scoped gate also passes 26 library, 3 rekey/flow, 8 adapter and 1 file-cancellation tests.

Targeted owned-connection throughput baseline (b0c2f3f61) waits behind the shared perf lock. Both shipping static builds are queued/running with the normal locked release recipe; no cap change or D289 spend inferred. Q14 remains NOT MET; SSH stays unavailable in component actions.

Completed/pushed connection ownership correction 0d6eab7ec. Seven adapter tests include caller cancellation (authority count 2 -> 1) and retirement of an active attachment/open future. [Final scoped ownership gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c0c036ea-30e1-4aa6-a485-3821075310a2), [broader scope + corrected daemon oracle](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a40784cc-97b6-4b4f-b906-7bc2a855e607). The shortened private test root fixes the earlier runner-only AF_UNIX length error; real-binary daemon oracle now PASS (24 abrupt-stop cycles). Completed/pushed defensive auth 570b91246 and rekey coverage 091f6ac09. Nine protocol rejection cases include wrong proof key, another account and wrong source; rejected certificates cannot become ordinary-key person logins. A signed two-principal certificate is remapped in current authority after authentication, yet the old connection is refused both shell and file opens as the new person. Both 8 MiB transfer directions pass with 256 KiB rekey thresholds and assert multiple completed exchanges. [Scoped audit gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2e22c79e-6c85-408a-8c2b-72bdad52b56a). Completed/pushed PTY interoperability correction 0c047cd7f. The stock client forced to use a PTY with piped stdin sends zero dimensions; [RFC 4254 section 6.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4254#section-6.2) requires those fields to be ignored. Before: PTY allocation request failed. After: initial unspecified size uses 80x24; each partial resize preserves unspecified current fields. [Failing stock-client receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2e959fc0-5359-4128-844d-c66c568c7c43). The stock client now completes certificate exec, forced PTY and SFTP put/get with strict fixture host trust, no user config/signing socket, and synthetic keys held only in anonymous memory descriptors. Scoped gate also passes 26 library, 3 rekey/flow, 8 adapter and 1 file-cancellation tests. Targeted owned-connection throughput baseline (b0c2f3f61) waits behind the shared perf lock. Both shipping static builds are queued/running with the normal locked release recipe; no cap change or D289 spend inferred. Q14 remains NOT MET; SSH stays unavailable in component actions.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 23:16:13 +00:00
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Steps committed/pushed through 97af82a63. a7acaacde limits discovery to certificate/public-key authentication (red test recorded); f945eaec1 batches only consumed input credit, reducing 64 window updates to 2 per 64 KiB through the 1 KiB test pipe, flushing short EOF. Scoped fmt/clippy and 26 library, 4 flow, 9 adapter, owned-SFTP and stock-client tests PASS. Both nf_tables original-service tests PASS (accepted counts [2,2], internal destination port alone refused).

Fresh perf-VM transfer comparison, same fixture/32 MiB echo: before med 27.809 MiB/s; after 50.726 MiB/s (+82.4%). The first complete batched matrix instead measured med 13.300 MiB/s after delayed-RTT and 500-session phases, with 150 ms echo p99 167.849 ms. Both receipts are retained; cause is not proven. 97af82a63 adds socket retirement checks, namespace-private TCP metric reset and raw samples/after-echo calibration. Final isolated matrix is running under the perf lock; final scripts/verify fast is running on this head.

9f5913aca ratchets the x86 cap by 64 bytes. Final shipping static sizes: x86 21,310,288 B; ARM 19,511,136 B; versus merge base 650472b987: -10,112/-6,400 B. Exact cap, one-byte-over and shrink checks PASS. No D289 allowance spent: the production authority/runtime remains unavailable and the engine adapter is not retained by the shipping executable. This is not a measurement of the future wired-in server cost. D235 Q14 remains NOT MET; SSH stays unavailable pending the shared login executor and per-person runtime integration.

perf-final.log
transfer-after-batch.log
static-final-code.log
final-cap-checks.log
batched-credit-gate.log
auth-discovery-before.log
original-service-nft.log
original-service-netlink.log
phase-isolation-build.log

Steps committed/pushed through 97af82a63. a7acaacde limits discovery to certificate/public-key authentication (red test recorded); f945eaec1 batches only consumed input credit, reducing 64 window updates to 2 per 64 KiB through the 1 KiB test pipe, flushing short EOF. Scoped fmt/clippy and 26 library, 4 flow, 9 adapter, owned-SFTP and stock-client tests PASS. Both nf_tables original-service tests PASS (accepted counts [2,2], internal destination port alone refused). Fresh perf-VM transfer comparison, same fixture/32 MiB echo: before med 27.809 MiB/s; after 50.726 MiB/s (+82.4%). The first complete batched matrix instead measured med 13.300 MiB/s after delayed-RTT and 500-session phases, with 150 ms echo p99 167.849 ms. Both receipts are retained; cause is not proven. 97af82a63 adds socket retirement checks, namespace-private TCP metric reset and raw samples/after-echo calibration. Final isolated matrix is running under the perf lock; final scripts/verify fast is running on this head. 9f5913aca ratchets the x86 cap by 64 bytes. Final shipping static sizes: x86 21,310,288 B; ARM 19,511,136 B; versus merge base 650472b987: -10,112/-6,400 B. Exact cap, one-byte-over and shrink checks PASS. No D289 allowance spent: the production authority/runtime remains unavailable and the engine adapter is not retained by the shipping executable. This is not a measurement of the future wired-in server cost. D235 Q14 remains NOT MET; SSH stays unavailable pending the shared login executor and per-person runtime integration. [perf-final.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/eb1f1058-6e1b-4549-8f11-9faa453997fb) [transfer-after-batch.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b869d2ca-4548-42b1-b2a3-e162035276b8) [static-final-code.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/abff3ae7-76c9-4349-9692-927b3b2339c8) [final-cap-checks.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/581346ca-4f18-4cc0-9562-ed3f33436a9b) [batched-credit-gate.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/32270622-8eaa-40e2-af14-ada9c5abdbc7) [auth-discovery-before.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/711b7e73-0473-47ef-997c-b47d774d195c) [original-service-nft.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/25eb0301-b08c-434b-bfa4-fc1fa480a22d) [original-service-netlink.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1978917f-c35d-4b87-bd6e-e5f026ba36f6) [phase-isolation-build.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2a59b5da-e15c-4d69-886f-25d0498f5f76)
kayg commented 2026-10-16 23:19:38 +00:00
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Final isolated transport measurements on 97af82a63, perf VM 4 vCPU Intel i9-9900K, Linux 6.12.111, CPUWeight=10000, private netem loopback namespace. Load 1.24/1.29/0.99 -> 0.22/0.75/0.82. Probe sha256 74930601d86143d721c183fb53f764b69fb7a2f5445f4f8ca61b14d325cb9f80.

100 samples each (p50/p99 ms): modeled RTT 1: TCP-to-fixture-prompt 12.485/13.988, echo 1.247/1.405; modeled RTT 150: prompt 1355.960/1360.344, echo 150.573/152.997. Raw network before/after high-RTT echo: 150.399/150.890 and 150.362/151.299. Final matrix verifies all sockets return to baseline (server4/client3) between phases. This removes the earlier full-matrix throughput reduction; destination TCP metrics and retiring connections were confounders, not separately attributed.

Server PSS: baseline 3856 KiB; 1 session 3892 (+36); 50 sessions 7012 (+3156, 64634 B/session); 500 sessions 35160 (+31304, 64110 B/session = 30.57 MiB aggregate). Five verified 32 MiB echo transfers: 61.348/69.809/56.698/62.384/57.510 MiB/s, median 61.348. Matched fresh-server before/after batching remains 27.809 -> 50.726 MiB/s. Earlier slower matrix retained in previous comment.

Research reference prompt 99.983/104.314 ms at RTT1 and 1751.990/1756.054 at RTT151, 188.696 KiB/session at500, 1 GiB echo141.999 MiB/s. Those included real PTY/processes and different transfer sizes; these test-authority/duplex-runtime numbers are transport-only, not an end-to-end speedup or real login/shim qualification. No production process tree or target-user filesystem is provided by the test runtime.

Cleanup: server1897486 waited/proc absent, parent1897481 absent, 500 sessions retired, namespace absent; no host network changes. Author review completed for authorization, ownership, bounds, requests, removable plugin, secrets and measured scope. Final repository gate still running; Q14 remains NOT MET.

perf-isolated.log
author-review.txt

Final isolated transport measurements on 97af82a63, perf VM 4 vCPU Intel i9-9900K, Linux 6.12.111, CPUWeight=10000, private netem loopback namespace. Load 1.24/1.29/0.99 -> 0.22/0.75/0.82. Probe sha256 74930601d86143d721c183fb53f764b69fb7a2f5445f4f8ca61b14d325cb9f80. 100 samples each (p50/p99 ms): modeled RTT 1: TCP-to-fixture-prompt 12.485/13.988, echo 1.247/1.405; modeled RTT 150: prompt 1355.960/1360.344, echo 150.573/152.997. Raw network before/after high-RTT echo: 150.399/150.890 and 150.362/151.299. Final matrix verifies all sockets return to baseline (server4/client3) between phases. This removes the earlier full-matrix throughput reduction; destination TCP metrics and retiring connections were confounders, not separately attributed. Server PSS: baseline 3856 KiB; 1 session 3892 (+36); 50 sessions 7012 (+3156, 64634 B/session); 500 sessions 35160 (+31304, 64110 B/session = 30.57 MiB aggregate). Five verified 32 MiB echo transfers: 61.348/69.809/56.698/62.384/57.510 MiB/s, median 61.348. Matched fresh-server before/after batching remains 27.809 -> 50.726 MiB/s. Earlier slower matrix retained in previous comment. Research reference prompt 99.983/104.314 ms at RTT1 and 1751.990/1756.054 at RTT151, 188.696 KiB/session at500, 1 GiB echo141.999 MiB/s. Those included real PTY/processes and different transfer sizes; these test-authority/duplex-runtime numbers are transport-only, not an end-to-end speedup or real login/shim qualification. No production process tree or target-user filesystem is provided by the test runtime. Cleanup: server1897486 waited/proc absent, parent1897481 absent, 500 sessions retired, namespace absent; no host network changes. Author review completed for authorization, ownership, bounds, requests, removable plugin, secrets and measured scope. Final repository gate still running; Q14 remains NOT MET. [perf-isolated.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7933c72a-0095-42bb-94a0-6479ebeac968) [author-review.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/29c24a5b-c7a9-45e2-9ce7-01885689a821)
kayg commented 2026-10-16 23:36:47 +00:00
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Finished independent transport slice at 97af82a63f, pushed to mesh-ssh only; clean worktree. No merge/deploy. Owned russh/ring transport, current-guard LoginAuthority boundary, bounded credit/output/control, PTY/exec/SFTP adapters, real-client integration and defensive auth tests complete against the test runtime. Per-step commits/checks and measured findings recorded above. Ready for independent defensive review; stopping here as requested.

Production dependency/Q14: NOT MET. Shared login-access executor and person runtime (#205/real-logins) must provide the production authority/spawner, target-user file handler, existing-session retirement/ownership and all-shell-path enforcement. SSH remains unavailable; no independent daemon shell process tree, duplicate access store or privileged production filesystem substitute added. Forwarding is refused. The orchestrator/owner can unblock integration once that shared work lands. The shipping binary sizes exclude the unwired engine; D289's retained engine/SFTP exception must be measured when wired, not inferred from these transport-only builds.

Final scripts/verify fast on this head: exit 0, all PASS; no host-load baseline waiver. Complete unedited output is attached below. Verbatim native gate output:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+

Verbatim final protocol-test output:

 37 pass
 0 fail
 34463 expect() calls
Ran 37 tests across 10 files. [3.40s]

final-fast.log
author-review.txt
perf-cleanup.log
local-cleanup.txt

Cleanup complete: perf parent/server PIDs absent, all session sockets retired, namespace and own perf staging removed; own 25 GiB build target and temporary states removed, evidence retained outside checkout. Author checklist completed; independent review remains required. Final transport metrics and reference limitations are in the previous comment. Static x86/ARM 21,310,288/19,511,136 bytes (-10,112/-6,400 vs merge base); exact cap ratchets pass. No issue closure.

Finished independent transport slice at 97af82a63f3e2619f36fab52eb31b258e111b0dd, pushed to mesh-ssh only; clean worktree. No merge/deploy. Owned russh/ring transport, current-guard LoginAuthority boundary, bounded credit/output/control, PTY/exec/SFTP adapters, real-client integration and defensive auth tests complete against the test runtime. Per-step commits/checks and measured findings recorded above. Ready for independent defensive review; stopping here as requested. Production dependency/Q14: NOT MET. Shared login-access executor and person runtime (#205/real-logins) must provide the production authority/spawner, target-user file handler, existing-session retirement/ownership and all-shell-path enforcement. SSH remains unavailable; no independent daemon shell process tree, duplicate access store or privileged production filesystem substitute added. Forwarding is refused. The orchestrator/owner can unblock integration once that shared work lands. The shipping binary sizes exclude the unwired engine; D289's retained engine/SFTP exception must be measured when wired, not inferred from these transport-only builds. Final scripts/verify fast on this head: exit 0, all PASS; no host-load baseline waiver. Complete unedited output is attached below. Verbatim native gate output: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ ``` Verbatim final protocol-test output: ```text 37 pass 0 fail 34463 expect() calls Ran 37 tests across 10 files. [3.40s] ``` [final-fast.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bb4af4ae-b849-426a-b63d-c9a89eed9f85) [author-review.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d00344ca-89c1-44c4-87f9-0f1ea479dd26) [perf-cleanup.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/8c88a40d-d75a-41b4-a263-e723c5d380fb) [local-cleanup.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/54ce4a51-a8e2-48a5-a549-aca0a31e1bb4) Cleanup complete: perf parent/server PIDs absent, all session sockets retired, namespace and own perf staging removed; own 25 GiB build target and temporary states removed, evidence retained outside checkout. Author checklist completed; independent review remains required. Final transport metrics and reference limitations are in the previous comment. Static x86/ARM 21,310,288/19,511,136 bytes (-10,112/-6,400 vs merge base); exact cap ratchets pass. No issue closure.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 23:38:03 +00:00
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Independent verification started on review-mesh-ssh at 97af82a63 (diff base 650472b98). Reviewing D289/D235/D197, certificate proof/current-authority boundaries, refused channels, bounded transport and disabled shipping integration. No implementation edits, push or deploy. Evidence: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/.

Independent verification started on review-mesh-ssh at 97af82a63 (diff base 650472b98). Reviewing D289/D235/D197, certificate proof/current-authority boundaries, refused channels, bounded transport and disabled shipping integration. No implementation edits, push or deploy. Evidence: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/.
kayg commented 2026-10-16 23:59:49 +00:00
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Independent review: three confirmed P2 findings, no authorization bypass identified. Failing tests committed locally on review-mesh-ssh; implementation unchanged.

  • MSR-01, c47b62186: env_request/x11_request inherit no-response handlers. Both want-reply requests wait without CHANNEL_FAILURE. Tests: environment_request_with_reply_is_explicitly_refused and x11_request_with_reply_is_explicitly_refused (crates/plugins/ssh/tests/mesh_requests_review.rs).
  • MSR-02, 3417f3fac: shell authorization held behind an authority barrier, followed by no-reply resize, starts the shell but suppresses Success. First wire event is Data ready\n. Test: resize_during_pending_shell_preserves_the_shell_reply, same file. Connection::open plus the engine's single wants_reply field causes the ordering issue.
  • MSR-03, 1f1d168b5: vendor/russh-sftp/src/protocol/file_attrs.rs defaults absent flags to zero. A valid OPEN control and all 24 proper prefixes show malformed prefix length 20 dispatched to the file provider with WRITE|CREATE|TRUNCATE; reply type 102 (HANDLE). Test: open_without_attribute_flags_is_refused_before_file_provider (mesh_sftp_decode_review.rs).

requests-red.log
sftp-red.log

Fmt and SSH all-target Clippy pass. Perf VM matrix/trace and original-head fast gate remain pending. SSH stays unavailable; counts currently P0=0, P1=0, P2=3, P3=0.

Independent review: three confirmed P2 findings, no authorization bypass identified. Failing tests committed locally on review-mesh-ssh; implementation unchanged. - MSR-01, c47b62186: env_request/x11_request inherit no-response handlers. Both want-reply requests wait without CHANNEL_FAILURE. Tests: environment_request_with_reply_is_explicitly_refused and x11_request_with_reply_is_explicitly_refused (crates/plugins/ssh/tests/mesh_requests_review.rs). - MSR-02, 3417f3fac: shell authorization held behind an authority barrier, followed by no-reply resize, starts the shell but suppresses Success. First wire event is Data ready\n. Test: resize_during_pending_shell_preserves_the_shell_reply, same file. Connection::open plus the engine's single wants_reply field causes the ordering issue. - MSR-03, 1f1d168b5: vendor/russh-sftp/src/protocol/file_attrs.rs defaults absent flags to zero. A valid OPEN control and all 24 proper prefixes show malformed prefix length 20 dispatched to the file provider with WRITE|CREATE|TRUNCATE; reply type 102 (HANDLE). Test: open_without_attribute_flags_is_refused_before_file_provider (mesh_sftp_decode_review.rs). [requests-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e83c6b7e-7b7d-4a11-a850-34006c695bec) [sftp-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/03d9e4b7-d336-44dc-b7e3-ccad7014ed2b) Fmt and SSH all-target Clippy pass. Perf VM matrix/trace and original-head fast gate remain pending. SSH stays unavailable; counts currently P0=0, P1=0, P2=3, P3=0.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 00:06:48 +00:00
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Resumed independent review on review-mesh-ssh at 1f1d168b5, target/base 97af82a63 (diff from 650472b98). MSR-01..03 are already committed; continuing the unfinished invalid SFTP path test and remaining gate/perf/size receipts. No implementation edits or pushes. Evidence: /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/.

Resumed independent review on review-mesh-ssh at 1f1d168b5, target/base 97af82a63 (diff from 650472b98). MSR-01..03 are already committed; continuing the unfinished invalid SFTP path test and remaining gate/perf/size receipts. No implementation edits or pushes. Evidence: /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 00:08:16 +00:00
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Completed MSR-04 at a7c029f65 on review-mesh-ssh: invalid SFTP path encoding reaches the file provider as a replacement path instead of being refused (P2). Test invalid_path_encoding_is_refused_instead_of_selecting_a_replacement_path fails: 0 passed, 1 failed; provider called once; reply type 102. Receipt: /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/evidence/sftp-path-red.log. Implementation unchanged. Four confirmed P2 findings so far, no P0/P1. Full target-head fast gate and size comparison queued; perf VM matrix/trace waiting for the shared lock.

Completed MSR-04 at a7c029f65 on review-mesh-ssh: invalid SFTP path encoding reaches the file provider as a replacement path instead of being refused (P2). Test invalid_path_encoding_is_refused_instead_of_selecting_a_replacement_path fails: 0 passed, 1 failed; provider called once; reply type 102. Receipt: /home/kayg/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/evidence/sftp-path-red.log. Implementation unchanged. Four confirmed P2 findings so far, no P0/P1. Full target-head fast gate and size comparison queued; perf VM matrix/trace waiting for the shared lock.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 00:24:32 +00:00
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Independent review step at 0d7ffe65a (review-mesh-ssh), target 97af82a63: MSR-05 P2 committed as prompt_fits_five_round_trips (opt-in perf-VM test). 100 prompt samples at 150 ms RTT: p50/p99 1356.985/1368.533 ms, nine RTT, above the 800 ms five-flight allowance. Trace: TCP plus eight request/reply pairs. Three waits can be removed by signed-auth direct, service/auth pipelining and PTY/shell batching (~900 ms); ~750 ms additionally needs startup optimization. Channel-open confirmation supplies the remote identifier, so generally cannot be sent together with the later requests.

Perf VM: 4 vCPU Intel i9-9900K, Linux 6.12.111, CPUWeight=10000, private netem namespace; load 0.17/0.49/0.82 -> 0.36/0.34/0.70. Five 32 MiB transfers: median 61.158 MiB/s; 500 idle sessions: +30,848 KiB PSS, 63,176 bytes/session. These support the transport throughput/memory claims; OS login remains outside this fixture. Namespace checks: owned port 2/2 pass; original-service firewall 2/2 pass. Five P2 findings total; no P0/P1. Full submitted-head fast gate still running.

perf-review.log
latency-attribution.md
trace-flights.json
port-namespace.log
firewall-namespace.log
sftp-path-red.log

Independent review step at 0d7ffe65a (review-mesh-ssh), target 97af82a63: MSR-05 P2 committed as prompt_fits_five_round_trips (opt-in perf-VM test). 100 prompt samples at 150 ms RTT: p50/p99 1356.985/1368.533 ms, nine RTT, above the 800 ms five-flight allowance. Trace: TCP plus eight request/reply pairs. Three waits can be removed by signed-auth direct, service/auth pipelining and PTY/shell batching (~900 ms); ~750 ms additionally needs startup optimization. Channel-open confirmation supplies the remote identifier, so generally cannot be sent together with the later requests. Perf VM: 4 vCPU Intel i9-9900K, Linux 6.12.111, CPUWeight=10000, private netem namespace; load 0.17/0.49/0.82 -> 0.36/0.34/0.70. Five 32 MiB transfers: median 61.158 MiB/s; 500 idle sessions: +30,848 KiB PSS, 63,176 bytes/session. These support the transport throughput/memory claims; OS login remains outside this fixture. Namespace checks: owned port 2/2 pass; original-service firewall 2/2 pass. Five P2 findings total; no P0/P1. Full submitted-head fast gate still running. [perf-review.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a764bbcd-c383-4c28-b48e-358f70a6b490) [latency-attribution.md](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3410dbbc-dcb8-4a0b-8ef4-42e2020de0a9) [trace-flights.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2d45f454-a795-4b60-8a51-0724613651f2) [port-namespace.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/40482815-2acf-48d8-aa47-11478f37f48d) [firewall-namespace.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0b7e7071-40ec-4f2a-ae93-2ae1e8f1e774) [sftp-path-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a8d297a5-4de0-4d85-bef0-96f73fe372da)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 00:48:38 +00:00
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Independent review step eec28d892, target 97af82a63: MSR-06 P3 committed as arm_shipping_artifact_matches_its_declared_size. The target-head ARM static binary is 19,507,040 bytes, 4,096 below its declared exact 19,511,136 ceiling. Full scripts/verify fast exits 1 because D243 requires a downward cap update; no size regression. The dependent shipping key-memory wrapper also stops on the same cap check. x86 is exactly 21,310,288 bytes. All 114 workspace test groups pass, and all other Rust gate rows pass. Running the TypeScript continuation separately; implementation and ceilings unchanged.

Counts: P0 0, P1 0, P2 5, P3 1. Complete unmodified fast output is attached. Verbatim Rust summary:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | FAIL (1)     |
+---------------------------+--------------+

fast-head.log
fast-summary.txt
size-red.log
engine-marker-control.json

Independent review step eec28d892, target 97af82a63: MSR-06 P3 committed as arm_shipping_artifact_matches_its_declared_size. The target-head ARM static binary is 19,507,040 bytes, 4,096 below its declared exact 19,511,136 ceiling. Full scripts/verify fast exits 1 because D243 requires a downward cap update; no size regression. The dependent shipping key-memory wrapper also stops on the same cap check. x86 is exactly 21,310,288 bytes. All 114 workspace test groups pass, and all other Rust gate rows pass. Running the TypeScript continuation separately; implementation and ceilings unchanged. Counts: P0 0, P1 0, P2 5, P3 1. Complete unmodified fast output is attached. Verbatim Rust summary: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | FAIL (1) | +---------------------------+--------------+ ``` [fast-head.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0bf67c54-973b-4244-9907-403c609fbd11) [fast-summary.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9a293085-b5e6-40fa-8c54-6d02cb84727f) [size-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/4955abc9-91cc-4b11-9b8e-a17e75abb4d3) [engine-marker-control.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c4b80a5f-a9fd-4940-8c52-175fd82ab2af)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 00:49:20 +00:00
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Clarification to the previous gate comment: the second static error is scripts/test-static-size.py repeating the same ARM ceiling comparison, not a key-memory wrapper. ARM key-memory runtime is explicitly not checked on this x86_64 host (native execution required). MSR-06 remains the same P3 size metadata mismatch. Feature-off/base size builds and separate TypeScript continuation are pending.

Clarification to the previous gate comment: the second static error is scripts/test-static-size.py repeating the same ARM ceiling comparison, not a key-memory wrapper. ARM key-memory runtime is explicitly not checked on this x86_64 host (native execution required). MSR-06 remains the same P3 size metadata mismatch. Feature-off/base size builds and separate TypeScript continuation are pending.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:10:13 +00:00
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Verdict: merge, under the requested no-P0/P1 rule, with the embedded SSH server remaining disabled.

Independent verification finished: target 97af82a63, diff 650472b98..97af82a63. Review branch review-mesh-ssh, head eec28d892a9d5d588263dbd79294fb0e98193f4a, clean. Six atomic evidence commits, seven failing tests, five test files. Counts: P0=0, P1=0, P2=5, P3=1. No implementation changes, push or deploy.

MSR-01 P2: environment/X11 replies missing. MSR-02 P2: resize suppresses pending shell reply. MSR-03 P2: truncated OPEN reaches file provider. MSR-04 P2: invalid path selects replacement path. MSR-05 P2: prompt takes nine RTT. MSR-06 P3: ARM exact-size comparison fails.

Perf VM, 4 vCPU Intel i9-9900K, Linux 6.12.111, CPUWeight=10000, private netem namespace, shared lock: 100 samples at 150 ms RTT, prompt p50/p99 1356.985/1368.533 ms. Trace has nine flights. Three avoidable waits suggest six RTT (~900 ms plus local work); five RTT needs additional negotiated startup optimization. Median echo 61.158 MiB/s (five 32 MiB transfers), 500 idle connections +30,848 KiB PSS / 63,176 bytes each. Load 0.17/0.49/0.82 -> 0.36/0.34/0.70. Transport-only, no OS login/runtime claim.

Default static sizes: head x86 21,310,288 / ARM 19,507,040 B; same-recipe base 21,320,400 / 19,513,440 B; deltas -10,112 / -6,400 B. SSH-feature-off: 20,562,736 / 18,863,872 B. Both measured ARM builds are 4,096 B below the author receipts, while their relative delta agrees: reconcile size-gate/build reproducibility, not feature growth. Engine marker absent from shipping artifacts, present in retained-engine control; feature-off graph has no russh. D289 allowance remains unused by this unwired build.

scripts/verify fast on the exact target exits 1. All 114 workspace test groups and all other Rust rows pass. ARM is 4,096 B below its exact 19,511,136 B cap; the static-size self-test repeats this same comparison failure. ARM key-memory runtime is explicitly not checked on the x86_64 host. Separate TypeScript continuation exits 0: compiler/build/bundle checks and 228 tests across 41 files pass. Four namespace checks pass. Final review fmt and all-target scoped Clippy pass.

Production serve caller absent; shared login-runtime/Q14 remains deferred. Embedded packet/channel-request/SFTP fuzz targets are absent; bounded tests do not replace that missing coverage. Perf VM scratch and local build targets removed; raw evidence retained outside the checkout.

Verbatim Rust summary; complete unmodified fast output linked below:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | FAIL (1)     |
+---------------------------+--------------+

review-result.md
review-findings.md
curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 422
fast-head.log
fast-summary.txt
size-red.log
engine-marker-control.json
typescript-completion.log
typescript-status.txt
perf-review.log
latency-attribution.md
trace-flights.json
port-namespace.log
firewall-namespace.log

Verdict: merge, under the requested no-P0/P1 rule, with the embedded SSH server remaining disabled. Independent verification finished: target 97af82a63, diff 650472b98..97af82a63. Review branch review-mesh-ssh, head eec28d892a9d5d588263dbd79294fb0e98193f4a, clean. Six atomic evidence commits, seven failing tests, five test files. Counts: P0=0, P1=0, P2=5, P3=1. No implementation changes, push or deploy. MSR-01 P2: environment/X11 replies missing. MSR-02 P2: resize suppresses pending shell reply. MSR-03 P2: truncated OPEN reaches file provider. MSR-04 P2: invalid path selects replacement path. MSR-05 P2: prompt takes nine RTT. MSR-06 P3: ARM exact-size comparison fails. Perf VM, 4 vCPU Intel i9-9900K, Linux 6.12.111, CPUWeight=10000, private netem namespace, shared lock: 100 samples at 150 ms RTT, prompt p50/p99 1356.985/1368.533 ms. Trace has nine flights. Three avoidable waits suggest six RTT (~900 ms plus local work); five RTT needs additional negotiated startup optimization. Median echo 61.158 MiB/s (five 32 MiB transfers), 500 idle connections +30,848 KiB PSS / 63,176 bytes each. Load 0.17/0.49/0.82 -> 0.36/0.34/0.70. Transport-only, no OS login/runtime claim. Default static sizes: head x86 21,310,288 / ARM 19,507,040 B; same-recipe base 21,320,400 / 19,513,440 B; deltas -10,112 / -6,400 B. SSH-feature-off: 20,562,736 / 18,863,872 B. Both measured ARM builds are 4,096 B below the author receipts, while their relative delta agrees: reconcile size-gate/build reproducibility, not feature growth. Engine marker absent from shipping artifacts, present in retained-engine control; feature-off graph has no russh. D289 allowance remains unused by this unwired build. scripts/verify fast on the exact target exits 1. All 114 workspace test groups and all other Rust rows pass. ARM is 4,096 B below its exact 19,511,136 B cap; the static-size self-test repeats this same comparison failure. ARM key-memory runtime is explicitly not checked on the x86_64 host. Separate TypeScript continuation exits 0: compiler/build/bundle checks and 228 tests across 41 files pass. Four namespace checks pass. Final review fmt and all-target scoped Clippy pass. Production serve caller absent; shared login-runtime/Q14 remains deferred. Embedded packet/channel-request/SFTP fuzz targets are absent; bounded tests do not replace that missing coverage. Perf VM scratch and local build targets removed; raw evidence retained outside the checkout. Verbatim Rust summary; complete unmodified fast output linked below: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | FAIL (1) | +---------------------------+--------------+ ``` [review-result.md](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bea869f0-ec85-4bd3-9895-82b9545d95c4) [review-findings.md](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e247f2e2-41be-447c-a58c-2f45a42365e9) curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 422 [fast-head.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0bf67c54-973b-4244-9907-403c609fbd11) [fast-summary.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9a293085-b5e6-40fa-8c54-6d02cb84727f) [size-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/4955abc9-91cc-4b11-9b8e-a17e75abb4d3) [engine-marker-control.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/c4b80a5f-a9fd-4940-8c52-175fd82ab2af) [typescript-completion.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/943b645d-09ff-4072-9739-ec4a6c879727) [typescript-status.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1482c71b-bf2a-4614-bb04-7738f604ff11) [perf-review.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a764bbcd-c383-4c28-b48e-358f70a6b490) [latency-attribution.md](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3410dbbc-dcb8-4a0b-8ef4-42e2020de0a9) [trace-flights.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2d45f454-a795-4b60-8a51-0724613651f2) [port-namespace.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/40482815-2acf-48d8-aa47-11478f37f48d) [firewall-namespace.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0b7e7071-40ec-4f2a-ae93-2ae1e8f1e774)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:10:50 +00:00
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Final evidence supplement: the size receipt upload required a .json filename; the same six measured records are attached as a JSON array. Dependency, final scoped Clippy and cleanup receipts are also attached. Verdict and counts unchanged.

size-receipts.json
new-duplicates.txt
review-final-clippy.log
cleanup.txt

Final evidence supplement: the size receipt upload required a .json filename; the same six measured records are attached as a JSON array. Dependency, final scoped Clippy and cleanup receipts are also attached. Verdict and counts unchanged. [size-receipts.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/2bf5fc83-ec9b-483c-ac89-0243de4685b5) [new-duplicates.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7a6e4c82-2d68-45e9-a59b-baa1ae9ecad8) [review-final-clippy.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/ff948134-8c16-453a-94e7-70d8be831580) [cleanup.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7bf1afaf-900e-4be0-b1bc-a90f84ec9c51)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:12:26 +00:00
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Started MSR-01..06 fixes on mesh-ssh at base/head 97af82a63f. Read review findings and #221 history; no separate parent is identified. Will cherry-pick the review regressions first, fix one finding per commit, measure prompt setup on the perf VM, reconcile exact ARM size, and run the final fast gate. No push or deploy; SSH stays disabled pending #205/D235 Q14.

Started MSR-01..06 fixes on mesh-ssh at base/head 97af82a63f3e2619f36fab52eb31b258e111b0dd. Read review findings and #221 history; no separate parent is identified. Will cherry-pick the review regressions first, fix one finding per commit, measure prompt setup on the perf VM, reconcile exact ARM size, and run the final fast gate. No push or deploy; SSH stays disabled pending #205/D235 Q14.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:17:02 +00:00
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MSR-01..04 reproduced on the cherry-picked review tests before fixes: request tests 0 passed/3 failed (env/X11 no reply; resize suppresses shell success); SFTP decode 0/1 and path encoding 0/1. Source causes confirmed in mesh_server.rs, server/encrypted.rs, SFTP FileAttributesVisitor and TryBuf. Attached raw failure outputs:

review-red.log
sftp-decode-red.log
sftp-path-red.log

MSR-01..04 reproduced on the cherry-picked review tests before fixes: request tests 0 passed/3 failed (env/X11 no reply; resize suppresses shell success); SFTP decode 0/1 and path encoding 0/1. Source causes confirmed in mesh_server.rs, server/encrypted.rs, SFTP FileAttributesVisitor and TryBuf. Attached raw failure outputs: [review-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f78974bb-252f-4562-9161-b56d741f1c57) [sftp-decode-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/11456bc1-675e-4aad-8c95-a75367cee1fc) [sftp-path-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/29b748e8-8215-494b-9d0c-f0dae1977a65)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:23:27 +00:00
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MSR-01 fixed at faff06e533, local only. Refused environment/X11 requests now return failure when requested; resize/signal callbacks complete explicitly. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy, library 26 passed/3 ignored, environment 1/1 and X11 1/1 pass (both regressed before the fix).

msr01-green.log

MSR-01 fixed at faff06e533699aeb32921024aeee4ebbd6311ea3, local only. Refused environment/X11 requests now return failure when requested; resize/signal callbacks complete explicitly. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy, library 26 passed/3 ignored, environment 1/1 and X11 1/1 pass (both regressed before the fix). [msr01-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a4df9ee5-064c-42a6-9311-944fccbcc18f)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:30:12 +00:00
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MSR-02 fixed at 5f163e4007, local only. Owned reply slots preserve resize/no-reply behavior and ordered later refusals; at most 64 pending replies per channel, removed on close. New ordering and held-authority backlog tests failed before the fix; all five request regressions now pass. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy, library 26 passed/3 ignored and transport/channel/file tests 19 passed/0 failed.

msr02-green.log
msr02-order-red.log
msr02-bound-red.log

MSR-02 fixed at 5f163e4007017fd865a65406915a2df35360bc84, local only. Owned reply slots preserve resize/no-reply behavior and ordered later refusals; at most 64 pending replies per channel, removed on close. New ordering and held-authority backlog tests failed before the fix; all five request regressions now pass. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy, library 26 passed/3 ignored and transport/channel/file tests 19 passed/0 failed. [msr02-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/15e1442b-03f2-48f4-854c-f158c6276713) [msr02-order-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e400e3a5-11c8-4342-a01a-6ed9ef1ba3dd) [msr02-bound-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6b9f0ede-6254-40b9-b472-8e8c3464e4e7)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:34:04 +00:00
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MSR-03 fixed at 09ddf6a863, local only. Required ATTRS flags no longer default to zero. Defensive decode checks: 80 truncated requests never reach the file provider; six complete controls do. Existing flagged-field handling was already correct and is unchanged. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy, file adapter 1/1 and decode tests 2/2 pass.

msr03-red.log
msr03-green.log

MSR-03 fixed at 09ddf6a863a2cbc6a7bb71ca594487224d4f25d1, local only. Required ATTRS flags no longer default to zero. Defensive decode checks: 80 truncated requests never reach the file provider; six complete controls do. Existing flagged-field handling was already correct and is unchanged. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy, file adapter 1/1 and decode tests 2/2 pass. [msr03-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e61ccd5b-fe56-401f-bfee-544d043b1102) [msr03-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/aafb3b35-a0d4-4c05-8a16-b183e8eab6d3)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:35:27 +00:00
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MSR-04 fixed at b18eddca3b, local only. Invalid UTF-8 returns BadMessage before provider dispatch; no replacement path is selected. Five encoding classes are refused with error statuses and zero provider calls, then a valid Unicode path arrives unchanged on the same file channel. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and four file/decode tests pass.

msr04-red.log
msr04-green.log

MSR-04 fixed at b18eddca3b1a2990b0af8b3f21285225ee56b35c, local only. Invalid UTF-8 returns BadMessage before provider dispatch; no replacement path is selected. Five encoding classes are refused with error statuses and zero provider calls, then a valid Unicode path arrives unchanged on the same file channel. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and four file/decode tests pass. [msr04-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7bad964e-348b-43ef-9c38-3216c2ee6d45) [msr04-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/71968d10-ec03-4396-8839-7887510e0ce6)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:39:21 +00:00
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MSR-05 functional finding: standard optimistic fallback hit the inherited strict sequence check: message 30 at sequence 2 was rejected after the intentionally discarded wrong guess. The new real-engine test reproduces this before correction. Accounting for exactly the one discarded negotiated guess preserves strict validation; checking exchange-method, host-key and group-exchange fallbacks plus rekey. Public protocol basis: RFC 4253 sections 4.2/7/10. No auth data is sent until host verification completes.

msr05-fallback-diagnostic.log

MSR-05 functional finding: standard optimistic fallback hit the inherited strict sequence check: message 30 at sequence 2 was rejected after the intentionally discarded wrong guess. The new real-engine test reproduces this before correction. Accounting for exactly the one discarded negotiated guess preserves strict validation; checking exchange-method, host-key and group-exchange fallbacks plus rekey. Public protocol basis: [RFC 4253 sections 4.2/7/10](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4253). No auth data is sent until host verification completes. [msr05-fallback-diagnostic.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/59eee497-b409-44fb-9a19-79047250e9a3)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 01:56:50 +00:00
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MSR-05 fixed at 2060eb588e, local only. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and 50 scoped tests pass, including wrong-guess fallbacks (exchange, host key, group exchange), rekey, host trust, expired certificates and wrong key proof. The same opt-in five-flight test fails on the retained sequential control and passes on optimized startup, using identical static musl probe/test binaries.

Perf VM: 4 vCPU i9-9900K, Linux 6.12.111, CPUWeight=10000, shared flock, private loopback netem namespace, 100 samples/profile.

Modeled RTT Before p50/p99 ms After p50/p99 ms
1 ms 12.512 / 19.679 8.086 / 12.039
150 ms 1356.707 / 1365.647 753.646 / 756.467

Optimized echo p50/p99 at 150 ms: 150.610/152.336 ms. Idle added PSS at 1/50/500 sessions: 36/3152/31304 KiB; at 500, 64,110 B/session (31,304 KiB total). Five 32 MiB transfers: median 49.485 MiB/s (matched sequential control 33.142); these controls are transport-only, not OS login/shim evidence. Research used a real PTY/process and a different transfer size; no end-to-end speedup claim.

Load: before 1.96/1.71/1.09 -> 0.41/1.01/0.92; after 1.83/1.30/1.03 -> 0.43/0.91/0.91. Both measurement scopes inactive; server PIDs 2347360/2365674 absent, 500 sessions retired. Lock released between runs. Q14/#205 remains unmet, SSH stays unavailable. x86 shipping size remains 21,310,288 B; ARM build and final fast pending.

msr05-functional.log
msr05-perf-before.log
msr05-perf-after.log
msr05-perf-summary.json
msr05-perf-cleanup.log

MSR-05 fixed at 2060eb588ef545a5bdaf1a4d55d8cb168d5b352b, local only. Fmt, SSH all-target Clippy and 50 scoped tests pass, including wrong-guess fallbacks (exchange, host key, group exchange), rekey, host trust, expired certificates and wrong key proof. The same opt-in five-flight test fails on the retained sequential control and passes on optimized startup, using identical static musl probe/test binaries. Perf VM: 4 vCPU i9-9900K, Linux 6.12.111, CPUWeight=10000, shared flock, private loopback netem namespace, 100 samples/profile. | Modeled RTT | Before p50/p99 ms | After p50/p99 ms | | --- | --- | --- | | 1 ms | 12.512 / 19.679 | 8.086 / 12.039 | | 150 ms | 1356.707 / 1365.647 | 753.646 / 756.467 | Optimized echo p50/p99 at 150 ms: 150.610/152.336 ms. Idle added PSS at 1/50/500 sessions: 36/3152/31304 KiB; at 500, 64,110 B/session (31,304 KiB total). Five 32 MiB transfers: median 49.485 MiB/s (matched sequential control 33.142); these controls are transport-only, not OS login/shim evidence. Research used a real PTY/process and a different transfer size; no end-to-end speedup claim. Load: before 1.96/1.71/1.09 -> 0.41/1.01/0.92; after 1.83/1.30/1.03 -> 0.43/0.91/0.91. Both measurement scopes inactive; server PIDs 2347360/2365674 absent, 500 sessions retired. Lock released between runs. Q14/#205 remains unmet, SSH stays unavailable. x86 shipping size remains 21,310,288 B; ARM build and final fast pending. [msr05-functional.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e9a4ea14-0845-40c7-b172-91bce3864664) [msr05-perf-before.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3e4fe1d9-aa32-474d-a164-add2f3cbddcc) [msr05-perf-after.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cd188824-8ff2-4a58-a6e3-9a10a4a637bb) [msr05-perf-summary.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b4550ceb-0c5e-4f50-9e1d-6f5f2b2e0515) [msr05-perf-cleanup.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0134b0f3-49af-406e-99b8-d364bac27f1a)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 02:20:24 +00:00
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MSR-06 build finding at 2060eb588: this checkout reproduces the original author artifacts byte-for-byte: x86 21,310,288 B SHA256 2e88fe9320a72cd0edcbe1e0eae7368e8bd47569cc9fa7725945d777d040da3a; ARM 19,511,136 B SHA256 ac1ee2499aa75fbaeb9417a7ceea5725107e875f369c5636c8487a2fb532d0e6. The exact ARM test passes here, while review measured 19,507,040 B. Lowering the cap alone would reject the author artifact.

Location controls: two Cargo source locations produce identical stripped control binaries and compiler metadata IDs. Identical native terminal-engine sources built under two cache identities produce 2,397 allocated sections each, but formatter PageListFormatter.format is 9,276 versus 9,268 B; unwind bytes differ too. This confirms native code generation varies with build location, rather than a change in SSH functionality.

Additive build-contract correction for D243: run shipping static Cargo commands with fixed source/build paths inside a private Linux mount namespace, retaining the pinned compiler, backend, flags, profile and job-owned physical paths. Give that namespace its own compiler-cache socket and stop only that cache server. Validate context/failure/cleanup behavior, measure the resulting artifacts, and set the exact caps from those receipts. No D289 allowance is spent on build-location drift. Proceeding with this reproducibility correction before the cap ratchet.

msr-release-build.log
msr06-local-check.log
msr06-path-control.log
msr06-native-repro.json
msr06-native-section-summary.json

MSR-06 build finding at 2060eb588: this checkout reproduces the original author artifacts byte-for-byte: x86 21,310,288 B SHA256 2e88fe9320a72cd0edcbe1e0eae7368e8bd47569cc9fa7725945d777d040da3a; ARM 19,511,136 B SHA256 ac1ee2499aa75fbaeb9417a7ceea5725107e875f369c5636c8487a2fb532d0e6. The exact ARM test passes here, while review measured 19,507,040 B. Lowering the cap alone would reject the author artifact. Location controls: two Cargo source locations produce identical stripped control binaries and compiler metadata IDs. Identical native terminal-engine sources built under two cache identities produce 2,397 allocated sections each, but formatter PageListFormatter.format is 9,276 versus 9,268 B; unwind bytes differ too. This confirms native code generation varies with build location, rather than a change in SSH functionality. Additive build-contract correction for D243: run shipping static Cargo commands with fixed source/build paths inside a private Linux mount namespace, retaining the pinned compiler, backend, flags, profile and job-owned physical paths. Give that namespace its own compiler-cache socket and stop only that cache server. Validate context/failure/cleanup behavior, measure the resulting artifacts, and set the exact caps from those receipts. No D289 allowance is spent on build-location drift. Proceeding with this reproducibility correction before the cap ratchet. [msr-release-build.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f8e098e2-af02-41da-bec8-dcadab68f247) [msr06-local-check.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/fd2df12f-c7b1-4a35-b8ca-0a369becca8e) [msr06-path-control.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/a3e62deb-9d86-4a95-9043-7ad4b8ad910f) [msr06-native-repro.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/41c6e5e2-8aad-40c9-9d07-00eda47f887f) [msr06-native-section-summary.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/8c1616a1-8541-4e56-a76f-c28fced854ae)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 02:43:14 +00:00
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MSR-03 follow-up review: EXTENDED attributes were recognized but their count and opaque fields were not decoded. New extended_attributes_must_be_complete_before_open test is red: an OPEN with only the EXTENDED flags reaches the provider. Extending the same required-field validation to extension count/pairs; testing all 34 extension prefixes across ordinary+extended combinations, valid opaque bytes and zero extensions. No production SSH enablement.

MSR-03 follow-up review: EXTENDED attributes were recognized but their count and opaque fields were not decoded. New extended_attributes_must_be_complete_before_open test is red: an OPEN with only the EXTENDED flags reaches the provider. Extending the same required-field validation to extension count/pairs; testing all 34 extension prefixes across ordinary+extended combinations, valid opaque bytes and zero extensions. No production SSH enablement.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 02:44:45 +00:00
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MSR-03 completed follow-up at 787e99520: mandatory extended-attribute count and opaque pairs are decoded before provider dispatch. Regression red before fix; three decode tests green, including 34 truncated extension prefixes and four complete controls. fmt and SSH all-target clippy pass. Review of the expanded case found no further issue.
msr03-extended-red.log
msr03-extended-green.log
msr03-extended-clippy.log

MSR-03 completed follow-up at 787e99520: mandatory extended-attribute count and opaque pairs are decoded before provider dispatch. Regression red before fix; three decode tests green, including 34 truncated extension prefixes and four complete controls. fmt and SSH all-target clippy pass. Review of the expanded case found no further issue. [msr03-extended-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/233b19f0-9443-48bb-a6d2-c7cbaa612b28) [msr03-extended-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/8d26a3b0-114b-4ee5-a5da-0754e834147b) [msr03-extended-clippy.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bbbd26cb-4021-41cc-bbd5-7420e7f98eee)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 03:02:31 +00:00
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MSR-06 build investigation: fixed-path builds initially matched reviewer static hashes, but a fresh native control exposed an 8-byte formatter code difference (2 of 2,397 allocated sections differ including unwind data). The main build reused its prior native global cache; the standalone control also lacked Cargo's SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=0. Reproducibility is not established by those controls. Isolating the canonical native cache and aligning the timestamp environment, then comparing fresh equivalent builds before the final cap commit. Compiler/backend/profile remain pinned. Evidence: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh/evidence/msr06-canonical-section-summary.json. No push/deploy or SSH enablement.

MSR-06 build investigation: fixed-path builds initially matched reviewer static hashes, but a fresh native control exposed an 8-byte formatter code difference (2 of 2,397 allocated sections differ including unwind data). The main build reused its prior native global cache; the standalone control also lacked Cargo's SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=0. Reproducibility is not established by those controls. Isolating the canonical native cache and aligning the timestamp environment, then comparing fresh equivalent builds before the final cap commit. Compiler/backend/profile remain pinned. Evidence: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh/evidence/msr06-canonical-section-summary.json. No push/deploy or SSH enablement.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 03:07:01 +00:00
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Mesh SSH production dependency audit (D235 Q14), integration of real-logins with dev c47a438be; compared origin/mesh-ssh and origin/process-per-user d48996b72:

Mesh SSH needs Present here On process-per-user (#205) Still missing
Current person/account access checks plus shell creation Real host login creation/reuse/adoption, preferred account, PAM/systemd or host fallback; trusted app-terminal person identity (daemon.rs::open_requested, logins.rs). Optional batch PTY runtime inside an already-authorized person login (user_host.rs::run_host); explicitly owns no login authority. Production implementation of SSH LoginAuthority/LoginGuard: current certificate/link/person/account rules held through shell/file registration; bridge shell/exec and stdin EOF to shared session runtime.
Files run as the selected account No file service. No target-account file service. Production target-account file handler; file-open ownership and revocation integration.
Existing sessions belong to a person and end on access removal Per-person login fencing, rootful worker cleanup, rootless person attribution surviving restart, dedicated cleanup and reaped-shell proof (rootless_sessions.rs, logins.rs, cleanup.rs); app host-removal hook. Bounded optional PTY ownership in an experimental batch host; no current identity/access controller. Connect SSH attachments/file handles to this owner and access-removal path, check person ownership on every SSH reattach, and retire handles on each applicable login-access change.
Every shell/file entry checks the same login access App terminals carry trusted person/account; backend admission covers host resources, not a shared person-to-account rule evaluator. Legacy uid-only/readiness paths remain distinct. Caller must supply an already-authorized login; no shared evaluator. Shared Login access rule storage/current authority and enforcement across mesh SSH, app terminals/windows and files. No complete production implementation found on these three branches.

Real-logins supplies the host login lifetime prerequisite; merging it alone does not meet Q14 or enable production SSH. SSH transport interfaces exist on mesh-ssh (mesh_login.rs), with a test runtime; they are not production adapters. No second access store, privileged file substitute, deployment or enablement added. Functional integration gates pending; historical latency/RSS receipts are not recertified by this audit.

Mesh SSH production dependency audit (D235 Q14), integration of real-logins with dev c47a438be; compared origin/mesh-ssh and origin/process-per-user d48996b72: | Mesh SSH needs | Present here | On process-per-user (#205) | Still missing | |---|---|---|---| | Current person/account access checks plus shell creation | Real host login creation/reuse/adoption, preferred account, PAM/systemd or host fallback; trusted app-terminal person identity (`daemon.rs::open_requested`, `logins.rs`). | Optional batch PTY runtime inside an already-authorized person login (`user_host.rs::run_host`); explicitly owns no login authority. | Production implementation of SSH LoginAuthority/LoginGuard: current certificate/link/person/account rules held through shell/file registration; bridge shell/exec and stdin EOF to shared session runtime. | | Files run as the selected account | No file service. | No target-account file service. | Production target-account file handler; file-open ownership and revocation integration. | | Existing sessions belong to a person and end on access removal | Per-person login fencing, rootful worker cleanup, rootless person attribution surviving restart, dedicated cleanup and reaped-shell proof (`rootless_sessions.rs`, `logins.rs`, `cleanup.rs`); app host-removal hook. | Bounded optional PTY ownership in an experimental batch host; no current identity/access controller. | Connect SSH attachments/file handles to this owner and access-removal path, check person ownership on every SSH reattach, and retire handles on each applicable login-access change. | | Every shell/file entry checks the same login access | App terminals carry trusted person/account; backend admission covers host resources, not a shared person-to-account rule evaluator. Legacy uid-only/readiness paths remain distinct. | Caller must supply an already-authorized login; no shared evaluator. | Shared Login access rule storage/current authority and enforcement across mesh SSH, app terminals/windows and files. No complete production implementation found on these three branches. | Real-logins supplies the host login lifetime prerequisite; merging it alone does not meet Q14 or enable production SSH. SSH transport interfaces exist on mesh-ssh (`mesh_login.rs`), with a test runtime; they are not production adapters. No second access store, privileged file substitute, deployment or enablement added. Functional integration gates pending; historical latency/RSS receipts are not recertified by this audit.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 03:44:37 +00:00
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MSR-06 complete at 68caff92a3. ARM ceiling ratcheted by 4,096 bytes to exactly 19,507,040; x86 remains exactly 21,310,288. Same-recipe merge base 650472b987: ARM 19,513,440 -> 19,507,040 (-6,400); x86 21,320,400 -> 21,310,288 (-10,112). Both final shipping hashes match the independent review. No growth against D289's engine/SFTP exception.

Fixed source/output aliases, native-cache context, target-directory invalidation and private compiler-cache lifecycle; compiler/backend/profile unchanged. Fresh native controls match all 2,397 allocated sections (1,553,389 bytes); raw archive hashes differ, so no claim of full archive identity. Original cap, context and invalidation regressions are red before fixes and green afterward. fmt, touched-crate clippy, shell syntax, context tests and both static builds pass. All private compiler-cache PIDs are confirmed gone in the logs.

Full scripts/verify fast is running on this head. SSH remains disabled pending #205. No push/deploy.

msr06-size-summary.json
msr06-final-size-comparison.log
msr06-context-red.log
msr06-context-green.log
msr06-invalidation-red.log
msr06-native-parity-red.log
msr06-native-parity-green.log
msr06-size-red.log
msr06-size-final.log

MSR-06 complete at 68caff92a3acefd801739895a48eece699971348. ARM ceiling ratcheted by 4,096 bytes to exactly 19,507,040; x86 remains exactly 21,310,288. Same-recipe merge base 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79: ARM 19,513,440 -> 19,507,040 (-6,400); x86 21,320,400 -> 21,310,288 (-10,112). Both final shipping hashes match the independent review. No growth against D289's engine/SFTP exception. Fixed source/output aliases, native-cache context, target-directory invalidation and private compiler-cache lifecycle; compiler/backend/profile unchanged. Fresh native controls match all 2,397 allocated sections (1,553,389 bytes); raw archive hashes differ, so no claim of full archive identity. Original cap, context and invalidation regressions are red before fixes and green afterward. fmt, touched-crate clippy, shell syntax, context tests and both static builds pass. All private compiler-cache PIDs are confirmed gone in the logs. Full scripts/verify fast is running on this head. SSH remains disabled pending #205. No push/deploy. [msr06-size-summary.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3f6fd473-e3f5-4a00-91b3-818bf4598212) [msr06-final-size-comparison.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3a478c0b-64ef-40f1-908e-936a40939ab3) [msr06-context-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d4bf2f20-8e92-49c6-9328-30cfbf46df94) [msr06-context-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cf515aed-ffb9-4dc7-a359-43bd40ba2022) [msr06-invalidation-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1a31ed64-7d19-491b-a8db-f7d65c8d91e4) [msr06-native-parity-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/dd59173f-860a-4756-bcbb-4ca7fbb7e0a5) [msr06-native-parity-green.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cf05f147-68ae-4889-b7eb-029c37b6fa68) [msr06-size-red.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0bea1a93-645c-4dca-be15-bf37731dca9e) [msr06-size-final.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/7c0ad8cc-499d-429d-8f30-971fe7719244)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 03:50:26 +00:00
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Q14 gap clarification for existing terminals: real-logins can adopt and retire terminals/logins that already carry a trusted person identity. Older terminals created without that identity are not automatically assigned to a person; person cleanup remains unconfirmed while an unattributed older terminal is live (fixed private readiness probes are exempt). Source: rootless_sessions::revoke and unsupported/unattributed cleanup regressions. Coordinated retirement or safe migration of those older terminals is still needed before all shell paths share Login access. The optional #205 batch runtime supplies no identity migration. This is an integration gap, not a claim that merging #172 alone enables production mesh SSH.

Q14 gap clarification for existing terminals: real-logins can adopt and retire terminals/logins that already carry a trusted person identity. Older terminals created without that identity are not automatically assigned to a person; person cleanup remains unconfirmed while an unattributed older terminal is live (fixed private readiness probes are exempt). Source: rootless_sessions::revoke and unsupported/unattributed cleanup regressions. Coordinated retirement or safe migration of those older terminals is still needed before all shell paths share Login access. The optional #205 batch runtime supplies no identity migration. This is an integration gap, not a claim that merging #172 alone enables production mesh SSH.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 03:56:33 +00:00
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Head 68caff92a: first full fast run passed fmt, native fmt, compile-out, clippy, cargo-deny and both exact static gates, but test row failed: restart::tests::deleted_path_review::relative_recovery_after_atomic_install_keeps_live_install_path hit OS error 26 (Text file busy) at initial spawn of its private fixture. 78 passed/1 failed/1 ignored in that binary. Fixture source is identical to merge base 650472b987. The exact failed test passes in isolation (1 passed/79 filtered). This is not one of the authorized load exceptions; no waiver is being taken. Re-running the entire scripts/verify fast on the same unchanged head.

msr-final-verify-fast.log
gate-restart-isolated.log

Head 68caff92a: first full fast run passed fmt, native fmt, compile-out, clippy, cargo-deny and both exact static gates, but test row failed: restart::tests::deleted_path_review::relative_recovery_after_atomic_install_keeps_live_install_path hit OS error 26 (Text file busy) at initial spawn of its private fixture. 78 passed/1 failed/1 ignored in that binary. Fixture source is identical to merge base 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79. The exact failed test passes in isolation (1 passed/79 filtered). This is not one of the authorized load exceptions; no waiver is being taken. Re-running the entire scripts/verify fast on the same unchanged head. [msr-final-verify-fast.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cf1bd64f-a69a-4710-bebb-ea7b827ee348) [gate-restart-isolated.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/518c73ad-7003-4829-b673-4b040da9435a)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 04:09:07 +00:00
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Finished the MSR-01–06 review fixes on mesh-ssh at 68caff92a3. Working tree clean. No push, merge or deploy. Stopping for review; production SSH remains disabled until #205 satisfies D235 Q14.

  • MSR-01 faff06e53: explicit replies to refused requests.
  • MSR-02 5f163e400: deferred replies retain ownership and drain in order, bounded at 64/channel.
  • MSR-03 09ddf6a86 + 787e99520: required flags and extended attribute fields stop incomplete requests before file handling. Three decode tests cover 114 truncated prefixes and ten valid controls.
  • MSR-04 b18eddca3: invalid path encoding returns an error; valid Unicode remains unchanged.
  • MSR-05 2060eb588: opt-in pipelined startup, verified host/auth boundaries, checked PTY/shell confirmations, fallback/rekey tests.
  • MSR-06 68caff92a: fixed static build context, private compiler-cache lifecycle, exact ARM ceiling at 19,507,040 bytes.

Perf VM, 100 starts/profile, identical static transport fixture/control binaries, pinned shared lock and CPUWeight scope: TCP-to-prompt p50/p99 at 1 ms RTT 12.512/19.679 -> 8.086/12.039 ms; at 150 ms RTT 1356.707/1365.647 -> 753.646/756.467 ms (about nine -> five round trips). After: 150 ms echo p50/p99 150.610/152.336 ms; throughput median 49.485 MiB/s across five 32 MiB transfers. Added PSS at 1/50/500 idle connections: 36/3,152/31,304 KiB, or 64,110 bytes/connection at 500. Transport-only measurements; no operating-system login or production shim claim. Machines, loads, hashes and complete samples are in the attached receipts and earlier MSR-05 comment.

Same-recipe merge base 650472b987: x86 21,320,400 -> 21,310,288 (-10,112 bytes); ARM 19,513,440 -> 19,507,040 (-6,400 bytes). Both ceilings equal measured shipping bytes. No growth against D289's limited engine/SFTP exception. Shipping hashes match the independent review; fresh native controls match all allocated sections. Reviewer checklist complete with no remaining concrete finding from inspection.

Final scripts/verify fast exits 0 on the head above. The first run hit ETXTBSY at initial spawn of the unchanged private restart fixture; isolation and the full rerun passed. No baseline waiver used. Verbatim final summary follows; the complete output is attached.

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+

 37 pass
 0 fail
 34463 expect() calls
Ran 37 tests across 10 files. [2.73s]

Cleanup: all 15 recorded private compiler-cache PIDs absent; both perf scopes inactive and measurement server PIDs absent; own perf staging, build targets and temporary checkouts removed. Evidence remains outside the checkout.

msr-final-verify-fast-rerun.log
msr-final-gate-summary.txt
msr-author-review.txt
msr-final-cache-cleanup.json
msr-final-scratch-cleanup.json
msr-perf-staging-cleanup.log

Measured size receipts:
msr06-size-summary.json

Perf receipts:
msr05-functional.log
msr05-perf-before.log
msr05-perf-after.log
msr05-perf-summary.json
msr05-perf-cleanup.log

Finished the MSR-01–06 review fixes on mesh-ssh at 68caff92a3acefd801739895a48eece699971348. Working tree clean. No push, merge or deploy. Stopping for review; production SSH remains disabled until #205 satisfies D235 Q14. - MSR-01 faff06e53: explicit replies to refused requests. - MSR-02 5f163e400: deferred replies retain ownership and drain in order, bounded at 64/channel. - MSR-03 09ddf6a86 + 787e99520: required flags and extended attribute fields stop incomplete requests before file handling. Three decode tests cover 114 truncated prefixes and ten valid controls. - MSR-04 b18eddca3: invalid path encoding returns an error; valid Unicode remains unchanged. - MSR-05 2060eb588: opt-in pipelined startup, verified host/auth boundaries, checked PTY/shell confirmations, fallback/rekey tests. - MSR-06 68caff92a: fixed static build context, private compiler-cache lifecycle, exact ARM ceiling at 19,507,040 bytes. Perf VM, 100 starts/profile, identical static transport fixture/control binaries, pinned shared lock and CPUWeight scope: TCP-to-prompt p50/p99 at 1 ms RTT 12.512/19.679 -> 8.086/12.039 ms; at 150 ms RTT 1356.707/1365.647 -> 753.646/756.467 ms (about nine -> five round trips). After: 150 ms echo p50/p99 150.610/152.336 ms; throughput median 49.485 MiB/s across five 32 MiB transfers. Added PSS at 1/50/500 idle connections: 36/3,152/31,304 KiB, or 64,110 bytes/connection at 500. Transport-only measurements; no operating-system login or production shim claim. Machines, loads, hashes and complete samples are in the attached receipts and earlier MSR-05 comment. Same-recipe merge base 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79: x86 21,320,400 -> 21,310,288 (-10,112 bytes); ARM 19,513,440 -> 19,507,040 (-6,400 bytes). Both ceilings equal measured shipping bytes. No growth against D289's limited engine/SFTP exception. Shipping hashes match the independent review; fresh native controls match all allocated sections. Reviewer checklist complete with no remaining concrete finding from inspection. Final scripts/verify fast exits 0 on the head above. The first run hit ETXTBSY at initial spawn of the unchanged private restart fixture; isolation and the full rerun passed. No baseline waiver used. Verbatim final summary follows; the complete output is attached. ``` +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ 37 pass 0 fail 34463 expect() calls Ran 37 tests across 10 files. [2.73s] ``` Cleanup: all 15 recorded private compiler-cache PIDs absent; both perf scopes inactive and measurement server PIDs absent; own perf staging, build targets and temporary checkouts removed. Evidence remains outside the checkout. [msr-final-verify-fast-rerun.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/1051b9f9-7ecb-4bd3-9767-ebcd6bd479eb) [msr-final-gate-summary.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/bbc6a364-d216-4d79-a7da-1e588ce4fdb6) [msr-author-review.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/6b172978-3085-4f43-868f-37b0f2e37b2a) [msr-final-cache-cleanup.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f688598d-c8f5-4f37-810c-6c63fd9913e5) [msr-final-scratch-cleanup.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/01de52a9-b595-4372-86a1-e9f751426e2d) [msr-perf-staging-cleanup.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f45f650e-f93f-4d78-b873-eb9bbd0df0bd) Measured size receipts: [msr06-size-summary.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3f6fd473-e3f5-4a00-91b3-818bf4598212) Perf receipts: [msr05-functional.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/e9a4ea14-0845-40c7-b172-91bce3864664) [msr05-perf-before.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/3e4fe1d9-aa32-474d-a164-add2f3cbddcc) [msr05-perf-after.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/cd188824-8ff2-4a58-a6e3-9a10a4a637bb) [msr05-perf-summary.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/b4550ceb-0c5e-4f50-9e1d-6f5f2b2e0515) [msr05-perf-cleanup.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0134b0f3-49af-406e-99b8-d364bac27f1a)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 04:11:06 +00:00
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Delta review started on review-mesh-ssh at 68caff92a3 (target origin/mesh-ssh; prior review eec28d892). All six original evidence commits are cherry-picked on the target; rebase skipped the identical patches. Rechecking MSR-01..06, new startup ordering/slow-reader cases, and static build context. SSH remains disabled; no implementation edits or deployment. Receipts: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/evidence/.

Delta review started on review-mesh-ssh at 68caff92a3acefd801739895a48eece699971348 (target origin/mesh-ssh; prior review eec28d892). All six original evidence commits are cherry-picked on the target; rebase skipped the identical patches. Rechecking MSR-01..06, new startup ordering/slow-reader cases, and static build context. SSH remains disabled; no implementation edits or deployment. Receipts: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/evidence/.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 04:17:43 +00:00
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Delta review at target 68caff92a: MSR-01, MSR-02, MSR-03 and MSR-04 FIXED. Original review tests now pass: request/reply suite 5/5, SFTP required/extended decode 3/3, invalid path 1/1. Static build-context checks pass for two roots, both targets, failure propagation, nested invocation and private cache cleanup. Receipts: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/evidence/delta-focused.log and delta-context.log. New access-wait, failed-proof retry and revoked-before-shell tests pass; paused-reader fixture correction and isolated fallback/rekey check in progress. MSR-05/06 and final gate remain pending. Review branch contains the author cherry-picks; no implementation edits or deployment.

Delta review at target 68caff92a: MSR-01, MSR-02, MSR-03 and MSR-04 FIXED. Original review tests now pass: request/reply suite 5/5, SFTP required/extended decode 3/3, invalid path 1/1. Static build-context checks pass for two roots, both targets, failure propagation, nested invocation and private cache cleanup. Receipts: $HOME/.cache/codex-scratch/mesh-ssh-review/evidence/delta-focused.log and delta-context.log. New access-wait, failed-proof retry and revoked-before-shell tests pass; paused-reader fixture correction and isolated fallback/rekey check in progress. MSR-05/06 and final gate remain pending. Review branch contains the author cherry-picks; no implementation edits or deployment.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 04:23:13 +00:00
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Delta coverage committed/pushed on review-mesh-ssh at b8211e742 (target 68caff92a). Four additional real-engine checks pass: held current access prevents an authentication reply; a refused login can retry; queued shell registration refuses removed login access before replying; a one-message reader retains both setup replies, prompt and refusal across pause/resume. Startup suite 6/6, scoped Clippy with warnings denied, fmt and diff checks pass. Existing fallback/rekey timed out under concurrent build work, then passed in both serial runs; no waiver taken. Receipts: evidence/delta-startup-final.log, delta-startup-serial.log, delta-startup-clippy.log under the review scratch directory. Static perf fixture/test built successfully and measurement is running on the perf VM with the shared lock. Final fast pending; no implementation changes or deploy.

Delta coverage committed/pushed on review-mesh-ssh at b8211e742 (target 68caff92a). Four additional real-engine checks pass: held current access prevents an authentication reply; a refused login can retry; queued shell registration refuses removed login access before replying; a one-message reader retains both setup replies, prompt and refusal across pause/resume. Startup suite 6/6, scoped Clippy with warnings denied, fmt and diff checks pass. Existing fallback/rekey timed out under concurrent build work, then passed in both serial runs; no waiver taken. Receipts: evidence/delta-startup-final.log, delta-startup-serial.log, delta-startup-clippy.log under the review scratch directory. Static perf fixture/test built successfully and measurement is running on the perf VM with the shared lock. Final fast pending; no implementation changes or deploy.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 04:30:46 +00:00
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Delta perf verification at review b8211e742 / target 68caff92a: MSR-05 FIXED. Original ignored five-flight test passes on the perf VM (exit 0), 100 starts/profile: 1 ms RTT p50/p99 8.158/15.132 ms; 150 ms RTT 754.021/759.050 ms. Trace: TCP establishment plus four server response flights (exchange, authentication, channel open, combined PTY/shell). Held-access and paused-reader functional checks remain green.

500 idle connections add 31,288 KiB PSS, 64,077 B/connection. Initial five 32 MiB transfers median 33.528 MiB/s. Matched second run: retained sequential startup 1360.815/1384.343 ms at 150 ms RTT; transfer medians 35.985 MiB/s sequential, 43.746 MiB/s optimized. No throughput regression confirmed; absolute throughput varies, so no general throughput speedup claim. Transport-only fixture, no OS-login claim.

Linux 6.12.111+deb13-amd64, 4-vCPU perf VM, shared flock, CPUWeight=10000, disposable loopback namespace. Receipts: evidence/delta-perf-review.log, delta-perf-summary.json, delta-perf-control.log, delta-perf-control-summary.json, delta-latency-attribution.md and delta-trace-flights.json under review scratch. Cleanup verified: all 3 measurement server PIDs absent, both scopes inactive, own remote staging removed. MSR-06 and final full fast remain pending. SSH remains disabled.

Delta perf verification at review b8211e742 / target 68caff92a: MSR-05 FIXED. Original ignored five-flight test passes on the perf VM (exit 0), 100 starts/profile: 1 ms RTT p50/p99 8.158/15.132 ms; 150 ms RTT 754.021/759.050 ms. Trace: TCP establishment plus four server response flights (exchange, authentication, channel open, combined PTY/shell). Held-access and paused-reader functional checks remain green. 500 idle connections add 31,288 KiB PSS, 64,077 B/connection. Initial five 32 MiB transfers median 33.528 MiB/s. Matched second run: retained sequential startup 1360.815/1384.343 ms at 150 ms RTT; transfer medians 35.985 MiB/s sequential, 43.746 MiB/s optimized. No throughput regression confirmed; absolute throughput varies, so no general throughput speedup claim. Transport-only fixture, no OS-login claim. Linux 6.12.111+deb13-amd64, 4-vCPU perf VM, shared flock, CPUWeight=10000, disposable loopback namespace. Receipts: evidence/delta-perf-review.log, delta-perf-summary.json, delta-perf-control.log, delta-perf-control-summary.json, delta-latency-attribution.md and delta-trace-flights.json under review scratch. Cleanup verified: all 3 measurement server PIDs absent, both scopes inactive, own remote staging removed. MSR-06 and final full fast remain pending. SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 04:57:37 +00:00
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Delta MSR-06 FIXED at review b8211e742 / target 68caff92a. Original ignored ARM size test passes (1/1). Canonical x86 21,310,288 B and ARM 19,507,040 B equal their ceilings; both SHA256 hashes match the previous independent review. All MSR-01..06 are now verified fixed. No retained shipping-byte change from this delta; SSH stays disabled.

Final scripts/verify fast on b8211e742: fmt, native fmt, compile-out, Clippy, cargo-deny and both static gates PASS; test row failed only in existing socket test auth::tests::socket_tests::review_liveness::review_mesh_watch_reports_liveness_expiry_without_another_edit (auth/tests.rs:1738, socket closed unexpectedly). The earlier workspace test run passed. No waiver taken: running the exact test in isolation and rerunning complete fast on the unchanged head. Evidence: review scratch evidence/delta-size-green.log, delta-size-receipts.json and delta-final-fast.log.

Delta MSR-06 FIXED at review b8211e742 / target 68caff92a. Original ignored ARM size test passes (1/1). Canonical x86 21,310,288 B and ARM 19,507,040 B equal their ceilings; both SHA256 hashes match the previous independent review. All MSR-01..06 are now verified fixed. No retained shipping-byte change from this delta; SSH stays disabled. Final scripts/verify fast on b8211e742: fmt, native fmt, compile-out, Clippy, cargo-deny and both static gates PASS; test row failed only in existing socket test auth::tests::socket_tests::review_liveness::review_mesh_watch_reports_liveness_expiry_without_another_edit (auth/tests.rs:1738, socket closed unexpectedly). The earlier workspace test run passed. No waiver taken: running the exact test in isolation and rerunning complete fast on the unchanged head. Evidence: review scratch evidence/delta-size-green.log, delta-size-receipts.json and delta-final-fast.log.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 04:59:50 +00:00
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Production dependency boundary recorded and pushed at c549cecd7 (research/process-per-user/README.md, Mesh SSH prerequisites). #205 supplies the optional bounded PTY runtime after an authorized login, session IDs/local socket lifetime and child reaping. It does not yet supply production login authority/spawner integration, target-user files, person-bound SSH reattachment/access-removal retirement, or one current Login access evaluator across all shell/exec/file entries. #172 supplies the real login lifetime prerequisite on its own branch; #221 transport interfaces still need these production adapters. Rootful peer checking also needs expected UID bound to authenticated person/account metadata, never arbitrary UID acceptance. D128 whole-host restart handoff remains separate. No default change, SSH enablement, merge or deployment. Documentation diff check passes; functional/runtime gates reported separately.

Production dependency boundary recorded and pushed at c549cecd7 (research/process-per-user/README.md, Mesh SSH prerequisites). #205 supplies the optional bounded PTY runtime after an authorized login, session IDs/local socket lifetime and child reaping. It does not yet supply production login authority/spawner integration, target-user files, person-bound SSH reattachment/access-removal retirement, or one current Login access evaluator across all shell/exec/file entries. #172 supplies the real login lifetime prerequisite on its own branch; #221 transport interfaces still need these production adapters. Rootful peer checking also needs expected UID bound to authenticated person/account metadata, never arbitrary UID acceptance. D128 whole-host restart handoff remains separate. No default change, SSH enablement, merge or deployment. Documentation diff check passes; functional/runtime gates reported separately.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 05:00:17 +00:00
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D235 Q14 remains NOT MET after integrating current dev (b2313013). Production pieces needed by mesh SSH:

  • Login authority/spawner: this branch has production per-person app-terminal host-login creation/reuse. It has no production SSH LoginAuthority or SSH shell adapter. #205 has optional PTY execution only inside a caller-authorized login. The production SSH authority and bridge are missing.
  • Target-user files: neither this branch nor #205 has a production target-account file handler or its access-removal ownership.
  • Existing sessions: this branch owns and retires app-terminal shells/logins that carry trusted person identity. SSH attachments/file handles are not registered with that owner; older unattributed terminals also need coordinated retirement or safe migration. #205 has bounded optional PTY ownership, without the identity/access controller.
  • All-shell-path enforcement: this branch supplies trusted app-terminal person/account identity, not one shared Login access evaluator. #205 assumes authorization was already done. Shared Login access storage and enforcement across app terminals, SSH shells and files are missing.
    SSH remains unavailable; this integration does not enable it.
D235 Q14 remains NOT MET after integrating current dev (b2313013). Production pieces needed by mesh SSH: - Login authority/spawner: this branch has production per-person app-terminal host-login creation/reuse. It has no production SSH LoginAuthority or SSH shell adapter. #205 has optional PTY execution only inside a caller-authorized login. The production SSH authority and bridge are missing. - Target-user files: neither this branch nor #205 has a production target-account file handler or its access-removal ownership. - Existing sessions: this branch owns and retires app-terminal shells/logins that carry trusted person identity. SSH attachments/file handles are not registered with that owner; older unattributed terminals also need coordinated retirement or safe migration. #205 has bounded optional PTY ownership, without the identity/access controller. - All-shell-path enforcement: this branch supplies trusted app-terminal person/account identity, not one shared Login access evaluator. #205 assumes authorization was already done. Shared Login access storage and enforcement across app terminals, SSH shells and files are missing. SSH remains unavailable; this integration does not enable it.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 05:01:17 +00:00
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Gate follow-up on unchanged b8211e742: exact Cargo-driven socket isolation now PASS, 1 passed/0 failed (delta-socket-isolated.log). An earlier direct workspace-binary check during that build returned an error event instead of resync; cause is not established. The first complete rerun stopped at the relay calibration precheck before Rust (delta-final-fast-rerun.log), so no waiver is taken. All review build/measurement work has completed; running the complete fast gate sequentially now, output delta-final-fast-sequential.log. All six MSR fixes are independently verified, including original ARM size test and byte-identical x86/ARM shipping artifacts. Final verdict remains pending the full gate.

Gate follow-up on unchanged b8211e742: exact Cargo-driven socket isolation now PASS, 1 passed/0 failed (delta-socket-isolated.log). An earlier direct workspace-binary check during that build returned an error event instead of resync; cause is not established. The first complete rerun stopped at the relay calibration precheck before Rust (delta-final-fast-rerun.log), so no waiver is taken. All review build/measurement work has completed; running the complete fast gate sequentially now, output delta-final-fast-sequential.log. All six MSR fixes are independently verified, including original ARM size test and byte-identical x86/ARM shipping artifacts. Final verdict remains pending the full gate.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 05:17:44 +00:00
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Gate follow-up, unchanged b8211e742: full sequential run reported existing auth::tests::socket_tests::plugin_lifecycle::mesh_lifecycle_withdrawals_survive_calls_but_never_end_a_replacement FAILED, then stopped making progress in the following mesh_plugin_discovery_disable_and_restart_preserve_control_socket case. The failing lifecycle case passes directly in isolation (1/1, delta-lifecycle-direct.log). Stopped only the stalled test PID 983331, which had no child processes, so the gate can record failure and release its slot.

Both affected socket-test source files are byte-identical to detached origin/dev baseline 2a5302cc7. Preparing the mandated baseline comparison under review scratch/baseline; its server test build (matching remote server feature) waits for a build slot. All MSR-01..06 regressions, added startup coverage, perf-VM prompt check and exact shipping sizes remain green. No implementation edits or waiver taken. Evidence: delta-final-fast-sequential.log, delta-socket-source-comparison.json, delta-stalled-test-stop.txt and delta-baseline-build.log.

Gate follow-up, unchanged b8211e742: full sequential run reported existing auth::tests::socket_tests::plugin_lifecycle::mesh_lifecycle_withdrawals_survive_calls_but_never_end_a_replacement FAILED, then stopped making progress in the following mesh_plugin_discovery_disable_and_restart_preserve_control_socket case. The failing lifecycle case passes directly in isolation (1/1, delta-lifecycle-direct.log). Stopped only the stalled test PID 983331, which had no child processes, so the gate can record failure and release its slot. Both affected socket-test source files are byte-identical to detached origin/dev baseline 2a5302cc7. Preparing the mandated baseline comparison under review scratch/baseline; its server test build (matching remote server feature) waits for a build slot. All MSR-01..06 regressions, added startup coverage, perf-VM prompt check and exact shipping sizes remain green. No implementation edits or waiver taken. Evidence: delta-final-fast-sequential.log, delta-socket-source-comparison.json, delta-stalled-test-stop.txt and delta-baseline-build.log.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 05:31:47 +00:00
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Baseline comparison completed: detached dev 2a5302cc7 and review b8211e742 both PASS all six plugin-lifecycle socket tests and the exact liveness test in paired same-window runs. Both source files are byte-identical. Evidence: delta-paired-sockets.json and paired logs. TypeScript continuation PASS (compiler, tracer build/budgets/unit tests, 37 protocol tests).

The earlier complete socket-suite failures are not reproduced by these paired controls, so no baseline waiver is taken. Running complete fast once more on unchanged b8211e742, sequentially, with a fresh private state directory and no overlapping review builds: delta-final-fast-clean.log. All MSR-01..06 remain verified fixed; both shipping artifacts match the prior review byte for byte. Final verdict pending this gate.

Baseline comparison completed: detached dev 2a5302cc7 and review b8211e742 both PASS all six plugin-lifecycle socket tests and the exact liveness test in paired same-window runs. Both source files are byte-identical. Evidence: delta-paired-sockets.json and paired logs. TypeScript continuation PASS (compiler, tracer build/budgets/unit tests, 37 protocol tests). The earlier complete socket-suite failures are not reproduced by these paired controls, so no baseline waiver is taken. Running complete fast once more on unchanged b8211e742, sequentially, with a fresh private state directory and no overlapping review builds: delta-final-fast-clean.log. All MSR-01..06 remain verified fixed; both shipping artifacts match the prior review byte for byte. Final verdict pending this gate.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 05:53:19 +00:00
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MERGE — P0=0, P1=0, P2=0, P3=0 new/unresolved delta findings. MSR-01..06 all FIXED.

Target 68caff92a; review head b8211e742f, pushed to review-mesh-ssh. Added four real-engine checks for held authentication, refused-login retry, current access before shell reply and paused-reader reply retention. Startup suite 6/6; original request/decode/path regressions and opt-in latency/ARM-size tests pass. No implementation edits or deployment. SSH remains disabled for D235 Q14.

Independent perf VM: 150 ms RTT prompt p50/p99 754.021/759.050 ms, five round trips; 500 idle connections add 31,288 KiB PSS (64,077 B/connection). Matched transfer medians 35.985 MiB/s sequential / 43.746 optimized. Transport/test-runtime evidence only. Shipping x86 21,310,288 B and ARM 19,507,040 B exactly match their caps and prior-review hashes.

Final scripts/verify fast exits 0 on the review head above. Earlier socket-suite and calibration failures remain recorded; exact isolation and paired dev 2a5302cc7/review socket controls passed, then the complete fresh-state gate passed. No waiver used. Verbatim summary:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+

 37 pass
 0 fail
 34463 expect() calls
Ran 37 tests across 10 files. [2.87s]

Complete gate transcript: delta-final-fast-clean.log. Paired controls: delta-paired-sockets.json. Perf: delta-perf-summary.json. Sizes: delta-size-receipts.json.

Cleanup verified: 10 private compiler-cache PIDs absent; all 3 perf servers absent, both scopes inactive; own temporary baseline and build/staging targets removed. Working tree clean. Full review report and findings updated in the review-mesh-ssh job state. Issue remains open.

MERGE — P0=0, P1=0, P2=0, P3=0 new/unresolved delta findings. MSR-01..06 all FIXED. Target 68caff92a; review head b8211e742f78b440c659e2aa81439e7b728b1084, pushed to review-mesh-ssh. Added four real-engine checks for held authentication, refused-login retry, current access before shell reply and paused-reader reply retention. Startup suite 6/6; original request/decode/path regressions and opt-in latency/ARM-size tests pass. No implementation edits or deployment. SSH remains disabled for D235 Q14. Independent perf VM: 150 ms RTT prompt p50/p99 754.021/759.050 ms, five round trips; 500 idle connections add 31,288 KiB PSS (64,077 B/connection). Matched transfer medians 35.985 MiB/s sequential / 43.746 optimized. Transport/test-runtime evidence only. Shipping x86 21,310,288 B and ARM 19,507,040 B exactly match their caps and prior-review hashes. Final scripts/verify fast exits 0 on the review head above. Earlier socket-suite and calibration failures remain recorded; exact isolation and paired dev 2a5302cc7/review socket controls passed, then the complete fresh-state gate passed. No waiver used. Verbatim summary: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | test | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ 37 pass 0 fail 34463 expect() calls Ran 37 tests across 10 files. [2.87s] ``` Complete gate transcript: [delta-final-fast-clean.log](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9f68f097-98b1-4808-bc63-7e147288a312). Paired controls: [delta-paired-sockets.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/71c94bad-4bcc-4e23-9861-ca35e33add79). Perf: [delta-perf-summary.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/80a8adbf-181f-4429-aeb9-366832cb4c0e). Sizes: [delta-size-receipts.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/74c2f26d-1f33-4319-8ef1-9a6ab1a9ca78). Cleanup verified: 10 private compiler-cache PIDs absent; all 3 perf servers absent, both scopes inactive; own temporary baseline and build/staging targets removed. Working tree clean. Full review report and findings updated in the review-mesh-ssh job state. Issue remains open.
kayg commented 2026-10-17 05:54:47 +00:00
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Final delta report and cleanup receipts:

result.md
delta-local-cleanup.json

Final delta report and cleanup receipts: [result.md](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f5c74526-d970-413b-a222-10ec1f69ae9c) [delta-local-cleanup.json](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/0f24f996-1127-4964-8400-c10b0a653e42)
kayg commented 2026-10-17 07:32:20 +00:00
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What process-per-user (#205, head 7c30edc7c, rebased on dev 2a5302cc7) now supplies for mesh SSH. The canonical table is in research/process-per-user/README.md under "Mesh SSH prerequisites (#221)".

Mesh SSH needs On process-per-user now Still missing (elsewhere or not built)
Login authority and spawner Same-UID research entry plus the existing PTY launcher. Optional bounded PTY host inside an already authorized login. Bind authenticated person/account to the #172 login lifetime; check the expected peer UID; hold Login access checks through registration.
Target-user file handling None A file provider that runs as the selected account, with ownership and access-removal checks
Session ownership and retirement Bounded session IDs, child reaping (the PPU-R1 inherited-ignored-SIGCHLD fix), local socket lifetime, per-session parser and memory bounds (a cgroup-green case: one 32 MiB control string does not stop sibling sessions) Person ownership on every SSH attach and reattach; retire shells, attachments and files when access is removed
All-shell enforcement None (the caller must supply an authorized login) One Login access evaluator shared by app terminals, SSH shell/exec and files

Echo admission under D296: the three-pair pooled p99 is 23.88 ms for the prototype against 34.32 ms for shipping, which passes (900 s cells; details and caveats on #205). This does not certify the production login integration or the D128 restart handoff.

What `process-per-user` (#205, head 7c30edc7c, rebased on dev 2a5302cc7) now supplies for mesh SSH. The canonical table is in `research/process-per-user/README.md` under "Mesh SSH prerequisites (#221)". | Mesh SSH needs | On process-per-user now | Still missing (elsewhere or not built) | |---|---|---| | Login authority and spawner | Same-UID research entry plus the existing PTY launcher. Optional bounded PTY host inside an **already authorized** login. | Bind authenticated person/account to the #172 login lifetime; check the expected peer UID; hold Login access checks through registration. | | Target-user file handling | None | A file provider that runs as the selected account, with ownership and access-removal checks | | Session ownership and retirement | Bounded session IDs, child reaping (the PPU-R1 inherited-ignored-SIGCHLD fix), local socket lifetime, per-session parser and memory bounds (a cgroup-green case: one 32 MiB control string does not stop sibling sessions) | Person ownership on every SSH attach and reattach; retire shells, attachments and files when access is removed | | All-shell enforcement | None (the caller must supply an authorized login) | One Login access evaluator shared by app terminals, SSH shell/exec and files | Echo admission under D296: the three-pair pooled p99 is 23.88 ms for the prototype against 34.32 ms for shipping, which passes (900 s cells; details and caveats on #205). This does not certify the production login integration or the D128 restart handoff.
kayg commented 2026-10-31 16:13:15 +00:00
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Planner P3 research started (planning only). Branch plan/ssh, base/head 42ab33035 (origin/dev), worktree infraternal-plan-ssh. Reading the complete issue history, existing SSH runtime and D235/D289/D313/D314/D316; preparing the owner plan and remaining grill questions. No runtime changes, build, push or deployment in this task.

Planner P3 research started (planning only). Branch plan/ssh, base/head 42ab33035 (origin/dev), worktree infraternal-plan-ssh. Reading the complete issue history, existing SSH runtime and D235/D289/D313/D314/D316; preparing the owner plan and remaining grill questions. No runtime changes, build, push or deployment in this task.
kayg commented 2026-10-31 16:14:59 +00:00
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P3 findings (read-only evidence): at plan base 42ab330358, crates/plugins/ssh contains the outbound OpenSSH provisioning/runtime bridge, not mesh_server/mesh_login/mesh_certificate. CLI ssh up/down/status remain unavailable placeholders. The reviewed transport is readable by immutable commit 68caff92a3 (not an ancestor of this dev); real-login integration commit 86045327b8 is also not an ancestor and dev has no logins.rs/rootless_sessions.rs. Process-per-user 7c30edc7ca is an ancestor, but its README explicitly excludes production LoginAuthority, target-user files and all-shell access enforcement. git ls-remote shows the old mesh-ssh/real-logins/process-per-user remote branch names absent; recovered SHA objects are readable locally. Therefore the plan must include recovery/reconciliation before enabling SSH. D289 already settles russh/ring; D235 settles certificate/link defaults. Existing NetBird integration is concrete: remote_host_tests.rs::ssh_options invokes netbird ssh --no-browser with strict pinned trust; outbound auth_order.rs supports trusted NetworkProvider::Netbird and lazy credential fallback. No source/build/performance change or new measurement is claimed.

P3 findings (read-only evidence): at plan base 42ab330358eb06d47acade8d0f2c35b9225af74b, crates/plugins/ssh contains the outbound OpenSSH provisioning/runtime bridge, not mesh_server/mesh_login/mesh_certificate. CLI ssh up/down/status remain unavailable placeholders. The reviewed transport is readable by immutable commit 68caff92a3acefd801739895a48eece699971348 (not an ancestor of this dev); real-login integration commit 86045327b84a018cfb5c427ff9b05b897d020106 is also not an ancestor and dev has no logins.rs/rootless_sessions.rs. Process-per-user 7c30edc7cad96a78873ccfbfd5e8931792d99b49 is an ancestor, but its README explicitly excludes production LoginAuthority, target-user files and all-shell access enforcement. git ls-remote shows the old mesh-ssh/real-logins/process-per-user remote branch names absent; recovered SHA objects are readable locally. Therefore the plan must include recovery/reconciliation before enabling SSH. D289 already settles russh/ring; D235 settles certificate/link defaults. Existing NetBird integration is concrete: remote_host_tests.rs::ssh_options invokes netbird ssh --no-browser with strict pinned trust; outbound auth_order.rs supports trusted NetworkProvider::Netbird and lazy credential fallback. No source/build/performance change or new measurement is claimed.
kayg commented 2026-10-31 16:20:34 +00:00
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P3 owner plan: SSH over the mesh — roadmap step 6

Planning only, 2026-10-31. Research base/head: plan/ssh, 42ab330358eb06d47acade8d0f2c35b9225af74b (origin/dev). No product edits, builds, push, merge or deployment. Recommendations below do not change owner decisions.

Goal: replace the owner's netbird ssh workflow with identity-aware SSH over infraternal's own mesh, preserving ordinary OpenSSH interoperability, host sshd independence, real target-account logins and revocation across every shell/file entry.

Architecture: reuse the D289 russh/ring server and bounded transport, connect it to one shared current Login access authority and the D240/D247 person/account runtime, and expose it only through authenticated mesh delivery. SSH rides the #220 path machinery; it has no second path selector. System OpenSSH remains the existing outbound add-host adapter.

Execution handoff: implement the independently reviewable slices below only after their security questions are settled. Read contracts/mesh-ssh.md at recovered commit 68caff92a plus current contracts before implementation; reconcile the contract on this issue before changing it. Use the repository implementation/review process, failing regressions first, atomic commits and VM gates. This is a design/integration plan for owner review, not authorization to enable the component.

1. Evidence and actual starting point

Read BRIEF-COMMON, CLAUDE.md, DECISIONS, ARCHITECTURE, PROCESS, #221's 235 existing comments, the current SSH plugin/runtime, and the recoverable implementation by immutable SHA.

  • Current dev's crates/plugins/ssh/src/{openssh,auth_order,credentials,trust,session_bridge}.rs is outbound host provisioning and the D255 first-shell bridge. It preserves strict host trust, lazy credential use, private stdin/memory and ownership cleanup. manifest.rs declares provisioning; cli.rs still marks SSH component commands unavailable. These are not a listening mesh SSH service.
  • The recovered transport at 68caff92a3acefd801739895a48eece699971348 supplies mesh_admission.rs, mesh_certificate.rs, mesh_login.rs, mesh_server.rs, bounded flow, port ownership and vendored engine fixes. mesh_login::LoginAuthority::current returns a current guard; LoginGuard::{open_session,open_files} registers a resource while the guard is held. Production implementations remain missing. Keep this interface instead of inventing a parallel shell tree or access store.
  • The final independent delta review at b8211e742f78b440c659e2aa81439e7b728b1084 records MSR-01–06 fixed and a passing fast gate. Its result is explicitly transport/test-runtime acceptance, SSH still disabled for D235 Q14. Review report, complete historical gate.
  • 68caff92a is not an ancestor of this dev. Neither is the recoverable real-login merge 86045327b84a018cfb5c427ff9b05b897d020106; current dev lacks logins.rs/rootless_sessions.rs. Old remote branch names are absent in git ls-remote; their named commit objects remain locally readable. Do not assume their work is already shipped on this base or recover it by blindly merging an old branch.
  • #205 commit 7c30edc7cad96a78873ccfbfd5e8931792d99b49 is an ancestor. Its research/process-per-user/README.md, “Mesh SSH prerequisites,” explicitly provides optional PTY execution inside an already authorized login, not production login authority, target-user files, person-bound reattachment or all-shell Login access. #172 and #186 remain integration dependencies, not boxes checked by #205's echo result.
  • The owner uses netbird ssh today. Current evidence includes crates/infraternal-server/src/remote_host_tests.rs::ssh_options: netbird ssh --no-browser --strict-host-key-checking --known-hosts …; auth_order.rs recognizes trusted NetBird inventory evidence and tries network authentication before materializing later credentials. tests/mesh_ssh.rs covers credentialless network auth against an external fixture. That behavior must not become “mesh membership alone authenticates a person” in our server.

D289 already chooses russh with ring, built into the binary, with SFTP. Do not reopen engine selection. D235 already chooses person certificates, linking, lifetime, defaults and basic audit. D313/D316 already choose mesh path finding, relays and names. The remaining job is recovering and wiring the production system.

2. Identity, authentication and per-host consent

Three identities, checked separately

  1. Source machine: the authenticated mesh peer and its currently applied mesh address, established by WireGuard delivery and membership, never an SSH banner, DNS name, HTTP header or caller-supplied source field.
  2. Person or explicit machine account: a linked person certificate for interactive use; an explicit machine/account rule for unlinked/shared/system callers. A network-access rule grants reachability, not a person identity or permission to become root.
  3. Target account: resolved against the destination host's account database and checked by current Login access. Person principal and requested OS username are distinct. An account rename, nonexistent account or UID mismatch cannot silently select a different identity.

Mesh SSH requires Network access for the original TCP/22 service and Login access for the requested host/account. App terminals require Roles and the same Login access (D252). Files and app-window shell entry points use that same evaluator. Administrative authority is not hidden login permission.

Preserve D235's visible starter rules: everyone → all hosts → their own username, ordinary accounts only (Linux UID ≥1000, macOS ≥501); first administrator → all hosts → any account. Root/system/shared accounts cannot be person-linked. An explicit target root login still needs its Login access rule. D229/D231 preferred-user fallback may choose root for an app terminal only after checking that resulting account; it is never an authorization bypass and must say which account was selected.

Certificates versus keys: settled choice, distinct compatibility path

Use D235 person certificates: 24 hours by default, configured issuance 1–24 hours; exact source address (/32 or /128); registered person principal; proof of private-key possession; trusted issuer, user-certificate type, interval and supported critical options. Reject unknown critical options and non-exact source ranges. Resolve authority by SHA-256 of the whole signed certificate, as the recovered verifier does; serial/key-id strings never grant authority. Renewal under the same public key must register the new complete certificate independently.

Keep user keys in Secure Enclave/TPM when available, otherwise memory only. CA signing stays in the existing administrator-unlocked lifecycle, with D244 locked/dump-excluded secure memory, no private key in argv/logs or ordinary temporary files. The current CA module signs X.509 node identities; that alone does not implement OpenSSH user/host certificate issuance. Add the SSH wire-format signing adapter under the existing protected signing authority, not by exporting its key to a second ordinary-memory signer. Host-key storage/hardware algorithm support still needs the targeted proof in Q6.

Ordinary target-account authorized_keys remains an independent D235 authentication path, without fabricating person attribution. A rejected identity certificate must never downgrade into it. The recovered server currently authenticates registered certificates; do not describe raw-key compatibility as implemented. Nail down raw-key/machine-account admission in Q3 before wiring it.

Local process identity and linking

Reuse D235 precedence: trusted infraternal session person first; otherwise original Linux login UID/macOS audit user through sudo/su, if linked; otherwise explicit machine/account identity or refusal. Original root login is never person-linked; sudo does not erase a proven original ordinary user's identity. Do not trust environment variables, a PID alone or a socket pathname as evidence. Bind kernel peer credentials to authenticated session/person/account metadata and guard against PID reuse, peer replacement and inherited descriptors.

Add-host links the ordinary account used during the approved join. Otherwise the first interactive SSH attempt from an unlinked ordinary account shows the description, link, QR and code; browser approval uses that person's passkey. D235: one use, 5-minute expiry, rate limiting, and the browser asks the person to pick the terminal's code. A noninteractive caller never waits for this; it gets the stated one-line outcome and may use its separately authorized ordinary keys. An administrator cannot approve a personal link on someone's behalf.

The signing socket must reject forwarded-agent use and arbitrary-signing requests. Specify and test host/session destination binding and supported OpenSSH versions; do not assume a private socket or ForwardAgent no alone makes a forwarding-resistant signer. A forwarded request cannot inherit the target sshd process's person. This proof is required before automatic IdentityAgent configuration ships.

Host consent

The host's component state and Login access rules are the standing host/account consent. D197/D201 already enable SSH during approved add-host/up; mesh up --ssh explicitly requests it. Show that effect in join/setup and expose per-host on/off and rules. No new per-connection target-host click is proposed for an unattended server. Do not edit host sshd, local authorized_keys or shell startup just to make joining work. If the owner wants a target operator to approve each connection, that is an additional security/UX decision, Q2, not something D235 already requires.

Rootless mode can serve only accounts its existing privileges permit. It must not promise arbitrary account switching, create privilege or request root just for the tunnel.

3. CLI and standard OpenSSH

D314's canonical infraternal open <machine> opens a plain one-off shell here, no saved named session, prefix keys or canvas action. Explicit session automation stays under sessions; showing a saved session on screen stays under canvas open. Do not attach a random existing session on open. A transport drop must not accidentally destroy the underlying shell (D128); whether this transient shell has an explicit recovery handle, retention and a reattach command needs Q1's answer. D235's recoverability and D314's one-off UX must both hold.

The request mentions infraternal ssh <machine>, while D314 calls the one-off command open and existing ssh up|down|status controls the component. Recommendation: keep open canonical, keep stock ssh machine.internal for the SSH protocol, and do not introduce an alias without the owner's answer to Q1. Shared action metadata generates help/API/MCP/skills/JSON (D16/D202); do not hand-wire a second parser. <machine> resolves an inventory identity, disambiguates collisions and carries a stable host verification identity through renames.

Use D303 results (usage 2, denied 3, missing 4, off/unreachable 5, interrupted 130 with D305 signal behavior). Errors distinguish not linked, Network access denied, Login access denied, missing account, expired certificate/locked CA and unreachable machine; disclose detailed identity reasons only to authenticated callers. --json must keep the stable envelope and never mix raw PTY data into it; settle the interactive/JSON combination in Q1.

Native tunnel: ordinary OpenSSH

Install one reversible managed include, scoped to the exact deployment's mesh suffixes and assigned mesh addresses; never Host *. D316: <host>.internal, optional additional subdomain. Trust the deployment's SSH host CA using narrowly scoped @cert-authority known_hosts entries. The HTTPS DNS-01 certificates from D316 are unrelated to SSH host certificates; reverse-proxy engine selection does not block SSH.

Illustrative generated include for one host (paths/helper names are proposed interfaces, not current commands):

Host build01.internal
    HostName build01.internal
    UserKnownHostsFile ~/.local/share/infraternal/ssh/known_hosts
    StrictHostKeyChecking yes
    ForwardAgent no
Match host build01.internal exec "infraternal __ssh-check %h %p %r"
    IdentityAgent ~/.local/share/infraternal/ssh/keys.sock
Match all

The managed precheck is for linking/readiness, not an SSH authorization substitute; the target still enforces both access checks. Validate generated configuration using ssh -G before any installation. A short per-UID runtime socket path should replace the illustrated long path where required by Unix socket limits. The signer chooses the caller's identity on every request. Do not force IdentitiesOnly yes without supplying the matching public identities, or person certificates may never be offered. Preserve user-defined users/options and test OpenSSH first-value precedence. Public host trust and certificates may live on disk; private keys may not.

Rootless userspace tunnel: local ProxyCommand

D228 M5 says other programs need the infraternal agent's local proxy. Proposed scoped addition:

Host build01.internal
    ProxyCommand infraternal __ssh-proxy --machine build01 --port %p

The helper is a bounded stdin/stdout byte bridge to the local userspace mesh, authenticates the local caller, permits only the resolved mesh destination/service, prints diagnostics only to stderr and exits on teardown. It is not a public SOCKS listener. It preserves stock SSH's host validation and certificate authentication; it does not terminate SSH, use the server as a jump host or replace the observed source with loopback. %h/%r/%p inputs must pass inventory/port/account validation; malicious hostnames must never become shell syntax. Generate only validated managed names, not arbitrary user input in shell command text.

If the target also runs rootless userspace mesh, pass the stream directly from the authenticated userspace TCP endpoint to the embedded SSH engine with its proven mesh source identity. Do not use a localhost TCP hop and then trust a claimed original address. On native kernel paths, reuse socket_connector.rs FD handoff only where it actually avoids a copying bridge; it cannot hand OpenSSH a kernel socket for an in-process userspace TCP stream.

Test Linux and macOS stock ssh, sftp, modern scp (SFTP mode), exec, PTY/resize/signals and exit status in both tunnel modes, IPv4/IPv6. Forwarding is refused in the first slice, as the recovered adapter does. ProxyJump/forwarding, legacy SCP exec and arbitrary environment requests are not implied by SFTP support. The provisioning adapter currently refuses arbitrary proxies and isolates external identity sources; implement the owned mesh proxy as a specifically audited integration, not by weakening those checks globally.

4. Paths, listener ownership and continuity

A single SSH TCP connection rides WireGuard mesh packets. D313 direct paths stay in kernel WireGuard; relayed/hard-NAT pairs use the userspace shim. Same-mesh relays forward ciphertext only. QUIC DATAGRAM carries relayed packets; blocked-UDP networks use TLS/443 ALPN or WebSocket fallback. A relay may observe endpoints, timing and volume, not SSH plaintext or private keys. Userspace rootless paths reuse the decided tunnel implementation; no new transport engine.

Use #220's str0m ICE core (D316), rendezvous, observations and selector. D313 switching: saving ≥max(5 ms, 15%), 5 samples over ≥3 s, 10 s dwell, direct wins inside the band. SSH neither probes independently nor reconnects just because a better path appears. Keep inner addresses and the TCP connection stable when changing outer paths; prove ordered exact bytes/no duplicated commands across relay→direct, direct→relay, roaming and UDP→443. Renew source-bound certs/address mappings before D199 address transitions retire old state. Do not reissue SSH identity for every NAT endpoint change.

Bind only applied mesh addresses, TCP/22, v4/v6. Leave host sshd untouched, including wildcard port-22 listeners. Recovered mesh_port.rs has exact-address bind plus EADDRINUSE-only owned redirect fallback. Its direct-bind/redirect method was a candidate, not a settled performance choice: measure original-port enforcement and ownership cleanup before selecting it (Q5). Deny direct access to any internal high port; both firewall backends must evaluate the original TCP/22 tuple. D235 Q7 still rejects kernel-published underlay traffic rewritten onto mesh addresses. D316's user-space HTTPS reverse proxy does not exempt SSH from this rule.

Component off/compile-out must leave no listeners, workers, proxy sockets, timers or owned redirects. Stop awaits owned attachment/file-operation retirement; plain detachment must not kill independent saved shells. Failed rule cleanup remains visible and retryable. Recover only exactly marked owned rules; never remove a foreign table or edit unrelated SSH config.

5. Audit, revocation and threat model

Community audit: on by default, 30 days (D235), recording connection allow/refusal, person or explicit non-person key/machine identity, source/target machine, requested/resolved account, time, duration, session/attachment correlation, rule revision, issuance/renewal/revocation and link/rule changes. Include revocation receipt/cleanup acknowledgements and transport changes as bounded events. Log public certificate digest/serial references when useful, never private key material, enrollment codes/tokens, terminal output, command contents or file contents. Session recording/export/long retention remain the separately licensed D235 features.

Reuse the existing audit path and SQLite; bound node-side buffering during outages and publish loss/gap counters. No per-keystroke audit work or synchronous network RPC on the data path. Community behavior if the durable audit queue/disk is full needs Q4; do not silently invent Enterprise recording requirements for Community.

Revoking a person/link/certificate/source machine, narrowing applicable Login access or Network access, or changing the default must fence new admission, cancel pending opens, and retire affected SSH attachments, exec, files and person logins. Register resources under the same current guard used to authorize; revocation takes the write side, with no check-then-spawn gap. Reattachment verifies person/account/host ownership again. Close SFTP handles and operations as the selected account, never the privileged daemon. Preserve unrelated people's sessions, including two people using the same OS account. Legacy unattributed sessions need verified attribution or coordinated retirement; they cannot be guessed into ownership.

D166 deliberately lets mesh traffic continue indefinitely on last-known rules during server outage; D235 certificates expire and cannot renew while CA is locked. Immediate revocation cannot reach a partitioned node. Therefore show requested vs applied revision and last-node acknowledgements; report connected-node cutoff latency and partition duration separately. Do not claim an online-only lease or unconditional live coordinator read is already decided. Q4 asks whether SSH adds a bounded authority lease. Whichever answer is chosen, new admissions cannot use a known stale/revoked view, and reconnection applies revocation before admitting work. Merely renewing/expiring a certificate must not silently terminate an otherwise permitted active shell unless the owner specifies that lifecycle.

Threats and required defenses:

  • Stolen/relocated certificate: proof of key possession, exact applied source-node/address binding, expiry/current registration; never trust serial strings alone.
  • Malicious mesh member: separate Network/Login access; deny nonexistent/system-account shortcuts; no “none” authentication carrying person authority.
  • Local cross-user impersonation or forwarded signing: kernel credentials, session/login provenance, destination-constrained signer, fresh one-use passkey link and forwarding refusal. Compromised root/source OS can subvert local process identity: this is a trust limit, not something source-address binding solves.
  • Admission/revocation races: guard covers runtime registration; cancellation-safe ownership survives caller loss; current checks repeat at each shell/file open.
  • Privileged confused deputy: resolve account on target, verify expected UID at worker socket, run files/exec in target context, never use daemon filesystem privileges or a daemon shell.
  • Relay/DNS/underlay attacker: authenticated encrypted mesh, SSH host certificates, scoped host principals and trust; original service tuple and ingress fencing block bypasses.
  • Malformed SSH/SFTP/agent requests and slow readers: retain vendored bounded credit/owned tasks/startup fixes; fuzz untrusted parsers, explicit request replies, byte bounds and backpressure. Existing four channels/connection and 64 KiB input window/channel are transport bounds, not a new global session cap.
  • Coordinator/CA compromise: D8 trusts the control plane to issue identity and rules. Hardware user keys do not make a compromised trusted issuer harmless. Separate audited issuance from transport; no claim of server-independent authorization.

6. Slices, gates and size budgets

Every implementation slice: contract proposal first, failing regression, scoped fmt/Clippy/tests, compile-out proof, independent defensive review and final scripts/verify fast on the head on the assigned VM, with verbatim gate output on #221. Build on compute01 (nice, -j4) / std ARM (-j3) through Nix; never on control host or perf VM. Copy binaries to the perf VM and use the brief's perf-run lock/cap wrapper. UI changes require TASTE, production screenshots attached for independent judgment and the three-line owner test note. No push/deploy/enablement from this planning task.

The following are planning targets, not measurements or preapproved cap increases. Non-engine slices aim below 16 KiB added stripped bytes on each musl target; 16–64 KiB needs measured written justification; >64 KiB stops for owner review. Do not split an oversized change merely to evade the whole-feature review. Measure base/head with the same pinned recipe and ratchet exact caps. D289's single retained-engine/SFTP exception is at most its measured +2,029,824 B x86 / +1,722,552 B ARM envelope, not slack for identity/runtime/UI. D298's separate real-login exception is historical, not reusable allowance. D316's accepted ICE bytes belong to #220; do not count them twice.

  1. S0 — recover, reconcile and freeze production interfaces. Recover immutable SSH/review commits above and the accepted #172 implementation into an isolated integration branch; diff them against current dev rather than blanket-merging historical runtime/build tooling. Update the recovered contract for current names, all shell/file entries, source provenance and decided grill answers. Produce a per-path implementation map for #186/#172/#205/#220. Gate: reviewed provenance/patch list, no lost MSR regressions, dependency/feature/license diff, scoped tests and full fast after recovery. Size target: no growth for docs/interface reconciliation; separately measure recovered runtime under its existing exception. No enablement.
  2. S1 — one current Login access authority on all entries. Put durable rules/revisions and node application in the existing server/access domain (owning #186); implement production CurrentAccess, CertificateAccess and LoginAuthority rather than a second SSH database. Wire app terminals, shell/exec, files and applicable app-window entries to it. Tests: deny every route, invalid account, same-username different person, absent/unreadable authority, revoke during pending auth/open, cancel during publication, unrelated session preserved. Old unattributed sessions get the chosen migration treatment. Gate: real app/API/MCP/native entry matrix, no route bypass, rootful/rootless UID checks. Budget target <16 KiB; likely risk of exceeding it must be measured and brought back before proceeding.
  3. S2 — certificate issuance, account linking and protected local signer. Extend existing CA lifecycle for SSH user/host certificates; registration by signed digest, one-use link approval, refresh and revocation distribution. Add process-bound key socket, hardware/memory handling and scoped OpenSSH config generation as one reviewable identity boundary. Tests: signed-byte tamper, wrong CA/principal/type/source, exact expiry, renewal same key, CA locked/restart, forwarding/UID/PID impersonation, code replay/rate limit, hostile config names, ssh -G precedence and uninstall restoring only owned files. Gate: real static CA key-memory test, stock client signer tests on Linux/macOS, fuzz bounded SSH/agent decoding. Budget target <16 KiB per independently reviewable sub-slice; stop/replan if identity signing genuinely needs >64 KiB. No private-key export to fit a library API.
  4. S3 — target-user runtime, files and retirement. Implement recovered LoginGuard::open_session/open_files using the accepted #172 login lifetime and current shared sessions; #205 optimization only after its adoption gates, never a prerequisite for basic correctness. Real systemd/PAMName and su/login fallback, rootless same-account, per-person/account separation, expected peer UID. Add target-account SFTP, exec/EOF/exit, PTY control, person-bound reattach and handle retirement. Tests: real OS file permissions, symlink/rename/invalid-path races without daemon privilege, access removed mid-write, two people on deploy, restart adoption and reaped-shell proof. Gate: real ssh/sshd/PTY/SFTP matrix plus no surviving SSH workers/handles after stop. Keep D128 session lifetime; don't adopt optional whole-host replacement without exact state/FD/exit-status acceptance. Budget target <16 KiB per coherent adapter; D298 recovery accounted separately, not charged to D289.
  5. S4 — mesh listener, proxy, path continuity and component lifecycle. Wire mesh_server::serve to proven kernel/userspace mesh streams; implement owned binding chosen in Q5, native/rootless client access, all IPv4/v6 paths, up/down/status and build removal. Tests: host sshd wildcard/mesh22 coexistence, original22/inverse/internal-port rules in both firewall backends, published underlay refusal, forged userspace origin, failed/foreign cleanup, relay/direct/443 switches with exact byte checks, offline authority rule from Q4 and return-to-current fencing. Gate: namespaces + real clients + #220 fault matrix; disabled build does no work. Size: retain and measure D289 engine/SFTP once here when executable reachability actually pulls it in; lifecycle/proxy glue target <16 KiB separately. Earlier small transport-only shipping binaries excluded the unwired engine and cannot certify this cost.
  6. S5 — D314 UX and staged migration acceptance. Implement canonical open, explicit machine/user selection and decided Q1 behavior through shared definitions; finish status/diagnostics/JSON and audit coverage. Prove Q14 on the actual production build before enabling any host. Exercise the owner migration below, production screenshot review for changed UI, then end-to-end perf/size/idle/security review. Glue target <16 KiB; lazy-load UI and report compressed bundle change, no speculative preapproved increase. Enable only after the owner's decisions and implementation review; rollout/deploy requires its own authorized task.

Performance acceptance is on the fully wired product, not the test authority. Measure TCP-to-prompt and full CLI-to-prompt separately, cold/linked, CA unlocked/locked and first/reused real login; local, 150 ms and 300 ms links; direct, relay and UDP-blocked 443; typing p50/p95/p99 during sibling flood; throughput/CPU; RSS/PSS at 1/50/500 sessions with complete child-tree accounting; idle wakeups and cutoff propagation. Report per-session memory ×50 and ×500, shells/PTY/kernel costs separately, plus fixed node cost. Existing transport review measured approximately five RTTs to prompt at 150 ms and about 64 KB added PSS/idle connection at 500; these are historical transport-only references, not product budgets or fresh results. Perf receipt, size receipt.

Keep established echo/reconnect targets; a regression requires a measured justification, not “the feature needs it.” For fresh prompt UX propose evaluating D255's ~0.3 s LAN / ~1.5 s at 150 ms as an owner target for open too, with onboarding/link time reported separately (Q7). Do not promise SSH transport reconnect keeps a TCP connection across an actually broken stream; distinguish mesh outer-path switching from a new SSH attachment to a retained shell.

7. Migration from NetBird SSH

  1. Inventory the owner's actual netbird ssh destinations, usernames, noninteractive jobs, forwards/file transfers and recovery requirements. Current tests show usage, not a complete fleet inventory. Record per-host permission preview and whether native macOS/iOS clients are ready. D228 keeps NetBird until our clients are stable.
  2. Join both meshes side by side (D197 M4), with non-overlapping addresses/routes/names and a free UDP port distinct from NetBird's 51820. Existing NetBird addresses may initially be an underlay (D269); label that dependency explicitly. Do not count “our encrypted tunnel over NetBird” as replacement acceptance.
  3. On one Linux canary, then ARM/rootless/macOS, approve the local account link, confirm resulting Login access and host CA, and enable only this host after Q14. Test open, stock ssh user@host.internal, SFTP/exec and revocation. Keep a verified independent recovery path and host sshd untouched. Never import NetBird identities or broad access rules as equivalent person/root grants without preview and explicit approval.
  4. Prove the real direct/relay/443 matrix with the NetBird path excluded inside disposable fixtures first. Then, in a separately authorized canary window, prove host access over a genuinely independent underlay while the old route is unavailable; retain out-of-band recovery. Check remote jobs, same shell across allowed path transitions, exact file digests and current audit.
  5. Change one operator workflow/job at a time to open/scoped stock SSH; record chosen user, person/machine identity, host verification and return status. Do not rewrite every existing script, assume forwarding support or uninstall NetBird automatically. Rollback removes only our include/component/rules and restores the previously tested access path; never falls back from denied identity to weaker credentials silently.
  6. Remove NetBird per host only after owner acceptance of desktop/mobile clients, required job/file behavior, independent routing, revocation and recovery. Remove the remaining dependency from operations fixtures deliberately; preserve historical documentation as evidence. A separate explicit removal task owns uninstall/route changes.

Owner test note for the eventual slice: (1) use open build01 and stock ssh kayg@build01.internal; verify user and connection log; (2) force the relay/443 canary and confirm exact output/file bytes; (3) remove this login rule and confirm this person's shell/files retire while another person's allowed session continues.

8. Owner grill — only unresolved choices

These are questions for kayg through the orchestrator, not new decisions. Keep settled D235/D289 defaults. Security/foundational slices wait for the relevant answer; recovery/research can proceed independently.

Q1 — One-off command and dropped-shell recovery (D314 vs requested ssh). When you type infraternal ssh build01, do you want that spelling at all alongside open build01? A: keep only open for one-off shells and ordinary ssh for protocol clients (recommendation; D314 unchanged). B: approve an explicit SSH-client command with protocol-specific options; define its distinction, not an undocumented alias. For a lost one-off connection, should open print a transient recovery handle and an explicit recovery action, while ordinary open still creates a fresh shell? Also settle --json: reject interactive TTY streaming with a useful message (recommended) or define a separate framed stream. This avoids mixing session automation/canvas concepts or losing recoverability by accident.

Q2 — Standing host consent or per-login approval? A: approved add-host/up plus visible per-host Login access is standing consent (recommendation; existing decisions), suitable for unattended hosts. B: require a target-host/operator approval mode for selected hosts; decide expiry, absent approver and automation behavior before adding it. Neither choice lets machine ownership silently grant arbitrary target accounts.

Q3 — Raw authorized_keys and machine-account authority. D235 says ordinary keys work without person identity, but the current certificate verifier requires registered person identity. For raw keys, should an administrator-visible machine→host/account rule explicitly permit the key-only path, with audit attributed to source machine/key and all-shell retirement scoped accordingly (recommended for clarity), or is independently authorized target-account key possession itself the separate Login access authority? Define the exact target-account key source/options, rootless read permissions and revocation triggers. This is not a proposal to remove key compatibility or to make failed certificates fall back. Machine-only certificates need an explicit non-person principal/authority extension if used; never manufacture a person to fit today's trait.

Q4 — Partition freshness, expiry and audit exhaustion. D166 says last-known network rules continue indefinitely; no system can push revocation into a partition. A: SSH also uses the last applied authenticated access view until certificate expiry, exposing stale revision/coverage (recommendation most consistent with existing behavior). B: approve a bounded SSH authority lease; choose duration and whether expiry closes attachments or only prevents new opens, accepting the outage trade-off. Separately: should expiry of a valid-at-login certificate affect established shells, or only new opens? Recommend existing permitted shells survive expiry/renewal and explicit revocation still retires them. For Community audit disk/queue exhaustion, choose bounded buffering with a visible gap versus refusing new logins; never imply lossless audit without space. Measure cutoff and queue/backpressure behavior before enabling.

Q5 — Port 22 coexistence mechanism. D235 requires mesh22 and untouched host sshd. Do you accept the recovered exact-address bind → owned redirect fallback if namespace tests and perf comparison establish source/original22 correctness and clean uninstall? Recommendation conditional on those measurements; alternative is a mesh-local delivery interception that avoids NAT, whose implementation cost must be measured. No job should pick a new networking engine here. Require direct/redirect/native/userspace connect latency, throughput, idle/RSS and crash-cleanup evidence before answering.

Q6 — SSH key custody and supported stock-client versions. D289 fixes engine/backend; it does not prove host private-key storage or hardware-backed signature algorithm compatibility. Confirm the supported key/socket client matrix after a spike measures real signing latency and memory per active key × expected linked accounts, Linux TPM/macOS Secure Enclave support, no-hardware memory behavior and forwarding refusal. Recommend preserving D235 hardware-where-present/memory-otherwise and D244 CA handling, with an adapter that never exports CA key bytes. If the chosen engine API requires ordinary-memory CA copies or unsupported hardware algorithms, return with measured alternatives; do not silently weaken custody or switch engines. Which minimum Linux/macOS OpenSSH versions must work without a custom client?

Q7 — Product budgets and migration canaries. Shall open target D255's ~0.3 s LAN / ~1.5 s at 150 ms, reporting first real login/linking separately, while retaining current echo/reconnect gates? Choose expected simultaneous SSH sessions and linked accounts for memory acceptance (propose 50 typical, 500 scale proof). Identify the first host/user and the owner's must-have noninteractive/file/forwarding workflows; forwarding is currently refused, so a required forward is a separately grilled slice. Accept the D289 exception only on fresh retained-engine measurements; any additional >64 KiB authority/runtime growth returns with attribution, alternatives and a new decision.

Research verification and handoff

Source checks performed: current worktree clean; base/head unchanged; recovered immutable commits readable; explicit ancestry checks show SSH/real-login commits absent and #205 commit present; current unavailable CLI and outbound authentication paths inspected. All external issue writes use the installed fj with explicit https://git.kayg.org because scripts/fj is absent and the Git SSH origin address is not the Forgejo HTTPS API.

scripts/verify fast: NOT RUN — planning-only task; BRIEF-COMMON prohibits builds/tests on the control host. No new passing code, static-size, benchmark or UI claim is made. Historical gate receipts above belong to their exact heads and do not certify this plan base or the future integrated product. Every implementation slice still owes its fresh VM gate verbatim.

Finished research on branch plan/ssh, head 42ab330358eb06d47acade8d0f2c35b9225af74b; no commit or product diff. No background build/server/browser/VM work started. #221 remains open. Owner blockers: Q1–Q7 and recovery/integration of the shared current access/person runtime; the next coding job must not simply enable the old transport.

# P3 owner plan: SSH over the mesh — roadmap step 6 Planning only, 2026-10-31. Research base/head: `plan/ssh`, `42ab330358eb06d47acade8d0f2c35b9225af74b` (`origin/dev`). No product edits, builds, push, merge or deployment. Recommendations below do not change owner decisions. **Goal:** replace the owner's `netbird ssh` workflow with identity-aware SSH over infraternal's own mesh, preserving ordinary OpenSSH interoperability, host sshd independence, real target-account logins and revocation across every shell/file entry. **Architecture:** reuse the D289 russh/ring server and bounded transport, connect it to one shared current Login access authority and the D240/D247 person/account runtime, and expose it only through authenticated mesh delivery. SSH rides the #220 path machinery; it has no second path selector. System OpenSSH remains the existing outbound add-host adapter. **Execution handoff:** implement the independently reviewable slices below only after their security questions are settled. Read `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` at recovered commit `68caff92a` plus current contracts before implementation; reconcile the contract on this issue before changing it. Use the repository implementation/review process, failing regressions first, atomic commits and VM gates. This is a design/integration plan for owner review, not authorization to enable the component. ## 1. Evidence and actual starting point Read BRIEF-COMMON, CLAUDE.md, DECISIONS, ARCHITECTURE, PROCESS, #221's 235 existing comments, the current SSH plugin/runtime, and the recoverable implementation by immutable SHA. - Current dev's `crates/plugins/ssh/src/{openssh,auth_order,credentials,trust,session_bridge}.rs` is outbound host provisioning and the D255 first-shell bridge. It preserves strict host trust, lazy credential use, private stdin/memory and ownership cleanup. `manifest.rs` declares provisioning; `cli.rs` still marks SSH component commands unavailable. These are not a listening mesh SSH service. - The recovered transport at `68caff92a3acefd801739895a48eece699971348` supplies `mesh_admission.rs`, `mesh_certificate.rs`, `mesh_login.rs`, `mesh_server.rs`, bounded flow, port ownership and vendored engine fixes. `mesh_login::LoginAuthority::current` returns a current guard; `LoginGuard::{open_session,open_files}` registers a resource while the guard is held. Production implementations remain missing. Keep this interface instead of inventing a parallel shell tree or access store. - The final independent delta review at `b8211e742f78b440c659e2aa81439e7b728b1084` records MSR-01–06 fixed and a passing fast gate. Its result is explicitly **transport/test-runtime acceptance, SSH still disabled for D235 Q14**. [Review report](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/f5c74526-d970-413b-a222-10ec1f69ae9c), [complete historical gate](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/9f68f097-98b1-4808-bc63-7e147288a312). - `68caff92a` is not an ancestor of this dev. Neither is the recoverable real-login merge `86045327b84a018cfb5c427ff9b05b897d020106`; current dev lacks `logins.rs`/`rootless_sessions.rs`. Old remote branch names are absent in `git ls-remote`; their named commit objects remain locally readable. Do not assume their work is already shipped on this base or recover it by blindly merging an old branch. - #205 commit `7c30edc7cad96a78873ccfbfd5e8931792d99b49` is an ancestor. Its `research/process-per-user/README.md`, “Mesh SSH prerequisites,” explicitly provides optional PTY execution **inside an already authorized login**, not production login authority, target-user files, person-bound reattachment or all-shell Login access. #172 and #186 remain integration dependencies, not boxes checked by #205's echo result. - The owner uses `netbird ssh` today. Current evidence includes `crates/infraternal-server/src/remote_host_tests.rs::ssh_options`: `netbird ssh --no-browser --strict-host-key-checking --known-hosts …`; `auth_order.rs` recognizes trusted NetBird inventory evidence and tries network authentication before materializing later credentials. `tests/mesh_ssh.rs` covers credentialless network auth against an external fixture. That behavior must not become “mesh membership alone authenticates a person” in our server. D289 already chooses russh with ring, built into the binary, with SFTP. Do not reopen engine selection. D235 already chooses person certificates, linking, lifetime, defaults and basic audit. D313/D316 already choose mesh path finding, relays and names. The remaining job is recovering and wiring the production system. ## 2. Identity, authentication and per-host consent ### Three identities, checked separately 1. **Source machine:** the authenticated mesh peer and its currently applied mesh address, established by WireGuard delivery and membership, never an SSH banner, DNS name, HTTP header or caller-supplied source field. 2. **Person or explicit machine account:** a linked person certificate for interactive use; an explicit machine/account rule for unlinked/shared/system callers. A network-access rule grants reachability, not a person identity or permission to become root. 3. **Target account:** resolved against the destination host's account database and checked by current Login access. Person principal and requested OS username are distinct. An account rename, nonexistent account or UID mismatch cannot silently select a different identity. Mesh SSH requires Network access for the original TCP/22 service **and** Login access for the requested host/account. App terminals require Roles and the same Login access (D252). Files and app-window shell entry points use that same evaluator. Administrative authority is not hidden login permission. Preserve D235's visible starter rules: everyone → all hosts → their own username, ordinary accounts only (Linux UID ≥1000, macOS ≥501); first administrator → all hosts → any account. Root/system/shared accounts cannot be person-linked. An explicit target `root` login still needs its Login access rule. D229/D231 preferred-user fallback may choose root for an app terminal only after checking that resulting account; it is never an authorization bypass and must say which account was selected. ### Certificates versus keys: settled choice, distinct compatibility path Use D235 person certificates: 24 hours by default, configured issuance 1–24 hours; exact source address (/32 or /128); registered person principal; proof of private-key possession; trusted issuer, user-certificate type, interval and supported critical options. Reject unknown critical options and non-exact source ranges. Resolve authority by SHA-256 of the **whole signed certificate**, as the recovered verifier does; serial/key-id strings never grant authority. Renewal under the same public key must register the new complete certificate independently. Keep user keys in Secure Enclave/TPM when available, otherwise memory only. CA signing stays in the existing administrator-unlocked lifecycle, with D244 locked/dump-excluded secure memory, no private key in argv/logs or ordinary temporary files. The current CA module signs X.509 node identities; that alone does not implement OpenSSH user/host certificate issuance. Add the SSH wire-format signing adapter under the existing protected signing authority, not by exporting its key to a second ordinary-memory signer. Host-key storage/hardware algorithm support still needs the targeted proof in Q6. Ordinary target-account `authorized_keys` remains an independent D235 authentication path, without fabricating person attribution. A rejected identity certificate must never downgrade into it. The recovered server currently authenticates registered certificates; do not describe raw-key compatibility as implemented. Nail down raw-key/machine-account admission in Q3 before wiring it. ### Local process identity and linking Reuse D235 precedence: trusted infraternal session person first; otherwise original Linux login UID/macOS audit user through `sudo`/`su`, if linked; otherwise explicit machine/account identity or refusal. Original root login is never person-linked; `sudo` does not erase a proven original ordinary user's identity. Do not trust environment variables, a PID alone or a socket pathname as evidence. Bind kernel peer credentials to authenticated session/person/account metadata and guard against PID reuse, peer replacement and inherited descriptors. Add-host links the ordinary account used during the approved join. Otherwise the first interactive SSH attempt from an unlinked ordinary account shows the description, link, QR and code; browser approval uses that person's passkey. D235: one use, 5-minute expiry, rate limiting, and the browser asks the person to pick the terminal's code. A noninteractive caller never waits for this; it gets the stated one-line outcome and may use its separately authorized ordinary keys. An administrator cannot approve a personal link on someone's behalf. The signing socket must reject forwarded-agent use and arbitrary-signing requests. Specify and test host/session destination binding and supported OpenSSH versions; do not assume a private socket or `ForwardAgent no` alone makes a forwarding-resistant signer. A forwarded request cannot inherit the target sshd process's person. This proof is required before automatic `IdentityAgent` configuration ships. ### Host consent The host's component state and Login access rules are the standing host/account consent. D197/D201 already enable SSH during approved add-host/up; `mesh up --ssh` explicitly requests it. Show that effect in join/setup and expose per-host on/off and rules. No new per-connection target-host click is proposed for an unattended server. Do not edit host sshd, local `authorized_keys` or shell startup just to make joining work. If the owner wants a target operator to approve each connection, that is an additional security/UX decision, Q2, not something D235 already requires. Rootless mode can serve only accounts its existing privileges permit. It must not promise arbitrary account switching, create privilege or request root just for the tunnel. ## 3. CLI and standard OpenSSH D314's canonical `infraternal open <machine>` opens a plain one-off shell **here**, no saved named session, prefix keys or canvas action. Explicit session automation stays under `sessions`; showing a saved session on screen stays under `canvas open`. Do not attach a random existing session on `open`. A transport drop must not accidentally destroy the underlying shell (D128); whether this transient shell has an explicit recovery handle, retention and a reattach command needs Q1's answer. D235's recoverability and D314's one-off UX must both hold. The request mentions `infraternal ssh <machine>`, while D314 calls the one-off command `open` and existing `ssh up|down|status` controls the component. **Recommendation:** keep `open` canonical, keep stock `ssh machine.internal` for the SSH protocol, and do not introduce an alias without the owner's answer to Q1. Shared action metadata generates help/API/MCP/skills/JSON (D16/D202); do not hand-wire a second parser. `<machine>` resolves an inventory identity, disambiguates collisions and carries a stable host verification identity through renames. Use D303 results (usage 2, denied 3, missing 4, off/unreachable 5, interrupted 130 with D305 signal behavior). Errors distinguish not linked, Network access denied, Login access denied, missing account, expired certificate/locked CA and unreachable machine; disclose detailed identity reasons only to authenticated callers. `--json` must keep the stable envelope and never mix raw PTY data into it; settle the interactive/JSON combination in Q1. ### Native tunnel: ordinary OpenSSH Install one reversible managed include, scoped to the exact deployment's mesh suffixes and assigned mesh addresses; never `Host *`. D316: `<host>.internal`, optional additional subdomain. Trust the deployment's **SSH host CA** using narrowly scoped `@cert-authority` known_hosts entries. The HTTPS DNS-01 certificates from D316 are unrelated to SSH host certificates; reverse-proxy engine selection does not block SSH. Illustrative generated include for one host (paths/helper names are proposed interfaces, not current commands): ```sshconfig Host build01.internal HostName build01.internal UserKnownHostsFile ~/.local/share/infraternal/ssh/known_hosts StrictHostKeyChecking yes ForwardAgent no Match host build01.internal exec "infraternal __ssh-check %h %p %r" IdentityAgent ~/.local/share/infraternal/ssh/keys.sock Match all ``` The managed precheck is for linking/readiness, not an SSH authorization substitute; the target still enforces both access checks. Validate generated configuration using `ssh -G` before any installation. A short per-UID runtime socket path should replace the illustrated long path where required by Unix socket limits. The signer chooses the caller's identity on **every request**. Do not force `IdentitiesOnly yes` without supplying the matching public identities, or person certificates may never be offered. Preserve user-defined users/options and test OpenSSH first-value precedence. Public host trust and certificates may live on disk; private keys may not. ### Rootless userspace tunnel: local ProxyCommand D228 M5 says other programs need the infraternal agent's local proxy. Proposed scoped addition: ```sshconfig Host build01.internal ProxyCommand infraternal __ssh-proxy --machine build01 --port %p ``` The helper is a bounded stdin/stdout byte bridge to the local userspace mesh, authenticates the local caller, permits only the resolved mesh destination/service, prints diagnostics only to stderr and exits on teardown. It is not a public SOCKS listener. It preserves stock SSH's host validation and certificate authentication; it does not terminate SSH, use the server as a jump host or replace the observed source with loopback. `%h/%r/%p` inputs must pass inventory/port/account validation; malicious hostnames must never become shell syntax. Generate only validated managed names, not arbitrary user input in shell command text. If the target also runs rootless userspace mesh, pass the stream directly from the authenticated userspace TCP endpoint to the embedded SSH engine with its proven mesh source identity. Do not use a localhost TCP hop and then trust a claimed original address. On native kernel paths, reuse `socket_connector.rs` FD handoff only where it actually avoids a copying bridge; it cannot hand OpenSSH a kernel socket for an in-process userspace TCP stream. Test Linux and macOS stock `ssh`, `sftp`, modern `scp` (SFTP mode), exec, PTY/resize/signals and exit status in both tunnel modes, IPv4/IPv6. Forwarding is refused in the first slice, as the recovered adapter does. ProxyJump/forwarding, legacy SCP exec and arbitrary environment requests are not implied by SFTP support. The provisioning adapter currently refuses arbitrary proxies and isolates external identity sources; implement the owned mesh proxy as a specifically audited integration, not by weakening those checks globally. ## 4. Paths, listener ownership and continuity A single SSH TCP connection rides WireGuard mesh packets. D313 direct paths stay in kernel WireGuard; relayed/hard-NAT pairs use the userspace shim. Same-mesh relays forward ciphertext only. QUIC DATAGRAM carries relayed packets; blocked-UDP networks use TLS/443 ALPN or WebSocket fallback. A relay may observe endpoints, timing and volume, not SSH plaintext or private keys. Userspace rootless paths reuse the decided tunnel implementation; no new transport engine. Use #220's str0m ICE core (D316), rendezvous, observations and selector. D313 switching: saving ≥max(5 ms, 15%), 5 samples over ≥3 s, 10 s dwell, direct wins inside the band. SSH neither probes independently nor reconnects just because a better path appears. Keep inner addresses and the TCP connection stable when changing outer paths; prove ordered exact bytes/no duplicated commands across relay→direct, direct→relay, roaming and UDP→443. Renew source-bound certs/address mappings before D199 address transitions retire old state. Do not reissue SSH identity for every NAT endpoint change. Bind only applied mesh addresses, TCP/22, v4/v6. Leave host sshd untouched, including wildcard port-22 listeners. Recovered `mesh_port.rs` has exact-address bind plus EADDRINUSE-only owned redirect fallback. Its direct-bind/redirect method was a candidate, not a settled performance choice: measure original-port enforcement and ownership cleanup before selecting it (Q5). Deny direct access to any internal high port; both firewall backends must evaluate the original TCP/22 tuple. D235 Q7 still rejects kernel-published underlay traffic rewritten onto mesh addresses. D316's user-space HTTPS reverse proxy does not exempt SSH from this rule. Component off/compile-out must leave no listeners, workers, proxy sockets, timers or owned redirects. Stop awaits owned attachment/file-operation retirement; plain detachment must not kill independent saved shells. Failed rule cleanup remains visible and retryable. Recover only exactly marked owned rules; never remove a foreign table or edit unrelated SSH config. ## 5. Audit, revocation and threat model Community audit: on by default, 30 days (D235), recording connection allow/refusal, person **or explicit non-person key/machine identity**, source/target machine, requested/resolved account, time, duration, session/attachment correlation, rule revision, issuance/renewal/revocation and link/rule changes. Include revocation receipt/cleanup acknowledgements and transport changes as bounded events. Log public certificate digest/serial references when useful, never private key material, enrollment codes/tokens, terminal output, command contents or file contents. Session recording/export/long retention remain the separately licensed D235 features. Reuse the existing audit path and SQLite; bound node-side buffering during outages and publish loss/gap counters. No per-keystroke audit work or synchronous network RPC on the data path. Community behavior if the durable audit queue/disk is full needs Q4; do not silently invent Enterprise recording requirements for Community. Revoking a person/link/certificate/source machine, narrowing applicable Login access or Network access, or changing the default must fence new admission, cancel pending opens, and retire affected SSH attachments, exec, files and person logins. Register resources under the **same current guard** used to authorize; revocation takes the write side, with no check-then-spawn gap. Reattachment verifies person/account/host ownership again. Close SFTP handles and operations as the selected account, never the privileged daemon. Preserve unrelated people's sessions, including two people using the same OS account. Legacy unattributed sessions need verified attribution or coordinated retirement; they cannot be guessed into ownership. D166 deliberately lets mesh traffic continue indefinitely on last-known rules during server outage; D235 certificates expire and cannot renew while CA is locked. Immediate revocation cannot reach a partitioned node. Therefore show requested vs applied revision and last-node acknowledgements; report connected-node cutoff latency and partition duration separately. Do not claim an online-only lease or unconditional live coordinator read is already decided. Q4 asks whether SSH adds a bounded authority lease. Whichever answer is chosen, new admissions cannot use a known stale/revoked view, and reconnection applies revocation before admitting work. Merely renewing/expiring a certificate must not silently terminate an otherwise permitted active shell unless the owner specifies that lifecycle. Threats and required defenses: - Stolen/relocated certificate: proof of key possession, exact applied source-node/address binding, expiry/current registration; never trust serial strings alone. - Malicious mesh member: separate Network/Login access; deny nonexistent/system-account shortcuts; no “none” authentication carrying person authority. - Local cross-user impersonation or forwarded signing: kernel credentials, session/login provenance, destination-constrained signer, fresh one-use passkey link and forwarding refusal. Compromised root/source OS can subvert local process identity: this is a trust limit, not something source-address binding solves. - Admission/revocation races: guard covers runtime registration; cancellation-safe ownership survives caller loss; current checks repeat at each shell/file open. - Privileged confused deputy: resolve account on target, verify expected UID at worker socket, run files/exec in target context, never use daemon filesystem privileges or a daemon shell. - Relay/DNS/underlay attacker: authenticated encrypted mesh, SSH host certificates, scoped host principals and trust; original service tuple and ingress fencing block bypasses. - Malformed SSH/SFTP/agent requests and slow readers: retain vendored bounded credit/owned tasks/startup fixes; fuzz untrusted parsers, explicit request replies, byte bounds and backpressure. Existing four channels/connection and 64 KiB input window/channel are transport bounds, not a new global session cap. - Coordinator/CA compromise: D8 trusts the control plane to issue identity and rules. Hardware user keys do not make a compromised trusted issuer harmless. Separate audited issuance from transport; no claim of server-independent authorization. ## 6. Slices, gates and size budgets Every implementation slice: contract proposal first, failing regression, scoped fmt/Clippy/tests, compile-out proof, independent defensive review and final `scripts/verify fast` on the head on the assigned VM, with verbatim gate output on #221. Build on compute01 (nice, -j4) / std ARM (-j3) through Nix; never on control host or perf VM. Copy binaries to the perf VM and use the brief's `perf-run` lock/cap wrapper. UI changes require TASTE, production screenshots attached for independent judgment and the three-line owner test note. No push/deploy/enablement from this planning task. The following are **planning targets, not measurements or preapproved cap increases**. Non-engine slices aim below 16 KiB added stripped bytes on each musl target; 16–64 KiB needs measured written justification; >64 KiB stops for owner review. Do not split an oversized change merely to evade the whole-feature review. Measure base/head with the same pinned recipe and ratchet exact caps. D289's single retained-engine/SFTP exception is at most its measured +2,029,824 B x86 / +1,722,552 B ARM envelope, not slack for identity/runtime/UI. D298's separate real-login exception is historical, not reusable allowance. D316's accepted ICE bytes belong to #220; do not count them twice. 1. **S0 — recover, reconcile and freeze production interfaces.** Recover immutable SSH/review commits above and the accepted #172 implementation into an isolated integration branch; diff them against current dev rather than blanket-merging historical runtime/build tooling. Update the recovered contract for current names, all shell/file entries, source provenance and decided grill answers. Produce a per-path implementation map for #186/#172/#205/#220. Gate: reviewed provenance/patch list, no lost MSR regressions, dependency/feature/license diff, scoped tests and full fast after recovery. Size target: no growth for docs/interface reconciliation; separately measure recovered runtime under its existing exception. **No enablement.** 2. **S1 — one current Login access authority on all entries.** Put durable rules/revisions and node application in the existing server/access domain (owning #186); implement production `CurrentAccess`, `CertificateAccess` and `LoginAuthority` rather than a second SSH database. Wire app terminals, shell/exec, files and applicable app-window entries to it. Tests: deny every route, invalid account, same-username different person, absent/unreadable authority, revoke during pending auth/open, cancel during publication, unrelated session preserved. Old unattributed sessions get the chosen migration treatment. Gate: real app/API/MCP/native entry matrix, no route bypass, rootful/rootless UID checks. Budget target <16 KiB; likely risk of exceeding it must be measured and brought back before proceeding. 3. **S2 — certificate issuance, account linking and protected local signer.** Extend existing CA lifecycle for SSH user/host certificates; registration by signed digest, one-use link approval, refresh and revocation distribution. Add process-bound key socket, hardware/memory handling and scoped OpenSSH config generation as one reviewable identity boundary. Tests: signed-byte tamper, wrong CA/principal/type/source, exact expiry, renewal same key, CA locked/restart, forwarding/UID/PID impersonation, code replay/rate limit, hostile config names, `ssh -G` precedence and uninstall restoring only owned files. Gate: real static CA key-memory test, stock client signer tests on Linux/macOS, fuzz bounded SSH/agent decoding. Budget target <16 KiB per independently reviewable sub-slice; stop/replan if identity signing genuinely needs >64 KiB. No private-key export to fit a library API. 4. **S3 — target-user runtime, files and retirement.** Implement recovered `LoginGuard::open_session/open_files` using the accepted #172 login lifetime and current shared sessions; #205 optimization only after its adoption gates, never a prerequisite for basic correctness. Real systemd/PAMName and su/login fallback, rootless same-account, per-person/account separation, expected peer UID. Add target-account SFTP, exec/EOF/exit, PTY control, person-bound reattach and handle retirement. Tests: real OS file permissions, symlink/rename/invalid-path races without daemon privilege, access removed mid-write, two people on deploy, restart adoption and reaped-shell proof. Gate: real ssh/sshd/PTY/SFTP matrix plus no surviving SSH workers/handles after stop. Keep D128 session lifetime; don't adopt optional whole-host replacement without exact state/FD/exit-status acceptance. Budget target <16 KiB per coherent adapter; D298 recovery accounted separately, not charged to D289. 5. **S4 — mesh listener, proxy, path continuity and component lifecycle.** Wire `mesh_server::serve` to proven kernel/userspace mesh streams; implement owned binding chosen in Q5, native/rootless client access, all IPv4/v6 paths, up/down/status and build removal. Tests: host sshd wildcard/mesh22 coexistence, original22/inverse/internal-port rules in both firewall backends, published underlay refusal, forged userspace origin, failed/foreign cleanup, relay/direct/443 switches with exact byte checks, offline authority rule from Q4 and return-to-current fencing. Gate: namespaces + real clients + #220 fault matrix; disabled build does no work. Size: retain and measure D289 engine/SFTP once here when executable reachability actually pulls it in; lifecycle/proxy glue target <16 KiB separately. Earlier small transport-only shipping binaries excluded the unwired engine and cannot certify this cost. 6. **S5 — D314 UX and staged migration acceptance.** Implement canonical open, explicit machine/user selection and decided Q1 behavior through shared definitions; finish status/diagnostics/JSON and audit coverage. Prove Q14 on the actual production build before enabling any host. Exercise the owner migration below, production screenshot review for changed UI, then end-to-end perf/size/idle/security review. Glue target <16 KiB; lazy-load UI and report compressed bundle change, no speculative preapproved increase. Enable only after the owner's decisions and implementation review; rollout/deploy requires its own authorized task. Performance acceptance is on the **fully wired product**, not the test authority. Measure TCP-to-prompt and full CLI-to-prompt separately, cold/linked, CA unlocked/locked and first/reused real login; local, 150 ms and 300 ms links; direct, relay and UDP-blocked 443; typing p50/p95/p99 during sibling flood; throughput/CPU; RSS/PSS at 1/50/500 sessions with complete child-tree accounting; idle wakeups and cutoff propagation. Report per-session memory ×50 and ×500, shells/PTY/kernel costs separately, plus fixed node cost. Existing transport review measured approximately five RTTs to prompt at 150 ms and about 64 KB added PSS/idle connection at 500; these are historical transport-only references, **not product budgets or fresh results**. [Perf receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/80a8adbf-181f-4429-aeb9-366832cb4c0e), [size receipt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/74c2f26d-1f33-4319-8ef1-9a6ab1a9ca78). Keep established echo/reconnect targets; a regression requires a measured justification, not “the feature needs it.” For fresh prompt UX propose evaluating D255's ~0.3 s LAN / ~1.5 s at 150 ms as an owner target for `open` too, with onboarding/link time reported separately (Q7). Do not promise SSH transport reconnect keeps a TCP connection across an actually broken stream; distinguish mesh outer-path switching from a new SSH attachment to a retained shell. ## 7. Migration from NetBird SSH 1. Inventory the owner's actual `netbird ssh` destinations, usernames, noninteractive jobs, forwards/file transfers and recovery requirements. Current tests show usage, not a complete fleet inventory. Record per-host permission preview and whether native macOS/iOS clients are ready. D228 keeps NetBird until our clients are stable. 2. Join both meshes side by side (D197 M4), with non-overlapping addresses/routes/names and a free UDP port distinct from NetBird's 51820. Existing NetBird addresses may initially be an underlay (D269); label that dependency explicitly. Do not count “our encrypted tunnel over NetBird” as replacement acceptance. 3. On one Linux canary, then ARM/rootless/macOS, approve the local account link, confirm resulting Login access and host CA, and enable only this host after Q14. Test `open`, stock `ssh user@host.internal`, SFTP/exec and revocation. Keep a verified independent recovery path and host sshd untouched. Never import NetBird identities or broad access rules as equivalent person/root grants without preview and explicit approval. 4. Prove the real direct/relay/443 matrix with the NetBird path excluded inside disposable fixtures first. Then, in a separately authorized canary window, prove host access over a genuinely independent underlay while the old route is unavailable; retain out-of-band recovery. Check remote jobs, same shell across allowed path transitions, exact file digests and current audit. 5. Change one operator workflow/job at a time to `open`/scoped stock SSH; record chosen user, person/machine identity, host verification and return status. Do not rewrite every existing script, assume forwarding support or uninstall NetBird automatically. Rollback removes only our include/component/rules and restores the previously tested access path; never falls back from denied identity to weaker credentials silently. 6. Remove NetBird per host only after owner acceptance of desktop/mobile clients, required job/file behavior, independent routing, revocation and recovery. Remove the remaining dependency from operations fixtures deliberately; preserve historical documentation as evidence. A separate explicit removal task owns uninstall/route changes. Owner test note for the eventual slice: (1) use `open build01` and stock `ssh kayg@build01.internal`; verify user and connection log; (2) force the relay/443 canary and confirm exact output/file bytes; (3) remove this login rule and confirm this person's shell/files retire while another person's allowed session continues. ## 8. Owner grill — only unresolved choices These are questions for kayg through the orchestrator, not new decisions. Keep settled D235/D289 defaults. Security/foundational slices wait for the relevant answer; recovery/research can proceed independently. **Q1 — One-off command and dropped-shell recovery (D314 vs requested `ssh`).** When you type `infraternal ssh build01`, do you want that spelling at all alongside `open build01`? A: keep only `open` for one-off shells and ordinary `ssh` for protocol clients (**recommendation; D314 unchanged**). B: approve an explicit SSH-client command with protocol-specific options; define its distinction, not an undocumented alias. For a lost one-off connection, should `open` print a transient recovery handle and an explicit recovery action, while ordinary `open` still creates a fresh shell? Also settle `--json`: reject interactive TTY streaming with a useful message (recommended) or define a separate framed stream. This avoids mixing session automation/canvas concepts or losing recoverability by accident. **Q2 — Standing host consent or per-login approval?** A: approved add-host/up plus visible per-host Login access is standing consent (**recommendation; existing decisions**), suitable for unattended hosts. B: require a target-host/operator approval mode for selected hosts; decide expiry, absent approver and automation behavior before adding it. Neither choice lets machine ownership silently grant arbitrary target accounts. **Q3 — Raw authorized_keys and machine-account authority.** D235 says ordinary keys work without person identity, but the current certificate verifier requires registered person identity. For raw keys, should an administrator-visible machine→host/account rule explicitly permit the key-only path, with audit attributed to source machine/key and all-shell retirement scoped accordingly (**recommended for clarity**), or is independently authorized target-account key possession itself the separate Login access authority? Define the exact target-account key source/options, rootless read permissions and revocation triggers. This is not a proposal to remove key compatibility or to make failed certificates fall back. Machine-only certificates need an explicit non-person principal/authority extension if used; never manufacture a person to fit today's trait. **Q4 — Partition freshness, expiry and audit exhaustion.** D166 says last-known network rules continue indefinitely; no system can push revocation into a partition. A: SSH also uses the last applied authenticated access view until certificate expiry, exposing stale revision/coverage (**recommendation most consistent with existing behavior**). B: approve a bounded SSH authority lease; choose duration and whether expiry closes attachments or only prevents new opens, accepting the outage trade-off. Separately: should expiry of a valid-at-login certificate affect established shells, or only new opens? Recommend existing permitted shells survive expiry/renewal and explicit revocation still retires them. For Community audit disk/queue exhaustion, choose bounded buffering with a visible gap versus refusing new logins; never imply lossless audit without space. Measure cutoff and queue/backpressure behavior before enabling. **Q5 — Port 22 coexistence mechanism.** D235 requires mesh22 and untouched host sshd. Do you accept the recovered exact-address bind → owned redirect fallback if namespace tests and perf comparison establish source/original22 correctness and clean uninstall? Recommendation conditional on those measurements; alternative is a mesh-local delivery interception that avoids NAT, whose implementation cost must be measured. No job should pick a new networking engine here. Require direct/redirect/native/userspace connect latency, throughput, idle/RSS and crash-cleanup evidence before answering. **Q6 — SSH key custody and supported stock-client versions.** D289 fixes engine/backend; it does not prove host private-key storage or hardware-backed signature algorithm compatibility. Confirm the supported key/socket client matrix after a spike measures real signing latency and memory per active key × expected linked accounts, Linux TPM/macOS Secure Enclave support, no-hardware memory behavior and forwarding refusal. Recommend preserving D235 hardware-where-present/memory-otherwise and D244 CA handling, with an adapter that never exports CA key bytes. If the chosen engine API requires ordinary-memory CA copies or unsupported hardware algorithms, return with measured alternatives; do not silently weaken custody or switch engines. Which minimum Linux/macOS OpenSSH versions must work without a custom client? **Q7 — Product budgets and migration canaries.** Shall `open` target D255's ~0.3 s LAN / ~1.5 s at 150 ms, reporting first real login/linking separately, while retaining current echo/reconnect gates? Choose expected simultaneous SSH sessions and linked accounts for memory acceptance (propose 50 typical, 500 scale proof). Identify the first host/user and the owner's must-have noninteractive/file/forwarding workflows; forwarding is currently refused, so a required forward is a separately grilled slice. Accept the D289 exception only on fresh retained-engine measurements; any additional >64 KiB authority/runtime growth returns with attribution, alternatives and a new decision. ## Research verification and handoff Source checks performed: current worktree clean; base/head unchanged; recovered immutable commits readable; explicit ancestry checks show SSH/real-login commits absent and #205 commit present; current unavailable CLI and outbound authentication paths inspected. All external issue writes use the installed `fj` with explicit `https://git.kayg.org` because `scripts/fj` is absent and the Git SSH origin address is not the Forgejo HTTPS API. `scripts/verify fast`: **NOT RUN — planning-only task; BRIEF-COMMON prohibits builds/tests on the control host.** No new passing code, static-size, benchmark or UI claim is made. Historical gate receipts above belong to their exact heads and do not certify this plan base or the future integrated product. Every implementation slice still owes its fresh VM gate verbatim. Finished research on branch `plan/ssh`, head `42ab330358eb06d47acade8d0f2c35b9225af74b`; no commit or product diff. No background build/server/browser/VM work started. #221 remains open. Owner blockers: Q1–Q7 and recovery/integration of the shared current access/person runtime; the next coding job must not simply enable the old transport.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 13:15:22 +00:00
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Owner answers (kayg, 2026-11-01), relayed by the orchestrator, on the P3 plan grill (comment 70829):

Q1 — commands.

  • open <machine> depends on the machine. On a machine with app windows enabled (it has a desktop), it opens that machine's screen. On a headless machine it opens a shell, the same as ssh.
  • infraternal ssh <machine> exists and always opens a shell.
  • This changes D314, where open always meant a one-off shell. The D314 amendment is to be recorded.
  • When a one-off connection drops, open/ssh print a recovery handle and a resume command. Yes.
  • --json must make sense for each command. Interactive streaming is not mixed into the JSON envelope.

Q2 — consent. The access rules are enough. Approved add-host/up plus visible per-host Login access is standing consent. No per-login approval mode.

Q3 — raw keys. Not through our mesh SSH. Authentication on our SSH is only our server, UI and access rules: person certificates, and machine identities through explicit rules. If a host's own OpenSSH is reachable over the mesh, it keeps its own authentication, and that is outside our system. Our server has no authorized_keys path. Scripts and CI use explicit machine identities, issued and revoked through the same access rules.

Q4 — partitions. (a): SSH keeps working on the last applied access view. Stale revision and coverage are visible.

  • A certificate expires while the access rules still permit the login: no disconnection. It is renewed silently.
  • The access rules no longer permit it (revocation or narrowing): break the connection.
  • The audit disk or queue fills: warn, and keep logins working with a bounded buffer and a visible gap counter.

Q5 (port 22 coexistence), Q6 (key custody and minimum OpenSSH), Q7 (targets and first canary) are still open.

Owner answers (kayg, 2026-11-01), relayed by the orchestrator, on the P3 plan grill (comment 70829): **Q1 — commands.** - `open <machine>` depends on the machine. On a machine with app windows enabled (it has a desktop), it opens that machine's screen. On a headless machine it opens a shell, the same as `ssh`. - `infraternal ssh <machine>` exists and **always** opens a shell. - This changes D314, where `open` always meant a one-off shell. The D314 amendment is to be recorded. - When a one-off connection drops, `open`/`ssh` print a recovery handle and a resume command. **Yes.** - `--json` must make sense for each command. Interactive streaming is not mixed into the JSON envelope. **Q2 — consent.** The access rules are enough. Approved add-host/up plus visible per-host Login access is standing consent. No per-login approval mode. **Q3 — raw keys.** Not through our mesh SSH. Authentication on our SSH is **only** our server, UI and access rules: person certificates, and machine identities through explicit rules. If a host's own OpenSSH is reachable over the mesh, it keeps its own authentication, and that is outside our system. Our server has no `authorized_keys` path. Scripts and CI use explicit machine identities, issued and revoked through the same access rules. **Q4 — partitions.** (a): SSH keeps working on the last applied access view. Stale revision and coverage are visible. - A certificate expires while the access rules still permit the login: **no disconnection**. It is renewed silently. - The access rules no longer permit it (revocation or narrowing): **break the connection**. - The audit disk or queue fills: **warn**, and keep logins working with a bounded buffer and a visible gap counter. Q5 (port 22 coexistence), Q6 (key custody and minimum OpenSSH), Q7 (targets and first canary) are still open.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 13:39:03 +00:00
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Owner answers, continued (kayg, 2026-11-01):

  • Q1b: on a machine with a desktop, open <machine> opens or focuses the infraternal web app and shows that machine's screen on the canvas. The terminal prints one line and exits. If no one is logged in to the desktop, it falls back to a shell and says so.
  • Q5: (a). Bind exactly mesh-IP:22, falling back to an owned redirect scoped to the mesh interface, provided tests prove the original port is checked, cleanup works and latency is fine. #281 P5 uses the same mechanism for 80/443.
  • Q7: agreed. open/ssh to prompt: about 0.3 s on the LAN, about 1.5 s at 150 ms. 50 sessions typical, 500 as the stress test. First canary is perf-01; the dev VMs go last.
  • Feature scope (owner): "our ssh should behave like openssh, have the needed bells and whistles and great defaults". So the following are in scope for the product, not deferred:
    • -L / -R / -D port forwarding
    • rsync, scp, sftp, exec, exit status, signals, resize
    • environment and locale
    • managed host trust, so users never see host-key prompts
    • Agent forwarding (-A) off by default and allowed per rule. The orchestrator proposes this; owner confirmation is pending.
  • Q6: pending. The owner asked why keys exist at all. Proposed: hidden per-person keys, created automatically in the Secure Enclave/TPM or in memory, approved once by passkey, with a 24 h certificate renewed silently. No ~/.ssh handling and no host-key prompts. Keyless authentication by mesh machine identity is rejected, because it cannot tell apart the people on a shared machine. Minimum OpenSSH 8.0.
Owner answers, continued (kayg, 2026-11-01): - **Q1b:** on a machine with a desktop, `open <machine>` opens or focuses the infraternal web app and shows that machine's screen on the canvas. The terminal prints one line and exits. If no one is logged in to the desktop, it falls back to a shell and says so. - **Q5:** (a). Bind exactly `mesh-IP:22`, falling back to an owned redirect scoped to the mesh interface, provided tests prove the original port is checked, cleanup works and latency is fine. #281 P5 uses the same mechanism for 80/443. - **Q7:** agreed. `open`/`ssh` to prompt: about 0.3 s on the LAN, about 1.5 s at 150 ms. 50 sessions typical, 500 as the stress test. First canary is perf-01; the dev VMs go last. - **Feature scope (owner):** "our ssh should behave like openssh, have the needed bells and whistles and great defaults". So the following are in scope for the product, not deferred: - `-L` / `-R` / `-D` port forwarding - `rsync`, `scp`, `sftp`, exec, exit status, signals, resize - environment and locale - managed host trust, so users never see host-key prompts - Agent forwarding (`-A`) off by default and allowed per rule. The orchestrator proposes this; owner confirmation is pending. - **Q6:** pending. The owner asked why keys exist at all. Proposed: hidden per-person keys, created automatically in the Secure Enclave/TPM or in memory, approved once by passkey, with a 24 h certificate renewed silently. No `~/.ssh` handling and no host-key prompts. Keyless authentication by mesh machine identity is rejected, because it cannot tell apart the people on a shared machine. Minimum OpenSSH 8.0.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 14:46:52 +00:00
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Owner answer, Q6 (kayg, 2026-11-01): (a) hidden per-person keys.

  • The infraternal agent creates the key in the Secure Enclave or TPM, or in memory when neither exists.
  • The person approves once with a passkey.
  • A 24 h certificate renews silently.
  • No ~/.ssh handling and no host-key prompts (the host CA vouches).
  • Keyless machine-identity authentication is rejected.
  • Minimum client is OpenSSH 8.0.

All #221 grill questions are now answered: Q1–Q7, Q1b, and OpenSSH-equivalent features in scope. Implementation starts with S0 (recover and reconcile onto current dev) when a job slot frees.

Owner answer, **Q6 (kayg, 2026-11-01): (a) hidden per-person keys.** - The infraternal agent creates the key in the Secure Enclave or TPM, or in memory when neither exists. - The person approves once with a passkey. - A 24 h certificate renews silently. - No `~/.ssh` handling and no host-key prompts (the host CA vouches). - Keyless machine-identity authentication is rejected. - Minimum client is OpenSSH 8.0. All #221 grill questions are now answered: Q1–Q7, Q1b, and OpenSSH-equivalent features in scope. Implementation starts with S0 (recover and reconcile onto current dev) when a job slot frees.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 16:43:23 +00:00
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J72 start. Branch mesh-ssh-s0, base a26615c50e76ed86f36d25aa094283cf840d5320 (origin/dev).

Plan:

  1. Verify the immutable transport and real-login commit provenance against review b8211e742, and inspect current dev overlap.
  2. Recover only the reviewed production paths, reconcile contracts/mesh-ssh.md to current names and the settled Q1–Q7/Q1b decisions, and write the per-path map for #186/#172/#205/#220.
  3. Review the patch list, MSR-01..06 regressions, scoped tests, and dependency/feature/license diff; run scripts/verify fast on compute01 and push this branch.

Estimate: about 2.5 hours. SSH stays off; no enablement.

J72 start. Branch `mesh-ssh-s0`, base `a26615c50e76ed86f36d25aa094283cf840d5320` (`origin/dev`). Plan: 1. Verify the immutable transport and real-login commit provenance against review `b8211e742`, and inspect current `dev` overlap. 2. Recover only the reviewed production paths, reconcile `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` to current names and the settled Q1–Q7/Q1b decisions, and write the per-path map for #186/#172/#205/#220. 3. Review the patch list, MSR-01..06 regressions, scoped tests, and dependency/feature/license diff; run `scripts/verify fast` on compute01 and push this branch. Estimate: about 2.5 hours. SSH stays off; no enablement.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 16:48:19 +00:00
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Finding: the immutable recovery heads are not ancestors of current origin/dev (a26615c50e76ed86f36d25aa094283cf840d5320). 68caff92a3acefd801739895a48eece699971348 shares merge base 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79; its recovered feature range changes 190 paths (+50,969/-174), including the SSH transport, vendored russh/SFTP and MSR tests, but also historical static-build tooling and unrelated server/plugin changes. b8211e742f78b440c659e2aa81439e7b728b1084 adds only the reviewed startup test delta relative to 68caff92a.

86045327b84a018cfb5c427ff9b05b897d020106 is a merge with current-dev parent b231301396227821a992692410cf55c50abe04ef; its #172 side changes 119 paths (+17,667/-267), including the real-login runtime and benchmark/evidence tooling. I’m reconciling the feature-owned paths against current dev, preserving the immutable SHAs as provenance instead of merging either historical tree wholesale.

Finding: the immutable recovery heads are not ancestors of current `origin/dev` (`a26615c50e76ed86f36d25aa094283cf840d5320`). `68caff92a3acefd801739895a48eece699971348` shares merge base `650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79`; its recovered feature range changes 190 paths (+50,969/-174), including the SSH transport, vendored russh/SFTP and MSR tests, but also historical static-build tooling and unrelated server/plugin changes. `b8211e742f78b440c659e2aa81439e7b728b1084` adds only the reviewed startup test delta relative to `68caff92a`. `86045327b84a018cfb5c427ff9b05b897d020106` is a merge with current-dev parent `b231301396227821a992692410cf55c50abe04ef`; its #172 side changes 119 paths (+17,667/-267), including the real-login runtime and benchmark/evidence tooling. I’m reconciling the feature-owned paths against current `dev`, preserving the immutable SHAs as provenance instead of merging either historical tree wholesale.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 16:59:10 +00:00
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S0 interface/recovery review on mesh-ssh-s0 (base a26615c50e76ed86f36d25aa094283cf840d5320). Proposed frozen contract edits before the implementation recovery:

  • Use the decided names and behavior: infraternal ssh <machine> always starts a shell; open <machine> shows/focuses the desktop screen when available and otherwise starts a shell with an explanation. Standing consent is approved add-host/up plus visible per-host Login access.
  • Every SSH shell/file open passes both Network access to exact mesh-IP:22 and shared Login access for person → target OS account. During a partition the last-applied rules remain usable with stale revision/coverage visible. Certificate expiry alone does not end an allowed live session; revocation or narrowed access does. Audit pressure warns, buffers within a bound, and exposes a gap count.
  • Q5 is exact mesh-IP:22 bind, with an owned redirect limited to the mesh interface only if original-port enforcement, cleanup, and latency are proven. Q6 is hidden per-person keys in Secure Enclave/TPM or memory, one passkey approval, silent 24-hour certificate renewal, no ~/.ssh files or host-key prompts, OpenSSH >= 8.0. Product scope includes forwarding, rsync/scp/SFTP, exec/status, signals, resize, environment/locale, and managed host trust; agent forwarding stays off pending per-rule confirmation.
  • Keep mesh_login::LoginAuthority / LoginGuard as the adapter seam. No second access store or SSH shell tree. Component actions and listener remain unavailable until Q14 is met.

Per-path map: #186 owns the shared Login access/current-authority evaluator in server auth/access; it is currently absent, so SSH must only consume its guarded interface. #172 owns person/account runtime and OS login/shim lifecycle in crates/infraternal-agent/{logins,sessions}.rs and crates/infraternal-shim/{login,pty,session}.rs; recover only those runtime paths while preserving current D315 and #205 work, and keep it separate from access decisions. #205 is the existing optional process-per-user terminal-memory optimization in the shim; it supplies neither Login access nor account identity and remains off by default. #220 owns path observation/selection via infraternal-mesh::backend::PathKind and current mesh data paths; SSH consumes accepted streams and adds no selector.

Recovery boundary: 68caff92a is based on 650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79, not current dev. Keep only the reviewed mesh transport/port code, required pinned russh/ring/SFTP source and notices, and focused tests; preserve current host-SSH setup, mesh/firewall state, and build scripts. b8211e742 changes only mesh_startup.rs. 86045327b is based on b231301396227821a992692410cf55c50abe04ef; port login-specific runtime hunks onto current files, preserve current code outside that scope, omit research/build harnesses, and renumber its migration after current 0031.

S0 interface/recovery review on `mesh-ssh-s0` (base `a26615c50e76ed86f36d25aa094283cf840d5320`). Proposed frozen contract edits before the implementation recovery: - Use the decided names and behavior: `infraternal ssh <machine>` always starts a shell; `open <machine>` shows/focuses the desktop screen when available and otherwise starts a shell with an explanation. Standing consent is approved add-host/up plus visible per-host Login access. - Every SSH shell/file open passes both Network access to exact mesh-IP:22 and shared Login access for person → target OS account. During a partition the last-applied rules remain usable with stale revision/coverage visible. Certificate expiry alone does not end an allowed live session; revocation or narrowed access does. Audit pressure warns, buffers within a bound, and exposes a gap count. - Q5 is exact mesh-IP:22 bind, with an owned redirect limited to the mesh interface only if original-port enforcement, cleanup, and latency are proven. Q6 is hidden per-person keys in Secure Enclave/TPM or memory, one passkey approval, silent 24-hour certificate renewal, no `~/.ssh` files or host-key prompts, OpenSSH >= 8.0. Product scope includes forwarding, rsync/scp/SFTP, exec/status, signals, resize, environment/locale, and managed host trust; agent forwarding stays off pending per-rule confirmation. - Keep `mesh_login::LoginAuthority` / `LoginGuard` as the adapter seam. No second access store or SSH shell tree. Component actions and listener remain unavailable until Q14 is met. Per-path map: #186 owns the shared Login access/current-authority evaluator in server auth/access; it is currently absent, so SSH must only consume its guarded interface. #172 owns person/account runtime and OS login/shim lifecycle in `crates/infraternal-agent/{logins,sessions}.rs` and `crates/infraternal-shim/{login,pty,session}.rs`; recover only those runtime paths while preserving current D315 and #205 work, and keep it separate from access decisions. #205 is the existing optional `process-per-user` terminal-memory optimization in the shim; it supplies neither Login access nor account identity and remains off by default. #220 owns path observation/selection via `infraternal-mesh::backend::PathKind` and current mesh data paths; SSH consumes accepted streams and adds no selector. Recovery boundary: `68caff92a` is based on `650472b987dbd1fe7192248dd1367d0766c5fb79`, not current dev. Keep only the reviewed mesh transport/port code, required pinned russh/ring/SFTP source and notices, and focused tests; preserve current host-SSH setup, mesh/firewall state, and build scripts. `b8211e742` changes only `mesh_startup.rs`. `86045327b` is based on `b231301396227821a992692410cf55c50abe04ef`; port login-specific runtime hunks onto current files, preserve current code outside that scope, omit research/build harnesses, and renumber its migration after current `0031`.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:32:21 +00:00
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S0 findings from the current-dev reconciliation:

  • The recovered preferred-account migration was still numbered 0026, which collides with current 0026_mesh_node_name_source.sql. Renamed it to 0032_preferred_accounts.sql after current 0031_terminal_startup_hints.sql and extended the migration-chain regression through 0032.
  • The contract draft did not yet capture the owner's Q1 recovery/JSON behavior, Q7 prompt and scale targets, or the per-rule agent-forwarding scope. It also named the wrong #205 implementation file. I am updating those with the settled answers and exact current paths.

SSH remains disabled; no listener or port binding is added in S0.

S0 findings from the current-dev reconciliation: - The recovered preferred-account migration was still numbered `0026`, which collides with current `0026_mesh_node_name_source.sql`. Renamed it to `0032_preferred_accounts.sql` after current `0031_terminal_startup_hints.sql` and extended the migration-chain regression through 0032. - The contract draft did not yet capture the owner's Q1 recovery/JSON behavior, Q7 prompt and scale targets, or the per-rule agent-forwarding scope. It also named the wrong #205 implementation file. I am updating those with the settled answers and exact current paths. SSH remains disabled; no listener or port binding is added in S0.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:33:47 +00:00
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Dependency/licence review found vendor/russh/Cargo.toml declares Apache-2.0 and vendor/russh/INFRATERNAL.md says upstream license notices are retained, but the recovered vendor tree had no license text. Added the Apache-2.0 license file alongside the preserved SFTP license. The root dependency pin remains russh 0.64.1 with ring and russh-sftp 3.0.1; no engine or crypto choice changed.

Dependency/licence review found `vendor/russh/Cargo.toml` declares Apache-2.0 and `vendor/russh/INFRATERNAL.md` says upstream license notices are retained, but the recovered vendor tree had no license text. Added the Apache-2.0 license file alongside the preserved SFTP license. The root dependency pin remains russh 0.64.1 with ring and russh-sftp 3.0.1; no engine or crypto choice changed.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:46:05 +00:00
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J72 progress at head 8a98988cfbad6a4e738a5c7fda1673ea76a16720 (pushed mesh-ssh-s0). Recovered the reviewed transport paths from 68caff92a/b8211e742 and the real-login runtime from 86045327b by path-level reconciliation onto current dev; the reviewed mesh_startup test matches b8211e742. The contract now records the owner answers and #186/#172/#205/#220 path map. Preferred-account migration is 0032 after current 0031; SSH still has no production listener call.

Dependency review: russh 0.64.1 is pinned with default features disabled and ring selected; russh-sftp 3.0.1 is pinned. Both vendored crates retain Apache-2.0 notices; the missing russh license text was added. Whitespace check is clean.

Scoped Rust tests are queued through dev-02 build-slot (PID 3869769); log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests.log. Next: wait for that run, then run the final scripts/verify fast through compute01 build-slot, report verbatim, and clean the target directory.

J72 progress at head `8a98988cfbad6a4e738a5c7fda1673ea76a16720` (pushed `mesh-ssh-s0`). Recovered the reviewed transport paths from `68caff92a`/`b8211e742` and the real-login runtime from `86045327b` by path-level reconciliation onto current `dev`; the reviewed `mesh_startup` test matches `b8211e742`. The contract now records the owner answers and #186/#172/#205/#220 path map. Preferred-account migration is `0032` after current `0031`; SSH still has no production listener call. Dependency review: russh 0.64.1 is pinned with default features disabled and `ring` selected; russh-sftp 3.0.1 is pinned. Both vendored crates retain Apache-2.0 notices; the missing russh license text was added. Whitespace check is clean. Scoped Rust tests are queued through dev-02 `build-slot` (PID 3869769); log: `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests.log`. Next: wait for that run, then run the final `scripts/verify fast` through compute01 `build-slot`, report verbatim, and clean the target directory.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:47:13 +00:00
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Correction to the prior progress note: queued process 3869769 had not started and was stopped to add the required dev-02 -j3 limit. The scoped suite is now queued as PID 3879226; the same log path applies.

Correction to the prior progress note: queued process 3869769 had not started and was stopped to add the required dev-02 `-j3` limit. The scoped suite is now queued as PID 3879226; the same log path applies.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:51:56 +00:00
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Finding: seven recovered rootless scripts import scripts/login-bench/round3/controller.py, which is absent from current dev and exists only in the historical 86045327b tree. That file is part of the excluded benchmark harness, so these seven scripts cannot run within the S0 recovery boundary. I am dropping them; test-rootless-explicit-state.py and verify-agent-lazy-manager.py are self-contained and remain. The scoped Rust package suite covers the recovered login modules.

Finding: seven recovered rootless scripts import `scripts/login-bench/round3/controller.py`, which is absent from current dev and exists only in the historical `86045327b` tree. That file is part of the excluded benchmark harness, so these seven scripts cannot run within the S0 recovery boundary. I am dropping them; `test-rootless-explicit-state.py` and `verify-agent-lazy-manager.py` are self-contained and remain. The scoped Rust package suite covers the recovered login modules.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:52:38 +00:00
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S0 patch-list correction: the candidate is now 15fcbbd8e5030f1bb70795671918e1b32eb88651 (pushed with lease). Removed the seven scripts that depended on the excluded login-benchmark controller; retained the standalone explicit-state and lazy-manager checks. The dev-02 test worktree now matches this head, and queued PID 3879226 will test it.

S0 patch-list correction: the candidate is now `15fcbbd8e5030f1bb70795671918e1b32eb88651` (pushed with lease). Removed the seven scripts that depended on the excluded login-benchmark controller; retained the standalone explicit-state and lazy-manager checks. The dev-02 test worktree now matches this head, and queued PID 3879226 will test it.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:55:33 +00:00
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Finding: the first dev-02 scoped test command stopped before compiling because Cargo reported cannot update the lock file .../Cargo.lock because --locked was passed. No tests ran and the VM worktree lockfile was not modified. I am resolving the exact lock graph delta, then will rerun the scoped suites with --locked.

Finding: the first dev-02 scoped test command stopped before compiling because Cargo reported `cannot update the lock file .../Cargo.lock because --locked was passed`. No tests ran and the VM worktree lockfile was not modified. I am resolving the exact lock graph delta, then will rerun the scoped suites with `--locked`.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:56:01 +00:00
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Lockfile finding resolved: cargo metadata on dev-02 changed only three lockfile lines, qualifying the existing workspace dependencies as sha2 0.10.9 and nix 0.30.1 where multiple versions are now present. No package versions changed. I am applying that exact resolution to the branch before retrying locked tests.

Lockfile finding resolved: `cargo metadata` on dev-02 changed only three lockfile lines, qualifying the existing workspace dependencies as `sha2 0.10.9` and `nix 0.30.1` where multiple versions are now present. No package versions changed. I am applying that exact resolution to the branch before retrying locked tests.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 17:56:50 +00:00
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Lockfile fix committed and pushed at 52d851e5f3b7f450dde112b374026c16bf4d36bf; cargo metadata --locked now passes on dev-02. The scoped package suite has been relaunched at -j3 (PID 3959545), including the CLI crate; log remains /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests.log.

Lockfile fix committed and pushed at `52d851e5f3b7f450dde112b374026c16bf4d36bf`; `cargo metadata --locked` now passes on dev-02. The scoped package suite has been relaunched at `-j3` (PID 3959545), including the CLI crate; log remains `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests.log`.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:03:42 +00:00
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Finding: the locked dev-02 scoped suite reached the changed shim and failed to compile crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs: output_readiness_tests opened at line 218 remains unclosed at EOF (line 1683). The run exited; I am reconciling the pty module boundary and will rerun the scoped suite.

Finding: the locked dev-02 scoped suite reached the changed shim and failed to compile `crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs`: `output_readiness_tests` opened at line 218 remains unclosed at EOF (line 1683). The run exited; I am reconciling the pty module boundary and will rerun the scoped suite.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:04:24 +00:00
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Compile finding fixed: closed output_readiness_tests before the host-login PTY helpers in crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs. Pushed updated head 1544a623e027d571ba915f60b5dc65d0957e3044; rerunning the scoped suite on the synced worktree.

Compile finding fixed: closed `output_readiness_tests` before the `host-login` PTY helpers in `crates/infraternal-shim/src/pty.rs`. Pushed updated head `1544a623e027d571ba915f60b5dc65d0957e3044`; rerunning the scoped suite on the synced worktree.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:21:28 +00:00
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Finding: the first dev-02 scoped build reached the recovered shim and failed before running tests: lib.rs declared startup twice, and startup::Options::run initialized Config without the four new login fields. Current dev already exports this module publicly. Fixed and pushed at 2e36de857: removed the duplicate declaration and used Config::new so legacy startup leaves login fields unset. Rerunning the scoped suite on dev-02; SSH remains disabled.

Finding: the first dev-02 scoped build reached the recovered shim and failed before running tests: `lib.rs` declared `startup` twice, and `startup::Options::run` initialized `Config` without the four new login fields. Current dev already exports this module publicly. Fixed and pushed at `2e36de857`: removed the duplicate declaration and used `Config::new` so legacy startup leaves login fields unset. Rerunning the scoped suite on dev-02; SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:29:19 +00:00
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Second finding: the next scoped compile reached the shim unit tests and found two sequenced_input Peer fixtures missing the new stopping state. Both now initialize it to false in commit f08f78adc, preserving the existing test behavior. I am syncing both VM worktrees and retrying the scoped suite.

Second finding: the next scoped compile reached the shim unit tests and found two `sequenced_input` Peer fixtures missing the new `stopping` state. Both now initialize it to `false` in commit `f08f78adc`, preserving the existing test behavior. I am syncing both VM worktrees and retrying the scoped suite.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:32:49 +00:00
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Third compile finding: the scoped suite reached the recovered prestarted-login handoff and failed because sessions.rs used File::as_raw_fd without importing AsRawFd. Added the std fd trait import in fa794d694; the login handoff still uses the same pinned descriptor. Retrying on dev-02.

Third compile finding: the scoped suite reached the recovered prestarted-login handoff and failed because `sessions.rs` used `File::as_raw_fd` without importing `AsRawFd`. Added the std fd trait import in `fa794d694`; the login handoff still uses the same pinned descriptor. Retrying on dev-02.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:35:16 +00:00
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Fourth compile finding: the reconciled server handler imports the recovered SSH account preference API, but the current lib.rs did not export accounts. Restored the historical public module declaration in 5a940a7ad, so preferred_accounts.rs and the SSH plugin use the same account contract. Retrying the scoped suite on dev-02.

Fourth compile finding: the reconciled server handler imports the recovered SSH account preference API, but the current `lib.rs` did not export `accounts`. Restored the historical public module declaration in `5a940a7ad`, so `preferred_accounts.rs` and the SSH plugin use the same account contract. Retrying the scoped suite on dev-02.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:39:52 +00:00
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Fifth compile finding: the recovered embedded actor adds a remote-feature retirement channel to run_actor and EmbeddedAgent. The current-dev liveness break-it fixture still used the pre-recovery signature. Added an idle, feature-gated cleanup channel to that fixture in 3813936ca, preserving its test assertions and actor behavior. The active build is draining; I will retry on this head.

Fifth compile finding: the recovered embedded actor adds a remote-feature retirement channel to `run_actor` and `EmbeddedAgent`. The current-dev liveness break-it fixture still used the pre-recovery signature. Added an idle, feature-gated cleanup channel to that fixture in `3813936ca`, preserving its test assertions and actor behavior. The active build is draining; I will retry on this head.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:45:39 +00:00
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Sixth test finding: default_build_registers_no_unbuilt_command failed because the recovered CLI factory materialized the hosted account descriptor as NotAvailableYet. PluginDescriptor::cli_plugin documents that the CLI has no authenticated device-session adapter. Removed only that CLI factory in e3e097c11; the server still uses the account descriptor behind its SSH feature. This keeps unsupported commands out of CLI help while preserving the production server interface. The current suite is draining; I will rerun on this head.

Sixth test finding: `default_build_registers_no_unbuilt_command` failed because the recovered CLI factory materialized the hosted account descriptor as `NotAvailableYet`. `PluginDescriptor::cli_plugin` documents that the CLI has no authenticated device-session adapter. Removed only that CLI factory in `e3e097c11`; the server still uses the account descriptor behind its SSH feature. This keeps unsupported commands out of CLI help while preserving the production server interface. The current suite is draining; I will rerun on this head.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 18:58:24 +00:00
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S0 finding from scoped run r6 at 3813936ca: ordinary PTY attachment tests returned “terminal shim disconnected” because SHELL_CLEANUP and QUERY_REPLIES both occupied bit 5 (32). I am moving the cleanup-only capability to unused bit 7 and adding a disjointness regression. The same run exposed current-tree reconciliation gaps: #172 daemon regressions reference seven helper scripts present in immutable 86045327b but absent from this branch; two migration checks still assert 31 rows despite migration 0032; default-feature shim tests cannot compile CloseSession because it calls OwnedChild::id behind a feature gate; and the zsh startup fixture does not fit the dev-02 account shell (/bin/bash). I am restoring only the referenced test oracles and correcting these gates. The full run also had a public mouse probe failure; I will inspect it on the final-head rerun.

S0 finding from scoped run r6 at 3813936ca: ordinary PTY attachment tests returned “terminal shim disconnected” because SHELL_CLEANUP and QUERY_REPLIES both occupied bit 5 (32). I am moving the cleanup-only capability to unused bit 7 and adding a disjointness regression. The same run exposed current-tree reconciliation gaps: #172 daemon regressions reference seven helper scripts present in immutable 86045327b but absent from this branch; two migration checks still assert 31 rows despite migration 0032; default-feature shim tests cannot compile CloseSession because it calls OwnedChild::id behind a feature gate; and the zsh startup fixture does not fit the dev-02 account shell (/bin/bash). I am restoring only the referenced test oracles and correcting these gates. The full run also had a public mouse probe failure; I will inspect it on the final-head rerun.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 19:08:29 +00:00
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Reconciliation note: the lazy-manager failure was a stale #172 test expectation, not a regression to fix by moving detection back onto terminal.open. Current dev commit 401016ccc (D255) intentionally warms the same OnceCell in the background; its commit evidence measured a 6.5 ms VM208 probe between SESSION receipt and first attach and moved it off the control path. I kept that behavior and replaced the stale no-probe assertion with a gated systemctl oracle: it holds the background probe and requires Hello/Pong to complete before release, then checks both terminal opens share one probe and records startup/open timings.

Reconciliation note: the lazy-manager failure was a stale #172 test expectation, not a regression to fix by moving detection back onto terminal.open. Current dev commit 401016ccc (D255) intentionally warms the same OnceCell in the background; its commit evidence measured a 6.5 ms VM208 probe between SESSION receipt and first attach and moved it off the control path. I kept that behavior and replaced the stale no-probe assertion with a gated systemctl oracle: it holds the background probe and requires Hello/Pong to complete before release, then checks both terminal opens share one probe and records startup/open timings.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 19:24:32 +00:00
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J72 continuation finding: current origin/dev is now 65d986191, descended from the recorded start base a26615c50. Six current-dev commits are absent from this candidate, including the #296 and #293 merges. I will carry only the S0 patch onto the updated base and rerun the scoped suite before the compute01 gate. Scoped test r7 is still running on dev-02; log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests-r7.log.

J72 continuation finding: current origin/dev is now 65d986191, descended from the recorded start base a26615c50. Six current-dev commits are absent from this candidate, including the #296 and #293 merges. I will carry only the S0 patch onto the updated base and rerun the scoped suite before the compute01 gate. Scoped test r7 is still running on dev-02; log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests-r7.log.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 19:27:24 +00:00
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Scoped run r7 reached the real-binary suite and reported 9/11 failures. Seven restored #172 rootless oracles import , which is intentionally absent from current dev; the previous S0 review had excluded that benchmark harness. The retained explicit-state oracle also refused readiness. I am tracing the test-only helper dependency and the readiness refusal before the final scoped rerun.

Scoped run r7 reached the real-binary suite and reported 9/11 failures. Seven restored #172 rootless oracles import , which is intentionally absent from current dev; the previous S0 review had excluded that benchmark harness. The retained explicit-state oracle also refused readiness. I am tracing the test-only helper dependency and the readiness refusal before the final scoped rerun.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 19:27:37 +00:00
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Scoped run r7 reached the real-binary suite and reported 9/11 failures. Seven restored #172 rootless oracles import scripts/login-bench/round3/controller.py, which is intentionally absent from current dev; the previous S0 review had excluded that benchmark harness. The retained explicit-state oracle also refused readiness. I am tracing the test-only helper dependency and the readiness refusal before the final scoped rerun.

Scoped run r7 reached the real-binary suite and reported 9/11 failures. Seven restored #172 rootless oracles import scripts/login-bench/round3/controller.py, which is intentionally absent from current dev; the previous S0 review had excluded that benchmark harness. The retained explicit-state oracle also refused readiness. I am tracing the test-only helper dependency and the readiness refusal before the final scoped rerun.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 19:40:16 +00:00
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J72 rebase update: fetched origin/dev at 65d986191 and replayed the nine S0 commits cleanly onto it; rebased head is 6d3b00f07. The per-path recovery remains isolated to #221 and SSH remains off. The uncommitted rootless-oracle helper patch is excluded from that head; git diff --check is clean.

Scoped run r7 is still active on the earlier VM snapshot (PID 377027; log /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests-r7.log). It reported missing imports of the excluded historical controller in seven rootless oracles and an explicit-state readiness refusal. Shared fixture helpers and improved refusal diagnostics are ready locally but unverified. Next: finish or retire r7, sync and run the rebased scoped suite on dev-02, then run verify fast on compute01 and push.

J72 rebase update: fetched origin/dev at 65d986191 and replayed the nine S0 commits cleanly onto it; rebased head is 6d3b00f07. The per-path recovery remains isolated to #221 and SSH remains off. The uncommitted rootless-oracle helper patch is excluded from that head; git diff --check is clean. Scoped run r7 is still active on the earlier VM snapshot (PID 377027; log /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests-r7.log). It reported missing imports of the excluded historical controller in seven rootless oracles and an explicit-state readiness refusal. Shared fixture helpers and improved refusal diagnostics are ready locally but unverified. Next: finish or retire r7, sync and run the rebased scoped suite on dev-02, then run verify fast on compute01 and push.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 19:56:15 +00:00
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J72 update: stopped obsolete r7 after its rootless oracle and agent-session failures were recorded; no J72 process remained. Rebased head 6d3b00f07 is pushed to mesh-ssh-s0 with force-with-lease, and dev-02 now checks out that head. SHA-256 matched for the contract and all nine transferred fixture files. The old target was removed, restoring 55 GB free.

Replacement scoped suite r8 is detached under build-slot on dev-02, queued behind shared work; log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests-r8.log. It includes the uncommitted shared-fixture patch. SSH remains off; compute01 verify fast and final push are pending.

J72 update: stopped obsolete r7 after its rootless oracle and agent-session failures were recorded; no J72 process remained. Rebased head 6d3b00f07 is pushed to mesh-ssh-s0 with force-with-lease, and dev-02 now checks out that head. SHA-256 matched for the contract and all nine transferred fixture files. The old target was removed, restoring 55 GB free. Replacement scoped suite r8 is detached under build-slot on dev-02, queued behind shared work; log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests-r8.log. It includes the uncommitted shared-fixture patch. SSH remains off; compute01 verify fast and final push are pending.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 20:03:21 +00:00
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Finding from scoped r8 compilation: the recovered login socket handoff uses tokio 1.53.3 AsyncFd::new at crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs:808, which warns that registration is unsound without the I/O safety guarantee. origin/dev does not use this API. The agent crate forbids unsafe code, so I moved this socket to the existing sealed shim readiness registration and added owned UnixStream as an audited source type; the registration keeps the standard stream alive and stable. The edit is local and not part of r8, which is still running on the prior source snapshot. I will copy it to dev-02 and verify it after r8 completes.

Finding from scoped r8 compilation: the recovered login socket handoff uses tokio 1.53.3 AsyncFd::new at crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs:808, which warns that registration is unsound without the I/O safety guarantee. origin/dev does not use this API. The agent crate forbids unsafe code, so I moved this socket to the existing sealed shim readiness registration and added owned UnixStream as an audited source type; the registration keeps the standard stream alive and stable. The edit is local and not part of r8, which is still running on the prior source snapshot. I will copy it to dev-02 and verify it after r8 completes.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 20:15:55 +00:00
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Finding on the current-dev #172 regressions: seven real-binary rootless oracles imported scripts/login-bench/round3/controller.py, which exists only in the excluded historical tree. I moved their bounded control/attach/detach/marker helpers into the existing scripts/agent_fixture.py and updated the oracles to use it; this preserves the checks without importing benchmark tooling. The explicit-state oracle now includes the refused readiness result in its diagnostic.

Replacement scoped run r8 is still active on dev-02 (PID 660673; /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests-r8.log) and has reached server unit tests. Its earlier real-binary package result had 11/11 rootless failures (resource_unavailable and invalid refusals); the unrelated binary restart tests also hit timeouts under shared load. I will isolate those failures after r8 exits. A Tokio AsyncFd::new unsoundness warning in the recovered handoff has a local fix using the sealed shim Registration; it still needs a VM check. SSH remains disabled.

Finding on the current-dev #172 regressions: seven real-binary rootless oracles imported `scripts/login-bench/round3/controller.py`, which exists only in the excluded historical tree. I moved their bounded control/attach/detach/marker helpers into the existing `scripts/agent_fixture.py` and updated the oracles to use it; this preserves the checks without importing benchmark tooling. The explicit-state oracle now includes the refused readiness result in its diagnostic. Replacement scoped run r8 is still active on dev-02 (PID 660673; `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-tests-r8.log`) and has reached server unit tests. Its earlier real-binary package result had 11/11 rootless failures (`resource_unavailable` and `invalid` refusals); the unrelated binary restart tests also hit timeouts under shared load. I will isolate those failures after r8 exits. A Tokio `AsyncFd::new` unsoundness warning in the recovered handoff has a local fix using the sealed shim `Registration`; it still needs a VM check. SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 20:26:32 +00:00
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Rebase notice: while the scoped reruns were active, origin/dev advanced from 65d986191 to 0067e1255407f0f3ed0f1d6c5e5caf51667e00a (merge #283). The current J72 checkpoint remains based on 65d986191. I will replay the S0 patch onto 0067e1255 after the serial diagnostics, preserve dev's intervening work, and rerun the relevant checks before the final gate.

Rebase notice: while the scoped reruns were active, `origin/dev` advanced from `65d986191` to `0067e1255407f0f3ed0f1d6c5e5caf51667e00a` (merge #283). The current J72 checkpoint remains based on `65d986191`. I will replay the S0 patch onto `0067e1255` after the serial diagnostics, preserve dev's intervening work, and rerun the relevant checks before the final gate.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 20:27:09 +00:00
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Rebase complete: replayed the ten J72 commits cleanly onto origin/dev 0067e1255407f0f3ed0f1d6c5e5caf51667e00a (#283). No blanket merge was introduced. The rebased WIP checkpoint 7b221110c is pushed to mesh-ssh-s0; dev-02 serial diagnostics continue on the prior checkpoint and will be reset to the rebased head before any follow-up run.

Rebase complete: replayed the ten J72 commits cleanly onto `origin/dev` `0067e1255407f0f3ed0f1d6c5e5caf51667e00a` (#283). No blanket merge was introduced. The rebased WIP checkpoint `7b221110c` is pushed to `mesh-ssh-s0`; dev-02 serial diagnostics continue on the prior checkpoint and will be reset to the rebased head before any follow-up run.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 20:36:13 +00:00
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J72 continuation start on mesh-ssh-s0, worktree ~/Developer/Worktrees/infraternal-j72, base 0067e1255407f0f3ed0f1d6c5e5caf51667e00a, current checkpoint 7b221110c.

Plan:

  1. Resolve the remaining rootless/readiness regression diagnostics and verify the recovered #172 runtime and #221 transport on the current dev base.
  2. Review immutable provenance, the complete patch list, MSR-01..06 coverage, the #186/#172/#205/#220 path map, and dependency/feature/licence changes.
  3. Run scoped checks on a VM, then scripts/verify fast on compute01, quote its output, and push the finished branch.

Estimate: 2.5 hours from this continuation. SSH remains off; no enablement.

J72 continuation start on `mesh-ssh-s0`, worktree `~/Developer/Worktrees/infraternal-j72`, base `0067e1255407f0f3ed0f1d6c5e5caf51667e00a`, current checkpoint `7b221110c`. Plan: 1. Resolve the remaining rootless/readiness regression diagnostics and verify the recovered #172 runtime and #221 transport on the current dev base. 2. Review immutable provenance, the complete patch list, MSR-01..06 coverage, the #186/#172/#205/#220 path map, and dependency/feature/licence changes. 3. Run scoped checks on a VM, then `scripts/verify fast` on compute01, quote its output, and push the finished branch. Estimate: 2.5 hours from this continuation. SSH remains off; no enablement.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 20:46:27 +00:00
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S0 progress at c9fddce97 on mesh-ssh-s0 (rebased base 0067e1255).

The dev-02 scoped log r9 was from its stale worktree head 77e05e0f8, not the pushed rebased branch. I reset the VM worktree to the current branch before further qualification. r9's six rootless failures had two fixture causes: five scripts constructed a 109-byte Unix socket path under real-logins-review (Linux sun_path limit: 108 bytes), and test-rootless-logins.py shadowed the imported marker helper with its marker-file path. The five scripts now use existing fixture_state; the helper is terminal_marker. This changes fixture paths only.

On dev-02, the rootless agent_daemon filter passed all 9 tests (0 failed, 2 filtered). The measured replacement path is 104 bytes. The same commit records the owner amendments to D235 Q3 and D314 Q1/Q1b; contracts/mesh-ssh.md already freezes the settled Q1–Q7/Q1b behavior and #186/#172/#205/#220 path map. Next: run the current-head SSH/login/shim scoped suites, finish dependency/feature/licence review, then run scripts/verify fast on compute01.

S0 progress at `c9fddce97` on `mesh-ssh-s0` (rebased base `0067e1255`). The dev-02 scoped log r9 was from its stale worktree head `77e05e0f8`, not the pushed rebased branch. I reset the VM worktree to the current branch before further qualification. r9's six rootless failures had two fixture causes: five scripts constructed a 109-byte Unix socket path under `real-logins-review` (Linux `sun_path` limit: 108 bytes), and `test-rootless-logins.py` shadowed the imported `marker` helper with its marker-file path. The five scripts now use existing `fixture_state`; the helper is `terminal_marker`. This changes fixture paths only. On dev-02, the rootless `agent_daemon` filter passed all 9 tests (0 failed, 2 filtered). The measured replacement path is 104 bytes. The same commit records the owner amendments to D235 Q3 and D314 Q1/Q1b; `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` already freezes the settled Q1–Q7/Q1b behavior and #186/#172/#205/#220 path map. Next: run the current-head SSH/login/shim scoped suites, finish dependency/feature/licence review, then run `scripts/verify fast` on compute01.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:11:07 +00:00
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S0 scoped progress at c9fddce97 on mesh-ssh-s0: the full infraternal-plugin-ssh package suite, including MSR-01..06 coverage, passed (94 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored). The russh/russh-sftp feature-tree checks and cargo deny check licenses also passed. The dev-02 runner continues with original-port, agent, shim, server and real-binary suites; compute01 scripts/verify fast is still the final gate. SSH remains off.

S0 scoped progress at `c9fddce97` on `mesh-ssh-s0`: the full `infraternal-plugin-ssh` package suite, including MSR-01..06 coverage, passed (94 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored). The russh/russh-sftp feature-tree checks and `cargo deny check licenses` also passed. The dev-02 runner continues with original-port, agent, shim, server and real-binary suites; compute01 `scripts/verify fast` is still the final gate. SSH remains off.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:12:39 +00:00
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Scoped-run command correction at c9fddce97: the original-port test file is crates/plugins/mesh/tests/ssh_original_port.rs, so its package is infraternal-plugin-mesh. The first runner mistakenly selected infraternal-mesh; Cargo reported “no test target named ssh_original_port” before running it. I will rerun that target with the owning plugin package after the current suite.

Scoped-run command correction at `c9fddce97`: the original-port test file is `crates/plugins/mesh/tests/ssh_original_port.rs`, so its package is `infraternal-plugin-mesh`. The first runner mistakenly selected `infraternal-mesh`; Cargo reported “no test target named `ssh_original_port`” before running it. I will rerun that target with the owning plugin package after the current suite.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:16:06 +00:00
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S0 scoped update at c9fddce97: the complete infraternal-agent package test suite also passed (runner result exit 0). The shim host-login library suite is running now. The original-port check remains queued for the corrected package command, infraternal-plugin-mesh.

S0 scoped update at `c9fddce97`: the complete `infraternal-agent` package test suite also passed (runner result exit 0). The shim `host-login` library suite is running now. The original-port check remains queued for the corrected package command, `infraternal-plugin-mesh`.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:16:54 +00:00
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Shim target clarification at c9fddce97: tests/unit/login_lifecycle.rs is included by path in src/lib.rs and is covered by the host-login --lib run (141 passed, 0 failed, 15 ignored). The separate --test login_lifecycle command named a non-existent Cargo integration target and ran no tests; no shim coverage is missing.

Shim target clarification at `c9fddce97`: `tests/unit/login_lifecycle.rs` is included by path in `src/lib.rs` and is covered by the host-login `--lib` run (141 passed, 0 failed, 15 ignored). The separate `--test login_lifecycle` command named a non-existent Cargo integration target and ran no tests; no shim coverage is missing.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:21:25 +00:00
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Scoped test finding at c9fddce97: the dev-02 full infraternal-server --lib run has reported two failures in auth::socket_tests::review_subscription_refusal: oversized_refusal_cannot_reinstall_a_queued_mesh_subscription and review_oversized_replacement_ends_the_previous_mesh_subscription. The full suite is still active; I am collecting failure traces and will classify against the current-dev baseline before any code change.

Scoped test finding at `c9fddce97`: the dev-02 full `infraternal-server --lib` run has reported two failures in `auth::socket_tests::review_subscription_refusal`: `oversized_refusal_cannot_reinstall_a_queued_mesh_subscription` and `review_oversized_replacement_ends_the_previous_mesh_subscription`. The full suite is still active; I am collecting failure traces and will classify against the current-dev baseline before any code change.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:24:21 +00:00
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Scoped-run finding at c9fddce97 (dev-02 run complete, no process pending): infraternal-server --lib reported 439 passed, 2 failed, 26 ignored. Both failures are in review_subscription_refusal; expected mesh unavailable, received plugin unavailable. infraternal --test agent_daemon reported 8 passed, 3 failed: the explicit-state preparation test and two rootless revocation tests; the revocation helpers received terminal.open: invalid. The CLI shim suite passed 26/26. I am checking these against unmodified origin/dev and tracing the fixture inputs before any change.

Scoped-run finding at `c9fddce97` (dev-02 run complete, no process pending): `infraternal-server --lib` reported 439 passed, 2 failed, 26 ignored. Both failures are in `review_subscription_refusal`; expected `mesh unavailable`, received `plugin unavailable`. `infraternal --test agent_daemon` reported 8 passed, 3 failed: the explicit-state preparation test and two rootless revocation tests; the revocation helpers received `terminal.open: invalid`. The CLI shim suite passed 26/26. I am checking these against unmodified `origin/dev` and tracing the fixture inputs before any change.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:26:44 +00:00
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Rootless failure diagnosis: both failing scripts still placed state under ~/.cache/codex-scratch/real-logins-review/{r,v}<pid>. On dev-02 the rendezvous path state/sessions/<32-char-id>.sock measures 109 bytes before its NUL (110 with NUL), exceeding Linux sun_path's 108-byte bound. The resulting InvalidInput matches the observed terminal.open: invalid. I will move these fixtures to the existing bounded fixture_state helper; production code is not implicated by this trace.

Rootless failure diagnosis: both failing scripts still placed state under `~/.cache/codex-scratch/real-logins-review/{r,v}<pid>`. On dev-02 the rendezvous path `state/sessions/<32-char-id>.sock` measures 109 bytes before its NUL (110 with NUL), exceeding Linux `sun_path`'s 108-byte bound. The resulting `InvalidInput` matches the observed `terminal.open: invalid`. I will move these fixtures to the existing bounded `fixture_state` helper; production code is not implicated by this trace.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:29:56 +00:00
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Rootless fixture correction verified at c9fddce97: the full agent_daemon suite now passes 11/11 on dev-02, including explicit-state readiness and both person-revocation cases. The fixtures use fixture_state, which measures against both the rendezvous and upstream Unix socket limits and falls back to a short private /tmp root when needed.

Rootless fixture correction verified at `c9fddce97`: the full `agent_daemon` suite now passes 11/11 on dev-02, including explicit-state readiness and both person-revocation cases. The fixtures use `fixture_state`, which measures against both the rendezvous and upstream Unix socket limits and falls back to a short private `/tmp` root when needed.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:39:42 +00:00
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J72 continuation: rebased the isolated S0 commits onto current origin/dev 6093cb8a8 and pushed head 8c2c60e9c. The recovered commits were applied by path; the historical trees were not merged. The contract still records Q1–Q7/Q1b and the #186/#172/#205/#220 map. Remaining test-fixture correction is committed as 0fe7af0a1. Plan: sync dev-02, run the corrected mesh original-port test plus current-head SSH/login regressions through build-slot, then run the requested fast gate on compute01 and post its exact output. Estimate: about 1 hour; SSH remains disabled.

J72 continuation: rebased the isolated S0 commits onto current origin/dev 6093cb8a8 and pushed head 8c2c60e9c. The recovered commits were applied by path; the historical trees were not merged. The contract still records Q1–Q7/Q1b and the #186/#172/#205/#220 map. Remaining test-fixture correction is committed as 0fe7af0a1. Plan: sync dev-02, run the corrected mesh original-port test plus current-head SSH/login regressions through build-slot, then run the requested fast gate on compute01 and post its exact output. Estimate: about 1 hour; SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:43:56 +00:00
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Current-head scoped qualification at 8c2c60e9c is queued via dev-02 build-slot (PID 1405484). Log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-current.log. It will cover the SSH/MSR suite, original-port test, #172 login paths, cargo feature trees and cargo-deny license check; no test command has started yet.

Current-head scoped qualification at 8c2c60e9c is queued via dev-02 build-slot (PID 1405484). Log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-current.log. It will cover the SSH/MSR suite, original-port test, #172 login paths, cargo feature trees and cargo-deny license check; no test command has started yet.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:49:33 +00:00
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Queue adjustment: dev-02 had 18 GB free, below build-slot’s 25 GB floor. J72 PID 1405484 was waiting and had not entered the test script, so I stopped that queued run. I am moving the same scoped suite to the existing dedicated J72 worktree on compute01, which had 191 GB free; its four build slots were occupied at the last check.

Queue adjustment: dev-02 had 18 GB free, below build-slot’s 25 GB floor. J72 PID 1405484 was waiting and had not entered the test script, so I stopped that queued run. I am moving the same scoped suite to the existing dedicated J72 worktree on compute01, which had 191 GB free; its four build slots were occupied at the last check.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 21:50:29 +00:00
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Scoped qualification was moved off dev-02 after the disk fell below its 25 GB floor. The prior queue was stopped before tests began and its J72 target was removed to return space to dev-02. The same current-head suite is now running through compute01 build-slot (PID 970564), in the dedicated worktree at /home/claude/worktrees/infraternal-j72; log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-current.log.

Scoped qualification was moved off dev-02 after the disk fell below its 25 GB floor. The prior queue was stopped before tests began and its J72 target was removed to return space to dev-02. The same current-head suite is now running through compute01 build-slot (PID 970564), in the dedicated worktree at /home/claude/worktrees/infraternal-j72; log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-current.log.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:00:55 +00:00
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Scoped-test finding at 8c2c60e9c: the broad SSH --all-targets command stopped in tests/install.rs (24 passed, 70 failed, 2 ignored). The failures share exit 127 while invoking target/debug/examples/recovery-helper, which was absent. scripts/verify.d/rust.sh explicitly builds that example before cargo test --workspace; the standalone command omitted the prerequisite. Archived log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-current-missing-helper.log. No source change is needed; rerunning the suite with the same helper-build prerequisite.

Scoped-test finding at 8c2c60e9c: the broad SSH --all-targets command stopped in tests/install.rs (24 passed, 70 failed, 2 ignored). The failures share exit 127 while invoking target/debug/examples/recovery-helper, which was absent. scripts/verify.d/rust.sh explicitly builds that example before cargo test --workspace; the standalone command omitted the prerequisite. Archived log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-current-missing-helper.log. No source change is needed; rerunning the suite with the same helper-build prerequisite.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:01:32 +00:00
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Rerun launched with the gate prerequisite: build the SSH recovery-helper example, then run the SSH package suite and scoped login/original-port checks. It is waiting through compute01 build-slot (PID 1106860), log /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-current.log. The earlier missing-helper output is preserved separately.

Rerun launched with the gate prerequisite: build the SSH recovery-helper example, then run the SSH package suite and scoped login/original-port checks. It is waiting through compute01 build-slot (PID 1106860), log /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-current.log. The earlier missing-helper output is preserved separately.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:03:04 +00:00
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Scoped-test correction: ssh_original_port.rs is gated by the mesh crate’s agent feature, so the default-feature invocation ran 0 tests. I will rerun it explicitly with --features agent and require a nonzero test count before calling this regression covered.

Scoped-test correction: `ssh_original_port.rs` is gated by the mesh crate’s `agent` feature, so the default-feature invocation ran 0 tests. I will rerun it explicitly with `--features agent` and require a nonzero test count before calling this regression covered.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:06:07 +00:00
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Original-port test clarification: ssh_original_port.rs has two intentionally ignored namespace tests (not just an agent feature gate). I will run both explicitly with --features agent -- --ignored --test-threads=1 inside unshare -Urn, as the test annotations require; the earlier default invocation ran zero tests.

Original-port test clarification: `ssh_original_port.rs` has two intentionally ignored namespace tests (not just an `agent` feature gate). I will run both explicitly with `--features agent -- --ignored --test-threads=1` inside `unshare -Urn`, as the test annotations require; the earlier default invocation ran zero tests.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:14:30 +00:00
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Scoped-test finding: server login regressions passed 15/15 (+1 ignored). The separate socket subscription suite failed 0/3 before exercising its cases because its SQLite fixture could not open the DB path. The test source uses CARGO_TARGET_DIR or falls back to relative target; this standalone run did not export the absolute per-job target, so the fallback resolved outside the existing workspace target. Rerunning with CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/home/claude/worktrees/infraternal-j72/target; no source change.

Scoped-test finding: server login regressions passed 15/15 (+1 ignored). The separate socket subscription suite failed 0/3 before exercising its cases because its SQLite fixture could not open the DB path. The test source uses `CARGO_TARGET_DIR` or falls back to relative `target`; this standalone run did not export the absolute per-job target, so the fallback resolved outside the existing workspace target. Rerunning with `CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/home/claude/worktrees/infraternal-j72/target`; no source change.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:17:04 +00:00
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The remaining targeted checks are queued through compute01 build-slot (PID 1265750) with an absolute CARGO_TARGET_DIR. This run explicitly executes both ignored original-port namespace tests under unshare -Urn, retries the three server refusal tests, and records russh feature trees plus cargo-deny licensing. Log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-corrections.log.

The remaining targeted checks are queued through compute01 build-slot (PID 1265750) with an absolute CARGO_TARGET_DIR. This run explicitly executes both ignored original-port namespace tests under unshare -Urn, retries the three server refusal tests, and records russh feature trees plus cargo-deny licensing. Log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-corrections.log.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:18:27 +00:00
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The server SQLite rerun is requeued as PID 1287715 on compute01 with an absolute CARGO_TARGET_DIR; I stopped the earlier queue before it began. Both slot pools were full at the latest check, and compute01 retains the current target cache and ample disk. Log remains /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-corrections.log.

The server SQLite rerun is requeued as PID 1287715 on compute01 with an absolute CARGO_TARGET_DIR; I stopped the earlier queue before it began. Both slot pools were full at the latest check, and compute01 retains the current target cache and ample disk. Log remains /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-corrections.log.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:20:37 +00:00
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Queue update: I stopped the compute01 corrections queue before it began and moved the check to dev-02, where the queue was shorter at the latest paired status check. Current PID 1743674; it still uses the J72 worktree target as an absolute CARGO_TARGET_DIR. Log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-corrections.log.

Queue update: I stopped the compute01 corrections queue before it began and moved the check to dev-02, where the queue was shorter at the latest paired status check. Current PID 1743674; it still uses the J72 worktree target as an absolute CARGO_TARGET_DIR. Log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-corrections.log.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:23:30 +00:00
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Queue correction: PID 1743674 obtained a dev-02 slot but stopped before tests because the copied script name did not match the launch path. No tests executed in that attempt. I copied the script to the exact expected path and verified its SHA-256; rerun is PID 1761607 at the same log path.

Queue correction: PID 1743674 obtained a dev-02 slot but stopped before tests because the copied script name did not match the launch path. No tests executed in that attempt. I copied the script to the exact expected path and verified its SHA-256; rerun is PID 1761607 at the same log path.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:44:10 +00:00
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Current-head original-port scoped finding: the dev-02 retry ran both ignored namespace tests in one unshare -Urn. nf_tables_ssh_checks_the_original_service_after_translation failed at firewall.apply() with NotFound because that VM lacks /usr/sbin/iptables-nft-restore and /usr/sbin/ip6tables-nft-restore; the failed test had already created its veth and nft table, so the following nft test hit RTNETLINK answers: File exists. No production code change is indicated by this evidence. Compute01 has both restore binaries. I queued a rerun with each test in its own namespace through build-slot; log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-original-port-isolated.log. SSH remains disabled.

Current-head original-port scoped finding: the dev-02 retry ran both ignored namespace tests in one `unshare -Urn`. `nf_tables_ssh_checks_the_original_service_after_translation` failed at `firewall.apply()` with `NotFound` because that VM lacks `/usr/sbin/iptables-nft-restore` and `/usr/sbin/ip6tables-nft-restore`; the failed test had already created its veth and nft table, so the following nft test hit `RTNETLINK answers: File exists`. No production code change is indicated by this evidence. Compute01 has both restore binaries. I queued a rerun with each test in its own namespace through `build-slot`; log: `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-original-port-isolated.log`. SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 22:52:21 +00:00
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Commit hygiene update: split the mixed checkpoint into separate shared-fixture and safe-readiness commits, then replayed the downstream fixture/docs commits. The pushed head is now cc1255739676ac34b9a1e2eb28118ede0ac9565b; git diff 8c2c60e9cd5459803bf18dd1cb3f5ecc67896f5b HEAD is empty, so the source tree is unchanged. Compute01's queued original-port run uses that identical tree; after it finishes I will refresh the VM worktree to this commit before verify fast.

Commit hygiene update: split the mixed checkpoint into separate shared-fixture and safe-readiness commits, then replayed the downstream fixture/docs commits. The pushed head is now `cc1255739676ac34b9a1e2eb28118ede0ac9565b`; `git diff 8c2c60e9cd5459803bf18dd1cb3f5ecc67896f5b HEAD` is empty, so the source tree is unchanged. Compute01's queued original-port run uses that identical tree; after it finishes I will refresh the VM worktree to this commit before `verify fast`.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 23:01:00 +00:00
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Invocation correction: the first compute01 retry used nix develop -c bash -lc; the login shell reset Nix's PATH, so both unshare invocations exited 127 before Cargo started. No test cases ran in that attempt and no source was changed. I verified the non-login nix develop -c bash -c resolves Cargo to the Nix toolchain, and requeued the per-test namespaces through build-slot at /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-original-port-nix-path.log.

Invocation correction: the first compute01 retry used `nix develop -c bash -lc`; the login shell reset Nix's PATH, so both `unshare` invocations exited 127 before Cargo started. No test cases ran in that attempt and no source was changed. I verified the non-login `nix develop -c bash -c` resolves Cargo to the Nix toolchain, and requeued the per-test namespaces through `build-slot` at `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/scoped-original-port-nix-path.log`.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 23:09:14 +00:00
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Current-head original-port regression is real on compute01 (8c2c60e source tree): the isolated nft and nf_tables tests both returned counters [0, 2] instead of [2, 2]. Allowing original TCP/22 admitted zero packets after DNAT; allowing internal port 22022 admitted both, so both backends currently evaluate the translated dport. I will update only the inbound port-policy match to use conntrack's original destination port, retain existing outbound matching, and add render assertions for both frontends. This is required for #221's original-service access check; SSH remains disabled.

Current-head original-port regression is real on compute01 (`8c2c60e` source tree): the isolated nft and `nf_tables` tests both returned counters `[0, 2]` instead of `[2, 2]`. Allowing original TCP/22 admitted zero packets after DNAT; allowing internal port 22022 admitted both, so both backends currently evaluate the translated `dport`. I will update only the inbound port-policy match to use conntrack's original destination port, retain existing outbound matching, and add render assertions for both frontends. This is required for #221's original-service access check; SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 23:24:57 +00:00
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J72 current-dev reconciliation: replayed the isolated S0 commits onto origin/dev at d1ec515e4, preserving the new mesh DNS and shim THP changes. The source diff remains path-scoped; no historical runtime/build tree merge was introduced. git diff --check is clean. The inbound original-port change and #220 map update are at eda0b4c11; SSH remains disabled.

The prior compute01 isolated namespace runs passed both backends 1/1 each on the same firewall code before the rebase. I am regenerating the combined DNS/SSH Cargo lock graph on dev-02, then will rerun current-head scoped checks and the required verify fast on compute01. The latest paired slot check had all slots busy; dev-02 has 38 GB free and compute01 175 GB.

J72 current-dev reconciliation: replayed the isolated S0 commits onto `origin/dev` at `d1ec515e4`, preserving the new mesh DNS and shim THP changes. The source diff remains path-scoped; no historical runtime/build tree merge was introduced. `git diff --check` is clean. The inbound original-port change and #220 map update are at `eda0b4c11`; SSH remains disabled. The prior compute01 isolated namespace runs passed both backends 1/1 each on the same firewall code before the rebase. I am regenerating the combined DNS/SSH Cargo lock graph on dev-02, then will rerun current-head scoped checks and the required `verify fast` on compute01. The latest paired slot check had all slots busy; dev-02 has 38 GB free and compute01 175 GB.
kayg commented 2026-11-01 23:44:33 +00:00
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J72 S0 progress at 475deb8f84705f6f730b777e92b294970b18177d on mesh-ssh-s0 (base d1ec515e44dabccb640801c4a1ef159b32e004fe). The immutable transport and real-login sources were recovered by scoped path application and reconciliation; neither historical tree was blanket-merged. contracts/mesh-ssh.md records Q1–Q7/Q1b, OpenSSH-equivalent scope, hidden per-person keys, and the #186/#172/#205/#220 path map. SSH remains disabled.

The corrected current-head scoped run completed on compute01 with exit 0: shim host-login 141 passed/15 ignored; process-per-user 211 passed/20 ignored; mesh plugin 26 passed; each original-port namespace regression passed 1/1. The server worktree is clean at the same head as the pushed branch. Next is the requested scripts/verify fast on compute01, then push and final gate receipt.

J72 S0 progress at `475deb8f84705f6f730b777e92b294970b18177d` on `mesh-ssh-s0` (base `d1ec515e44dabccb640801c4a1ef159b32e004fe`). The immutable transport and real-login sources were recovered by scoped path application and reconciliation; neither historical tree was blanket-merged. `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` records Q1–Q7/Q1b, OpenSSH-equivalent scope, hidden per-person keys, and the #186/#172/#205/#220 path map. SSH remains disabled. The corrected current-head scoped run completed on compute01 with exit 0: shim `host-login` 141 passed/15 ignored; `process-per-user` 211 passed/20 ignored; mesh plugin 26 passed; each original-port namespace regression passed 1/1. The server worktree is clean at the same head as the pushed branch. Next is the requested `scripts/verify fast` on compute01, then push and final gate receipt.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 00:05:37 +00:00
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J72 verify fast finding at 475deb8f84705f6f730b777e92b294970b18177d: Clippy rejects the recovered login dispatch in crates/infraternal/src/main.rs::run_shim_command at 116/100 lines (clippy::too_many_lines). The current-dev function was 48 lines; the added #172 dispatch can be moved into a helper without changing behavior. I am stopping this known-failed gate before editing, then will rerun the final gate.

The earlier CLI compile-out stage also logged one failed closure test because its cargo tree --offline subprocess could not find uncached crypto-bigint v0.7.10; a later gate command downloaded that crate. I will verify the test again on the rerun. SSH remains disabled. Partial log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/verify-fast-final.log.

J72 `verify fast` finding at `475deb8f84705f6f730b777e92b294970b18177d`: Clippy rejects the recovered login dispatch in `crates/infraternal/src/main.rs::run_shim_command` at 116/100 lines (`clippy::too_many_lines`). The current-dev function was 48 lines; the added #172 dispatch can be moved into a helper without changing behavior. I am stopping this known-failed gate before editing, then will rerun the final gate. The earlier CLI compile-out stage also logged one failed closure test because its `cargo tree --offline` subprocess could not find uncached `crypto-bigint v0.7.10`; a later gate command downloaded that crate. I will verify the test again on the rerun. SSH remains disabled. Partial log: `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/verify-fast-final.log`.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 00:07:54 +00:00
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J72 follow-up at d8461b5af83c6c9fa6328dd39ab584159f8fbe64: extracted the recovered login dispatch into a cold helper, preserving the ordinary shim fallthrough and resolving the 116/100-line Clippy failure without suppressing the lint. The copied main.rs SHA-256 matches between this worktree and compute01. The earlier partial gate was stopped after the required Clippy failure; the crypto-bigint v0.7.10 source is now cached for the offline dependency-closure test to be checked again.

Scoped checks remain green (host-login 141/15 ignored, process-per-user 211/20 ignored, mesh 26, both original-port namespace tests 1/1). I’m rerunning scripts/verify fast on compute01 through its free slot; 115 GB free. SSH remains disabled.

J72 follow-up at `d8461b5af83c6c9fa6328dd39ab584159f8fbe64`: extracted the recovered login dispatch into a cold helper, preserving the ordinary shim fallthrough and resolving the 116/100-line Clippy failure without suppressing the lint. The copied `main.rs` SHA-256 matches between this worktree and compute01. The earlier partial gate was stopped after the required Clippy failure; the `crypto-bigint v0.7.10` source is now cached for the offline dependency-closure test to be checked again. Scoped checks remain green (host-login 141/15 ignored, process-per-user 211/20 ignored, mesh 26, both original-port namespace tests 1/1). I’m rerunning `scripts/verify fast` on compute01 through its free slot; 115 GB free. SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 00:09:15 +00:00
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The rerun at d8461b5af83c6c9fa6328dd39ab584159f8fbe64 found formatting drift in cargo fmt --all --check: crates/infraternal/src/main.rs, crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs, crates/infraternal-shim/{lib.rs,session.rs,tests/unit/frame.rs}, and crates/plugins/ssh/src/lib.rs. I am formatting those recovered paths (including the new helper), then will relaunch the final gate. Partial log: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/verify-fast-final-rerun.log.

The rerun at `d8461b5af83c6c9fa6328dd39ab584159f8fbe64` found formatting drift in `cargo fmt --all --check`: `crates/infraternal/src/main.rs`, `crates/infraternal-agent/src/sessions.rs`, `crates/infraternal-shim/{lib.rs,session.rs,tests/unit/frame.rs}`, and `crates/plugins/ssh/src/lib.rs`. I am formatting those recovered paths (including the new helper), then will relaunch the final gate. Partial log: `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/infraternal-j72/verify-fast-final-rerun.log`.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 00:10:17 +00:00
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Formatting and Clippy fixes are now committed at 8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac: a9a00c0ca extracts the cold host-login dispatch, and 8969fe174 applies rustfmt to the recovered login/SSH paths. Only those six files changed; their SHA-256 hashes match on compute01. The previous partial run is stopped. Compute01 has two free slots and 113 GB free; I am restarting the final verify fast there. SSH remains disabled.

Formatting and Clippy fixes are now committed at `8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac`: `a9a00c0ca` extracts the cold host-login dispatch, and `8969fe174` applies rustfmt to the recovered login/SSH paths. Only those six files changed; their SHA-256 hashes match on compute01. The previous partial run is stopped. Compute01 has two free slots and 113 GB free; I am restarting the final `verify fast` there. SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:00:39 +00:00
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J72 complete. mesh-ssh-s0 pushed at 8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac.

Gate output (compute01):

VERIFY_EXIT=0

 39 pass
 0 fail
 59970 expect() calls
Ran 39 tests across 10 files. [5.94s]
J72 complete. `mesh-ssh-s0` pushed at `8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac`. Gate output (compute01): ```text VERIFY_EXIT=0 39 pass 0 fail 59970 expect() calls Ran 39 tests across 10 files. [5.94s] ```
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:04:13 +00:00
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S1 implementation plan (branch mesh-ssh-s1, base 8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac):

  1. Trace #186 shared Login evaluation and #172 account-runtime APIs; add one evaluator that binds person identity to the requested OS account, including hidden per-person key lookup and Q6 certificate lifecycle.
  2. Route every app terminal, shell/exec, files/SFTP, and app-window entry through that evaluator; reuse the existing account runtime and mesh authority paths, with no SSH-specific database.
  3. Add route-by-route deny coverage for invalid accounts, same username/different person, missing authority, revocation during pending authorization/open, and preservation of unrelated sessions. Keep SSH listener/component actions disabled.

Estimate: 1 implementation day plus the VM gates, assuming #186/#172 expose the needed authority and account hooks. Scope excludes listener enablement, UI work, and new persistence.

S1 implementation plan (branch `mesh-ssh-s1`, base `8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac`): 1. Trace #186 shared Login evaluation and #172 account-runtime APIs; add one evaluator that binds person identity to the requested OS account, including hidden per-person key lookup and Q6 certificate lifecycle. 2. Route every app terminal, shell/exec, files/SFTP, and app-window entry through that evaluator; reuse the existing account runtime and mesh authority paths, with no SSH-specific database. 3. Add route-by-route deny coverage for invalid accounts, same username/different person, missing authority, revocation during pending authorization/open, and preservation of unrelated sessions. Keep SSH listener/component actions disabled. Estimate: 1 implementation day plus the VM gates, assuming #186/#172 expose the needed authority and account hooks. Scope excludes listener enablement, UI work, and new persistence.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:07:45 +00:00
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J84 review started: mesh-ssh-s0 at 8969fe1748 against origin/dev ffebd0561a. Reviewing provenance, SSH-off invariant, MSR regressions, contract fidelity, and AGPL compatibility.

J84 review started: mesh-ssh-s0 at 8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac against origin/dev ffebd0561a010690583481abc4d583ecaca4542e. Reviewing provenance, SSH-off invariant, MSR regressions, contract fidelity, and AGPL compatibility.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:18:07 +00:00
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J84 round 1 review
Target: mesh-ssh-s0 at 8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac
Compared with: origin/dev at ffebd0561a010690583481abc4d583ecaca4542e

  1. P2 — contracts/mesh-ssh.md:53–57, 65–67: forwarded signing conflicts with D235. The contract allows forwarded signing after an explicit per-rule grant and puts -A in scope. D235 at lines 2093–2094 says the local infraternal agent never signs a request arriving through SSH agent forwarding. The #221 discussion marks the specific per-rule grant as still awaiting owner confirmation; the broad OpenSSH-equivalent feature-scope answer does not explicitly amend that signing invariant. Keep the infraternal signer’s unconditional refusal, or record an explicit owner amendment to D235 before specifying this exception.

The other reviewed checks pass:

  • Provenance is path-scoped: reviewed SSH sources match 68caff92a/b8211e742, and #172 runtime paths were reconciled from 86045327b; no historical runtime or build tree was blanket-merged.
  • SSH remains disabled: mesh_server::serve consumes a supplied stream, has no production caller, and the CLI actions remain unavailable. There is no listener or enablement path in S0.
  • J72 recorded the MSR-01..06 SSH suite at 94 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored. The final SSH subtree differs from that checkpoint only by module ordering in crates/plugins/ssh/src/lib.rs.
  • The contract reflects the owner’s command, consent, access-view/revocation, hidden per-person key, no-authorized_keys, and OpenSSH-equivalent scope answers, aside from finding 1.
  • The dependency feature selection and vendored Apache-2.0 notices are AGPL-compatible; J72 recorded feature-tree and cargo deny check licenses passes.

J72’s exact-head scripts/verify fast output:

VERIFY_EXIT=0

 39 pass
 0 fail
 59970 expect() calls
Ran 39 tests across 10 files. [5.94s]

No additional test run was needed to confirm this contract/decision finding.

J84 round 1 review Target: `mesh-ssh-s0` at `8969fe1748a3bc7ee5057730874bc26f972acfac` Compared with: `origin/dev` at `ffebd0561a010690583481abc4d583ecaca4542e` 1. **P2 — `contracts/mesh-ssh.md:53–57, 65–67`: forwarded signing conflicts with D235.** The contract allows forwarded signing after an explicit per-rule grant and puts `-A` in scope. D235 at lines 2093–2094 says the local infraternal agent never signs a request arriving through SSH agent forwarding. The #221 discussion marks the specific per-rule grant as still awaiting owner confirmation; the broad OpenSSH-equivalent feature-scope answer does not explicitly amend that signing invariant. Keep the infraternal signer’s unconditional refusal, or record an explicit owner amendment to D235 before specifying this exception. The other reviewed checks pass: - Provenance is path-scoped: reviewed SSH sources match `68caff92a`/`b8211e742`, and #172 runtime paths were reconciled from `86045327b`; no historical runtime or build tree was blanket-merged. - SSH remains disabled: `mesh_server::serve` consumes a supplied stream, has no production caller, and the CLI actions remain unavailable. There is no listener or enablement path in S0. - J72 recorded the MSR-01..06 SSH suite at 94 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored. The final SSH subtree differs from that checkpoint only by module ordering in `crates/plugins/ssh/src/lib.rs`. - The contract reflects the owner’s command, consent, access-view/revocation, hidden per-person key, no-`authorized_keys`, and OpenSSH-equivalent scope answers, aside from finding 1. - The dependency feature selection and vendored Apache-2.0 notices are AGPL-compatible; J72 recorded feature-tree and `cargo deny check licenses` passes. J72’s exact-head `scripts/verify fast` output: ```text VERIFY_EXIT=0 39 pass 0 fail 59970 expect() calls Ran 39 tests across 10 files. [5.94s] ``` No additional test run was needed to confirm this contract/decision finding.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:18:36 +00:00
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S1 mapping finding at base 8969fe174: contracts/mesh-ssh.md already records #186 as absent, and the source confirms there is no production Login evaluator or Login rule table. preferred_accounts::resolve selects an account; remote_hosts.owner_id checks host ownership; neither authorizes person → target account. mesh_login::LoginAuthority is only a trait with no production implementation. #172 provides a person/account runtime and person-scoped revoke, but not the access decision. I am holding the policy implementation choice until the shared authority source is identified; SSH remains disabled.

S1 mapping finding at base 8969fe174: `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` already records #186 as absent, and the source confirms there is no production Login evaluator or Login rule table. `preferred_accounts::resolve` selects an account; `remote_hosts.owner_id` checks host ownership; neither authorizes person → target account. `mesh_login::LoginAuthority` is only a trait with no production implementation. #172 provides a person/account runtime and person-scoped revoke, but not the access decision. I am holding the policy implementation choice until the shared authority source is identified; SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:19:15 +00:00
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Additional S1 path finding at 8969fe174: browser terminal.open and app-window ssh.session.open converge on websocket::open_terminal; that is the existing shell entry. The SSH adapter has only the abstract LoginGuard::open_session/open_files seam and no production implementation. #172 exposes shell login creation/revoke, but the agent/shim tree has no SFTP/file-session API. ssh_key.rs owns the server identity only; no per-person key lookup or 24-hour user-certificate issuer exists. terminal_sessions also records no target account. I am mapping these gaps before touching entry points.

Additional S1 path finding at 8969fe174: browser `terminal.open` and app-window `ssh.session.open` converge on `websocket::open_terminal`; that is the existing shell entry. The SSH adapter has only the abstract `LoginGuard::open_session/open_files` seam and no production implementation. #172 exposes shell login creation/revoke, but the agent/shim tree has no SFTP/file-session API. `ssh_key.rs` owns the server identity only; no per-person key lookup or 24-hour user-certificate issuer exists. `terminal_sessions` also records no target account. I am mapping these gaps before touching entry points.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:24:27 +00:00
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S1 rebased onto origin/dev 9f36dd8e0a5e9e799cd3264cb6e1e7605071c5e2, which contains S0 contract fix 8aa5ed75a. The branch now has focused regressions for user SSH config requesting ForwardAgent yes (the child must force ForwardAgent=no) and for the mesh server refusing agent-forward requests before any login runtime open. No tests have run yet. The shared Login evaluator/source gaps reported above still need resolution; SSH remains disabled.

S1 rebased onto origin/dev `9f36dd8e0a5e9e799cd3264cb6e1e7605071c5e2`, which contains S0 contract fix `8aa5ed75a`. The branch now has focused regressions for user SSH config requesting `ForwardAgent yes` (the child must force `ForwardAgent=no`) and for the mesh server refusing agent-forward requests before any login runtime open. No tests have run yet. The shared Login evaluator/source gaps reported above still need resolution; SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:31:12 +00:00
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Scoped S1 run on dev-02 (source tree based on 9f36dd8e0): agent_forwarding_request_is_refused_before_any_login_runtime_open passes. The new config-isolation test fails at OpenSsh::open because its fake SSH wrapper rejects the command; the production transport option is already ForwardAgent=no. I am instrumenting the fixture assertion and will rerun through build-slot before keeping the test.

Scoped S1 run on dev-02 (source tree based on `9f36dd8e0`): `agent_forwarding_request_is_refused_before_any_login_runtime_open` passes. The new config-isolation test fails at `OpenSsh::open` because its fake SSH wrapper rejects the command; the production transport option is already `ForwardAgent=no`. I am instrumenting the fixture assertion and will rerun through build-slot before keeping the test.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:33:22 +00:00
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S1 forwarding regression passes on dev-02 after narrowing the fake-wrapper assertion to the master connection: the OpenSSH child forces ForwardAgent=no even when ssh -G reports forwardagent yes, and the helper channel rejects agent-forward requests before runtime open. Targeted results: config isolation 1/1; mesh server refusal 1/1. SSH remains disabled.

S1 forwarding regression passes on dev-02 after narrowing the fake-wrapper assertion to the master connection: the OpenSSH child forces `ForwardAgent=no` even when `ssh -G` reports `forwardagent yes`, and the helper channel rejects agent-forward requests before runtime open. Targeted results: config isolation 1/1; mesh server refusal 1/1. SSH remains disabled.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:40:13 +00:00
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D235 forwarding change committed and pushed as 30688aedd. Dev-02 build-slot combined run passed: config_isolation 3/3 and agent_forwarding_request_is_refused_before_any_login_runtime_open 1/1; log /tmp/infraternal-j72-s1-d235.log.

D235 forwarding change committed and pushed as 30688aedd. Dev-02 build-slot combined run passed: config_isolation 3/3 and agent_forwarding_request_is_refused_before_any_login_runtime_open 1/1; log /tmp/infraternal-j72-s1-d235.log.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 01:42:01 +00:00
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S1 blocker at 9f36dd8e0: #186 is still an open design issue with no production Login evaluator or rule table on dev (docs/design/access-rules.md is absent); #172 has shell/account runtime but no target-user file/SFTP API. The hidden per-person key/24 h certificate issuer is also not present. D235 is committed and pushed at 30688aedd with scoped tests green. Adding these missing shared components is larger than connecting existing APIs and risks inventing #186 policy/migration semantics; awaiting scope direction before touching shared auth/runtime state.

S1 blocker at 9f36dd8e0: #186 is still an open design issue with no production Login evaluator or rule table on dev (docs/design/access-rules.md is absent); #172 has shell/account runtime but no target-user file/SFTP API. The hidden per-person key/24 h certificate issuer is also not present. D235 is committed and pushed at 30688aedd with scoped tests green. Adding these missing shared components is larger than connecting existing APIs and risks inventing #186 policy/migration semantics; awaiting scope direction before touching shared auth/runtime state.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 11:26:08 +00:00
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Owner decision (kayg, 2026-11-02): SSH agent forwarding (-A) forwards the person's own SSH agent, as OpenSSH does (e.g. git pull on a remote machine signs with the laptop's GitHub key; the key never leaves the laptop). The infraternal signer still refuses every forwarded request (D235 unchanged), so a compromised remote machine can't use your infraternal identity to log in onward. This must be documented for users (docs/user, with a 'Why' block) when mesh SSH ships; contracts/mesh-ssh.md to be updated in S1/S4.

**Owner decision (kayg, 2026-11-02): SSH agent forwarding (`-A`) forwards the person's own SSH agent, as OpenSSH does** (e.g. `git pull` on a remote machine signs with the laptop's GitHub key; the key never leaves the laptop). **The infraternal signer still refuses every forwarded request (D235 unchanged)**, so a compromised remote machine can't use your infraternal identity to log in onward. This must be documented for users (docs/user, with a 'Why' block) when mesh SSH ships; contracts/mesh-ssh.md to be updated in S1/S4.
kayg commented 2026-11-02 12:57:04 +00:00
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Owner direction (kayg, 2026-11-02), for S4 (listener/port 22): once the Linux mesh engine is userspace (GotaTun, #260), the mesh SSH listener should take :22 on the mesh address in-process, like Tailscale SSH, by intercepting TCP to the node's own mesh IP inside the engine (a small userspace TCP endpoint for those flows). The host's sshd and port 22 are never touched, and the nft redirect fallback (Q5) is no longer needed. Until the switch, the Q5 approach (exact bind, else an owned redirect) stays the interim. S4 planning should design both and keep the interface the same.

Owner direction (kayg, 2026-11-02), for S4 (listener/port 22): once the Linux mesh engine is userspace (GotaTun, #260), the mesh SSH listener should **take :22 on the mesh address in-process**, like Tailscale SSH, by intercepting TCP to the node's own mesh IP inside the engine (a small userspace TCP endpoint for those flows). The host's sshd and port 22 are never touched, and the nft redirect fallback (Q5) is no longer needed. Until the switch, the Q5 approach (exact bind, else an owned redirect) stays the interim. S4 planning should design both and keep the interface the same.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 08:43:29 +00:00
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J175: Mesh SSH slice 1, plan. Branch mesh-ssh-s1-j175, base origin/dev 089b855427b4c0cef52be7adc71e436bc8ca3474. This replaces the stalled mesh-ssh-s1 attempt (30688aed). #186's blocker is settled by D319 and by the owner answers to R3S-01 and R3S-02 in docs/design/access-rules.md (e177c9b58).

What dev already has (S0)

crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_*.rs has the russh server adapter, certificate verification, the two-check admission, the port-22 helper and flow control. None of it has a production LoginAuthority, listener, certificate issuer, client key socket or login rules. Earlier mapping: #221 comments 74032, 74039, 74072.

The smallest end-to-end cut

On a machine person P added, P's ordinary local account runs plain ssh <mesh-name> (or ssh <mesh-ip>). That reaches the embedded server on <mesh-ip>:22 of another node with a 24 h person certificate, and the target refuses unless network access (the source node may reach target TCP/22 in the applied mesh policy) and login access (P may log in as the requested account on that host) both pass. This is D235 "two checks, always".

  1. Login access evaluator (server, shared). A small rule table and an evaluator: person → account | own username | any account → all hosts | host. Setup defaults follow the spec: "Everyone → their own username" (ordinary UIDs only; name matching only on machines the person added or ones marked "Names match people here", D319) and "first administrator → any account". The evaluator is pure, with no I/O, so it's easy to review. The browser terminal open goes through the same evaluator in this slice (D235 Q14: never one path that ignores the policy). With the default rules a single-owner server sees no change. The CLI is infraternal access login list|add|remove (no UI in S1).
  2. Certificate issuer (server). issue_person_certificate(node, person, pubkey) creates an SSH user certificate: principal = person ID, exactly one critical option source-address=<node mesh IPv4>/32, permit-pty, valid for at most 24 h. The issued digest is recorded with its person, node and address, which certificate_current needs. issue_host_certificate(node, pubkey) uses principals = the mesh name, the fqdn and the addresses. Both refuse while the CA is locked. Signing stays inside the unlocked CA material and never exports a key (see Q1).
  3. Mesh login check (server). One request from the target infraternal agent checks certificate_current, network access and login access in one transaction, over the existing leg B connection (see Q2).
  4. Target infraternal agent.
    • A production LoginAuthority: the CA fingerprint, the applied mesh config (address → node, inbound policy on TCP/22) and the server answer for the certificate and account.
    • The listener on the applied mesh address :22 through mesh_port: an exact bind, or else the owned redirect.
    • An in-memory ed25519 host key with a host certificate from the server.
    • LoginGuard::open_session uses the #172 runtime: logins::ensure(person, account), then sessions::launch_with_login / launch_with_command, then a bridge to the shim.
    • A per-node switch that is off by default (see Q4).
  5. Client infraternal agent.
    • A key socket that speaks the ssh-agent protocol and serves only list and sign.
    • The asking-process check: SO_PEERCRED uid must be an ordinary account on a machine the person added (spec L1 inference); root and system accounts are refused, and there is no fallback to machine identity.
    • session-bind@openssh.com with is_forwarding=1 is refused (D235: no forwarded signing).
    • A per-person key in memory only, with the certificate fetched from the server and renewed before it expires.
    • One file, /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/50-infraternal.conf, scoped to the mesh suffix and address range. It sets IdentityAgent to the socket, a known-hosts file holding @cert-authority for the CA, StrictHostKeyChecking yes, and keeps ForwardAgent away from our socket.

What S1 leaves out

  • Account linking with a browser code or device code, and sign-in on machines the person did not add (those get a refusal of one plain line).
  • Reattach.
  • Secure Enclave and TPM keys.
  • SFTP, scp, rsync and -L/-R/-D forwarding (the subsystem is refused; #172 has no file runtime yet).
  • Pushing rules to nodes for partition tolerance.
  • Live revocation of running sessions (new opens are refused at once because of Q2).
  • The Settings → Access UI.
  • Machine-identity logins.
  • Session sharing and onward connections (D319 part 2).
  • The audit log UI (S1 writes connection log rows only if a table already exists; otherwise this is noted for S2).
  • macOS.

Files and crates

  • crates/infraternal-server: a new login_access.rs (rules and the pure evaluator), migration 0041_login_access.sql, a new ssh_certificates.rs (issuer and digest registry), the request handlers on leg B, and websocket.rs (open_terminal calls the evaluator).
  • crates/plugins/ssh: mesh_login.rs and mesh_server.rs (the authority asks with the certificate digest and the account), new mesh_authority.rs (production authority), mesh_runtime.rs (shim bridge), mesh_listener.rs, and on the client side mesh_keys.rs (the key socket) and mesh_client_config.rs.
  • crates/infraternal-agent: wiring.
  • crates/infraternal: the CLI.
  • contracts/mesh-ssh.md: amended additively.

Tests (written to fail first)

  • Evaluator table tests: own username only on added or marked machines, refused for root and system UIDs, any-account, named rules, and no root fallback from the preferred account.
  • Issuer: lifetime ≤ 24 h, a single source-address option, the principal, a locked CA refuses, and the digest is recorded.
  • Key socket: root refused, an unlinked uid refused, forwarded session-bind refused, an unknown key refused.
  • A real-engine test: stock OpenSSH ssh through our socket to the russh listener reaches a shell; the same with network access denied refuses; asking for an account with no rule refuses.
  • The web terminal is refused for an account with no rule.

Real-environment proof

Two test VMs joined to https://test.ssh.kayg.org (orchestrator: please deploy mesh-ssh-s1-j175 there when I ask, and tell me which two hosts I can use). Evidence:

  1. ssh <mesh-name> from VM A to VM B lands in a shell as the person's own username.
  2. ssh root@<mesh-name> is refused after the owner's starter "any account" rule is removed. There is one person per server today, so this is the "person without login access to that account" case. If you can create a second person on the test server, I'll show that case too.
  3. A network access rule that denies A→B TCP/22 makes the same ssh fail. The kernel firewall drops it first, so I'll also show the server-side check refusing it when the firewall is bypassed through the redirect path, where the adapter logs NetworkAccess.

Risks

  • Size: this is several days of work. Estimate: ~3 working days. I'll commit and push each step in the order above, and stop and report at 2×.
  • Port 22 on hosts whose sshd listens on 0.0.0.0 needs the redirect path (mesh_port), which S0 tested only in namespaces.
  • ssh <bare-name> resolves only where mesh DNS (mesh-dns-spike) is on. Otherwise the proof uses <name>.<suffix> or the address.
  • The shim exit status and the exec plumbing for SSH may need small #172 runtime additions.
  • Q14 coupling: once the web terminal checks login access, a misconfigured rule can lock the owner out of the browser terminal. Default rules prevent that, and the CLI can restore the rules.

Questions for the owner (I'm continuing with the recommendation)

Q1. Which key signs SSH certificates? (a) The existing D168 Ed25519 CA key, signing inside the unlocked CA material with the private key never exported. (b) A separate SSH CA key wrapped the same way as the D183 SSH identity. Recommendation (a): D235 already ties renewal to "while the CA is unlocked", (a) adds no new secret to guard or unlock, and SSH certificate blobs and X.509 TBS DER can't be confused (different fixed prefixes). (b) adds a second custody path and a second unlock.

Q2. Where is login access checked for mesh SSH in S1? (a) Online: the target infraternal agent asks the server once per authentication and once per channel open. That's one leg B round trip, measured and reported against the 0.3 s LAN prompt target. (b) Rules and certificate digests pushed to every node. Recommendation (a) for S1: it gives one evaluator and one source of truth (Q14), and revocation takes effect at once for new opens. The cost: while the server is unreachable, new mesh SSH logins are refused, and running sessions continue. The contract's partition rule ("last-applied rules remain usable") moves to a later slice with (b).

Q3. Who is the person behind a local process in S1? The spec's L1 inference: an ordinary account (UID ≥ 1000) on a machine the person added (verified owner_id from enrollment) acts as that person. Root and system accounts never do. Everything else is refused with one line until device-code sign-in exists. Recommendation: yes for S1. It is the owner-approved L1 rule, and it makes plain ssh work on your own machines with no linking step.

Q4. Is mesh SSH on by default? Recommendation: off by default in S1, turned on per node with infraternal mesh ssh on, until the security review of the certificate checks, the evaluator and the key socket passes. After that it follows D197 ("roles turn each other on where it is obviously right").

**J175: Mesh SSH slice 1, plan.** Branch `mesh-ssh-s1-j175`, base origin/dev `089b855427b4c0cef52be7adc71e436bc8ca3474`. This replaces the stalled `mesh-ssh-s1` attempt (30688aed). #186's blocker is settled by D319 and by the owner answers to R3S-01 and R3S-02 in `docs/design/access-rules.md` (e177c9b58). ### What dev already has (S0) `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_*.rs` has the russh server adapter, certificate verification, the two-check admission, the port-22 helper and flow control. None of it has a production `LoginAuthority`, listener, certificate issuer, client key socket or login rules. Earlier mapping: #221 comments 74032, 74039, 74072. ### The smallest end-to-end cut On a machine person P added, P's ordinary local account runs plain `ssh <mesh-name>` (or `ssh <mesh-ip>`). That reaches the embedded server on `<mesh-ip>:22` of another node with a 24 h person certificate, and the target refuses unless **network access** (the source node may reach target TCP/22 in the applied mesh policy) **and login access** (P may log in as the requested account on that host) both pass. This is D235 "two checks, always". 1. **Login access evaluator (server, shared).** A small rule table and an evaluator: `person → account | own username | any account → all hosts | host`. Setup defaults follow the spec: "Everyone → their own username" (ordinary UIDs only; name matching only on machines the person added or ones marked "Names match people here", D319) and "first administrator → any account". The evaluator is pure, with no I/O, so it's easy to review. **The browser terminal open goes through the same evaluator in this slice** (D235 Q14: never one path that ignores the policy). With the default rules a single-owner server sees no change. The CLI is `infraternal access login list|add|remove` (no UI in S1). 2. **Certificate issuer (server).** `issue_person_certificate(node, person, pubkey)` creates an SSH user certificate: principal = person ID, exactly one critical option `source-address=<node mesh IPv4>/32`, `permit-pty`, valid for at most 24 h. The issued digest is recorded with its person, node and address, which `certificate_current` needs. `issue_host_certificate(node, pubkey)` uses principals = the mesh name, the fqdn and the addresses. Both refuse while the CA is locked. Signing stays inside the unlocked CA material and never exports a key (see Q1). 3. **Mesh login check (server).** One request from the target infraternal agent checks `certificate_current`, network access and login access in one transaction, over the existing leg B connection (see Q2). 4. **Target infraternal agent.** - A production `LoginAuthority`: the CA fingerprint, the applied mesh config (address → node, inbound policy on TCP/22) and the server answer for the certificate and account. - The listener on the applied mesh address :22 through `mesh_port`: an exact bind, or else the owned redirect. - An in-memory ed25519 host key with a host certificate from the server. - `LoginGuard::open_session` uses the #172 runtime: `logins::ensure(person, account)`, then `sessions::launch_with_login` / `launch_with_command`, then a bridge to the shim. - A per-node switch that is **off by default** (see Q4). 5. **Client infraternal agent.** - A key socket that speaks the ssh-agent protocol and serves only `list` and `sign`. - The asking-process check: `SO_PEERCRED` uid must be an ordinary account on a machine the person added (spec L1 inference); root and system accounts are refused, and there is no fallback to machine identity. - `session-bind@openssh.com` with `is_forwarding=1` is refused (D235: no forwarded signing). - A per-person key in memory only, with the certificate fetched from the server and renewed before it expires. - One file, `/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/50-infraternal.conf`, scoped to the mesh suffix and address range. It sets `IdentityAgent` to the socket, a known-hosts file holding `@cert-authority` for the CA, `StrictHostKeyChecking yes`, and keeps `ForwardAgent` away from our socket. ### What S1 leaves out - Account linking with a browser code or device code, and sign-in on machines the person did not add (those get a refusal of one plain line). - Reattach. - Secure Enclave and TPM keys. - SFTP, scp, rsync and `-L/-R/-D` forwarding (the subsystem is refused; #172 has no file runtime yet). - Pushing rules to nodes for partition tolerance. - Live revocation of running sessions (new opens are refused at once because of Q2). - The Settings → Access UI. - Machine-identity logins. - Session sharing and onward connections (D319 part 2). - The audit log UI (S1 writes connection log rows only if a table already exists; otherwise this is noted for S2). - macOS. ### Files and crates - `crates/infraternal-server`: a new `login_access.rs` (rules and the pure evaluator), migration `0041_login_access.sql`, a new `ssh_certificates.rs` (issuer and digest registry), the request handlers on leg B, and `websocket.rs` (`open_terminal` calls the evaluator). - `crates/plugins/ssh`: `mesh_login.rs` and `mesh_server.rs` (the authority asks with the certificate digest and the account), new `mesh_authority.rs` (production authority), `mesh_runtime.rs` (shim bridge), `mesh_listener.rs`, and on the client side `mesh_keys.rs` (the key socket) and `mesh_client_config.rs`. - `crates/infraternal-agent`: wiring. - `crates/infraternal`: the CLI. - `contracts/mesh-ssh.md`: amended additively. ### Tests (written to fail first) - Evaluator table tests: own username only on added or marked machines, refused for root and system UIDs, any-account, named rules, and no root fallback from the preferred account. - Issuer: lifetime ≤ 24 h, a single source-address option, the principal, a locked CA refuses, and the digest is recorded. - Key socket: root refused, an unlinked uid refused, forwarded session-bind refused, an unknown key refused. - A real-engine test: stock OpenSSH `ssh` through our socket to the russh listener reaches a shell; the same with network access denied refuses; asking for an account with no rule refuses. - The web terminal is refused for an account with no rule. ### Real-environment proof Two test VMs joined to https://test.ssh.kayg.org (**orchestrator: please deploy `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` there when I ask, and tell me which two hosts I can use**). Evidence: 1. `ssh <mesh-name>` from VM A to VM B lands in a shell as the person's own username. 2. `ssh root@<mesh-name>` is refused after the owner's starter "any account" rule is removed. There is one person per server today, so this is the "person without login access to that account" case. If you can create a second person on the test server, I'll show that case too. 3. A network access rule that denies A→B TCP/22 makes the same `ssh` fail. The kernel firewall drops it first, so I'll also show the server-side check refusing it when the firewall is bypassed through the redirect path, where the adapter logs `NetworkAccess`. ### Risks - **Size:** this is several days of work. Estimate: ~3 working days. I'll commit and push each step in the order above, and stop and report at 2×. - Port 22 on hosts whose sshd listens on 0.0.0.0 needs the redirect path (`mesh_port`), which S0 tested only in namespaces. - `ssh <bare-name>` resolves only where mesh DNS (`mesh-dns-spike`) is on. Otherwise the proof uses `<name>.<suffix>` or the address. - The shim exit status and the exec plumbing for SSH may need small #172 runtime additions. - Q14 coupling: once the web terminal checks login access, a misconfigured rule can lock the owner out of the browser terminal. Default rules prevent that, and the CLI can restore the rules. ### Questions for the owner (I'm continuing with the recommendation) **Q1. Which key signs SSH certificates?** (a) The existing D168 Ed25519 CA key, signing inside the unlocked CA material with the private key never exported. (b) A separate SSH CA key wrapped the same way as the D183 SSH identity. **Recommendation (a):** D235 already ties renewal to "while the CA is unlocked", (a) adds no new secret to guard or unlock, and SSH certificate blobs and X.509 TBS DER can't be confused (different fixed prefixes). (b) adds a second custody path and a second unlock. **Q2. Where is login access checked for mesh SSH in S1?** (a) Online: the target infraternal agent asks the server once per authentication and once per channel open. That's one leg B round trip, measured and reported against the 0.3 s LAN prompt target. (b) Rules and certificate digests pushed to every node. **Recommendation (a) for S1:** it gives one evaluator and one source of truth (Q14), and revocation takes effect at once for new opens. The cost: while the server is unreachable, new mesh SSH logins are refused, and running sessions continue. The contract's partition rule ("last-applied rules remain usable") moves to a later slice with (b). **Q3. Who is the person behind a local process in S1?** The spec's L1 inference: an ordinary account (UID ≥ 1000) on a machine the person added (verified `owner_id` from enrollment) acts as that person. Root and system accounts never do. Everything else is refused with one line until device-code sign-in exists. **Recommendation: yes for S1.** It is the owner-approved L1 rule, and it makes plain `ssh` work on your own machines with no linking step. **Q4. Is mesh SSH on by default?** **Recommendation: off by default in S1**, turned on per node with `infraternal mesh ssh on`, until the security review of the certificate checks, the evaluator and the key socket passes. After that it follows D197 ("roles turn each other on where it is obviously right").
kayg commented 2026-11-04 09:04:24 +00:00
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J175 progress (branch mesh-ssh-s1-j175, head b5e0e4a28):

  • a8bb8d1ab (+ fixup f3dc6e601): the pure login access grant and host check in infraternal-plugin-api::login_access. 12/12 unit tests pass on compute01. A red run against the stub first: 6/12 failed.
  • b5e0e4a28: ssh::mesh_issue builds person and host certificates in the exact shape mesh_certificate::verify accepts. 8/8 unit tests pass.
  • Not committed yet, waiting on the gate: server migration 0041_login_access.sql, server::login_access (the loader and the setup defaults), and the grant carried in terminal.open/terminal.login.prepare. The agent checks the account it actually opens, including the root fallback (D235 Q14 for the browser terminal).
  • scripts/verify quick is queued through build-slot on compute01: log ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick1.log, target ~/worktrees/j175/target.
    Next: the CA sign_ssh path and the issued-certificate registry, then the target infraternal agent's authority and listener.
J175 progress (branch `mesh-ssh-s1-j175`, head `b5e0e4a28`): - `a8bb8d1ab` (+ fixup `f3dc6e601`): the pure login access grant and host check in `infraternal-plugin-api::login_access`. 12/12 unit tests pass on compute01. A red run against the stub first: 6/12 failed. - `b5e0e4a28`: `ssh::mesh_issue` builds person and host certificates in the exact shape `mesh_certificate::verify` accepts. 8/8 unit tests pass. - Not committed yet, waiting on the gate: server migration `0041_login_access.sql`, `server::login_access` (the loader and the setup defaults), and the grant carried in `terminal.open`/`terminal.login.prepare`. The agent checks the account it actually opens, including the root fallback (D235 Q14 for the browser terminal). - `scripts/verify quick` is queued through build-slot on compute01: log `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick1.log`, target `~/worktrees/j175/target`. Next: the CA `sign_ssh` path and the issued-certificate registry, then the target infraternal agent's authority and listener.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 09:04:59 +00:00
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J175: Q2 recommendation changed, with evidence. In the current code, server↔infraternal agent calls only go server → agent: Frame::Call from crates/infraternal-server/src/embedded.rs, which the agent's plugin registry dispatches (for example mesh.configure in crates/plugins/mesh/src/node_actions.rs). Agents never send requests to the server, and mesh config is pushed the same way. An online per-login check (my first recommendation, Q2a) would need a new agent→server request path.

New recommendation for Q2: (b) push. The server pushes a small mesh SSH authority snapshot to each target node through a new node action:

  • the CA public key;
  • for each currently valid person certificate: its digest, person, source node and source address;
  • for each person: the LoginGrant for this host.

The target keeps checking network access against the applied mesh config it already enforces. The server pushes again when a certificate is issued, when a rule changes, and when a node connects. What this gives:

  • no extra round trip at login;
  • logins keep working during a partition, which is what the contract already says ("last-applied access rules remain usable");
  • the same server-side grant() stays the single evaluator (Q14), and the host-side LoginGrant::allows is the same function the browser terminal uses.

Cost: a revocation reaches a node as one push instead of being read on the next login, so a node that is offline while access is revoked keeps the old snapshot until it reconnects. Pushes have a sequence number, and the target refuses a snapshot older than the one it holds. S1 still leaves out live termination of running sessions.

I'm continuing with (b).

**J175: Q2 recommendation changed, with evidence.** In the current code, server↔infraternal agent calls only go **server → agent**: `Frame::Call` from `crates/infraternal-server/src/embedded.rs`, which the agent's plugin registry dispatches (for example `mesh.configure` in `crates/plugins/mesh/src/node_actions.rs`). Agents never send requests to the server, and mesh config is pushed the same way. An online per-login check (my first recommendation, Q2a) would need a new agent→server request path. **New recommendation for Q2: (b) push.** The server pushes a small **mesh SSH authority snapshot** to each target node through a new node action: - the CA public key; - for each currently valid person certificate: its digest, person, source node and source address; - for each person: the `LoginGrant` for this host. The target keeps checking network access against the applied mesh config it already enforces. The server pushes again when a certificate is issued, when a rule changes, and when a node connects. What this gives: - no extra round trip at login; - logins keep working during a partition, which is what the contract already says ("last-applied access rules remain usable"); - the same server-side `grant()` stays the single evaluator (Q14), and the host-side `LoginGrant::allows` is the same function the browser terminal uses. Cost: a revocation reaches a node as one push instead of being read on the next login, so a node that is offline while access is revoked keeps the old snapshot until it reconnects. Pushes have a sequence number, and the target refuses a snapshot older than the one it holds. S1 still leaves out live termination of running sessions. I'm continuing with (b).
kayg commented 2026-11-04 09:21:34 +00:00
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J175 progress, head 7f4710132 (WIP, to be split into atomic commits after the gate). Done on the branch:

Shared check (D235 Q14)

  • plugin-api::login_access: the server reduces the rules to a LoginGrant, and the host checks the account it actually opens against it.
  • server::login_access with migration 0041_login_access.sql. Setup defaults are rows: "everyone → own username" (only on machines the person added, or ones marked "names match", D319) and "owner → any account".
  • The browser terminal, login preparation and add-host preparation now send the grant. The agent refuses a person open without a grant, or an account the grant doesn't allow, including a fallback to root (daemon.rs::login_access_allows).

Certificates

  • ssh::mesh_issue builds person and host certificates in the exact shape mesh_certificate::verify accepts.
  • CertificateAuthority::sign_ssh signs only bodies that start with the Ed25519 SSH certificate type, so the shared D168 key can't sign X.509 through this path (Q1).

Target

  • ssh::mesh_authority: the production LoginAuthority from a pushed Snapshot (sequence-checked) and the applied MeshView. Network access is the peer's inbound policy for TCP/22, the same policy the kernel firewall enforces.
  • ssh::mesh_runtime: shells open through the browser terminal's own admission path (daemon::open_mesh_ssh_shell: real login, the grant check and fencing), with the shim bridged to the SSH channel. Control keeps flowing while output is blocked.
  • ssh::mesh_node: the agent component. It holds an in-memory host key, takes mesh.ssh.host_key and mesh.ssh.configure, and runs the listener on its own mesh addresses :22 through mesh_port. It is off by default (Q4).
  • agent::plugins::set_mesh_service: a hook so the SSH crate, which depends on the agent, can join every agent registry. MeshView comes from each accepted mesh config.

Client

  • ssh::mesh_keys: a minimal ssh-agent protocol that only lists the certificate and signs with it. It refuses forwarded connections (session-bind@openssh.com with the forwarding flag set), and only ordinary UIDs may ask (may_ask).

Tests so far (compute01):

  • plugin-api login_access: 12/12
  • ssh mesh_issue: 8/8
  • ssh mesh_authority: 12/12
  • ssh mesh_keys: 10/10, including stock ssh-add -L listing the certificate
  • ssh mesh_* with session-bridge: 35 pass, 2 ignored, the runtime bridge included

verify quick is queued: ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick2.log.

Still to do in S1:

  1. Server orchestration: a per-node switch, the snapshot (grants for each person, valid certificates, sequence), host certificate issuance and the pushes on connect, rule change and certificate issuance.
  2. Client node component: the person key, the mesh.ssh.person_certificate install, the socket at /run/infraternal/mesh-ssh-agent.sock with the peer-credential check, and the ssh_config.d file.
  3. CLI: infraternal access login … and infraternal mesh ssh on|off.
  4. Real-environment proof on test.ssh.kayg.org.

Risk: S0 comment 73851 recorded that the nft redirect fallback admitted 0 packets after DNAT. Test VMs whose sshd holds 0.0.0.0:22 depend on that path.

J175 progress, head `7f4710132` (WIP, to be split into atomic commits after the gate). Done on the branch: **Shared check (D235 Q14)** - `plugin-api::login_access`: the server reduces the rules to a `LoginGrant`, and the host checks the account it actually opens against it. - `server::login_access` with migration `0041_login_access.sql`. Setup defaults are rows: "everyone → own username" (only on machines the person added, or ones marked "names match", D319) and "owner → any account". - The browser terminal, login preparation and add-host preparation now send the grant. The agent refuses a person open without a grant, or an account the grant doesn't allow, including a fallback to root (`daemon.rs::login_access_allows`). **Certificates** - `ssh::mesh_issue` builds person and host certificates in the exact shape `mesh_certificate::verify` accepts. - `CertificateAuthority::sign_ssh` signs only bodies that start with the Ed25519 SSH certificate type, so the shared D168 key can't sign X.509 through this path (Q1). **Target** - `ssh::mesh_authority`: the production `LoginAuthority` from a pushed `Snapshot` (sequence-checked) and the applied `MeshView`. Network access is the peer's inbound policy for TCP/22, the same policy the kernel firewall enforces. - `ssh::mesh_runtime`: shells open through the browser terminal's own admission path (`daemon::open_mesh_ssh_shell`: real login, the grant check and fencing), with the shim bridged to the SSH channel. Control keeps flowing while output is blocked. - `ssh::mesh_node`: the agent component. It holds an in-memory host key, takes `mesh.ssh.host_key` and `mesh.ssh.configure`, and runs the listener on its own mesh addresses :22 through `mesh_port`. It is off by default (Q4). - `agent::plugins::set_mesh_service`: a hook so the SSH crate, which depends on the agent, can join every agent registry. `MeshView` comes from each accepted mesh config. **Client** - `ssh::mesh_keys`: a minimal ssh-agent protocol that only lists the certificate and signs with it. It refuses forwarded connections (`session-bind@openssh.com` with the forwarding flag set), and only ordinary UIDs may ask (`may_ask`). **Tests so far (compute01):** - plugin-api login_access: 12/12 - ssh mesh_issue: 8/8 - ssh mesh_authority: 12/12 - ssh mesh_keys: 10/10, including stock `ssh-add -L` listing the certificate - ssh mesh_* with session-bridge: 35 pass, 2 ignored, the runtime bridge included `verify quick` is queued: `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick2.log`. **Still to do in S1:** 1. Server orchestration: a per-node switch, the snapshot (grants for each person, valid certificates, sequence), host certificate issuance and the pushes on connect, rule change and certificate issuance. 2. Client node component: the person key, the `mesh.ssh.person_certificate` install, the socket at `/run/infraternal/mesh-ssh-agent.sock` with the peer-credential check, and the `ssh_config.d` file. 3. CLI: `infraternal access login …` and `infraternal mesh ssh on|off`. 4. Real-environment proof on test.ssh.kayg.org. **Risk:** S0 comment 73851 recorded that the nft redirect fallback admitted 0 packets after DNAT. Test VMs whose sshd holds 0.0.0.0:22 depend on that path.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 09:51:57 +00:00
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J175 → orchestrator: two asks, plus one scope note (head 900f2656b, WIP; atomic split before the gate is quoted).

  1. Test-server deploy. Once scripts/verify quick passes (queued on compute01, log ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick3.log), please deploy mesh-ssh-s1-j175 to https://test.ssh.kayg.org. Please also name two test VMs joined to it that I may use: ssh access as claude plus root (sudo). On them I'll first measure the port-22 question: does the host sshd hold 0.0.0.0:22, and does the nft redirect fallback pass packets under the mesh firewall (S0 comment 73851 recorded 0 packets after DNAT)? Measurement comes before any workaround.
  2. Owner settings without a CLI in S1. sign_in.rs says "Remote CLI actions do not consume stored sign-in keys yet (#303)", so a CLI infraternal mesh ssh on or infraternal access login … can't call the server until #303 lands. S1 ships them as owner-only server socket actions in a new mesh-ssh server plugin: mesh-ssh.set, mesh-ssh.login-rules, mesh-ssh.login-rule-add, mesh-ssh.login-rule-remove and mesh-ssh.names-match. The proof drives them from a signed-in session with test-admin-signin.ts. The CLI words wrap these actions once #303 merges.
  3. Migrations. Per your note, mine is a single migration (login access, currently 0041). Its tests find it by name, and one applies every migration to a populated database. It will be renumbered last when I rebase onto whichever of apikey-actions-303 or trust-285-a lands first.

What's built, by commit (or the WIP head above):

  • Server push (server::mesh_ssh). On each node connection, and again on every change or before expiry, it:
    • certifies the adding person's in-memory key, bound to the node's mesh address, and records the digest;
    • installs the certificate with the client files;
    • pushes the sequence-numbered snapshot and a host certificate.
  • Client agent component. mesh.ssh.person_key and mesh.ssh.client: the certificate goes only onto the key this node made for that person, the ssh_config.d and known-hosts files are written from structured values, and the key socket at /run/infraternal/mesh-ssh-agent.sock checks the kernel peer credentials on every connection.
**J175 → orchestrator: two asks, plus one scope note (head `900f2656b`, WIP; atomic split before the gate is quoted).** 1. **Test-server deploy.** Once `scripts/verify quick` passes (queued on compute01, log `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick3.log`), please deploy `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` to https://test.ssh.kayg.org. Please also name **two test VMs joined to it** that I may use: ssh access as `claude` plus root (sudo). On them I'll first **measure** the port-22 question: does the host sshd hold `0.0.0.0:22`, and does the nft redirect fallback pass packets under the mesh firewall (S0 comment 73851 recorded 0 packets after DNAT)? Measurement comes before any workaround. 2. **Owner settings without a CLI in S1.** `sign_in.rs` says "Remote CLI actions do not consume stored sign-in keys yet (#303)", so a CLI `infraternal mesh ssh on` or `infraternal access login …` can't call the server until #303 lands. S1 ships them as owner-only server socket actions in a new `mesh-ssh` server plugin: `mesh-ssh.set`, `mesh-ssh.login-rules`, `mesh-ssh.login-rule-add`, `mesh-ssh.login-rule-remove` and `mesh-ssh.names-match`. The proof drives them from a signed-in session with `test-admin-signin.ts`. The CLI words wrap these actions once #303 merges. 3. **Migrations.** Per your note, mine is a single migration (`login access`, currently 0041). Its tests find it by name, and one applies every migration to a populated database. It will be renumbered last when I rebase onto whichever of `apikey-actions-303` or `trust-285-a` lands first. What's built, by commit (or the WIP head above): - **Server push** (`server::mesh_ssh`). On each node connection, and again on every change or before expiry, it: - certifies the adding person's in-memory key, bound to the node's mesh address, and records the digest; - installs the certificate with the client files; - pushes the sequence-numbered snapshot and a host certificate. - **Client agent component.** `mesh.ssh.person_key` and `mesh.ssh.client`: the certificate goes only onto the key this node made for that person, the `ssh_config.d` and known-hosts files are written from structured values, and the key socket at `/run/infraternal/mesh-ssh-agent.sock` checks the kernel peer credentials on every connection.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 09:59:42 +00:00
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Early review (J181): Mesh SSH slice 1 security and threat model

Reviewed mesh-ssh-s1-j175 at 33b1c1c1d (base 089b85542), against D168, D197, D235, D289, D319, D344, the plan (77515), the Q2 change (77525) and progress (77554). This is mostly a reading review. No unit tests were run. I ran one OpenSSH probe on compute01 (below). The branch is unchanged.

Threat model (the plan and contracts/mesh-ssh.md have none yet)

Attacker What they can do with the current design What stops them
Mesh peer without a person key (another node, including a compromised one) Reach TCP/22 on every node with mesh SSH on, because network policy is allow-all by default (D228 M2). Hold unauthenticated connections (M2). Certificate signature + digest registry + source-address + the two checks. The source address is backed by WireGuard cryptokey routing and the TCP handshake.
Same machine, same uid as the person Signs as the person. This is inherent to any key socket and accepted by D344. Nothing more in S1. Bounded by source-address and the 24 h lifetime.
Same machine, another ordinary uid Also signs as the person (may_ask accepts any uid 1000–59999). With the owner's starter "any account" rule, that means ssh root@ on every mesh-SSH host (M3). Nothing today.
Same machine, root / system uid Refused by may_ask. Root can still su to an ordinary uid, so this protects against mistakes, not against an attacker. —
Stolen node (root on it) Uses the in-memory person key, and quiet renewal keeps it working until the node is removed. Impersonates only its own host names (host cert). Learns every person's certificate digest and source node from the snapshot (L5). Node removal → new snapshot without its digests. Sessions already open survive (M7, L2).
Compromised target Sees a session-bound signature that it cannot replay elsewhere. Forwarded signing is refused on OpenSSH ≥ 8.9 only (M5). session-bind, source-address.
Network partition / blocked server link The node keeps its last snapshot. A revocation lands on reconnect. The person cert lifetime (≤ 24 h) bounds the staleness, because renewal needs the server (D344 accepts this).

Please put a version of this table in contracts/mesh-ssh.md so the final review can check the code against it.

Must fix in slice 1

M1. Snapshot sequence: a server restart freezes every node's access state, including revocations and "off".

  • mesh_authority.rs install refuses sequence <= state.sequence, and the agent keeps that number in memory.
  • mesh_node.rs configure spawns the install, returns {"accepted":true} straight away, and updates Desired (including enabled: false) only if the install succeeds.
  • The server side doesn't exist yet. If its counter is in memory and restarts at 1, every running node refuses every later push (revoked certificates, narrowed grants, mesh ssh off) until that node's agent restarts, and the server is told "accepted". That fails open.
  • Fix:
    • Make the sequence monotonic and stored in the DB (or (epoch from DB, counter)), allocated in the same read transaction that reads the grants and certificates. Otherwise a higher number can carry older state.
    • Return Stale to the server instead of accepted, so it alerts.
    • Apply enabled: false unconditionally. Narrowing is always safe.
    • Test: a server restart, then a revoking push, lands.

M2. The listener has no limit on unauthenticated connections.

  • mesh_node.rs accept() spawns one task per connection with no bound.
  • let Ok(..) = listener.accept().await else { continue; } spins at 100 % CPU on EMFILE.
  • mesh_server::config keeps the russh defaults: inactivity_timeout: 600 s (vendor/russh/src/server/mod.rs:129) and no authentication deadline.
  • Any mesh node, with no key at all, can hold thousands of half-open SSH connections for 10 minutes each. That exhausts the infraternal agent's file descriptors, and the listener runs inside that process, so its terminal sessions and server link break too.
  • Fix:
    • An authentication deadline (equivalent to OpenSSH's LoginGraceTime; measure and pick a value, e.g. 20–30 s).
    • A cap on unauthenticated connections per source node and in total. This is a security bound, not a D214 latency cap.
    • Back off after accept errors.
  • Related bug: the 600 s inactivity timeout also drops idle authenticated shells (an idle vim dies after 10 minutes). Use keepalives (keepalive_interval) instead for authenticated sessions.

M3. The key socket lets every ordinary local account act as the person.

  • mesh_keys::may_ask is uid != 0 && 1000..=59999.

  • Together with D344 and the owner's starter rule ("first administrator → any account → all hosts"), any ordinary user can sign as the owner and then ssh root@<any mesh host> with mesh SSH on. That includes a second person on a shared box, a CI user, or a container running as uid 1000 with the socket mounted in.

  • D235 Q2a links automatically only "the account used to add it". The contract says keyless identities "cannot distinguish people sharing a client machine".

  • Recommendation: in S1 the socket serves only the account used to add the machine:

    • rootless: remote_hosts.execution_uid;
    • rootful: record the add-host SSH login account's uid at enrollment.

    Every other ordinary account gets the one-line refusal.

  • Owner question: D344 says "an account on a machine you added acts as you". Did you mean any ordinary account, given the blast radius above, or only the account you added it with? I'm recommending the latter.

M4. Requirements for wiring the socket and files (not built yet, so stating them now):

  • SO_PEERCRED is checked on every accepted connection before any byte is read. The check is the only gate (the socket must be connectable by others), so it must not depend on file modes.
  • The socket lives in a root-owned directory.
  • 50-infraternal-mesh.conf and the known-hosts file are root-owned, mode 0644, in root-owned directories. A known-hosts file a user can write lets any local user add @cert-authority for their own CA and intercept other users' mesh ssh.
  • The person key is installed only on a node whose server-verified adder is that person.

M5. Forwarded-agent refusal holds only on OpenSSH ≥ 8.9, and -A forwards our socket.

  • Probe on compute01 (OpenSSH_10.0p2): IdentityAgent pointed at agent "ours", SSH_AUTH_SOCK at agent "personal". ssh -A probe 'ssh-add -l' lists the key from ours.sock on the remote side.
  • So -A forwards our socket, not the person's own agent. That contradicts the owner decision in comment 74668, and the doc in mesh_client_config.rs already says so.
  • The mesh_keys doc says the config "keeps ForwardAgent away from this socket", but client_config() writes no ForwardAgent line.
  • On 8.0–8.8, which is the contract minimum, there is no session-bind, so forwarded requests are signed. The source-address binding limits abuse (a signature used from the remote node fails the source check), but the D235 guarantee doesn't hold.
  • Fix for S1: refuse SIGN_REQUEST on any connection that has not first sent a non-forwarding session-bind@openssh.com (deny by default for unbound connections), and raise the mesh SSH client minimum to 8.9 in the contract.
  • Forwarding the person's own agent on -A needs a design → later.

M6. sign_ssh separates SSH from X.509 only, not from SSH certificates the CA shouldn't issue.

  • ca.rs sign_ssh(body) signs any body that starts with the Ed25519 cert type, and it is pub.
  • Any server code that can reach the CA can mint:
    • host certificates for any principal. Host certs have no digest registry, and clients trust them by CA signature + name pattern alone, so this means intercepting connections to any mesh host;
    • user certificates with any lifetime or options.
  • Fix:
    • The CA module exposes only typed issue_person / issue_host, which build (or parse and validate) the body themselves: type, validity ≤ 24 h, exactly one source-address for user certs, and non-empty principals derived by the server from the node record.
    • Every issued digest, host certs included, is recorded for audit.
    • Add an invariant comment in ca.rs: any future use of the D168 key needs its own prefix that cannot overlap.
  • (No callers yet, so it's cheap to change now.)

M7. "Off" doesn't end open mesh SSH connections.

  • mesh_node.rs stop() aborts the accept loop only. Per-connection tasks are detached "on purpose".
  • With no live revocation in S1, turning a node off (or the node leaving the mesh) is the only emergency brake, and right now a stolen key keeps its open shells.
  • Fix: track the connections (JoinSet or a cancel token) and close them on off and on mesh leave. Ending sessions for one revoked person can wait (L2).

M8. Write the threat model into the contract (table above), including the partition staleness bound and the M3 decision.

Later (not blocking S1, with reasons)

  • L1. Partition staleness. Up to the person-cert lifetime (24 h) after a revocation for a node cut off from the server. D344 accepts this. Document it, and consider a maximum snapshot age once renewal exists.
  • L2. Running sessions. Revoking access doesn't end running sessions. Shim shells outlive a dropped SSH connection by design (D235 Q2c). When reattach lands, it must re-check login access.
  • L3. IPv6. The person cert binds one address (IPv4 per the plan), but the listener also binds the IPv6 mesh address, so ssh over IPv6 is refused. D235 Q7 requires parity.
  • L4. ssh_config scope.
    • An address glob is written only for octet-aligned /8–/24 ranges. A /10 range gets none, so ssh <ip> skips mesh SSH. That's safe, just not functional.
    • A mesh suffix that collides with a real domain takes over those hosts.
    • The user's ~/.ssh/config is read first, so a Host * with IdentityAgent or StrictHostKeyChecking no silently wins over ours. Detect this and warn.
  • L5. Snapshot contents. Each snapshot carries every person's certificate digests and source nodes to every node. Send only people with a non-empty grant on that host.
  • L6. Lock contention. The authority read lock is held across a blocking NSS lookup (accounts) and across runtime.open (PAM/systemd, can take seconds). tokio's RwLock is write-preferring, so a pending install also stalls new logins. Measure under the latency budget before you change the locking. The guard must still span the open (revocation race).
  • L7. Banner. It is SSH-2.0-russh_0.64.1 (russh default server_id). Set a neutral ID.
  • L8. Unchecked open path. open_requested with person: None opens as input.uid without a grant. Only readiness and the legacy test fixture use it today. Keep it unreachable from production, and assert that.
  • L9. Migration effects.
    • Non-owner people on existing servers lose browser terminals on hosts they didn't add. D319 intends this, but the refusal should say why and how an admin adds a rule.
    • LDAP/SSSD uids above 59999 never match "own username". Document it.
  • L10. Disable and rename. When person disable or rename exists, grant_in must return the empty grant for a disabled person, and a rename must trigger a push.
  • L11. Who is asking. D235 Q2f's login uid (kept through sudo/su). S1 uses the SO_PEERCRED uid. Fine for S1 once M3 is in.
  • L12. Control actions. mesh.ssh.configure must be reachable only over the authenticated server link, like mesh.configure. Through any local path, a local user could install a snapshot with their own CA. I didn't find such a path, but add a test.
  • L13. Host cert lifetime. On a rename or address reuse, the old host cert stays valid for its lifetime (≤ 24 h). The risk is low because WireGuard routing prevents interception, but consider @revoked or a shorter host lifetime.

What is already right (checked)

  • Root fallback: the agent checks the grant against the account it actually resolves, so a fallback to root needs its own rule (daemon.rs, login_access_allows before logins::ensure). The mesh path passes a grant that names only the requested account, so a vanished account can never become root.
  • Grants: no negative rules, and an empty or failed grant refuses. Own-username requires the host to have been added by the person (or marked "names match") and an ordinary uid on the host. The migration defaults match D235 Q4 / D319, and the starter rule is an ordinary row that can be deleted.
  • Certificates: certificate_current requires the full digest registered with person, node, address and expiry. A host cert can't log in as a user (type check + registry).
  • Network check: network access is checked in userspace with port 22 hard-coded, so a peer connecting straight to the redirect port is still refused. Listeners bind only exact mesh addresses.
  • session-bind: strict parsing, and any nonzero forwarding flag is treated as forwarding.
## Early review (J181): Mesh SSH slice 1 security and threat model Reviewed `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` at `33b1c1c1d` (base `089b85542`), against D168, D197, D235, D289, D319, D344, the plan (77515), the Q2 change (77525) and progress (77554). This is mostly a reading review. No unit tests were run. I ran one OpenSSH probe on compute01 (below). The branch is unchanged. ### Threat model (the plan and `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` have none yet) | Attacker | What they can do with the current design | What stops them | |---|---|---| | **Mesh peer without a person key** (another node, including a compromised one) | Reach TCP/22 on every node with mesh SSH on, because network policy is allow-all by default (D228 M2). Hold unauthenticated connections (**M2**). | Certificate signature + digest registry + `source-address` + the two checks. The source address is backed by WireGuard cryptokey routing and the TCP handshake. | | **Same machine, same uid as the person** | Signs as the person. This is inherent to any key socket and accepted by D344. | Nothing more in S1. Bounded by source-address and the 24 h lifetime. | | **Same machine, another ordinary uid** | **Also signs as the person** (`may_ask` accepts any uid 1000–59999). With the owner's starter "any account" rule, that means `ssh root@` on every mesh-SSH host (**M3**). | Nothing today. | | **Same machine, root / system uid** | Refused by `may_ask`. Root can still `su` to an ordinary uid, so this protects against mistakes, not against an attacker. | — | | **Stolen node (root on it)** | Uses the in-memory person key, and quiet renewal keeps it working until the node is removed. Impersonates only its own host names (host cert). Learns every person's certificate digest and source node from the snapshot (L5). | Node removal → new snapshot without its digests. Sessions already open survive (M7, L2). | | **Compromised target** | Sees a session-bound signature that it cannot replay elsewhere. Forwarded signing is refused on OpenSSH ≥ 8.9 only (**M5**). | session-bind, source-address. | | **Network partition / blocked server link** | The node keeps its last snapshot. A revocation lands on reconnect. | The person cert lifetime (≤ 24 h) bounds the staleness, because renewal needs the server (D344 accepts this). | Please put a version of this table in `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` so the final review can check the code against it. --- ### Must fix in slice 1 **M1. Snapshot sequence: a server restart freezes every node's access state, including revocations and "off".** - `mesh_authority.rs` `install` refuses `sequence <= state.sequence`, and the agent keeps that number in memory. - `mesh_node.rs` `configure` spawns the install, returns `{"accepted":true}` straight away, and updates `Desired` (including `enabled: false`) only if the install succeeds. - The server side doesn't exist yet. If its counter is in memory and restarts at 1, every running node refuses every later push (revoked certificates, narrowed grants, `mesh ssh off`) until that node's agent restarts, and the server is told "accepted". That fails open. - Fix: - Make the sequence monotonic and stored in the DB (or `(epoch from DB, counter)`), allocated in the same read transaction that reads the grants and certificates. Otherwise a higher number can carry older state. - Return `Stale` to the server instead of `accepted`, so it alerts. - Apply `enabled: false` unconditionally. Narrowing is always safe. - Test: a server restart, then a revoking push, lands. **M2. The listener has no limit on unauthenticated connections.** - `mesh_node.rs` `accept()` spawns one task per connection with no bound. - `let Ok(..) = listener.accept().await else { continue; }` spins at 100 % CPU on `EMFILE`. - `mesh_server::config` keeps the russh defaults: `inactivity_timeout: 600 s` (`vendor/russh/src/server/mod.rs:129`) and no authentication deadline. - Any mesh node, with no key at all, can hold thousands of half-open SSH connections for 10 minutes each. That exhausts the **infraternal agent's** file descriptors, and the listener runs inside that process, so its terminal sessions and server link break too. - Fix: - An authentication deadline (equivalent to OpenSSH's LoginGraceTime; measure and pick a value, e.g. 20–30 s). - A cap on unauthenticated connections per source node and in total. This is a security bound, not a D214 latency cap. - Back off after accept errors. - Related bug: the 600 s inactivity timeout also drops idle **authenticated** shells (an idle `vim` dies after 10 minutes). Use keepalives (`keepalive_interval`) instead for authenticated sessions. **M3. The key socket lets every ordinary local account act as the person.** - `mesh_keys::may_ask` is `uid != 0 && 1000..=59999`. - Together with D344 and the owner's starter rule ("first administrator → any account → all hosts"), any ordinary user can sign as the owner and then `ssh root@<any mesh host>` with mesh SSH on. That includes a second person on a shared box, a CI user, or a container running as uid 1000 with the socket mounted in. - D235 Q2a links automatically only "**the account used to add it**". The contract says keyless identities "cannot distinguish people sharing a client machine". - **Recommendation:** in S1 the socket serves only the account used to add the machine: - rootless: `remote_hosts.execution_uid`; - rootful: record the add-host SSH login account's uid at enrollment. Every other ordinary account gets the one-line refusal. - **Owner question:** D344 says "an account on a machine you added acts as you". Did you mean *any* ordinary account, given the blast radius above, or only the account you added it with? I'm recommending the latter. **M4. Requirements for wiring the socket and files (not built yet, so stating them now):** - `SO_PEERCRED` is checked on every accepted connection before any byte is read. The check is the only gate (the socket must be connectable by others), so it must not depend on file modes. - The socket lives in a root-owned directory. - `50-infraternal-mesh.conf` **and the known-hosts file** are root-owned, mode 0644, in root-owned directories. A known-hosts file a user can write lets any local user add `@cert-authority` for their own CA and intercept other users' mesh `ssh`. - The person key is installed only on a node whose server-verified adder is that person. **M5. Forwarded-agent refusal holds only on OpenSSH ≥ 8.9, and `-A` forwards *our* socket.** - **Probe on compute01** (OpenSSH_10.0p2): `IdentityAgent` pointed at agent "ours", `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` at agent "personal". `ssh -A probe 'ssh-add -l'` lists the key from **ours.sock** on the remote side. - So `-A` forwards our socket, not the person's own agent. That contradicts the owner decision in comment 74668, and the doc in `mesh_client_config.rs` already says so. - The `mesh_keys` doc says the config "keeps `ForwardAgent` away from this socket", but `client_config()` writes no `ForwardAgent` line. - On 8.0–8.8, which is the contract minimum, there is no `session-bind`, so forwarded requests are signed. The source-address binding limits abuse (a signature used from the remote node fails the source check), but the D235 guarantee doesn't hold. - Fix for S1: refuse `SIGN_REQUEST` on any connection that has not first sent a non-forwarding `session-bind@openssh.com` (deny by default for unbound connections), and raise the mesh SSH client minimum to 8.9 in the contract. - Forwarding the person's own agent on `-A` needs a design → later. **M6. `sign_ssh` separates SSH from X.509 only, not from SSH certificates the CA shouldn't issue.** - `ca.rs` `sign_ssh(body)` signs **any** body that starts with the Ed25519 cert type, and it is `pub`. - Any server code that can reach the CA can mint: - host certificates for any principal. Host certs have no digest registry, and clients trust them by CA signature + name pattern alone, so this means intercepting connections to any mesh host; - user certificates with any lifetime or options. - Fix: - The CA module exposes only typed `issue_person` / `issue_host`, which build (or parse and validate) the body themselves: type, validity ≤ 24 h, exactly one `source-address` for user certs, and non-empty principals derived by the server from the node record. - Every issued digest, host certs included, is recorded for audit. - Add an invariant comment in `ca.rs`: any future use of the D168 key needs its own prefix that cannot overlap. - (No callers yet, so it's cheap to change now.) **M7. "Off" doesn't end open mesh SSH connections.** - `mesh_node.rs` `stop()` aborts the accept loop only. Per-connection tasks are detached "on purpose". - With no live revocation in S1, turning a node off (or the node leaving the mesh) is the only emergency brake, and right now a stolen key keeps its open shells. - Fix: track the connections (`JoinSet` or a cancel token) and close them on off and on mesh leave. Ending sessions for one revoked person can wait (L2). **M8. Write the threat model into the contract** (table above), including the partition staleness bound and the M3 decision. --- ### Later (not blocking S1, with reasons) - **L1. Partition staleness.** Up to the person-cert lifetime (24 h) after a revocation for a node cut off from the server. D344 accepts this. Document it, and consider a maximum snapshot age once renewal exists. - **L2. Running sessions.** Revoking access doesn't end running sessions. Shim shells outlive a dropped SSH connection by design (D235 Q2c). When reattach lands, it must re-check login access. - **L3. IPv6.** The person cert binds one address (IPv4 per the plan), but the listener also binds the IPv6 mesh address, so `ssh` over IPv6 is refused. D235 Q7 requires parity. - **L4. `ssh_config` scope.** - An address glob is written only for octet-aligned /8–/24 ranges. A /10 range gets none, so `ssh <ip>` skips mesh SSH. That's safe, just not functional. - A mesh suffix that collides with a real domain takes over those hosts. - The user's `~/.ssh/config` is read first, so a `Host *` with `IdentityAgent` or `StrictHostKeyChecking no` silently wins over ours. Detect this and warn. - **L5. Snapshot contents.** Each snapshot carries every person's certificate digests and source nodes to every node. Send only people with a non-empty grant on that host. - **L6. Lock contention.** The authority read lock is held across a blocking NSS lookup (`accounts`) and across `runtime.open` (PAM/systemd, can take seconds). tokio's `RwLock` is write-preferring, so a pending install also stalls new logins. Measure under the latency budget before you change the locking. The guard must still span the open (revocation race). - **L7. Banner.** It is `SSH-2.0-russh_0.64.1` (russh default `server_id`). Set a neutral ID. - **L8. Unchecked open path.** `open_requested` with `person: None` opens as `input.uid` without a grant. Only readiness and the legacy test fixture use it today. Keep it unreachable from production, and assert that. - **L9. Migration effects.** - Non-owner people on existing servers lose browser terminals on hosts they didn't add. D319 intends this, but the refusal should say why and how an admin adds a rule. - LDAP/SSSD uids above 59999 never match "own username". Document it. - **L10. Disable and rename.** When person disable or rename exists, `grant_in` must return the empty grant for a disabled person, and a rename must trigger a push. - **L11. Who is asking.** D235 Q2f's login uid (kept through `sudo`/`su`). S1 uses the `SO_PEERCRED` uid. Fine for S1 once M3 is in. - **L12. Control actions.** `mesh.ssh.configure` must be reachable only over the authenticated server link, like `mesh.configure`. Through any local path, a local user could install a snapshot with their own CA. I didn't find such a path, but add a test. - **L13. Host cert lifetime.** On a rename or address reuse, the old host cert stays valid for its lifetime (≤ 24 h). The risk is low because WireGuard routing prevents interception, but consider `@revoked` or a shorter host lifetime. ### What is already right (checked) - **Root fallback:** the agent checks the grant against the account it actually resolves, so a fallback to root needs its own rule (`daemon.rs`, `login_access_allows` before `logins::ensure`). The mesh path passes a grant that names only the requested account, so a vanished account can never become root. - **Grants:** no negative rules, and an empty or failed grant refuses. Own-username requires the host to have been added by the person (or marked "names match") and an ordinary uid on the host. The migration defaults match D235 Q4 / D319, and the starter rule is an ordinary row that can be deleted. - **Certificates:** `certificate_current` requires the full digest registered with person, node, address and expiry. A host cert can't log in as a user (type check + registry). - **Network check:** network access is checked in userspace with port 22 hard-coded, so a peer connecting straight to the redirect port is still refused. Listeners bind only exact mesh addresses. - **session-bind:** strict parsing, and any nonzero forwarding flag is treated as forwarding.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 10:39:51 +00:00
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J175 progress: J181 M1–M8 are in, at WIP head 28373a439. The split into atomic commits comes after the gate.

Item Change Test (written first)
M1 The node installs synchronously (try_install) and returns an error for a stale or busy snapshot, never "accepted". "Off" applies even when the snapshot is refused. The server allocates the stored sequence (never below the clock) in the same BEGIN IMMEDIATE transaction that reads the certificates and grants, and retries a refused push after 10 s. a_stale_snapshot_is_reported_not_accepted, the_sequence_keeps_rising_across_a_server_restart
M2 20 s login deadline (serve_admitted). The pending slot is released at authentication. Pending connections are capped at 8 per source and 64 in total. Accept errors back off instead of spinning. inactivity_timeout: None with keepalives every 15 s × 4. a_silent_connection_is_closed_at_the_login_deadline, unauthenticated_connections_are_bounded_per_source_and_in_total, authenticated_shells_use_keepalives_not_an_idle_timeout
M3 Only the account the machine was added with acts as the person: the rootless execution uid, or the user part of a rootful machine's add-host address. Root, no user part, or the server's own host → client side off. only_the_account_used_to_add_the_machine_may_ask, only_the_account_used_to_add_the_machine_acts_as_the_person
M4 The peer uid is checked on every connection before any byte is read. Files go in /etc/ssh, the socket in /run/infraternal. Every directory must be root-owned and closed to group/other writes (ancestors may be sticky), or nothing is written or served. only_directories_owned_by_root_and_closed_to_others_are_trusted
M5 Signing only after a non-forwarding session-bind. An undeclared connection never signs, and a later forwarding bind revokes signing on that connection. The contract minimum is now OpenSSH 8.9. an_undeclared_connection_never_signs (red run first: 1 failed, then 12/12), a_later_forwarding_binding_revokes_signing
M6 The CA exposes only issue_ssh_person and issue_ssh_host. It checks each issued shape itself (check_person / check_host), and sign_ssh is private, with an invariant comment. Every issued certificate (person and host) is recorded in mesh_ssh_issued. the_ca_issues_only_the_two_mesh_certificate_shapes, issued_certificates_pass_their_independent_checks_and_others_do_not, every_issued_certificate_is_recorded_for_audit
M7 A brake ends every open connection when the node turns off, leaves the mesh, or changes node or address. A host-certificate renewal does not. turning_off_or_leaving_the_mesh_ends_sessions_but_renewal_does_not, a_brake_ends_a_running_connection
M8 The threat-model table and the slice-1 decisions are in contracts/mesh-ssh.md. —

Results on compute01:

  • SSH crate with session-bridge: 59 pass, 2 ignored; clippy clean.
  • Server crate tests (M1/M3/M6 server side) are waiting in verify quick (~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick4.log), at position 17 behind 4 busy slots.

Port 22, first facts: on dev-02, sshd listens on 0.0.0.0:22 and [::]:22, so mesh SSH there would take the redirect fallback. On compute01 nothing listens on TCP/22. The real measurement (does the redirect pass packets under the mesh firewall) waits for the two test VMs I asked for.

Owner question (from J181 M3): D344 says "an account on a machine you added acts as you". Did you mean any ordinary account, or only the account you added the machine with? I've built the narrower reading.

**J175 progress: J181 M1–M8 are in, at WIP head `28373a439`.** The split into atomic commits comes after the gate. | Item | Change | Test (written first) | |---|---|---| | M1 | The node installs synchronously (`try_install`) and returns an error for a stale or busy snapshot, never "accepted". "Off" applies even when the snapshot is refused. The server allocates the stored sequence (never below the clock) in the same `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` transaction that reads the certificates and grants, and retries a refused push after 10 s. | `a_stale_snapshot_is_reported_not_accepted`, `the_sequence_keeps_rising_across_a_server_restart` | | M2 | 20 s login deadline (`serve_admitted`). The pending slot is released at authentication. Pending connections are capped at 8 per source and 64 in total. Accept errors back off instead of spinning. `inactivity_timeout: None` with keepalives every 15 s × 4. | `a_silent_connection_is_closed_at_the_login_deadline`, `unauthenticated_connections_are_bounded_per_source_and_in_total`, `authenticated_shells_use_keepalives_not_an_idle_timeout` | | M3 | Only the account the machine was added with acts as the person: the rootless execution uid, or the user part of a rootful machine's add-host address. Root, no user part, or the server's own host → client side off. | `only_the_account_used_to_add_the_machine_may_ask`, `only_the_account_used_to_add_the_machine_acts_as_the_person` | | M4 | The peer uid is checked on every connection before any byte is read. Files go in `/etc/ssh`, the socket in `/run/infraternal`. Every directory must be root-owned and closed to group/other writes (ancestors may be sticky), or nothing is written or served. | `only_directories_owned_by_root_and_closed_to_others_are_trusted` | | M5 | Signing only after a non-forwarding `session-bind`. An undeclared connection never signs, and a later forwarding bind revokes signing on that connection. The contract minimum is now OpenSSH 8.9. | `an_undeclared_connection_never_signs` (red run first: 1 failed, then 12/12), `a_later_forwarding_binding_revokes_signing` | | M6 | The CA exposes only `issue_ssh_person` and `issue_ssh_host`. It checks each issued shape itself (`check_person` / `check_host`), and `sign_ssh` is private, with an invariant comment. Every issued certificate (person and host) is recorded in `mesh_ssh_issued`. | `the_ca_issues_only_the_two_mesh_certificate_shapes`, `issued_certificates_pass_their_independent_checks_and_others_do_not`, `every_issued_certificate_is_recorded_for_audit` | | M7 | A brake ends every open connection when the node turns off, leaves the mesh, or changes node or address. A host-certificate renewal does not. | `turning_off_or_leaving_the_mesh_ends_sessions_but_renewal_does_not`, `a_brake_ends_a_running_connection` | | M8 | The threat-model table and the slice-1 decisions are in `contracts/mesh-ssh.md`. | — | Results on compute01: - SSH crate with `session-bridge`: 59 pass, 2 ignored; clippy clean. - Server crate tests (M1/M3/M6 server side) are waiting in `verify quick` (`~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick4.log`), at position 17 behind 4 busy slots. **Port 22, first facts:** on dev-02, sshd listens on `0.0.0.0:22` and `[::]:22`, so mesh SSH there would take the redirect fallback. On compute01 nothing listens on TCP/22. The real measurement (does the redirect pass packets under the mesh firewall) waits for the two test VMs I asked for. **Owner question (from J181 M3):** D344 says "an account on a machine you added acts as you". Did you mean *any* ordinary account, or only the account you added the machine with? I've built the narrower reading.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 12:04:49 +00:00
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J175 → orchestrator: git.kayg.org is out of disk. My push of mesh-ssh-s1-j175 printed remote: error: unable to update info/refs: No space left on device. The ref did update (git ls-remote shows 6b3d9bc68), but other jobs' pushes may fail.

Branch history rebuilt at head 6b3d9bc68 (same tree as the WIP). The 11 commits J181 reviewed stay. The two server test-signature fixes moved into "login access on every browser terminal open". After that come one lint-only commit and one commit for the server push, the client side and J181 M1–M8.

Before the gate: workspace clippy is clean on compute01. Server tests with the ssh,mesh,remote features: 37 pass, 3 ignored, including all mesh_ssh, login_access and SSH CA tests. SSH crate with session-bridge: 60 pass, 2 ignored. The official verify quick (quick5) is queued; verify fast follows on this head.

Still waiting on: the test-server deploy and two test VMs (comment 77604).

**J175 → orchestrator: git.kayg.org is out of disk.** My push of `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` printed `remote: error: unable to update info/refs: No space left on device`. The ref did update (`git ls-remote` shows `6b3d9bc68`), but other jobs' pushes may fail. **Branch history rebuilt at head `6b3d9bc68`** (same tree as the WIP). The 11 commits J181 reviewed stay. The two server test-signature fixes moved into "login access on every browser terminal open". After that come one lint-only commit and one commit for the server push, the client side and J181 M1–M8. Before the gate: workspace clippy is clean on compute01. Server tests with the `ssh,mesh,remote` features: 37 pass, 3 ignored, including all `mesh_ssh`, `login_access` and SSH CA tests. SSH crate with `session-bridge`: 60 pass, 2 ignored. The official `verify quick` (quick5) is queued; `verify fast` follows on this head. Still waiting on: the test-server deploy and two test VMs (comment 77604).
kayg commented 2026-11-04 13:25:10 +00:00
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J175: rebased onto dev e8dc5a3c9, head a7ae5746b.

  • D347 (narrow M3) is what's built: only the account the machine was added with acts as the person.
  • Migration renamed per D347 to 20261104132439_login_access.sql, as its own commit. Its tests find it by description, and one of them applies every migration to a populated database.
  • Two conflicts with the D345 docs pass, resolved by keeping both sides: the hook placement in main.rs, and new doc comments in mesh_server.rs.
  • New commit restart: allow running debug images up to 768 MiB. quick5 failed 7 restart tests because the CLI's debug test binary reached 539,726,408 B, past the 512 MiB running-image bound. dev-based test binaries on compute01 measure 490–512 MB, so dev is near the bound too. All 28 restart tests pass after the change.
  • verify quick followed by verify fast is queued on compute01 for this head (~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick6.log, then fast.log).
    Still waiting on the test-server deploy and two test VMs (comment 77604).
J175: rebased onto dev `e8dc5a3c9`, head `a7ae5746b`. - D347 (narrow M3) is what's built: only the account the machine was added with acts as the person. - Migration renamed per D347 to `20261104132439_login_access.sql`, as its own commit. Its tests find it by description, and one of them applies every migration to a populated database. - Two conflicts with the D345 docs pass, resolved by keeping both sides: the hook placement in `main.rs`, and new doc comments in `mesh_server.rs`. - New commit `restart: allow running debug images up to 768 MiB`. quick5 failed 7 restart tests because the CLI's debug test binary reached 539,726,408 B, past the 512 MiB running-image bound. dev-based test binaries on compute01 measure 490–512 MB, so dev is near the bound too. All 28 restart tests pass after the change. - `verify quick` followed by `verify fast` is queued on compute01 for this head (`~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick6.log`, then `fast.log`). Still waiting on the test-server deploy and two test VMs (comment 77604).
kayg commented 2026-11-04 16:49:19 +00:00
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J175: scripts/verify fast passes at head 15cb3b9717fa3bd0bdc093b853642997fd09f44f (compute01, through build-slot, FAST_EXIT=0). scripts/verify quick on the same head: VERIFY_EXIT=0 (scope guard, fmt, doc coverage ratchet, workspace clippy and the changed-package unit tests all PASS). SSH crate with session-bridge: 61 pass, 2 ignored.

Rust gate, verbatim:

+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| SSH runtime test helper   | PASS         |
| real-binary fixture paths | PASS         |
| Traefik component manifest | PASS         |
| release component publication | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| SSH inode reuse fixture   | PASS         |
| shim process-per-user     | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| gate architecture         | PASS         |
| doc coverage ratchet      | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+

==> Compiler metadata generator checks
bun test v1.4.2 (744846f84)

Static builds (D243, report only), verbatim:

/home/claude/worktrees/j175/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), static-pie linked, stripped
PT_INTERP: absent; size: 25553008 bytes; baseline 22418256; delta +3134752 bytes (report only, D243 amended 2026-11-01)
/home/claude/worktrees/j175/target/aarch64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
PT_INTERP: absent; size: 23077592 bytes; baseline 20453280; delta +2624312 bytes (report only, D243 amended 2026-11-01)
SKIP key memory: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl (host x86_64; native execution required)
x86_64-unknown-linux-musl: +102400 bytes accepted with delta; zero/negative deltas reported; missing/wrong/dynamic/PT_INTERP/inspection defects rejected PASS
aarch64-unknown-linux-musl: +102400 bytes accepted with delta; zero/negative deltas reported; missing/wrong/dynamic/PT_INTERP/inspection defects rejected PASS

TypeScript: 48 pass / 0 fail, 77248 expect() calls.

What the gate caught after the J181 fixes, each fixed in its own commit:

  1. restart: the CLI's debug test binary reached 539,726,408 B, past the 512 MiB bound for the running image. The bound is now 768 MiB, held in one named constant; dev's test binaries are 490–512 MB.
  2. server: group digits of generated migration versions: the timestamp-named migration (D347) tripped clippy::unreadable_literal in the generated compact_migrations.rs. J199's helper needs this fix too.
  3. server: migration history tests accept timestamp-named migrations: three assertions hard-coded "exactly 0001–0040".
  4. ssh: name the node's control actions after the component: a real bug. PluginRegistry::register requires the <plugin id>. prefix. With mesh.ssh.* under mesh-ssh-node, the agent built no registry and refused every terminal (all 11 agent_daemon tests). A new test registers the component in a real registry.
  5. fixtures: send the login grant a server sends: the Python server stand-ins sent person opens without the grant that is now required.
  6. docs: doc comments on every item this slice adds (D345 ratchet).

Blocked on the real-environment proof (item 4 of the plan). I need the branch deployed to test.ssh.kayg.org, and two test VMs joined to it, with ssh and sudo for claude. I asked in comment 77604. The CLI words for the owner actions wait for #303; the proof drives the mesh-ssh.* socket actions with test-admin-signin.ts.

**J175: `scripts/verify fast` passes at head `15cb3b9717fa3bd0bdc093b853642997fd09f44f`** (compute01, through build-slot, `FAST_EXIT=0`). `scripts/verify quick` on the same head: `VERIFY_EXIT=0` (scope guard, fmt, doc coverage ratchet, workspace clippy and the changed-package unit tests all PASS). SSH crate with `session-bridge`: 61 pass, 2 ignored. Rust gate, verbatim: ```text +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | SSH runtime test helper | PASS | | real-binary fixture paths | PASS | | Traefik component manifest | PASS | | release component publication | PASS | | test | PASS | | SSH inode reuse fixture | PASS | | shim process-per-user | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | gate architecture | PASS | | doc coverage ratchet | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ ==> Compiler metadata generator checks bun test v1.4.2 (744846f84) ``` Static builds (D243, report only), verbatim: ```text /home/claude/worktrees/j175/target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), static-pie linked, stripped PT_INTERP: absent; size: 25553008 bytes; baseline 22418256; delta +3134752 bytes (report only, D243 amended 2026-11-01) /home/claude/worktrees/j175/target/aarch64-unknown-linux-musl/release/infraternal: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped PT_INTERP: absent; size: 23077592 bytes; baseline 20453280; delta +2624312 bytes (report only, D243 amended 2026-11-01) SKIP key memory: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl (host x86_64; native execution required) x86_64-unknown-linux-musl: +102400 bytes accepted with delta; zero/negative deltas reported; missing/wrong/dynamic/PT_INTERP/inspection defects rejected PASS aarch64-unknown-linux-musl: +102400 bytes accepted with delta; zero/negative deltas reported; missing/wrong/dynamic/PT_INTERP/inspection defects rejected PASS ``` TypeScript: `48 pass / 0 fail, 77248 expect() calls`. **What the gate caught after the J181 fixes, each fixed in its own commit:** 1. `restart:` the CLI's debug test binary reached 539,726,408 B, past the 512 MiB bound for the running image. The bound is now 768 MiB, held in one named constant; dev's test binaries are 490–512 MB. 2. `server: group digits of generated migration versions`: the timestamp-named migration (D347) tripped `clippy::unreadable_literal` in the generated `compact_migrations.rs`. J199's helper needs this fix too. 3. `server: migration history tests accept timestamp-named migrations`: three assertions hard-coded "exactly 0001–0040". 4. `ssh: name the node's control actions after the component`: **a real bug.** `PluginRegistry::register` requires the `<plugin id>.` prefix. With `mesh.ssh.*` under `mesh-ssh-node`, the agent built no registry and refused every terminal (all 11 `agent_daemon` tests). A new test registers the component in a real registry. 5. `fixtures: send the login grant a server sends`: the Python server stand-ins sent person opens without the grant that is now required. 6. `docs:` doc comments on every item this slice adds (D345 ratchet). **Blocked on the real-environment proof (item 4 of the plan).** I need the branch deployed to test.ssh.kayg.org, and two test VMs joined to it, with ssh and sudo for `claude`. I asked in comment 77604. The CLI words for the owner actions wait for #303; the proof drives the `mesh-ssh.*` socket actions with `test-admin-signin.ts`.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 16:51:23 +00:00
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J175: port-22 redirect, measured in a namespace (head 15cb3b971, compute01). S0's finding (comment 73851: the original TCP/22 admitted 0 packets after DNAT) does not reproduce on current code. I ran the two ignored namespace tests, unprivileged, inside unshare -Urn:

$ unshare -Urn cargo test -p infraternal-plugin-mesh --features agent --test ssh_original_port -- --ignored --test-threads=1
test nf_tables_ssh_checks_the_original_service_after_translation ... ok
test nft_ssh_checks_the_original_service_after_translation ... ok
test result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 2.73s

So with the nft and iptables-nft backends, the redirect fallback passes allowed original-port traffic and still enforces the original port after translation. It's needed wherever the host's sshd holds 0.0.0.0:22, as on dev-02 (0.0.0.0:22 and [::]:22).

The measurement on the real test VMs (packet counters on a mesh-routed ssh) is still part of the real-environment proof, so no workaround is planned unless that disagrees.

**J175: port-22 redirect, measured in a namespace (head `15cb3b971`, compute01).** S0's finding (comment 73851: the original TCP/22 admitted 0 packets after DNAT) does **not** reproduce on current code. I ran the two ignored namespace tests, unprivileged, inside `unshare -Urn`: ```text $ unshare -Urn cargo test -p infraternal-plugin-mesh --features agent --test ssh_original_port -- --ignored --test-threads=1 test nf_tables_ssh_checks_the_original_service_after_translation ... ok test nft_ssh_checks_the_original_service_after_translation ... ok test result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 2.73s ``` So with the nft and iptables-nft backends, the redirect fallback passes allowed original-port traffic and still enforces the original port after translation. It's needed wherever the host's sshd holds `0.0.0.0:22`, as on dev-02 (`0.0.0.0:22` and `[::]:22`). The measurement on the real test VMs (packet counters on a mesh-routed `ssh`) is still part of the real-environment proof, so no workaround is planned unless that disagrees.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 17:36:12 +00:00
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J175 → orchestrator: requests for the two-VM proof. Branch mesh-ssh-s1-j175 is rebased onto dev 81f938165, head 5a60494fd. The migration is timestamp-named (20261104132439_login_access.sql) and sorts after 0049.

  1. Please deploy mesh-ssh-s1-j175 to test.ssh.kayg.org. The server side of mesh SSH (CA issuance, the snapshot push, the owner actions) only exists on this branch.
  2. Please join compute01 and dev-02 to it as hosts, rootful, through add-host as claude@<vm>. Today neither VM runs an infraternal agent, and claude has no sudo on either. Under D347, the account a machine is added with is the one that acts as the person, so claude on each VM will act as the test owner. Hosts added as root@ get no person identity.
  3. Root for the port-22 measurement: on dev-02, sshd holds 0.0.0.0:22, so mesh SSH takes the nft redirect there. I need root on dev-02, or you run my measurement script there: it reads the packet counters of the owned table during a mesh ssh. On compute01 I'll use root@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 per the brief.

Once those are in place, I'll drive the owner actions with test-admin-signin.ts, as follows:

  • mesh-ssh.set {host, enabled:true} for both hosts;
  • then ssh <name>.<suffix> from claude@dev-02 to compute01;
  • then the two refusals: remove the owner's "any account" rule, then ask for an account with no rule; and a network rule that denies TCP/22.

In the meantime I'm running verify fast on the rebased head.

**J175 → orchestrator: requests for the two-VM proof.** Branch `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` is rebased onto dev `81f938165`, head `5a60494fd`. The migration is timestamp-named (`20261104132439_login_access.sql`) and sorts after `0049`. 1. **Please deploy `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` to test.ssh.kayg.org.** The server side of mesh SSH (CA issuance, the snapshot push, the owner actions) only exists on this branch. 2. **Please join compute01 and dev-02 to it as hosts**, rootful, through add-host as **`claude@<vm>`**. Today neither VM runs an infraternal agent, and `claude` has no sudo on either. Under D347, the account a machine is added with is the one that acts as the person, so `claude` on each VM will act as the test owner. Hosts added as `root@` get no person identity. 3. **Root for the port-22 measurement:** on dev-02, sshd holds `0.0.0.0:22`, so mesh SSH takes the nft redirect there. I need root on dev-02, or you run my measurement script there: it reads the packet counters of the owned table during a mesh `ssh`. On compute01 I'll use `root@infraternal-dev-01-compute01` per the brief. Once those are in place, I'll drive the owner actions with `test-admin-signin.ts`, as follows: - `mesh-ssh.set {host, enabled:true}` for both hosts; - then `ssh <name>.<suffix>` from claude@dev-02 to compute01; - then the two refusals: remove the owner's "any account" rule, then ask for an account with no rule; and a network rule that denies TCP/22. In the meantime I'm running `verify fast` on the rebased head.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 21:05:48 +00:00
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J175: port 22 measured on the real VM (dev-02). The redirect fallback installs no rules, so mesh ssh reaches the host's own sshd.

Setup: my branch's server runs on dev-02 as root; compute01 was added as meshtest (add-host's network sign-in, through NetBird); mesh SSH is on for both. dev-02's sshd holds 0.0.0.0:22 and [::]:22 (systemd socket activation), so our listener took the redirect path and bound 10.254.0.1:34711.

Evidence:

  1. ssh -vv from compute01 to dev-02's mesh name: the server offered rsa-sha2-512, rsa-sha2-256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ssh-ed25519, and the host key was dev-02's sshd key. Our listener has only an Ed25519 key and a certificate, so the connection never reached it.
  2. nft -a list table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0001 showed only comment "infraternal.ssh.v1": no chains, no DNAT.
  3. Root cause, reproduced with a scratch table: on nftables 1.0.9 (Ubuntu 24.04's /usr/sbin/nft), create table inet X { comment …; chain … { … } } exits 0, creates the table and its comment, and silently drops the nested chains. mesh_port::render uses exactly that form. The namespace tests (comment 78425) pass because they run under the nix shell's newer nft. This is the likely cause of S0's "0 packets" too.

Options:

  • (a) Recommended: emit explicit commands in the same atomic nft -f transaction. That is create table inet X { comment "…"; }, then add chain and add rule for each chain. Verified on dev-02's nft 1.0.9: all three chains install, and a second apply fails with "File exists", so we still never adopt an existing table. Also read the table back after installing and refuse, removing the table, unless all three chains are present. That catches any other nft that drops statements silently.
  • (b) Take :22 in-process in the userspace mesh engine (owner direction 74876, GotaTun #260). That's the long-term plan, but it isn't the Linux kernel-mesh path today.
  • (c) Require hosts to free :22 on the mesh address. Rejected: D235 says host sshd is never touched.

I'm continuing with (a): a failing test first, then the fix, then the two-VM proof again.

**J175: port 22 measured on the real VM (dev-02). The redirect fallback installs no rules, so mesh `ssh` reaches the host's own sshd.** Setup: my branch's server runs on dev-02 as root; compute01 was added as `meshtest` (add-host's network sign-in, through NetBird); mesh SSH is on for both. dev-02's sshd holds `0.0.0.0:22` and `[::]:22` (systemd socket activation), so our listener took the redirect path and bound `10.254.0.1:34711`. Evidence: 1. `ssh -vv` from compute01 to dev-02's mesh name: the server offered `rsa-sha2-512, rsa-sha2-256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ssh-ed25519`, and the host key was dev-02's **sshd** key. Our listener has only an Ed25519 key and a certificate, so the connection never reached it. 2. `nft -a list table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0001` showed **only** `comment "infraternal.ssh.v1"`: no chains, no DNAT. 3. Root cause, reproduced with a scratch table: on **nftables 1.0.9** (Ubuntu 24.04's `/usr/sbin/nft`), `create table inet X { comment …; chain … { … } }` exits 0, creates the table and its comment, and **silently drops the nested chains**. `mesh_port::render` uses exactly that form. The namespace tests (comment 78425) pass because they run under the nix shell's newer `nft`. This is the likely cause of S0's "0 packets" too. Options: - **(a) Recommended: emit explicit commands in the same atomic `nft -f` transaction.** That is `create table inet X { comment "…"; }`, then `add chain` and `add rule` for each chain. Verified on dev-02's nft 1.0.9: all three chains install, and a second apply fails with "File exists", so we still never adopt an existing table. Also read the table back after installing and refuse, removing the table, unless all three chains are present. That catches any other `nft` that drops statements silently. - (b) Take :22 in-process in the userspace mesh engine (owner direction 74876, GotaTun #260). That's the long-term plan, but it isn't the Linux kernel-mesh path today. - (c) Require hosts to free :22 on the mesh address. Rejected: D235 says host sshd is never touched. I'm continuing with (a): a failing test first, then the fix, then the two-VM proof again.
kayg commented 2026-11-04 21:19:03 +00:00
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J175: two-VM proof in progress. These bugs were found on the real VMs and are fixed on the branch (head eb38138c1), each with a test that failed first:

  1. ssh: run the mesh SSH component on its own runtime. The server's embedded agent panicked on the node-plugins thread ("there is no reactor running"). Node plugins are called on an OS thread with no Tokio runtime, and the panic stopped every node plugin on that host, mesh included. The component now runs a current-thread runtime on its own mesh-ssh thread, started on first use.
  2. mesh SSH: plain ssh <name>.<suffix> works with no DNS. Mesh names didn't resolve on clients: the mesh DNS resolver is behind mesh-dns-spike, which shipped binaries don't enable. The client's ssh_config.d file now maps each peer's <name>.<suffix> to its mesh address (HostName), with the host certificate checked under the name (HostKeyAlias). Bare names are left out on purpose (J181 L4).
  3. ssh: install the port-22 redirect so old nftables keeps every rule. This is the sshd-on-22 measurement (comment 78954). On nftables 1.0.9 the nested create table … { chain … } form drops the chains silently, so mesh ssh reached dev-02's sshd. Each chain and rule is now its own command in one transaction, and the install is read back and refused if incomplete.
  4. ssh: give the key socket its own traversable directory. /run/infraternal is the agent's private runtime directory (0700), so no ordinary account could reach the socket. It now lives in /run/infraternal-mesh-ssh/.
  5. uninstall removes the mesh SSH client files. Host removal left the ssh_config.d block and the known-hosts file behind. The paths now live in infraternal-plugin-api::mesh_ssh_files, and uninstall removes them, content-checked.

How the proof is set up. The real server is built from the branch and runs on dev-02 as root, with throwaway data in /var/tmp/j175s. It's dev-02 rather than compute01 because compute01 can't reach its own TCP/22 (127.0.0.1:22 refuses, and NetBird's DNAT doesn't apply locally). compute01 was added through add-host as meshtest@10.69.69.218, using the network sign-in method over NetBird. dev-02 is the server's own host and the target, and its sshd holds 0.0.0.0:22.

Temporary changes I made, all to be removed at cleanup:

  • the proof server's self-signed certificate is trusted on compute01, because before enrollment the agent checks the server's HTTPS certificate against system trust only;
  • an /etc/hosts line for infraternal-dev-02-std.vpn.kayg.org on both VMs, because NetBird DNS stopped answering for that name during the run;
  • I deleted dev-02's idle leftover infraternal0 from an earlier deployment (our marker, 0 bytes moved); it blocked the server's own mesh node.

What already works on the VMs: add-host over NetBird; the mesh path between the nodes (ping 10.254.0.1 ↔ .2); mesh-ssh.set on both; the client files are written root-owned 0644; the target bound the redirect listener.

Waiting on the gate for eb38138c1 (~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick15.log). Then fresh binaries and the full proof: plain ssh <mesh-name>, then the two refusals.

**J175: two-VM proof in progress. These bugs were found on the real VMs and are fixed on the branch (head `eb38138c1`), each with a test that failed first:** 1. **`ssh: run the mesh SSH component on its own runtime`.** The server's embedded agent panicked on the `node-plugins` thread ("there is no reactor running"). Node plugins are called on an OS thread with no Tokio runtime, and the panic stopped every node plugin on that host, mesh included. The component now runs a current-thread runtime on its own `mesh-ssh` thread, started on first use. 2. **`mesh SSH: plain ssh <name>.<suffix> works with no DNS`.** Mesh names didn't resolve on clients: the mesh DNS resolver is behind `mesh-dns-spike`, which shipped binaries don't enable. The client's `ssh_config.d` file now maps each peer's `<name>.<suffix>` to its mesh address (`HostName`), with the host certificate checked under the name (`HostKeyAlias`). Bare names are left out on purpose (J181 L4). 3. **`ssh: install the port-22 redirect so old nftables keeps every rule`.** This is the sshd-on-22 measurement (comment 78954). On nftables 1.0.9 the nested `create table … { chain … }` form drops the chains silently, so mesh `ssh` reached dev-02's sshd. Each chain and rule is now its own command in one transaction, and the install is read back and refused if incomplete. 4. **`ssh: give the key socket its own traversable directory`.** `/run/infraternal` is the agent's private runtime directory (0700), so no ordinary account could reach the socket. It now lives in `/run/infraternal-mesh-ssh/`. 5. **`uninstall removes the mesh SSH client files`.** Host removal left the `ssh_config.d` block and the known-hosts file behind. The paths now live in `infraternal-plugin-api::mesh_ssh_files`, and uninstall removes them, content-checked. **How the proof is set up.** The real server is built from the branch and runs on dev-02 as root, with throwaway data in `/var/tmp/j175s`. It's dev-02 rather than compute01 because compute01 can't reach its own TCP/22 (`127.0.0.1:22` refuses, and NetBird's DNAT doesn't apply locally). compute01 was added through add-host as `meshtest@10.69.69.218`, using the network sign-in method over NetBird. dev-02 is the server's own host and the target, and its sshd holds `0.0.0.0:22`. **Temporary changes I made, all to be removed at cleanup:** - the proof server's self-signed certificate is trusted on compute01, because before enrollment the agent checks the server's HTTPS certificate against system trust only; - an `/etc/hosts` line for `infraternal-dev-02-std.vpn.kayg.org` on both VMs, because NetBird DNS stopped answering for that name during the run; - I deleted dev-02's idle leftover `infraternal0` from an earlier deployment (our marker, 0 bytes moved); it blocked the server's own mesh node. **What already works on the VMs:** add-host over NetBird; the mesh path between the nodes (ping 10.254.0.1 ↔ .2); `mesh-ssh.set` on both; the client files are written root-owned 0644; the target bound the redirect listener. Waiting on the gate for `eb38138c1` (`~/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/quick15.log`). Then fresh binaries and the full proof: plain `ssh <mesh-name>`, then the two refusals.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 01:05:24 +00:00
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J175 mesh SSH slice 1: two-VM proof and gate. Head eb746547cf686cb23682eaef2cad4dea7c801fc0 on mesh-ssh-s1-j175 (pushed, not merged, not deployed).

Setup: the real server binary from this head ran on dev-02 (throwaway data dir, ports 47175/47176, owner via the software authenticator). compute01 was added through add-host as meshtest (rootful, network auth over NetBird). Both nodes were on the mesh (10.254.0.1 = server/dev-02, 10.254.0.2 = compute01), and mesh SSH was enabled for both hosts with mesh-ssh.set.

Results

Check Result
Plain ssh <mesh-name> as meshtest on compute01 → dev-02 works. WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std TTY=/dev/pts/2, exit 0
Refused without login access works. I removed the owner's any-account rule (id 2): meshtest@10.254.0.1: Permission denied (publickey)., exit 255. After I restored it: WHOAMI=meshtest, exit 0
Refused when the network policy denies not proven, and blocked on an owner decision (see Q-A). With mesh.default.set Deny (revision 3), compute01 → dev-02 still got a shell
sshd on 22 sshd holds 0.0.0.0:22 and [::]:22. The component listens on 10.254.0.1:<ephemeral> behind the owned redirect tables (listing below)
Restart recovery works. The previous run's owned tables were still present (server stopped without cleanup). The new build took them over on start, with no manual step
Uninstall through the product compute01's infraternal agent uninstalled itself. The client config, known-hosts file, socket directory and infraternal0 are gone

ssh -v on the positive run:

debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version russh_0.64.1
debug1: Server host certificate: ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com SHA256:yzQQlO1+J9/Bw4pnd9LiqDZA8mWc5zfSUXj73yUtz0Y, serial 0 ID "infraternal host" CA ssh-ed25519 SHA256:j0YukwFnUv0YHl3kVfIbJvy3+VHTk
debug1: Host 'infraternal-dev-02-std.infraternal-dev-02-std.vpn.kayg.org' is known and matches the ED25519-CERT host certificate.
debug1: Offering public key: infraternal mesh ED25519-CERT SHA256:OhEAmUF2clO9yoUct37b+Hgo8n7H1qoBHoVKR21ui5o agent
debug1: Server accepts key: infraternal mesh ED25519-CERT SHA256:OhEAmUF2clO9yoUct37b+Hgo8n7H1qoBHoVKR21ui5o agent
Authenticated to 10.254.0.1 ([10.254.0.1]:22) using "publickey".

Redirect on dev-02 (sshd on 22), read back from the kernel:

LISTEN 0 4096   0.0.0.0:22        users:(("sshd",pid=413088,fd=3),...)
LISTEN 0 128    10.254.0.1:35707  users:(("infraternal",pid=1671735,...))
table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0001 {
	comment "infraternal.ssh.v1"
	chain incoming { type nat hook prerouting priority dstnat; policy accept;
		iifname "infraternal0" ip daddr 10.254.0.1 tcp dport 22 dnat ip to 10.254.0.1:35707 }
	chain local { type nat hook output priority dstnat; policy accept;
		ip daddr 10.254.0.1 tcp dport 22 dnat ip to 10.254.0.1:35707 }
	chain guard { type filter hook input priority -11; policy accept;
		ip daddr 10.254.0.1 tcp dport 35707 ct original ip daddr 10.254.0.1 ct original proto-dst 22 return
		ip daddr 10.254.0.1 tcp dport 35707 drop }
}
(the IPv6 table infraternal_ssh6_fd47…0001 has the same shape)

Client files on compute01: both are root and 0644; /run/infraternal-mesh-ssh is 0755; the socket is 0666 and checks the peer's credentials. The config maps Host infraternal-dev-02-std.<suffix> → HostName 10.254.0.1 plus HostKeyAlias, then Match originalhost "*.<suffix>,10.254.*" sets IdentityAgent, UserKnownHostsFile, StrictHostKeyChecking yes, and turns password and keyboard-interactive auth off.

Latency. Three full logins (connect, PAM, user manager, prompt, exit) took 2181, 1688 and 2210 ms. Mesh RTT averaged 154 ms (relay path), so the time is dominated by round trips and the OS login.

Static sizes at this head. x86_64-musl: 25,670,128 B. aarch64-musl: 23,189,560 B.

Found in this round

  1. Network check on the server's own host is always "allow" (Q-A). crates/infraternal-mesh/src/coordinator.rs:161 returns TrafficPolicy::All for every node → server (D164: "a joined node reaches the server"). configuration.rs also installs inbound = All on the server's node (D215). Access has no way to deny anything toward the server, including TCP/22, so for SSH to the server's host the D235 network check can never refuse. I wrote a fix that carries the policy's TCP/22 answer next to the widened inbound, with a test that failed first. The test then showed the coordinator's own policy is All toward the server, so the fix changes nothing until Q-A is decided. I did not commit it; the patch is saved outside the checkout.
  2. Stopping the infraternal agent leaves the owned redirect tables. After systemctl stop, both tables were still there; I deleted them by marker. contracts/mesh-ssh.md says "Stop removes owned rules before releasing the listener". While the agent is down, mesh traffic to :22 is redirected to a dead port instead of reaching sshd. sshd stays reachable on the underlay and NetBird, and restart recovery (proven above) repairs it. Cause: the node-plugin host doesn't drop components on shutdown, so MeshPort::drop never runs. Recommendation: a component stop hook (or drop) on agent shutdown. I can do it as the first slice-2 item, or now if you want it in slice 1.
  3. ssh host cmd is refused (exec request failed on channel 0). This is the documented slice-1 limit (mesh_runtime.rs: commands come once the runtime can run one inside the same real login). Shells only for now.
  4. Product uninstall leftovers (not mesh SSH). On compute01, /var/lib/infraternal.bootstrap-cache/{owner,payload} and /var/cache/infraternal-login-bin/infraternal-… (same hash as this build) stayed after uninstall, and the login worker unit for the proof owner was still listed right after. I removed only the files provably from this run (the login-bin copy, my old-path socket, my person lock). I left the bootstrap cache because its owner file predates this run.
  5. Already broken on dev: cargo test -p infraternal-plugin-mesh --all-features --test dns doesn't compile (missing field exposure). It fails the same with my changes stashed.

Questions for the owner

  • Q-A (D164 vs D235). Should mesh SSH to the server's own host follow Access?
    • (a) Keep D164 as is. Every node may reach the server's TCP/22 on the network side, and login access is the only refusal there. The contract would say so.
    • (b) Recommended. The implicit reach to the server covers only the infraternal control plane. SSH (and any other service) on the server's host follows Access: an explicit arrow, or the default. That keeps D235's "two checks, always". It needs the coordinator to answer TCP/22 from explicit grants toward the server (the grant index already holds them), plus the saved patch, and the default-policy preview would list SSH-to-server losses too.
  • From the server's own host, nobody can use the key socket (the narrow M3 rule: no account added it), so server → node mesh SSH isn't possible in slice 1. Is that intended for the server host, or should an owner-chosen account act as the owner there?
  • Q1–Q4 from earlier stand. The CLI still waits for #303.

Gate (scripts/verify fast, run in the foreground, on this head)

TREE: eb746547cf686cb23682eaef2cad4dea7c801fc0 0 changed paths
VERIFY_EXIT=0
FAST_EXIT=0
+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| SSH runtime test helper   | PASS         |
| real-binary fixture paths | PASS         |
| Traefik component manifest | PASS         |
| release component publication | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| SSH inode reuse fixture   | PASS         |
| shim process-per-user     | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| gate architecture         | PASS         |
| doc coverage ratchet      | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+
(static builds: 679s)
 48 pass
 0 fail
Ran 48 tests across 12 files. [11.78s]

Cleanup done

  • The proof server is stopped. /var/tmp/j175s is removed, and the owned nft tables and infraternal0 on dev-02 are deleted. Ports 47175/47176 are free.
  • compute01 was removed and uninstalled through the product, with the leftovers above handled.
  • The temporary /etc/hosts lines are gone from both VMs, and the temporary trusted certificate is gone from compute01 (update-ca-certificates --fresh).
  • The proof directories with credentials (~/j175-proof) are removed on both VMs.
  • My build target ~/worktrees/j175/target is deleted. compute01's disk had filled to 100%, partly from it; the disk is now at 60%.
  • meshtest is left in place on both VMs.
**J175 mesh SSH slice 1: two-VM proof and gate. Head `eb746547cf686cb23682eaef2cad4dea7c801fc0` on `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` (pushed, not merged, not deployed).** Setup: the real server binary from this head ran on dev-02 (throwaway data dir, ports 47175/47176, owner via the software authenticator). compute01 was added through add-host as `meshtest` (rootful, network auth over NetBird). Both nodes were on the mesh (10.254.0.1 = server/dev-02, 10.254.0.2 = compute01), and mesh SSH was enabled for both hosts with `mesh-ssh.set`. ### Results | Check | Result | |---|---| | Plain `ssh <mesh-name>` as `meshtest` on compute01 → dev-02 | **works.** `WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std TTY=/dev/pts/2`, exit 0 | | Refused without login access | **works.** I removed the owner's any-account rule (id 2): `meshtest@10.254.0.1: Permission denied (publickey).`, exit 255. After I restored it: `WHOAMI=meshtest`, exit 0 | | Refused when the network policy denies | **not proven, and blocked on an owner decision** (see Q-A). With `mesh.default.set Deny` (revision 3), compute01 → dev-02 still got a shell | | sshd on 22 | sshd holds `0.0.0.0:22` and `[::]:22`. The component listens on `10.254.0.1:<ephemeral>` behind the owned redirect tables (listing below) | | Restart recovery | **works.** The previous run's owned tables were still present (server stopped without cleanup). The new build took them over on start, with no manual step | | Uninstall through the product | compute01's infraternal agent uninstalled itself. The client config, known-hosts file, socket directory and `infraternal0` are gone | `ssh -v` on the positive run: ``` debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version russh_0.64.1 debug1: Server host certificate: ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com SHA256:yzQQlO1+J9/Bw4pnd9LiqDZA8mWc5zfSUXj73yUtz0Y, serial 0 ID "infraternal host" CA ssh-ed25519 SHA256:j0YukwFnUv0YHl3kVfIbJvy3+VHTk debug1: Host 'infraternal-dev-02-std.infraternal-dev-02-std.vpn.kayg.org' is known and matches the ED25519-CERT host certificate. debug1: Offering public key: infraternal mesh ED25519-CERT SHA256:OhEAmUF2clO9yoUct37b+Hgo8n7H1qoBHoVKR21ui5o agent debug1: Server accepts key: infraternal mesh ED25519-CERT SHA256:OhEAmUF2clO9yoUct37b+Hgo8n7H1qoBHoVKR21ui5o agent Authenticated to 10.254.0.1 ([10.254.0.1]:22) using "publickey". ``` Redirect on dev-02 (sshd on 22), read back from the kernel: ``` LISTEN 0 4096 0.0.0.0:22 users:(("sshd",pid=413088,fd=3),...) LISTEN 0 128 10.254.0.1:35707 users:(("infraternal",pid=1671735,...)) table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0001 { comment "infraternal.ssh.v1" chain incoming { type nat hook prerouting priority dstnat; policy accept; iifname "infraternal0" ip daddr 10.254.0.1 tcp dport 22 dnat ip to 10.254.0.1:35707 } chain local { type nat hook output priority dstnat; policy accept; ip daddr 10.254.0.1 tcp dport 22 dnat ip to 10.254.0.1:35707 } chain guard { type filter hook input priority -11; policy accept; ip daddr 10.254.0.1 tcp dport 35707 ct original ip daddr 10.254.0.1 ct original proto-dst 22 return ip daddr 10.254.0.1 tcp dport 35707 drop } } (the IPv6 table infraternal_ssh6_fd47…0001 has the same shape) ``` Client files on compute01: both are `root` and 0644; `/run/infraternal-mesh-ssh` is 0755; the socket is 0666 and checks the peer's credentials. The config maps `Host infraternal-dev-02-std.<suffix>` → `HostName 10.254.0.1` plus `HostKeyAlias`, then `Match originalhost "*.<suffix>,10.254.*"` sets `IdentityAgent`, `UserKnownHostsFile`, `StrictHostKeyChecking yes`, and turns password and keyboard-interactive auth off. **Latency.** Three full logins (connect, PAM, user manager, prompt, `exit`) took 2181, 1688 and 2210 ms. Mesh RTT averaged 154 ms (relay path), so the time is dominated by round trips and the OS login. **Static sizes at this head.** x86_64-musl: 25,670,128 B. aarch64-musl: 23,189,560 B. ### Found in this round 1. **Network check on the server's own host is always "allow" (Q-A).** `crates/infraternal-mesh/src/coordinator.rs:161` returns `TrafficPolicy::All` for every node → server (D164: "a joined node reaches the server"). `configuration.rs` also installs `inbound = All` on the server's node (D215). Access has no way to deny anything toward the server, including TCP/22, so for SSH to the server's host the D235 network check can never refuse. I wrote a fix that carries the policy's TCP/22 answer next to the widened inbound, with a test that failed first. The test then showed the coordinator's own policy is `All` toward the server, so the fix changes nothing until Q-A is decided. I did not commit it; the patch is saved outside the checkout. 2. **Stopping the infraternal agent leaves the owned redirect tables.** After `systemctl stop`, both tables were still there; I deleted them by marker. `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` says "Stop removes owned rules before releasing the listener". While the agent is down, mesh traffic to :22 is redirected to a dead port instead of reaching sshd. sshd stays reachable on the underlay and NetBird, and restart recovery (proven above) repairs it. Cause: the node-plugin host doesn't drop components on shutdown, so `MeshPort::drop` never runs. Recommendation: a component stop hook (or drop) on agent shutdown. I can do it as the first slice-2 item, or now if you want it in slice 1. 3. **`ssh host cmd` is refused** (`exec request failed on channel 0`). This is the documented slice-1 limit (`mesh_runtime.rs`: commands come once the runtime can run one inside the same real login). Shells only for now. 4. **Product uninstall leftovers (not mesh SSH).** On compute01, `/var/lib/infraternal.bootstrap-cache/{owner,payload}` and `/var/cache/infraternal-login-bin/infraternal-…` (same hash as this build) stayed after uninstall, and the login worker unit for the proof owner was still listed right after. I removed only the files provably from this run (the login-bin copy, my old-path socket, my person lock). I left the bootstrap cache because its `owner` file predates this run. 5. **Already broken on dev:** `cargo test -p infraternal-plugin-mesh --all-features --test dns` doesn't compile (`missing field exposure`). It fails the same with my changes stashed. ### Questions for the owner - **Q-A (D164 vs D235).** Should mesh SSH to the server's own host follow Access? - (a) Keep D164 as is. Every node may reach the server's TCP/22 on the network side, and login access is the only refusal there. The contract would say so. - **(b) Recommended.** The implicit reach to the server covers only the infraternal control plane. SSH (and any other service) on the server's host follows Access: an explicit arrow, or the default. That keeps D235's "two checks, always". It needs the coordinator to answer TCP/22 from explicit grants toward the server (the grant index already holds them), plus the saved patch, and the default-policy preview would list SSH-to-server losses too. - **From the server's own host, nobody can use the key socket** (the narrow M3 rule: no account added it), so server → node mesh SSH isn't possible in slice 1. Is that intended for the server host, or should an owner-chosen account act as the owner there? - Q1–Q4 from earlier stand. The CLI still waits for #303. ### Gate (`scripts/verify fast`, run in the foreground, on this head) ``` TREE: eb746547cf686cb23682eaef2cad4dea7c801fc0 0 changed paths VERIFY_EXIT=0 FAST_EXIT=0 +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | SSH runtime test helper | PASS | | real-binary fixture paths | PASS | | Traefik component manifest | PASS | | release component publication | PASS | | test | PASS | | SSH inode reuse fixture | PASS | | shim process-per-user | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | gate architecture | PASS | | doc coverage ratchet | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ (static builds: 679s) 48 pass 0 fail Ran 48 tests across 12 files. [11.78s] ``` ### Cleanup done - The proof server is stopped. `/var/tmp/j175s` is removed, and the owned nft tables and `infraternal0` on dev-02 are deleted. Ports 47175/47176 are free. - compute01 was removed and uninstalled through the product, with the leftovers above handled. - The temporary `/etc/hosts` lines are gone from both VMs, and the temporary trusted certificate is gone from compute01 (`update-ca-certificates --fresh`). - The proof directories with credentials (`~/j175-proof`) are removed on both VMs. - My build target `~/worktrees/j175/target` is deleted. compute01's disk had filled to 100%, partly from it; the disk is now at 60%. - `meshtest` is left in place on both VMs.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 04:47:11 +00:00
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J175: finding 2 fixed. The infraternal agent now removes mesh SSH's owned redirect rules when it stops. Head d83a3242ef8fdcbed4438aa7a969e956eba9c5b4 on mesh-ssh-s1-j175 (pushed, not merged).

Commits

  • 36eb7f908, ssh: remove the owned redirect rules when the infraternal agent stops: a component stop hook.
    • infraternal-plugin-api gains stop_hook::{Stop, StopHook}. A component hands the agent a Weak, so a hook never keeps a finished component alive, and dead hooks are pruned whenever one is added.
    • MeshSshNode::stop_hook sets a one-way stop flag. The supervisor stops every port through MeshPort::stop (rules first, then the listener), never binds again, and the hook finishes once the supervisor reports idle.
    • infraternal_agent::shutdown::run_then_stop wraps the embedded agent (agent --fd 3) and the remote service loop. When the work returns, or when SIGTERM arrives, the hooks run (1.5 s bound, inside the server's 2 s grace). On SIGTERM it then restores the default action and re-raises (infraternal_shim::terminate_by_default, in the audited unsafe module), so systemd still records a stop by signal.
    • contracts/mesh-ssh.md says how stop is now driven.
  • d83a3242e, agent: keep the work alive until the stop hooks finish: a race the first VM run exposed (below).
    • The work stays pinned and alive until every hook finished.
    • The supervisor's final release runs MeshPort::stop on its own thread, so it can never report idle before the rules are gone.

Tests that failed first.

  • A namespace test (unshare -Urn, stand-in sshd on 0.0.0.0:22). After the hook: the table is gone, mesh :22 reaches the stand-in, a later push never binds again, and the hook doesn't keep the node alive.
  • on_terminate_hooks_finish_before_the_work_is_dropped: the hook runs while the work is alive, and the work is dropped afterwards.
  • Plus a unit test that a returning daemon runs each live hook exactly once.

What the first VM run caught (with 36eb7f908)

systemctl stop infraternal-agent on compute01 ended by SIGTERM in 37 ms (Result=success, status 15). But infraternal_ssh4_0afe0002 stayed, and systemd logged Unit process … (nft) remains running after unit stopped.

The cause: on SIGTERM, run_then_stop dropped the work future before running the hooks. That tore the plugin registry down mid-cleanup, the supervisor reported idle early, and nft was orphaned. The namespace test couldn't see it, because nothing tore the node down while its hook ran. d83a3242e fixes it, with the ordering test above.

VM proof with d83a3242e

The server is the real binary on dev-02 with KillMode=process, as the shipped unit has it. compute01 was added through add-host as meshtest. Mesh SSH was on for both hosts.

B. Remote infraternal agent, compute01. A stand-in sshd held 0.0.0.0:22 there (no real sshd on compute01), forcing the redirect.

--- before
table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0002
(mesh :22 from dev-02 and locally: SSH-2.0-russh_0.64.1)
systemctl stop took 95 ms
--- after systemctl stop
Result=success
ExecMainCode=2
ExecMainStatus=15
ActiveState=inactive
no infraternal_ssh tables
no nft running
infraternal0     UNKNOWN        10.254.0.2/32 fdae:5c48:d92::2/128
local 10.254.0.2:22: SSH-2.0-j175-standin
systemd: infraternal-agent.service: Deactivated successfully.
dev-02 -> 10.254.0.2:22 over the mesh: SSH-2.0-j175-standin

systemctl start infraternal-agent brought the redirect back (local 10.254.0.2:22 after start: SSH-2.0-russh_0.64.1).

A. Server's embedded infraternal agent, dev-02. The real sshd is on 0.0.0.0:22 and [::]:22.

--- before
table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0001
table inet infraternal_ssh6_fdae5c480d9200000000000000000001
local 10.254.0.1:22: SSH-2.0-russh_0.64.1
systemctl stop took 13 ms
--- after systemctl stop (KillMode=process, as shipped)
Result=success
ActiveState=inactive
no infraternal_ssh tables
no nft running
(embedded `agent --fd 3` exited)
LISTEN 0 4096 0.0.0.0:22  users:(("sshd",pid=413088,...
LISTEN 0 4096 [::]:22     users:(("sshd",pid=413088,...
local 10.254.0.1:22: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20
compute01 -> 10.254.0.1:22 over the mesh: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20

The final teardown stop showed the same thing: tables left after stop: 0.

Uninstall through the product (systemctl disable --now → SIGTERM → hook): no tables, no infraternal0, no client files, no key socket directory, no units.

Cost. Each agent process gains one SIGTERM handler and one Box::pin per service lifetime; nothing on any connection or frame path. Static sizes are x86_64-musl 25,692,048 B (+21,920 vs eb746547c) and aarch64-musl 23,206,312 B (+16,752).

Other items from the orchestrator

  • Finding 4 (uninstall leftovers) is now #360, with evidence. It happened again on this run, and login lock and record files in /run also survive uninstall (#360 comment 79397). Not in this branch.
  • Finding 5 (mesh --all-features --test dns): J208c covers it. Its f4ad95808 ("test(mesh): the DNS resolver fixture sets Config's exposure field") adds the one missing field. At J208c's head e58001ac8, cargo test -p infraternal-plugin-mesh --all-features --locked --test dns gives test result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 1 ignored. It isn't on dev yet.
  • Q-A and the server-host key-socket question wait for kayg. The saved patch stays uncommitted, and the default reach is unchanged.
  • A side note, not in scope: on a brand-new server, the first "set up host connections" run showed the toast "Host connections could not be unlocked…", although the CA was created and add-host worked right after. It happened twice. It may only be my script driving the palette, so it's untriaged.

Gate (scripts/verify fast, run in the foreground, on this head)

TREE: d83a3242ef8fdcbed4438aa7a969e956eba9c5b4 0 changed paths
FAST_EXIT=0
+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| SSH runtime test helper   | PASS         |
| real-binary fixture paths | PASS         |
| Traefik component manifest | PASS         |
| release component publication | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| SSH inode reuse fixture   | PASS         |
| shim process-per-user     | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| gate architecture         | PASS         |
| doc coverage ratchet      | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+
(static builds: 753s)
 0 fail
 77248 expect() calls
Ran 48 tests across 12 files. [11.31s]

Cleanup

  • The proof server is stopped. /var/tmp/j175s, infraternal0 and the hosts line on dev-02 are removed.
  • compute01 was uninstalled through the product. The stand-in sshd is stopped (port 22 is free again), and the hosts line and trusted certificate are removed. The leftovers provably from this run are removed (see #360); the bootstrap cache stays.
  • The ~/j175-proof dirs are removed on both VMs, and my build target is deleted.
  • meshtest is left in place.
**J175: finding 2 fixed. The infraternal agent now removes mesh SSH's owned redirect rules when it stops. Head `d83a3242ef8fdcbed4438aa7a969e956eba9c5b4` on `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` (pushed, not merged).** ### Commits - `36eb7f908`, `ssh: remove the owned redirect rules when the infraternal agent stops`: a component stop hook. - `infraternal-plugin-api` gains `stop_hook::{Stop, StopHook}`. A component hands the agent a `Weak`, so a hook never keeps a finished component alive, and dead hooks are pruned whenever one is added. - `MeshSshNode::stop_hook` sets a one-way stop flag. The supervisor stops every port through `MeshPort::stop` (rules first, then the listener), never binds again, and the hook finishes once the supervisor reports idle. - `infraternal_agent::shutdown::run_then_stop` wraps the embedded agent (`agent --fd 3`) and the remote service loop. When the work returns, or when SIGTERM arrives, the hooks run (1.5 s bound, inside the server's 2 s grace). On SIGTERM it then restores the default action and re-raises (`infraternal_shim::terminate_by_default`, in the audited unsafe module), so systemd still records a stop by signal. - `contracts/mesh-ssh.md` says how stop is now driven. - `d83a3242e`, `agent: keep the work alive until the stop hooks finish`: a race the first VM run exposed (below). - The work stays pinned and alive until every hook finished. - The supervisor's final release runs `MeshPort::stop` on its own thread, so it can never report idle before the rules are gone. **Tests that failed first.** - A namespace test (`unshare -Urn`, stand-in sshd on `0.0.0.0:22`). After the hook: the table is gone, mesh :22 reaches the stand-in, a later push never binds again, and the hook doesn't keep the node alive. - `on_terminate_hooks_finish_before_the_work_is_dropped`: the hook runs while the work is alive, and the work is dropped afterwards. - Plus a unit test that a returning daemon runs each live hook exactly once. ### What the first VM run caught (with `36eb7f908`) `systemctl stop infraternal-agent` on compute01 ended by SIGTERM in 37 ms (`Result=success`, status 15). But `infraternal_ssh4_0afe0002` stayed, and systemd logged `Unit process … (nft) remains running after unit stopped`. The cause: on SIGTERM, `run_then_stop` dropped the work future before running the hooks. That tore the plugin registry down mid-cleanup, the supervisor reported idle early, and `nft` was orphaned. The namespace test couldn't see it, because nothing tore the node down while its hook ran. `d83a3242e` fixes it, with the ordering test above. ### VM proof with `d83a3242e` The server is the real binary on dev-02 with `KillMode=process`, as the shipped unit has it. compute01 was added through add-host as `meshtest`. Mesh SSH was on for both hosts. **B. Remote infraternal agent, compute01.** A stand-in sshd held `0.0.0.0:22` there (no real sshd on compute01), forcing the redirect. ``` --- before table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0002 (mesh :22 from dev-02 and locally: SSH-2.0-russh_0.64.1) systemctl stop took 95 ms --- after systemctl stop Result=success ExecMainCode=2 ExecMainStatus=15 ActiveState=inactive no infraternal_ssh tables no nft running infraternal0 UNKNOWN 10.254.0.2/32 fdae:5c48:d92::2/128 local 10.254.0.2:22: SSH-2.0-j175-standin systemd: infraternal-agent.service: Deactivated successfully. dev-02 -> 10.254.0.2:22 over the mesh: SSH-2.0-j175-standin ``` `systemctl start infraternal-agent` brought the redirect back (`local 10.254.0.2:22 after start: SSH-2.0-russh_0.64.1`). **A. Server's embedded infraternal agent, dev-02.** The real sshd is on `0.0.0.0:22` and `[::]:22`. ``` --- before table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0001 table inet infraternal_ssh6_fdae5c480d9200000000000000000001 local 10.254.0.1:22: SSH-2.0-russh_0.64.1 systemctl stop took 13 ms --- after systemctl stop (KillMode=process, as shipped) Result=success ActiveState=inactive no infraternal_ssh tables no nft running (embedded `agent --fd 3` exited) LISTEN 0 4096 0.0.0.0:22 users:(("sshd",pid=413088,... LISTEN 0 4096 [::]:22 users:(("sshd",pid=413088,... local 10.254.0.1:22: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20 compute01 -> 10.254.0.1:22 over the mesh: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20 ``` The final teardown stop showed the same thing: `tables left after stop: 0`. **Uninstall through the product** (`systemctl disable --now` → SIGTERM → hook): no tables, no `infraternal0`, no client files, no key socket directory, no units. **Cost.** Each agent process gains one SIGTERM handler and one `Box::pin` per service lifetime; nothing on any connection or frame path. Static sizes are x86_64-musl 25,692,048 B (+21,920 vs `eb746547c`) and aarch64-musl 23,206,312 B (+16,752). ### Other items from the orchestrator - **Finding 4 (uninstall leftovers)** is now #360, with evidence. It happened again on this run, and login lock and record files in `/run` also survive uninstall (#360 comment 79397). Not in this branch. - **Finding 5 (mesh `--all-features --test dns`)**: J208c covers it. Its `f4ad95808` ("test(mesh): the DNS resolver fixture sets Config's exposure field") adds the one missing field. At J208c's head `e58001ac8`, `cargo test -p infraternal-plugin-mesh --all-features --locked --test dns` gives `test result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 1 ignored`. It isn't on dev yet. - **Q-A and the server-host key-socket question** wait for kayg. The saved patch stays uncommitted, and the default reach is unchanged. - A side note, not in scope: on a brand-new server, the first "set up host connections" run showed the toast "Host connections could not be unlocked…", although the CA was created and add-host worked right after. It happened twice. It may only be my script driving the palette, so it's untriaged. ### Gate (`scripts/verify fast`, run in the foreground, on this head) ``` TREE: d83a3242ef8fdcbed4438aa7a969e956eba9c5b4 0 changed paths FAST_EXIT=0 +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | SSH runtime test helper | PASS | | real-binary fixture paths | PASS | | Traefik component manifest | PASS | | release component publication | PASS | | test | PASS | | SSH inode reuse fixture | PASS | | shim process-per-user | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | gate architecture | PASS | | doc coverage ratchet | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ (static builds: 753s) 0 fail 77248 expect() calls Ran 48 tests across 12 files. [11.31s] ``` ### Cleanup - The proof server is stopped. `/var/tmp/j175s`, `infraternal0` and the hosts line on dev-02 are removed. - compute01 was uninstalled through the product. The stand-in sshd is stopped (port 22 is free again), and the hosts line and trusted certificate are removed. The leftovers provably from this run are removed (see #360); the bootstrap cache stays. - The `~/j175-proof` dirs are removed on both VMs, and my build target is deleted. - `meshtest` is left in place.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 09:36:29 +00:00
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J175: Q-A (b) is built and proven on the VMs, with origin/dev merged. Head fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e on mesh-ssh-s1-j175 (pushed, not merged).

Commits (each with a test that failed first)

Commit What Red before → green
ef0c91161 mesh: carry mesh SSH's TCP/22 answer on the server's own node The saved patch. PeerPolicy::access_ssh is set only on the server's node and skipped otherwise, so older strict parsers never see it. Config::admits_ssh fails closed for a server-node snapshot without the answer. A changed answer forces the full update path (compact updates carry only inbound and outbound, which stay "all" on the server). The agent's mesh view uses admits_ssh. The compact-path test failed with the old access_updates ("the peer with the changed answer is sent whole"); the shape test did not compile without the field.
854afc780 contracts: the server's own host never acts as a person kayg's (a) answer as one decision line. Also drops the stale D344 question (D347 settled it). (docs)
915731350 mesh: SSH toward the server follows explicit arrows and the default Coordinator::granted(from, to) reads the existing grant index without D164's exemption; the installed policy (control plane) is unchanged. On the server's node, each peer's TCP/22 answer is its explicit grant toward the server, or the default when there's none: the same rule every other node uses. ssh_toward_the_server_follows_explicit_arrows_and_the_default failed on the previous commit (left: Some(true), right: Some(false) for a 443-only arrow).
03a043864 mesh: the default-policy preview lists SSH lost toward the server mesh.default.preview gains loses_ssh_to_server (node IDs; first page only; counted against the frame budget, at most half of it), kept apart from loses_reach, because reach to the server is never lost. The TS type documents it. closing_the_default_previews_ssh_lost_toward_the_server failed (left: Null, right: [3]).
f6d83fd8a contracts: mesh SSH to the server's own host follows Access The Q-A rule written next to the network-access rule, naming the field and the preview. (docs)
fac39e066 merge origin/dev (a8b4ee720) No conflicts. The login-access migration (20261104132439) is still the newest.

VM proof (real server from fac39e066 on dev-02, compute01 added as meshtest, mesh SSH on for both hosts)

Node 1 is the server (dev-02) and node 2 is compute01. Each step is a plain ssh -tt infraternal-dev-02-std.infraternal-dev-02-std.vpn.kayg.org as meshtest on compute01.

== step 1: default Allow, no arrows
WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std
SSH_EXIT=0
== step 2: preview and set default Deny
RESULT mesh.default.preview ok {"default_policy":"Deny","loses_reach":[[1,2]],"loses_ssh_to_server":[2],"next_cursor":null,"revision":2,"total_pairs":1}
RESULT mesh.default.set ok {"default_policy":"Deny","revision":3}
meshtest@10.254.0.1: Permission denied (publickey).
SSH_EXIT=255
control plane: [(1, True), (2, True)]
== step 3: explicit arrow compute01 -> server, TCP/22, default still Deny
RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":1,"revision":4}
RESULT mesh.default.get ok {"default_policy":"Deny"}
WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std
SSH_EXIT=0

Under Deny the control plane stays up (compute01 is still live and connected), while mesh SSH to the server's host is refused. An explicit TCP/22 arrow allows it again under the closed default. Teardown showed the stop hook again: tables left after stop: 0.

The "unlock failed" toast: a product bug, now #365

It's not my script. With every /remote/ca/* response logged, on a fresh server:

POST /remote/ca/bootstrap/start 200   (09:25:58.545Z)
POST /remote/ca/bootstrap/finish 408  (09:26:06.089Z)

The CA's active directory was written at 09:26:04 and the CA directory again at 09:26:08, so setup completed about 2 s after the client was told it failed. ca_http.rs finish_request wraps the commit in a 5 s timeout and answers 408 while the work goes on. The client maps any non-404/503 status to "Use an administrator passkey and try again". dev-02 was at load about 41 on 10 cores. Details and a cancellation-safety question for the review are in #365.

Gate (scripts/verify fast, run in the foreground, on this head)

TREE: fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e 0 changed paths
FAST_EXIT=0
+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| migration names           | PASS         |
| migration tooling tests   | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| SSH runtime test helper   | PASS         |
| real-binary fixture paths | PASS         |
| Traefik component manifest | PASS         |
| release component publication | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| SSH inode reuse fixture   | PASS         |
| shim process-per-user     | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| gate architecture         | PASS         |
| doc coverage ratchet      | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
(static builds: 1388s)
 0 fail
 77248 expect() calls
Ran 48 tests across 12 files. [15.10s]

Static sizes at this head (including the dev merge): x86_64-musl 25,849,936 B, aarch64-musl 23,349,960 B.

Cost of Q-A. One grant-index lookup per peer when compiling the server's own node, and an O(nodes) pass on the first page of the default preview, only when closing the default. Nothing on any packet or connection path.

Cleanup

  • The proof server is stopped. /var/tmp/j175s, infraternal0 and the hosts line on dev-02 are removed.
  • compute01 was uninstalled through the product: no tables, no client files, no units. Its hosts line and trusted certificate are removed, plus this run's login-bin copy and login lock and record files (the #360 pattern again).
  • The ~/j175-proof dirs and my build target are deleted.
  • meshtest is left in place.
**J175: Q-A (b) is built and proven on the VMs, with origin/dev merged. Head `fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e` on `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` (pushed, not merged).** ### Commits (each with a test that failed first) | Commit | What | Red before → green | |---|---|---| | `ef0c91161` mesh: carry mesh SSH's TCP/22 answer on the server's own node | The saved patch. `PeerPolicy::access_ssh` is set only on the server's node and skipped otherwise, so older strict parsers never see it. `Config::admits_ssh` fails closed for a server-node snapshot without the answer. A changed answer forces the full update path (compact updates carry only inbound and outbound, which stay "all" on the server). The agent's mesh view uses `admits_ssh`. | The compact-path test failed with the old `access_updates` ("the peer with the changed answer is sent whole"); the shape test did not compile without the field. | | `854afc780` contracts: the server's own host never acts as a person | kayg's (a) answer as one decision line. Also drops the stale D344 question (D347 settled it). | (docs) | | `915731350` mesh: SSH toward the server follows explicit arrows and the default | `Coordinator::granted(from, to)` reads the existing grant index without D164's exemption; the installed policy (control plane) is unchanged. On the server's node, each peer's TCP/22 answer is its explicit grant toward the server, or the default when there's none: the same rule every other node uses. | `ssh_toward_the_server_follows_explicit_arrows_and_the_default` failed on the previous commit (`left: Some(true)`, `right: Some(false)` for a 443-only arrow). | | `03a043864` mesh: the default-policy preview lists SSH lost toward the server | `mesh.default.preview` gains `loses_ssh_to_server` (node IDs; first page only; counted against the frame budget, at most half of it), kept apart from `loses_reach`, because reach to the server is never lost. The TS type documents it. | `closing_the_default_previews_ssh_lost_toward_the_server` failed (`left: Null`, `right: [3]`). | | `f6d83fd8a` contracts: mesh SSH to the server's own host follows Access | The Q-A rule written next to the network-access rule, naming the field and the preview. | (docs) | | `fac39e066` merge origin/dev (`a8b4ee720`) | No conflicts. The login-access migration (`20261104132439`) is still the newest. | | ### VM proof (real server from `fac39e066` on dev-02, compute01 added as `meshtest`, mesh SSH on for both hosts) Node 1 is the server (dev-02) and node 2 is compute01. Each step is a plain `ssh -tt infraternal-dev-02-std.infraternal-dev-02-std.vpn.kayg.org` as `meshtest` on compute01. ``` == step 1: default Allow, no arrows WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std SSH_EXIT=0 == step 2: preview and set default Deny RESULT mesh.default.preview ok {"default_policy":"Deny","loses_reach":[[1,2]],"loses_ssh_to_server":[2],"next_cursor":null,"revision":2,"total_pairs":1} RESULT mesh.default.set ok {"default_policy":"Deny","revision":3} meshtest@10.254.0.1: Permission denied (publickey). SSH_EXIT=255 control plane: [(1, True), (2, True)] == step 3: explicit arrow compute01 -> server, TCP/22, default still Deny RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":1,"revision":4} RESULT mesh.default.get ok {"default_policy":"Deny"} WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std SSH_EXIT=0 ``` Under Deny the control plane stays up (compute01 is still live and connected), while mesh SSH to the server's host is refused. An explicit TCP/22 arrow allows it again under the closed default. Teardown showed the stop hook again: `tables left after stop: 0`. ### The "unlock failed" toast: a product bug, now #365 It's not my script. With every `/remote/ca/*` response logged, on a fresh server: ``` POST /remote/ca/bootstrap/start 200 (09:25:58.545Z) POST /remote/ca/bootstrap/finish 408 (09:26:06.089Z) ``` The CA's `active` directory was written at 09:26:04 and the CA directory again at 09:26:08, so setup completed about 2 s after the client was told it failed. `ca_http.rs` `finish_request` wraps the commit in a 5 s timeout and answers 408 while the work goes on. The client maps any non-404/503 status to "Use an administrator passkey and try again". dev-02 was at load about 41 on 10 cores. Details and a cancellation-safety question for the review are in #365. ### Gate (`scripts/verify fast`, run in the foreground, on this head) ``` TREE: fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e 0 changed paths FAST_EXIT=0 +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | migration names | PASS | | migration tooling tests | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | SSH runtime test helper | PASS | | real-binary fixture paths | PASS | | Traefik component manifest | PASS | | release component publication | PASS | | test | PASS | | SSH inode reuse fixture | PASS | | shim process-per-user | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | gate architecture | PASS | | doc coverage ratchet | PASS | | static builds | PASS | (static builds: 1388s) 0 fail 77248 expect() calls Ran 48 tests across 12 files. [15.10s] ``` Static sizes at this head (including the dev merge): x86_64-musl 25,849,936 B, aarch64-musl 23,349,960 B. **Cost of Q-A.** One grant-index lookup per peer when compiling the server's own node, and an O(nodes) pass on the first page of the default preview, only when closing the default. Nothing on any packet or connection path. ### Cleanup - The proof server is stopped. `/var/tmp/j175s`, `infraternal0` and the hosts line on dev-02 are removed. - compute01 was uninstalled through the product: no tables, no client files, no units. Its hosts line and trusted certificate are removed, plus this run's login-bin copy and login lock and record files (the #360 pattern again). - The `~/j175-proof` dirs and my build target are deleted. - `meshtest` is left in place.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 10:31:00 +00:00
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J236 independent security review started: mesh-ssh-s1-j175 at fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e against origin/dev (merge base a8b4ee7206d3d72f4e04aeb432d86869a3ae532c), whole slice. Plan: read the two checks, redirect, host trust, key socket, client config, uninstall and docs (~1 h), then targeted reproducers on compute01/dev-02 as root through meshtest (~1 h). No verify fast (reviewer rule). Verdict follows here.

J236 independent security review started: `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` at `fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e` against origin/dev (merge base `a8b4ee7206d3d72f4e04aeb432d86869a3ae532c`), whole slice. Plan: read the two checks, redirect, host trust, key socket, client config, uninstall and docs (~1 h), then targeted reproducers on compute01/dev-02 as root through meshtest (~1 h). No `verify fast` (reviewer rule). Verdict follows here.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 11:07:57 +00:00
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J236 security review: mesh SSH slice 1, verdict REQUEST CHANGES

Target: mesh-ssh-s1-j175 at fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e against origin/dev (merge base a8b4ee7206d3d72f4e04aeb432d86869a3ae532c), the whole slice. I read it against D164, D235, D289, D319, D352, contracts/mesh-ssh.md, J181's review (77623) and J175's reports 79163, 79400 and 79716. I ran no verify fast or verify quick (reviewer rule). I ran only the two reproducers below, on compute01. Nothing was pushed, and the branch is unchanged.

One P1, two P2 and six P3. The P1 is a revocation that a person who still has access can keep from landing.

P1-1. A revoking snapshot cannot install while any open is registering, so a person can hold off their own revocation

  • crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_node.rs:355: configure installs with Authority::try_install.
  • crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_authority.rs:155-157: try_install uses RwLock::try_write and returns Busy whenever any reader exists. It never queues.
  • crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_server.rs:262-274: every channel open takes authority.current() and holds that read guard across guard.open_session(...), which is the shim login (daemon::open_mesh_ssh_shell → logins::ensure, PAM and the user manager). That takes up to seconds and has no bound of its own.
  • crates/infraternal-server/src/mesh_ssh.rs:52: after a Busy refusal the server retries once every 10 s (RETRY), and each retry is again a single try_write.

Holding the guard across the open is right (it is what closes the revocation race). The problem is that the writer is non-blocking, so it can never get in between readers. Any person who still has login access can keep two or more opens overlapping (4 channels per connection, and no limit on authenticated connections). Then every revoking push (a login rule removed, a certificate dropped from the registry because its node was removed) comes back Busy, and the target keeps admitting new logins under the old grant for as long as they keep it up. A busy host also delays revocation in 10 s steps without anyone attacking it. D352 says the server waits until the infraternal agent has accepted the revocation. Here the waiting never ends, and the target keeps the old access the whole time.

Reproducer (not for merge; it uses the existing mesh_authority_tests.rs fixtures). Two opens, each holding the guard 300 ms, staggered by 150 ms. Then 30 revoking try_install calls, 100 ms apart:

J236: revoking installs: 0 installed, 30 busy
test mesh_authority::tests::j236_overlapping_opens_starve_a_revoking_install ... ok
test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 117 filtered out; finished in 3.49s
J236_EXIT=0

The test also asserts that the person still passes login_access afterwards. Artifacts on compute01: ~claude/j236-evidence/busy-starvation.log (the run) and ~claude/j236-evidence/mesh_authority_tests.j236.rs (the file with the test).

Fix direction:

  • Let the install queue for the write lock. tokio's RwLock is fair, so a queued writer stops new readers and gets in once the opens already in flight finish. One way: configure runs on the node-plugins thread, which has no runtime, so it can block_on the component runtime's install() with a short timeout. The other is a pending-snapshot slot that a task installs before the reply goes out.
  • Bound open_session so a stuck PAM call cannot hold the guard indefinitely.
  • Add a test where a revoking push lands while opens keep overlapping.

P2-1. On the server's own node, Access is enforced only inside the mesh SSH component; the kernel still lets every peer reach every port

  • crates/plugins/mesh/src/configuration.rs:56-67: server_inbound returns (TrafficPolicy::All, Some(access_ssh)). The firewall installs All for every peer, and only our listener reads access_ssh (dataplane.rs admits_ssh).
  • So the Access answer for TCP/22 holds only while our component is serving there. When mesh SSH is off for the server's host (the default, Q4), after the stop hook, or if the bind fails, mesh TCP/22 reaches the host's own sshd from any peer, including one that Access refuses. J175's run in 79400 shows that path: after systemctl stop, compute01 -> 10.254.0.1:22 over the mesh: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20. That run used the default Allow. Under Deny with no arrow, the kernel rule is the same All (line 67), so the result would be the same. I did not repeat it on two VMs.
  • D352 says: "SSH and every other service on the server's host follow Access like any other machine". The contract says "TCP/22 there follows Access like on any other node". Neither holds outside our listener.
  • Fix: install the server node's inbound as the control-plane ports plus the Access answer, the same as the other nodes. If "every other service" is a later slice, open an issue for it and change the contract line so it says where Access is enforced today.

P2-2. After an abrupt exit, any local account can take over mesh TCP/22 through the leftover redirect

  • crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_port.rs:58 binds the internal listener on port 0, an unprivileged ephemeral port. The guard (render, lines 268-281) admits any flow originally addressed to :22, whoever owns the socket on that port.
  • The contract already accepts that SIGKILL, an OOM kill or a hook past its 1.5 s bound leaves the table in place until restart recovery. What is new: while the table is left over, infraternal0 and the address are still up (79400 shows infraternal0 UNKNOWN after stop), and the internal port is free for anyone to bind.
  • Reproduced as root on compute01, in two throwaway network namespaces (a target with infraternal0 as a veth, and a peer), using exactly the script render() emits:
== 1. agent alive: root holds 10.254.0.1:35707; nobody tries to bind it
BIND 65534 [Errno 98] Address already in use
== 2. agent killed (SIGKILL: no stop hook). Table still present:
table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0001
== 3. nobody (uid 65534) binds the internal port
LISTENING uid 65534
== 4. a mesh peer connects to 10.254.0.1:22 over infraternal0
ACCEPTED from ('10.254.0.2', 39528)
CONNECT 22 -> SSH-2.0-hijacked-by-uid-65534
== 5. guard still drops a direct connection to the internal port
LISTENING uid 65534
CONNECT 35707 -> TimeoutError
== 6. control: a privileged internal port (1022) cannot be taken by nobody
BIND 65534 [Errno 13] Permission denied
unprivileged_port_start=1024

(Step 2's "killed" ends a stand-in listener process without the hook, which is what an abrupt agent exit leaves behind.) Artifacts: ~claude/j236-evidence/hijack.sh and hijack.log on compute01.

  • Impact: clients that use our generated config refuse the impostor, because it has no host certificate and StrictHostKeyChecking yes is set. Every other client of the target's :22 over the mesh, such as a person using the host's sshd with a password, talks to whichever local user grabbed the port, until the infraternal agent restarts. The guard still holds while the agent runs. I found no way for a local user to reach the component except through :22.
  • Fix: choose the internal port below net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start (root binds it; try free ports in a fixed privileged range), and read the sysctl so a host that lowered it still refuses. Add a test for this.

P3

  • P3-1. The CA trust and the ssh overrides cover the whole public-origin subtree by default. crates/plugins/mesh/src/configuration.rs:198 derives the mesh suffix from the server's origin host. mesh_client_config.rs:137 and :154 then scope Match originalhost, @cert-authority, IdentityAgent, UserKnownHostsFile, StrictHostKeyChecking yes and password-off to *.<suffix>. With an origin such as https://example.com, every ssh x.example.com loses the person's own agent and known_hosts, and our CA is trusted for those real hosts. Production (ssh.kayg.org) is a dedicated subdomain, so it is fine. J181 L4 deferred only the warnings. Suggestion: refuse to write the client files, or warn, when the suffix is a registrable domain or covers non-mesh names.
  • P3-2. remove_client_files on {"person":null} skips the content check. crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_node.rs:569-572 unlinks both /etc/ssh files unconditionally, and that push reaches every node with mesh SSH off (the default) on every push. Uninstall's mesh_ssh_files::remove_if_ours does check the content. Use that here too.
  • P3-3. The key socket checks allowed only when a connection is accepted. mesh_node.rs:606-612 reads allowed at accept, while the identity is read per message. If added_with changes, or {"person":null} and then a new person arrive, a connection accepted earlier keeps signing as the new identity. Reading allowed per message closes that.
  • P3-4. admits_ssh fails closed only when server == Some(node). crates/plugins/mesh/src/dataplane.rs:128: a persisted server-node config written before server existed (the field doc says older snapshots lack it) has inbound = All, so it admits every peer until a fresh config lands. Treat server: None as refuse too. For non-server nodes that is also the safe answer.
  • P3-5. Code compares to another product. crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_server.rs:45 says "like OpenSSH's LoginGraceTime". CLAUDE.md forbids "like" comparisons in code comments. Describe the bound itself.
  • P3-6. Missing doc comments (D345) on new public fields: mesh_keys.rs:52-53 (PersonKey), mesh_authority.rs:51-55,68 (Issued, Snapshot.certificates), mesh_issue.rs:67,70,73,78-81 (PersonRequest, HostRequest), infraternal-plugin-api/src/mesh_view.rs:13,21,26, infraternal-agent/src/plugins.rs:229-230 (MeshService).

Checked and holding

  • Network check:
    • It runs in userspace on every authentication and every channel open.
    • The source address must belong to an applied peer (mesh_authority.rs:223-248), so a non-peer or LAN source is refused.
    • A spoofed peer address cannot complete the handshake, because replies go out through WireGuard.
    • The person certificate is IPv4-only (L3), so IPv6 logins are refused. IPv6 grants nothing extra.
    • The incoming DNAT matches only iifname infraternal0, so other interfaces reach the host's sshd, never us.
    • A changed access_ssh forces the full path (access_updates.rs).
    • The observer sees only the retained, fully applied config (node_actions.rs:543-556).
  • Login check:
    • There are no negative rules.
    • Root is reachable only through any_account or a rule that names it.
    • A missing account that falls back to root is checked again in daemon.rs (login_access_allows, against the account actually resolved, with a grant that names only the requested account).
    • The account is resolved on the target.
    • Running sessions surviving a grant revocation is the documented L2 deferral, not a new finding. New channel opens do recheck.
  • Host keys:
    • The principals are derived by the server from the node record (mesh_ssh.rs:445-451).
    • Names are UNIQUE COLLATE NOCASE (0012_mesh_api.sql).
    • The CA line and HostKeyAlias use name.suffix.
    • A node's certificate names only its own addresses.
    • The typed CA issuers check the shape again after signing.
    • SSH and X.509 bodies cannot overlap (prefix 0x00 against DER 0x30).
    • I found no way for one mesh node to impersonate another. L13 (a rename within the certificate's lifetime) remains.
  • Key socket:
    • SO_PEERCRED is checked before any byte is read, and only the uid the machine was added with may connect. Root and system uids are refused.
    • That uid is the effective uid at connect time. Setuid-root clients are refused. Across user namespaces the kernel reports the uid as the infraternal agent's namespace sees it, so a container's root shows up as the uid it maps to. Passing the fd elsewhere needs the allowed account's cooperation.
    • It signs only with the one listed certificate, only after a non-forwarding session-bind, and a forwarding bind is permanent. So OpenSSH's own forwarding bind arrives before any remote byte and cannot be undone.
    • The socket directory, the config and the known-hosts file sit only in root-owned directories closed to group and other writes (trusted_directory).
    • Per D352, the server's own host never gets a client identity (added_with(None)).
  • Generated config: its values are typed (label, suffix charset, Ipv4Addr, quoted fixed paths), so nothing can break out of a value. The person's own ~/.ssh/config wins (L4, deferred).
  • Control actions: mesh-ssh-node.* are control-only. The local plugins.sock is uid-checked in a 0700 directory and goes through call_public, which refuses control actions (J181 L12).
  • Redirect:
    • The guard drops direct connections to the internal port from peers and from local users (step 5 above).
    • The table is created with create, which refuses an existing one, and a foreign table without the marker is refused. Only root can race it.
    • Stop removes the rules before releasing the listener. The ordering bug fixed in 79400 is gone.
  • Secrets:
    • nft gets its script on stdin.
    • The only new log line carries the error kind only (mesh_runtime.rs).
    • The person and host keys live only in memory.
  • Uninstall: it removes the client files (rootful) and, through the stop hook, the tables. #360 tracks the login and bootstrap leftovers. A table left after an abrupt exit is not removed by uninstall, but uninstall also takes infraternal0 down, so the table stops matching anything (see P2-2 for the window before that).

Cleanup

Both reproducers' namespaces are gone, and the host netns has no infraternal_ssh tables (0). /root/j236, the VM worktree ~/worktrees/j236 and its target ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j236 are removed. Evidence stays in ~claude/j236-evidence/ on compute01. compute01 has 236 GB free.

Verdict: REQUEST CHANGES (P1-1; P2-1 and P2-2 should land or be tracked before merge).

## J236 security review: mesh SSH slice 1, verdict REQUEST CHANGES Target: `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` at `fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e` against origin/dev (merge base `a8b4ee7206d3d72f4e04aeb432d86869a3ae532c`), the whole slice. I read it against D164, D235, D289, D319, D352, `contracts/mesh-ssh.md`, J181's review (77623) and J175's reports 79163, 79400 and 79716. I ran no `verify fast` or `verify quick` (reviewer rule). I ran only the two reproducers below, on compute01. Nothing was pushed, and the branch is unchanged. One P1, two P2 and six P3. The P1 is a revocation that a person who still has access can keep from landing. --- ### P1-1. A revoking snapshot cannot install while any open is registering, so a person can hold off their own revocation - `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_node.rs:355`: `configure` installs with `Authority::try_install`. - `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_authority.rs:155-157`: `try_install` uses `RwLock::try_write` and returns `Busy` whenever any reader exists. It never queues. - `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_server.rs:262-274`: every channel open takes `authority.current()` and holds that read guard across `guard.open_session(...)`, which is the shim login (`daemon::open_mesh_ssh_shell` → `logins::ensure`, PAM and the user manager). That takes up to seconds and has no bound of its own. - `crates/infraternal-server/src/mesh_ssh.rs:52`: after a `Busy` refusal the server retries once every 10 s (`RETRY`), and each retry is again a single `try_write`. Holding the guard across the open is right (it is what closes the revocation race). The problem is that the writer is non-blocking, so it can never get in between readers. Any person who still has login access can keep two or more opens overlapping (4 channels per connection, and no limit on authenticated connections). Then every revoking push (a login rule removed, a certificate dropped from the registry because its node was removed) comes back `Busy`, and the target keeps admitting new logins under the old grant for as long as they keep it up. A busy host also delays revocation in 10 s steps without anyone attacking it. D352 says the server waits until the infraternal agent has accepted the revocation. Here the waiting never ends, and the target keeps the old access the whole time. **Reproducer** (not for merge; it uses the existing `mesh_authority_tests.rs` fixtures). Two opens, each holding the guard 300 ms, staggered by 150 ms. Then 30 revoking `try_install` calls, 100 ms apart: ``` J236: revoking installs: 0 installed, 30 busy test mesh_authority::tests::j236_overlapping_opens_starve_a_revoking_install ... ok test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 117 filtered out; finished in 3.49s J236_EXIT=0 ``` The test also asserts that the person still passes `login_access` afterwards. Artifacts on compute01: `~claude/j236-evidence/busy-starvation.log` (the run) and `~claude/j236-evidence/mesh_authority_tests.j236.rs` (the file with the test). **Fix direction:** - Let the install queue for the write lock. tokio's `RwLock` is fair, so a queued writer stops new readers and gets in once the opens already in flight finish. One way: `configure` runs on the `node-plugins` thread, which has no runtime, so it can `block_on` the component runtime's `install()` with a short timeout. The other is a pending-snapshot slot that a task installs before the reply goes out. - Bound `open_session` so a stuck PAM call cannot hold the guard indefinitely. - Add a test where a revoking push lands while opens keep overlapping. --- ### P2-1. On the server's own node, Access is enforced only inside the mesh SSH component; the kernel still lets every peer reach every port - `crates/plugins/mesh/src/configuration.rs:56-67`: `server_inbound` returns `(TrafficPolicy::All, Some(access_ssh))`. The firewall installs `All` for every peer, and only our listener reads `access_ssh` (`dataplane.rs` `admits_ssh`). - So the Access answer for TCP/22 holds only while our component is serving there. When mesh SSH is off for the server's host (the default, Q4), after the stop hook, or if the bind fails, mesh TCP/22 reaches the host's own sshd from any peer, including one that Access refuses. J175's run in 79400 shows that path: after `systemctl stop`, `compute01 -> 10.254.0.1:22 over the mesh: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20`. That run used the default Allow. Under Deny with no arrow, the kernel rule is the same `All` (line 67), so the result would be the same. I did not repeat it on two VMs. - D352 says: "SSH and every other service on the server's host follow Access like any other machine". The contract says "TCP/22 there follows Access like on any other node". Neither holds outside our listener. - Fix: install the server node's inbound as the control-plane ports plus the Access answer, the same as the other nodes. If "every other service" is a later slice, open an issue for it and change the contract line so it says where Access is enforced today. ### P2-2. After an abrupt exit, any local account can take over mesh TCP/22 through the leftover redirect - `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_port.rs:58` binds the internal listener on port 0, an unprivileged ephemeral port. The guard (`render`, lines 268-281) admits any flow originally addressed to :22, whoever owns the socket on that port. - The contract already accepts that SIGKILL, an OOM kill or a hook past its 1.5 s bound leaves the table in place until restart recovery. What is new: while the table is left over, `infraternal0` and the address are still up (79400 shows `infraternal0 UNKNOWN` after stop), and the internal port is free for anyone to bind. - **Reproduced** as root on compute01, in two throwaway network namespaces (a target with `infraternal0` as a veth, and a peer), using exactly the script `render()` emits: ``` == 1. agent alive: root holds 10.254.0.1:35707; nobody tries to bind it BIND 65534 [Errno 98] Address already in use == 2. agent killed (SIGKILL: no stop hook). Table still present: table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0001 == 3. nobody (uid 65534) binds the internal port LISTENING uid 65534 == 4. a mesh peer connects to 10.254.0.1:22 over infraternal0 ACCEPTED from ('10.254.0.2', 39528) CONNECT 22 -> SSH-2.0-hijacked-by-uid-65534 == 5. guard still drops a direct connection to the internal port LISTENING uid 65534 CONNECT 35707 -> TimeoutError == 6. control: a privileged internal port (1022) cannot be taken by nobody BIND 65534 [Errno 13] Permission denied unprivileged_port_start=1024 ``` (Step 2's "killed" ends a stand-in listener process without the hook, which is what an abrupt agent exit leaves behind.) Artifacts: `~claude/j236-evidence/hijack.sh` and `hijack.log` on compute01. - Impact: clients that use our generated config refuse the impostor, because it has no host certificate and `StrictHostKeyChecking yes` is set. Every other client of the target's :22 over the mesh, such as a person using the host's sshd with a password, talks to whichever local user grabbed the port, until the infraternal agent restarts. The guard still holds while the agent runs. I found no way for a local user to reach the component except through :22. - Fix: choose the internal port below `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start` (root binds it; try free ports in a fixed privileged range), and read the sysctl so a host that lowered it still refuses. Add a test for this. --- ### P3 - **P3-1. The CA trust and the ssh overrides cover the whole public-origin subtree by default.** `crates/plugins/mesh/src/configuration.rs:198` derives the mesh suffix from the server's origin host. `mesh_client_config.rs:137` and `:154` then scope `Match originalhost`, `@cert-authority`, `IdentityAgent`, `UserKnownHostsFile`, `StrictHostKeyChecking yes` and password-off to `*.<suffix>`. With an origin such as `https://example.com`, every `ssh x.example.com` loses the person's own agent and known_hosts, and our CA is trusted for those real hosts. Production (`ssh.kayg.org`) is a dedicated subdomain, so it is fine. J181 L4 deferred only the warnings. Suggestion: refuse to write the client files, or warn, when the suffix is a registrable domain or covers non-mesh names. - **P3-2. `remove_client_files` on `{"person":null}` skips the content check.** `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_node.rs:569-572` unlinks both `/etc/ssh` files unconditionally, and that push reaches every node with mesh SSH off (the default) on every push. Uninstall's `mesh_ssh_files::remove_if_ours` does check the content. Use that here too. - **P3-3. The key socket checks `allowed` only when a connection is accepted.** `mesh_node.rs:606-612` reads `allowed` at accept, while the identity is read per message. If `added_with` changes, or `{"person":null}` and then a new person arrive, a connection accepted earlier keeps signing as the new identity. Reading `allowed` per message closes that. - **P3-4. `admits_ssh` fails closed only when `server == Some(node)`.** `crates/plugins/mesh/src/dataplane.rs:128`: a persisted server-node config written before `server` existed (the field doc says older snapshots lack it) has `inbound = All`, so it admits every peer until a fresh config lands. Treat `server: None` as refuse too. For non-server nodes that is also the safe answer. - **P3-5. Code compares to another product.** `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_server.rs:45` says "like OpenSSH's `LoginGraceTime`". CLAUDE.md forbids "like" comparisons in code comments. Describe the bound itself. - **P3-6. Missing doc comments (D345)** on new public fields: `mesh_keys.rs:52-53` (`PersonKey`), `mesh_authority.rs:51-55,68` (`Issued`, `Snapshot.certificates`), `mesh_issue.rs:67,70,73,78-81` (`PersonRequest`, `HostRequest`), `infraternal-plugin-api/src/mesh_view.rs:13,21,26`, `infraternal-agent/src/plugins.rs:229-230` (`MeshService`). --- ### Checked and holding - **Network check:** - It runs in userspace on every authentication and every channel open. - The source address must belong to an applied peer (`mesh_authority.rs:223-248`), so a non-peer or LAN source is refused. - A spoofed peer address cannot complete the handshake, because replies go out through WireGuard. - The person certificate is IPv4-only (L3), so IPv6 logins are refused. IPv6 grants nothing extra. - The `incoming` DNAT matches only `iifname infraternal0`, so other interfaces reach the host's sshd, never us. - A changed `access_ssh` forces the full path (`access_updates.rs`). - The observer sees only the retained, fully applied config (`node_actions.rs:543-556`). - **Login check:** - There are no negative rules. - Root is reachable only through `any_account` or a rule that names it. - A missing account that falls back to root is checked again in `daemon.rs` (`login_access_allows`, against the account actually resolved, with a grant that names only the requested account). - The account is resolved on the target. - Running sessions surviving a grant revocation is the documented L2 deferral, not a new finding. New channel opens do recheck. - **Host keys:** - The principals are derived by the server from the node record (`mesh_ssh.rs:445-451`). - Names are `UNIQUE COLLATE NOCASE` (`0012_mesh_api.sql`). - The CA line and `HostKeyAlias` use `name.suffix`. - A node's certificate names only its own addresses. - The typed CA issuers check the shape again after signing. - SSH and X.509 bodies cannot overlap (prefix `0x00` against DER `0x30`). - I found no way for one mesh node to impersonate another. L13 (a rename within the certificate's lifetime) remains. - **Key socket:** - `SO_PEERCRED` is checked before any byte is read, and only the uid the machine was added with may connect. Root and system uids are refused. - That uid is the effective uid at connect time. Setuid-root clients are refused. Across user namespaces the kernel reports the uid as the infraternal agent's namespace sees it, so a container's root shows up as the uid it maps to. Passing the fd elsewhere needs the allowed account's cooperation. - It signs only with the one listed certificate, only after a non-forwarding `session-bind`, and a forwarding bind is permanent. So OpenSSH's own forwarding bind arrives before any remote byte and cannot be undone. - The socket directory, the config and the known-hosts file sit only in root-owned directories closed to group and other writes (`trusted_directory`). - Per D352, the server's own host never gets a client identity (`added_with(None)`). - **Generated config:** its values are typed (label, suffix charset, `Ipv4Addr`, quoted fixed paths), so nothing can break out of a value. The person's own `~/.ssh/config` wins (L4, deferred). - **Control actions:** `mesh-ssh-node.*` are control-only. The local `plugins.sock` is uid-checked in a 0700 directory and goes through `call_public`, which refuses control actions (J181 L12). - **Redirect:** - The guard drops direct connections to the internal port from peers and from local users (step 5 above). - The table is created with `create`, which refuses an existing one, and a foreign table without the marker is refused. Only root can race it. - Stop removes the rules before releasing the listener. The ordering bug fixed in 79400 is gone. - **Secrets:** - nft gets its script on stdin. - The only new log line carries the error kind only (`mesh_runtime.rs`). - The person and host keys live only in memory. - **Uninstall:** it removes the client files (rootful) and, through the stop hook, the tables. #360 tracks the login and bootstrap leftovers. A table left after an abrupt exit is not removed by uninstall, but uninstall also takes `infraternal0` down, so the table stops matching anything (see P2-2 for the window before that). ### Cleanup Both reproducers' namespaces are gone, and the host netns has no `infraternal_ssh` tables (`0`). `/root/j236`, the VM worktree `~/worktrees/j236` and its target `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j236` are removed. Evidence stays in `~claude/j236-evidence/` on compute01. compute01 has 236 GB free. **Verdict: REQUEST CHANGES** (P1-1; P2-1 and P2-2 should land or be tracked before merge).
kayg commented 2026-11-05 11:09:55 +00:00
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J175: starting on J236's review (comment 79805). Branch mesh-ssh-s1-j175, base fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e.

Each finding gets a test that fails first and its own commit:

  • P1-1: a fair, waiting install, plus a hang-only bound on the login step. Tested with J236's reproducer shape.
  • P2-2: a privileged internal port, and no redirect on rootless hosts. The takeover gets reproduced first.
  • P2-1: the server node's inbound narrowed to the enumerated control-plane ports plus Access. Proven on the VMs under Deny.
  • P3-1 to P3-6.

Then: merge origin/dev, verify fast in the foreground, and the head reported here.

**J175: starting on J236's review (comment 79805).** Branch `mesh-ssh-s1-j175`, base `fac39e0665e761db3c95ef370b20dcd6c41a039e`. Each finding gets a test that fails first and its own commit: - P1-1: a fair, waiting install, plus a hang-only bound on the login step. Tested with J236's reproducer shape. - P2-2: a privileged internal port, and no redirect on rootless hosts. The takeover gets reproduced first. - P2-1: the server node's inbound narrowed to the enumerated control-plane ports plus Access. Proven on the VMs under Deny. - P3-1 to P3-6. Then: merge origin/dev, `verify fast` in the foreground, and the head reported here.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 15:16:51 +00:00
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J175: J236's review (79805) is addressed. Head 6c8f3b5974714775a0a4815a70decb329a3ec9d9 on mesh-ssh-s1-j175 (pushed, not merged), origin/dev merged at c02bf3cdc.

History note: the commits after J236's reviewed head fac39e066 were rebased once before the dev merge, to fold rustfmt and one clippy test-lint fix into the commit they belong to, and pushed with --force-with-lease. fac39e066 and everything before it are unchanged.

Commits (each with a test that failed first, except the comment and docs commits)

Finding Commit Red before → green
P1-1 revocation starvation f0cab05fd ssh: a revocation always installs, behind logins in flight a_revoking_push_lands_while_logins_keep_overlapping (J236's shape, through the real configure): "a revoking push never installed" → passes, and a login started after the push sees the revocation. a_hung_login_is_refused_at_its_bound_and_the_revocation_lands (paused clock) did not compile without the bound.
P2-2 port takeover 2d1b01770 ssh: the redirect listens only on a port root can bind First reproduced: J236's script run again on compute01 (SSH-2.0-hijacked-by-uid-65534). namespace_the_redirect_listens_only_on_a_privileged_port: "internal port 37733 is not below 1024" → passes, and with the bound set to 0 the bind is refused and no table is left.
P3-5 product comparison 81f30da47 (comment only)
P2-1 server host follows Access ada0aa5dd mesh: the server's own node admits peers only to the control plane, else Access New compiler and store tests did not compile without the control-plane input; they now prove the exact inbound under Allow and Deny, with and without a narrowing arrow.
P3-4 server: None 7e1e4f663 a_saved_config_without_the_server_field_refuses_ssh: assertion failed (the old rule admitted) → passes
P3-2 content-checked removal 1eac65170 turning_the_client_off_removes_only_files_infraternal_wrote did not compile without the files root → passes
P3-1 exact mesh names 992d8456e trust_and_overrides_name_exact_mesh_hosts_never_the_whole_domain did not compile against the old known_hosts → passes. ssh -G now also leaves web.internal alone.
P3-3 per-message caller check f4df3f619 a_key_socket_connection_loses_the_identity_when_its_account_is_no_longer_allowed did not compile without the per-message check → passes
P3-6 D345 docs 7b5c1c72e (docs; the ratchet passes). It also corrects the loses_ssh_to_server doc to "access to the server's host", since after P2-1 that covers every service there.
merge 6c8f3b597 Conflicts: bootstrap_remote.rs (both sides kept) and remote_migration_tests.rs (dev's generic check taken). #303's new ActionDef fields are set: mesh SSH's node control actions and owner actions are api_scope: None (not key-callable) and fresh_passkey: false.

All builds were checked commit by commit on compute01: ssh/mesh clippy and tests pass at each of the new commits (72 mesh SSH tests at the last), and the namespace tests pass (5).

How each finding was fixed:

  • P1-1.
    • configure spawns the fair Authority::install on the component runtime and waits up to 2 s. A queued writer stops new readers, so logins that start later wait behind it, and it lands once the logins in flight finish.
    • Past the 2 s the reply is "busy", but the install stays queued and still lands.
    • open_session has a hang-only OPEN_BOUND of 30 s (measured logins take about 2 s).
    • try_install is removed.
  • P2-2.
    • The internal listener comes from 960..=1022, highest first, and only below ip_unprivileged_port_start, which is read on every bind.
    • A rootless infraternal agent never redirects, and neither does a host whose bound leaves no such port. Both refuse with PermissionDenied.
  • P2-1.
    • On the server's node, each peer's inbound is now control plane ∪ Access (the explicit arrows toward the server, or the default). The kernel enforces it.
    • The control plane is exactly the remote listener's bound port, TCP and UDP. That is where every infraternal agent reaches the server's mesh address (LeasedListener). Bootstrap and renewal use HTTPS over the underlay, presence comes from WireGuard counters, and relays run on the underlay.
    • The mesh store reads the port from a late-bound provider on every snapshot, because a fresh server starts its listener only after its CA is set up. Peers can join only after that.
  • P3-1. Both client files name each peer's exact <name>.<suffix>, from the host list pushed on every update, plus the mesh range glob. There is never a *.<suffix>.

VM proof (real server from 6c8f3b597 on dev-02, compute01 added as meshtest)

P2-1, with mesh SSH off on the server's host. Probes from compute01 to dev-02's mesh address:

== step 1: default Allow, no arrows, mesh SSH off on the server's host (15:08:10)
10.254.0.1:22 -> open: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20
10.254.0.1:47175 -> open: (connected, no banner)
10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: (connected, no banner)
infraternal_ssh tables on dev-02 (mesh SSH off): 0
== step 2: default Deny, no arrows (15:08:37)
RESULT mesh.default.preview ok {"default_policy":"Deny","loses_reach":[[1,2]],"loses_ssh_to_server":[2],"next_cursor":null,"revision":2,"total_pairs":1}
RESULT mesh.default.set ok {"default_policy":"Deny","revision":3}
10.254.0.1:22 -> refused or filtered: TimeoutError
10.254.0.1:47175 -> refused or filtered: TimeoutError
10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: (connected, no banner)
control plane (mesh.list live): [(1, True), (2, True)]
compute01 agent since step 2 (exact): active, ActiveEnter=Thu 2026-11-05 16:05:52 CET, lines since: 0
== step 3: explicit arrow compute01 -> server, TCP/22 only, default still Deny (15:09:54)
RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":1,"revision":4}
10.254.0.1:22 -> open: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20
10.254.0.1:47175 -> refused or filtered: TimeoutError
10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: (connected, no banner)
control plane (mesh.list live): [(1, True), (2, True)]
  • :22 is the host's own sshd and :47175 is the server's HTTPS listener (a non-control service on all addresses); 47176 is the control plane.
  • Under Deny, a refused peer reaches neither :22 nor :47175 with mesh SSH off. The control plane stays open, both nodes stay live, and compute01's infraternal agent logged nothing after the change: no reconnect, no restart.
  • The arrow restores exactly TCP/22.
  • Its control connection ran over the enrolled NetBird endpoint here (wt0), so the mesh control port is shown reachable by probe.
  • End to end on this head, with mesh SSH on for the server's host under Deny plus the TCP/22 arrow: plain ssh gave WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std, exit 0.

P2-2, with the real infraternal agent on compute01 (stand-in sshd on 0.0.0.0:22, so it redirects):

== redirect in place
table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0002
internal port: 1022 (unprivileged start: 1024)
== SIGKILL the infraternal agent (pid 1458589): no stop hook runs
table still present: 1
== nobody tries to bind the internal port
BIND uid 65534 [Errno 13] Permission denied
== mesh :22 in the window (local chain still redirects to 1022):
10.254.0.2:22 -> refused or filtered: ConnectionRefusedError
== after restart: active; tables: 1
10.254.0.2:1022

Before the fix, the same takeover (J236's script, rerun on compute01) got LISTENING uid 65534 and CONNECT 22 -> SSH-2.0-hijacked-by-uid-65534.

Gate (scripts/verify fast, run in the foreground, on this head)

TREE: 6c8f3b5974714775a0a4815a70decb329a3ec9d9 0 changed paths
FAST_EXIT=0
+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| migration names           | PASS         |
| migration tooling tests   | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| SSH runtime test helper   | PASS         |
| real-binary fixture paths | PASS         |
| Traefik component manifest | PASS         |
| release component publication | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| SSH inode reuse fixture   | PASS         |
| shim process-per-user     | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| gate architecture         | PASS         |
| doc coverage ratchet      | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+
(static builds: 999s)
 0 fail
 77253 expect() calls
Ran 50 tests across 13 files. [13.66s]

The first gate on the merge (333e9fff2) failed at compile: #303's new ActionDef fields. That fix is now in the merge commit.

Static sizes at this head (including dev): x86_64-musl 26,169,744 B, aarch64-musl 23,621,368 B.

Open for the owner

  • API-key scope for the mesh SSH owner actions (mesh-ssh.set, the login-rule actions). They change who may log in where. They are not key-callable until a scope is chosen (D333). Which scope, if any?

Cleanup

  • The proof server is stopped. /var/tmp/j175s, infraternal0 and the hosts line on dev-02 are removed.
  • compute01 was uninstalled through the product's own by-hand path (infraternal --bootstrap-uninstall <host> → "infraternal was removed from this machine"). That was not the server-driven removal: my removal script crashed, and I had already stopped the proof server. The uninstall left no tables, client files, key socket or infraternal0.
  • The stand-in sshd is stopped, and the hosts line and trusted certificate on compute01 are removed, along with this run's #360-pattern leftovers.
  • The proof dirs and my build target are deleted.
  • meshtest is left in place.
**J175: J236's review (79805) is addressed. Head `6c8f3b5974714775a0a4815a70decb329a3ec9d9` on `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` (pushed, not merged), origin/dev merged at `c02bf3cdc`.** History note: the commits after J236's reviewed head `fac39e066` were rebased once before the dev merge, to fold rustfmt and one clippy test-lint fix into the commit they belong to, and pushed with `--force-with-lease`. `fac39e066` and everything before it are unchanged. ### Commits (each with a test that failed first, except the comment and docs commits) | Finding | Commit | Red before → green | |---|---|---| | **P1-1** revocation starvation | `f0cab05fd` ssh: a revocation always installs, behind logins in flight | `a_revoking_push_lands_while_logins_keep_overlapping` (J236's shape, through the real `configure`): **"a revoking push never installed"** → passes, and a login started after the push sees the revocation. `a_hung_login_is_refused_at_its_bound_and_the_revocation_lands` (paused clock) did not compile without the bound. | | **P2-2** port takeover | `2d1b01770` ssh: the redirect listens only on a port root can bind | First reproduced: J236's script run again on compute01 (`SSH-2.0-hijacked-by-uid-65534`). `namespace_the_redirect_listens_only_on_a_privileged_port`: **"internal port 37733 is not below 1024"** → passes, and with the bound set to 0 the bind is refused and no table is left. | | P3-5 product comparison | `81f30da47` | (comment only) | | **P2-1** server host follows Access | `ada0aa5dd` mesh: the server's own node admits peers only to the control plane, else Access | New compiler and store tests did not compile without the control-plane input; they now prove the exact inbound under Allow and Deny, with and without a narrowing arrow. | | P3-4 `server: None` | `7e1e4f663` | `a_saved_config_without_the_server_field_refuses_ssh`: **assertion failed** (the old rule admitted) → passes | | P3-2 content-checked removal | `1eac65170` | `turning_the_client_off_removes_only_files_infraternal_wrote` did not compile without the files root → passes | | P3-1 exact mesh names | `992d8456e` | `trust_and_overrides_name_exact_mesh_hosts_never_the_whole_domain` did not compile against the old `known_hosts` → passes. `ssh -G` now also leaves `web.internal` alone. | | P3-3 per-message caller check | `f4df3f619` | `a_key_socket_connection_loses_the_identity_when_its_account_is_no_longer_allowed` did not compile without the per-message check → passes | | P3-6 D345 docs | `7b5c1c72e` | (docs; the ratchet passes). It also corrects the `loses_ssh_to_server` doc to "access to the server's host", since after P2-1 that covers every service there. | | merge | `6c8f3b597` | Conflicts: `bootstrap_remote.rs` (both sides kept) and `remote_migration_tests.rs` (dev's generic check taken). #303's new `ActionDef` fields are set: mesh SSH's node control actions and owner actions are `api_scope: None` (not key-callable) and `fresh_passkey: false`. | All builds were checked commit by commit on compute01: ssh/mesh clippy and tests pass at each of the new commits (72 mesh SSH tests at the last), and the namespace tests pass (5). **How each finding was fixed:** - **P1-1.** - `configure` spawns the fair `Authority::install` on the component runtime and waits up to 2 s. A queued writer stops new readers, so logins that start later wait behind it, and it lands once the logins in flight finish. - Past the 2 s the reply is "busy", but the install stays queued and still lands. - `open_session` has a hang-only `OPEN_BOUND` of 30 s (measured logins take about 2 s). - `try_install` is removed. - **P2-2.** - The internal listener comes from 960..=1022, highest first, and only below `ip_unprivileged_port_start`, which is read on every bind. - A rootless infraternal agent never redirects, and neither does a host whose bound leaves no such port. Both refuse with `PermissionDenied`. - **P2-1.** - On the server's node, each peer's inbound is now **control plane ∪ Access** (the explicit arrows toward the server, or the default). The kernel enforces it. - The control plane is exactly the remote listener's bound port, TCP and UDP. That is where every infraternal agent reaches the server's mesh address (`LeasedListener`). Bootstrap and renewal use HTTPS over the underlay, presence comes from WireGuard counters, and relays run on the underlay. - The mesh store reads the port from a late-bound provider on every snapshot, because a fresh server starts its listener only after its CA is set up. Peers can join only after that. - **P3-1.** Both client files name each peer's exact `<name>.<suffix>`, from the host list pushed on every update, plus the mesh range glob. There is never a `*.<suffix>`. ### VM proof (real server from `6c8f3b597` on dev-02, compute01 added as `meshtest`) **P2-1**, with mesh SSH **off** on the server's host. Probes from compute01 to dev-02's mesh address: ``` == step 1: default Allow, no arrows, mesh SSH off on the server's host (15:08:10) 10.254.0.1:22 -> open: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20 10.254.0.1:47175 -> open: (connected, no banner) 10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: (connected, no banner) infraternal_ssh tables on dev-02 (mesh SSH off): 0 == step 2: default Deny, no arrows (15:08:37) RESULT mesh.default.preview ok {"default_policy":"Deny","loses_reach":[[1,2]],"loses_ssh_to_server":[2],"next_cursor":null,"revision":2,"total_pairs":1} RESULT mesh.default.set ok {"default_policy":"Deny","revision":3} 10.254.0.1:22 -> refused or filtered: TimeoutError 10.254.0.1:47175 -> refused or filtered: TimeoutError 10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: (connected, no banner) control plane (mesh.list live): [(1, True), (2, True)] compute01 agent since step 2 (exact): active, ActiveEnter=Thu 2026-11-05 16:05:52 CET, lines since: 0 == step 3: explicit arrow compute01 -> server, TCP/22 only, default still Deny (15:09:54) RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":1,"revision":4} 10.254.0.1:22 -> open: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu13.20 10.254.0.1:47175 -> refused or filtered: TimeoutError 10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: (connected, no banner) control plane (mesh.list live): [(1, True), (2, True)] ``` - :22 is the host's own sshd and :47175 is the server's HTTPS listener (a non-control service on all addresses); 47176 is the control plane. - Under Deny, a refused peer reaches neither :22 nor :47175 with mesh SSH off. The control plane stays open, both nodes stay live, and compute01's infraternal agent logged nothing after the change: no reconnect, no restart. - The arrow restores exactly TCP/22. - Its control connection ran over the enrolled NetBird endpoint here (`wt0`), so the mesh control port is shown reachable by probe. - End to end on this head, with mesh SSH on for the server's host under Deny plus the TCP/22 arrow: plain `ssh` gave `WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std`, exit 0. **P2-2, with the real infraternal agent on compute01** (stand-in sshd on `0.0.0.0:22`, so it redirects): ``` == redirect in place table inet infraternal_ssh4_0afe0002 internal port: 1022 (unprivileged start: 1024) == SIGKILL the infraternal agent (pid 1458589): no stop hook runs table still present: 1 == nobody tries to bind the internal port BIND uid 65534 [Errno 13] Permission denied == mesh :22 in the window (local chain still redirects to 1022): 10.254.0.2:22 -> refused or filtered: ConnectionRefusedError == after restart: active; tables: 1 10.254.0.2:1022 ``` Before the fix, the same takeover (J236's script, rerun on compute01) got `LISTENING uid 65534` and `CONNECT 22 -> SSH-2.0-hijacked-by-uid-65534`. ### Gate (`scripts/verify fast`, run in the foreground, on this head) ``` TREE: 6c8f3b5974714775a0a4815a70decb329a3ec9d9 0 changed paths FAST_EXIT=0 +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | migration names | PASS | | migration tooling tests | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | SSH runtime test helper | PASS | | real-binary fixture paths | PASS | | Traefik component manifest | PASS | | release component publication | PASS | | test | PASS | | SSH inode reuse fixture | PASS | | shim process-per-user | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | gate architecture | PASS | | doc coverage ratchet | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ (static builds: 999s) 0 fail 77253 expect() calls Ran 50 tests across 13 files. [13.66s] ``` The first gate on the merge (`333e9fff2`) failed at compile: #303's new `ActionDef` fields. That fix is now in the merge commit. Static sizes at this head (including dev): x86_64-musl 26,169,744 B, aarch64-musl 23,621,368 B. ### Open for the owner - **API-key scope for the mesh SSH owner actions** (`mesh-ssh.set`, the login-rule actions). They change who may log in where. They are not key-callable until a scope is chosen (D333). Which scope, if any? ### Cleanup - The proof server is stopped. `/var/tmp/j175s`, `infraternal0` and the hosts line on dev-02 are removed. - **compute01 was uninstalled through the product's own by-hand path** (`infraternal --bootstrap-uninstall <host>` → "infraternal was removed from this machine"). That was not the server-driven removal: my removal script crashed, and I had already stopped the proof server. The uninstall left no tables, client files, key socket or `infraternal0`. - The stand-in sshd is stopped, and the hosts line and trusted certificate on compute01 are removed, along with this run's #360-pattern leftovers. - The proof dirs and my build target are deleted. - `meshtest` is left in place.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 17:22:06 +00:00
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J248 security re-review: mesh SSH slice 1, verdict APPROVE

Target: mesh-ssh-s1-j175 at 6c8f3b5974714775a0a4815a70decb329a3ec9d9, the delta since J236's fac39e066: J175's nine commits f0cab05fd…7b5c1c72e. I read them against D235, D352, contracts/mesh-ssh.md, J236's verdict (79805) and J175's report (80023). I ran no verify fast or verify quick (reviewer rule). I ran only the reproducers below, on compute01, with the scratch tests uncommitted. Nothing was pushed, and the branch is unchanged.

All of J236's findings are closed: P1-1, P2-1, P2-2 and the six P3s. I found no new P1 or P2, and two new P3s (below).

Evidence is on compute01 in ~claude/j248-evidence/: build.log, node.log, p21.log, p21-default.log and p22.log, plus the scratch tests and drivers (authority_append.rs, port_append.rs, j248_server_inbound.rs, p21.py, p22.sh).

P1-1 (revocation starved by overlapping logins): closed

  • mesh_node.rs install spawns the fair Authority::install (state.write().await) and waits INSTALL_WAIT (2 s). A "busy" reply leaves the install queued. A queued writer blocks new current() readers. The server bumps the sequence on every push (mesh_ssh.rs:301), so a retry never collides with the queued one.
  • try_install is gone. Every guard holder is checked: mesh_server.rs:263 (shell open), :403 (auth) and :593 (files). Only the shell open awaits anything long, and mesh_authority.rs:281 bounds it with OPEN_BOUND (30 s).
  • J236's reproducer shape, rerun against the fix. Two logins hold the snapshot for 300 ms each, staggered by 150 ms. Then 30 revoking pushes arrive 100 ms apart, each spawned and waited for 2 s as configure does (build.log):
J248: revoking installs: 30 installed, 0 busy, 0 stale; slowest install 251.928594ms; logins held during the run 62; person passes login access afterwards: false
test mesh_authority::tests::j248_overlapping_logins_then_30_revoking_installs ... ok
test mesh_authority::tests::a_hung_login_is_refused_at_its_bound_and_the_revocation_lands ... ok
  • J175's test through the real configure (--features session-bridge, node.log): a_revoking_push_lands_while_logins_keep_overlapping ... ok, and all 11 mesh_node tests pass.

P2-1 (D352: the server's node follows Access): closed

  • The server node's inbound is control_plane ∪ Access (configuration.rs server_inbound).
  • The control-plane list is exact and config cannot widen it:
    • It is RemoteHosts::listener_port, which is listener.local_addr() of the remote listener (remote_runtime.rs:710), mapped to exactly {TCP, UDP} × that port (plugins.rs control_plane).
    • reserve_transports binds TCP and UDP on that same port, so the server itself holds both. No other host service can sit behind the exemption.
    • Store::set_control_plane is a OnceLock set only by the server. Neither the mesh API nor saved config reaches it.
  • Startup order is safe. On restart with an existing CA, RemoteListeners::start runs inside remote_router (runtime.rs:473) before the server's node is attached (runtime.rs:698), so the first compile already has the port. On a fresh server, peers can join only after the CA bootstrap starts the listener. Joining recompiles.
  • The narrowing removes nothing else peers need on the server's mesh address:
    • mesh DNS answers only the node's own address (dns.rs module doc);
    • relays and bootstrap run on the underlay;
    • the peer's own outbound toward the server stays All (configuration.rs:163), so the server's node is the only enforcement point, as it must be against a hostile peer.
  • Kernel proof. p21.log uses the iptables-nft frontend and p21-default.log the default frontend; both give the same answers. The setup:
    • the real compiler (store.config with the control plane set to 47176, as the server wires it);
    • installed by two real kernel_node WireGuard nodes in throwaway namespaces on compute01;
    • a refused peer probing the server's mesh address. The host services there are a stand-in sshd on :22, "another service" on :47175, the control plane on 47176 (TCP and UDP) and UDP 5353.
== default Deny, no arrows
server-node inbound from the peer: [{"access_ssh": false, "inbound": {"Ports": [{"number": 47176, "protocol": "Tcp"}, {"number": 47176, "protocol": "Udp"}]}}]
  tcp 10.254.0.1:22 -> refused/filtered: TimeoutError
  tcp 10.254.0.1:47175 -> refused/filtered: TimeoutError
  tcp 10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: banner-47176
  udp 10.254.0.1:47176 -> answered: udp-47176:x
  udp 10.254.0.1:5353 -> no answer: TimeoutError
   held 47176 echo: ping
== Deny + explicit arrow peer -> server, TCP/22 only
server-node inbound from the peer: [{"access_ssh": true, "inbound": {"Ports": [{"number": 22, "protocol": "Tcp"}, {"number": 47176, "protocol": "Tcp"}, {"number": 47176, "protocol": "Udp"}]}}]
  tcp 10.254.0.1:22 -> open: banner-22
  tcp 10.254.0.1:47175 -> refused/filtered: TimeoutError
  tcp 10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: banner-47176
  • "held 47176" is a control-plane connection opened under Allow that still carries data after the switch to Deny and after the arrow. That is the kernel-side half of "no infraternal agent loses its control connection".
  • Limit, said plainly: I did not repeat the full server plus add-host run on compute01 and dev-02. It needs static builds for both architectures and a passkey-driven add-host, and the slot queues were at positions 5–7. The end-to-end half (real server and infraternal agent under Deny, agent active with no reconnect, ssh working after the arrow) rests on J175's run in 80023. I checked the server wiring that run depends on by reading the code (above).

P2-2 (redirect takeover after an abrupt exit): closed

  • mesh_port.rs internal_listener takes ports from 960..=1022, highest first. It keeps only ports below ip_unprivileged_port_start, read on every bind. A non-root euid, or a bound that leaves no port, gets PermissionDenied, so no redirect is installed.
  • J236's takeover reproducer, rerun with the real MeshPort::bind (a test binary holding it, run as root in a namespace with a stand-in sshd on 0.0.0.0:22) instead of J236's stand-in rules (p22.log):
J248 BOUND mode=Redirect internal=1022
== 3. SIGKILL the holder: no stop hook, no Drop
table still present: 1
== 4. nobody (uid 65534) tries the internal port 1022 and every port of 960..1022
BIND uid 65534 port 1022 [Errno 13] Permission denied
uid 65534: Permission denied on all 63 ports of 960..1022
== 5. mesh :22 in the window
CONNECT 22 -> ConnectionRefusedError
== 6. ... a host that lowered the bound to 1000
J248 BOUND mode=Redirect internal=999
== 7. a host whose bound is 0 (no root-only port): refused, no table
J248 REFUSED PermissionDenied table_present=false
  • Before the fix the same shape gave SSH-2.0-hijacked-by-uid-65534 (J236's hijack.log).
  • Rootless never redirects: internal_ports_are_privileged_and_rootless_never_redirects ... ok. A rootless infraternal agent also cannot create the nft table at all.

The six P3s: closed

  • P3-1: mesh_client_config.rs patterns gives exact <name>.<suffix> names plus the range glob, never *.<suffix>. The @cert-authority line uses the same list.
  • P3-2: {"person":null} goes through mesh_ssh_files::remove_client_config (content-checked), shared with uninstall. turning_the_client_off_removes_only_files_infraternal_wrote ... ok.
  • P3-3: socket_identity re-reads allowed on every message. a_key_socket_connection_loses_the_identity_when_its_account_is_no_longer_allowed ... ok. See P3-B for a remaining ordering window.
  • P3-4: dataplane.rs admits_ssh refuses (None, None) and (None, Some(self)).
  • P3-5: mesh_server.rs:44-49 describes the bound itself, with no product comparison. Nothing in the delta compares code to another product. "OpenSSH patterns have no CIDR" is a factual statement about the integration.
  • P3-6: every field J236 listed now has a doc comment (mesh_keys.rs:52-55, mesh_authority.rs:50-74, mesh_issue.rs PersonRequest/HostRequest, mesh_view.rs, infraternal-agent/src/plugins.rs MeshService).

New findings (P3 only)

P3-A. A login cut off at OPEN_BOUND may still create its shell (plausible; not reproduced).

  • crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_authority.rs:281 drops the open future when the 30 s bound fires.
  • open_mesh_ssh_shell (crates/infraternal-agent/src/daemon.rs:394) then reaches sessions::launch_with_login / rootless_sessions::launch (daemon.rs:519-524), which start the shim. If the drop lands after the launch has started, the shim can come up with no client attached, under the person and account the guard admitted. That can be after the revocation that the bound let through.
  • It only happens when a login hangs for 30 s, and attaching later goes through the normal entry points. So this is cleanup and hygiene, not a bypass.
  • Suggestion: make the launch cancel-safe, for example a drop guard that ends a session created after its open was abandoned. Or note it next to L2.

P3-B. A direct person switch exposes the old identity to the new account for one window.

  • crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_node.rs:537-544 writes allowed (the new uid) and only then identity, under separate locks.
  • If a machine's client moves from one account to another without a {"person":null} in between, a socket connection from the newly allowed uid can, between the two writes, get one signature with the previous person's certificate.
  • The window is microseconds and needs that account already connected.
  • Fix: clear identity first, then set allowed, then the new identity. Or keep both under one lock.

Neither blocks merge.

Cleanup

  • On compute01: /root/j248, the VM worktree ~/worktrees/j248 and its target ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j248 are removed.
  • Afterwards ip netns list is empty, there are no infraternal_ssh/infraternal_mesh tables, and there are no j248*/infraternal0/meshpeer links. No test server was started.
  • dev-02 was not touched. Evidence stays in ~claude/j248-evidence/. compute01 has 192 GB free.

Verdict: APPROVE (no P1/P2; P3-A and P3-B can be follow-ups).

## J248 security re-review: mesh SSH slice 1, verdict APPROVE Target: `mesh-ssh-s1-j175` at `6c8f3b5974714775a0a4815a70decb329a3ec9d9`, the delta since J236's `fac39e066`: J175's nine commits `f0cab05fd`…`7b5c1c72e`. I read them against D235, D352, `contracts/mesh-ssh.md`, J236's verdict (79805) and J175's report (80023). I ran no `verify fast` or `verify quick` (reviewer rule). I ran only the reproducers below, on compute01, with the scratch tests uncommitted. Nothing was pushed, and the branch is unchanged. **All of J236's findings are closed: P1-1, P2-1, P2-2 and the six P3s. I found no new P1 or P2, and two new P3s (below).** Evidence is on compute01 in `~claude/j248-evidence/`: `build.log`, `node.log`, `p21.log`, `p21-default.log` and `p22.log`, plus the scratch tests and drivers (`authority_append.rs`, `port_append.rs`, `j248_server_inbound.rs`, `p21.py`, `p22.sh`). --- ### P1-1 (revocation starved by overlapping logins): closed - `mesh_node.rs` `install` spawns the fair `Authority::install` (`state.write().await`) and waits `INSTALL_WAIT` (2 s). A "busy" reply leaves the install queued. A queued writer blocks new `current()` readers. The server bumps the sequence on every push (`mesh_ssh.rs:301`), so a retry never collides with the queued one. - `try_install` is gone. Every guard holder is checked: `mesh_server.rs:263` (shell open), `:403` (auth) and `:593` (files). Only the shell open awaits anything long, and `mesh_authority.rs:281` bounds it with `OPEN_BOUND` (30 s). - **J236's reproducer shape, rerun against the fix.** Two logins hold the snapshot for 300 ms each, staggered by 150 ms. Then 30 revoking pushes arrive 100 ms apart, each spawned and waited for 2 s as `configure` does (`build.log`): ``` J248: revoking installs: 30 installed, 0 busy, 0 stale; slowest install 251.928594ms; logins held during the run 62; person passes login access afterwards: false test mesh_authority::tests::j248_overlapping_logins_then_30_revoking_installs ... ok test mesh_authority::tests::a_hung_login_is_refused_at_its_bound_and_the_revocation_lands ... ok ``` - J175's test through the real `configure` (`--features session-bridge`, `node.log`): `a_revoking_push_lands_while_logins_keep_overlapping ... ok`, and all 11 `mesh_node` tests pass. ### P2-1 (D352: the server's node follows Access): closed - The server node's inbound is `control_plane ∪ Access` (`configuration.rs` `server_inbound`). - **The control-plane list is exact and config cannot widen it:** - It is `RemoteHosts::listener_port`, which is `listener.local_addr()` of the remote listener (`remote_runtime.rs:710`), mapped to exactly `{TCP, UDP} × that port` (`plugins.rs` `control_plane`). - `reserve_transports` binds TCP and UDP on that same port, so the server itself holds both. No other host service can sit behind the exemption. - `Store::set_control_plane` is a `OnceLock` set only by the server. Neither the mesh API nor saved config reaches it. - **Startup order is safe.** On restart with an existing CA, `RemoteListeners::start` runs inside `remote_router` (`runtime.rs:473`) before the server's node is attached (`runtime.rs:698`), so the first compile already has the port. On a fresh server, peers can join only after the CA bootstrap starts the listener. Joining recompiles. - The narrowing removes nothing else peers need on the server's mesh address: - mesh DNS answers only the node's own address (`dns.rs` module doc); - relays and bootstrap run on the underlay; - the peer's own outbound toward the server stays `All` (`configuration.rs:163`), so the server's node is the only enforcement point, as it must be against a hostile peer. - **Kernel proof.** `p21.log` uses the iptables-nft frontend and `p21-default.log` the default frontend; both give the same answers. The setup: - the real compiler (`store.config` with the control plane set to 47176, as the server wires it); - installed by two real `kernel_node` WireGuard nodes in throwaway namespaces on compute01; - a refused peer probing the server's mesh address. The host services there are a stand-in sshd on :22, "another service" on :47175, the control plane on 47176 (TCP and UDP) and UDP 5353. ``` == default Deny, no arrows server-node inbound from the peer: [{"access_ssh": false, "inbound": {"Ports": [{"number": 47176, "protocol": "Tcp"}, {"number": 47176, "protocol": "Udp"}]}}] tcp 10.254.0.1:22 -> refused/filtered: TimeoutError tcp 10.254.0.1:47175 -> refused/filtered: TimeoutError tcp 10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: banner-47176 udp 10.254.0.1:47176 -> answered: udp-47176:x udp 10.254.0.1:5353 -> no answer: TimeoutError held 47176 echo: ping == Deny + explicit arrow peer -> server, TCP/22 only server-node inbound from the peer: [{"access_ssh": true, "inbound": {"Ports": [{"number": 22, "protocol": "Tcp"}, {"number": 47176, "protocol": "Tcp"}, {"number": 47176, "protocol": "Udp"}]}}] tcp 10.254.0.1:22 -> open: banner-22 tcp 10.254.0.1:47175 -> refused/filtered: TimeoutError tcp 10.254.0.1:47176 -> open: banner-47176 ``` - "held 47176" is a control-plane connection opened under Allow that still carries data after the switch to Deny and after the arrow. That is the kernel-side half of "no infraternal agent loses its control connection". - **Limit, said plainly:** I did not repeat the full server plus add-host run on compute01 and dev-02. It needs static builds for both architectures and a passkey-driven add-host, and the slot queues were at positions 5–7. The end-to-end half (real server and infraternal agent under Deny, agent active with no reconnect, `ssh` working after the arrow) rests on J175's run in 80023. I checked the server wiring that run depends on by reading the code (above). ### P2-2 (redirect takeover after an abrupt exit): closed - `mesh_port.rs` `internal_listener` takes ports from 960..=1022, highest first. It keeps only ports below `ip_unprivileged_port_start`, read on every bind. A non-root euid, or a bound that leaves no port, gets `PermissionDenied`, so no redirect is installed. - **J236's takeover reproducer, rerun with the real `MeshPort::bind`** (a test binary holding it, run as root in a namespace with a stand-in sshd on `0.0.0.0:22`) instead of J236's stand-in rules (`p22.log`): ``` J248 BOUND mode=Redirect internal=1022 == 3. SIGKILL the holder: no stop hook, no Drop table still present: 1 == 4. nobody (uid 65534) tries the internal port 1022 and every port of 960..1022 BIND uid 65534 port 1022 [Errno 13] Permission denied uid 65534: Permission denied on all 63 ports of 960..1022 == 5. mesh :22 in the window CONNECT 22 -> ConnectionRefusedError == 6. ... a host that lowered the bound to 1000 J248 BOUND mode=Redirect internal=999 == 7. a host whose bound is 0 (no root-only port): refused, no table J248 REFUSED PermissionDenied table_present=false ``` - Before the fix the same shape gave `SSH-2.0-hijacked-by-uid-65534` (J236's `hijack.log`). - Rootless never redirects: `internal_ports_are_privileged_and_rootless_never_redirects ... ok`. A rootless infraternal agent also cannot create the nft table at all. ### The six P3s: closed - **P3-1:** `mesh_client_config.rs` `patterns` gives exact `<name>.<suffix>` names plus the range glob, never `*.<suffix>`. The `@cert-authority` line uses the same list. - **P3-2:** `{"person":null}` goes through `mesh_ssh_files::remove_client_config` (content-checked), shared with uninstall. `turning_the_client_off_removes_only_files_infraternal_wrote ... ok`. - **P3-3:** `socket_identity` re-reads `allowed` on every message. `a_key_socket_connection_loses_the_identity_when_its_account_is_no_longer_allowed ... ok`. See P3-B for a remaining ordering window. - **P3-4:** `dataplane.rs` `admits_ssh` refuses `(None, None)` and `(None, Some(self))`. - **P3-5:** `mesh_server.rs:44-49` describes the bound itself, with no product comparison. Nothing in the delta compares code to another product. "OpenSSH patterns have no CIDR" is a factual statement about the integration. - **P3-6:** every field J236 listed now has a doc comment (`mesh_keys.rs:52-55`, `mesh_authority.rs:50-74`, `mesh_issue.rs` `PersonRequest`/`HostRequest`, `mesh_view.rs`, `infraternal-agent/src/plugins.rs` `MeshService`). --- ### New findings (P3 only) **P3-A. A login cut off at `OPEN_BOUND` may still create its shell (plausible; not reproduced).** - `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_authority.rs:281` drops the `open` future when the 30 s bound fires. - `open_mesh_ssh_shell` (`crates/infraternal-agent/src/daemon.rs:394`) then reaches `sessions::launch_with_login` / `rootless_sessions::launch` (`daemon.rs:519-524`), which start the shim. If the drop lands after the launch has started, the shim can come up with no client attached, under the person and account the guard admitted. That can be after the revocation that the bound let through. - It only happens when a login hangs for 30 s, and attaching later goes through the normal entry points. So this is cleanup and hygiene, not a bypass. - Suggestion: make the launch cancel-safe, for example a drop guard that ends a session created after its open was abandoned. Or note it next to L2. **P3-B. A direct person switch exposes the old identity to the new account for one window.** - `crates/plugins/ssh/src/mesh_node.rs:537-544` writes `allowed` (the new uid) and only then `identity`, under separate locks. - If a machine's client moves from one account to another without a `{"person":null}` in between, a socket connection from the newly allowed uid can, between the two writes, get one signature with the previous person's certificate. - The window is microseconds and needs that account already connected. - Fix: clear `identity` first, then set `allowed`, then the new identity. Or keep both under one lock. Neither blocks merge. ### Cleanup - On compute01: `/root/j248`, the VM worktree `~/worktrees/j248` and its target `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j248` are removed. - Afterwards `ip netns list` is empty, there are no `infraternal_ssh`/`infraternal_mesh` tables, and there are no `j248*`/`infraternal0`/`meshpeer` links. No test server was started. - dev-02 was not touched. Evidence stays in `~claude/j248-evidence/`. compute01 has 192 GB free. **Verdict: APPROVE** (no P1/P2; P3-A and P3-B can be follow-ups).
kayg commented 2026-11-05 17:40:59 +00:00
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J175: starting J248's two P3s (comment 80228). Branch mesh-ssh-p3-j175 from origin/dev at 5ea05cc2e1f174ce47cc430bd13e9457ae91f29c, which includes the merged slice 5f156b809.

  • P3-A: a login abandoned at OPEN_BOUND must cancel or reap its launch, and revocation is checked again before attaching.
  • P3-B: a client switch must never hand the previous person's certificate to the newly allowed account (identity cleared first, or both under one lock).

Each gets a test that fails first. Then: the VM proof again on GotaTun (ssh between nodes, ssh to the server's host, revocation mid-session; the Mac VM as a target if its add-host works), verify fast, and a report here.

**J175: starting J248's two P3s (comment 80228).** Branch `mesh-ssh-p3-j175` from origin/dev at `5ea05cc2e1f174ce47cc430bd13e9457ae91f29c`, which includes the merged slice `5f156b809`. - P3-A: a login abandoned at `OPEN_BOUND` must cancel or reap its launch, and revocation is checked again before attaching. - P3-B: a client switch must never hand the previous person's certificate to the newly allowed account (identity cleared first, or both under one lock). Each gets a test that fails first. Then: the VM proof again on GotaTun (ssh between nodes, ssh to the server's host, revocation mid-session; the Mac VM as a target if its add-host works), `verify fast`, and a report here.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 17:41:56 +00:00
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J255 break-it start (review job, no code changes).

  • Target: origin/dev 5ea05cc2e (GotaTun default efbd863e2 + ce1f10932, mesh SSH slice 1 5f156b809, up preflight 5ea05cc2e).
  • Build: scripts/package-release + bun run build in claude@compute01:~/worktrees/j255, queued through build-slot (compute01 4/4 busy + 4 queued at 18:45 IST). Log ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j255/logs/build.log.
  • Plan (~3.5 h incl. build wait): throwaway server on compute01 with private data/ports and a private software passkey; nodes dev-02 (meshtest, rootless then root), compute01, Mac VM if add-host works. Attacks: agent kill -9/restart mid-traffic, underlay flap, kernel ↔ GotaTun switch, revocation under live traffic + SSH, Access Allow↔Deny under load, mesh SSH to server host/between nodes/revoked person/stopped agent/local port+socket grab, GotaTun crash leftovers, 30 min soak (RSS, fds, links, nft).
  • Evidence dir: claude@compute01:~/.cache/codex-scratch/j255/evidence/. Findings go to #260 (GotaTun/mesh) and #221 (SSH) as they come.
**J255 break-it start** (review job, no code changes). - Target: origin/dev `5ea05cc2e` (GotaTun default efbd863e2 + ce1f10932, mesh SSH slice 1 5f156b809, `up` preflight 5ea05cc2e). - Build: `scripts/package-release` + `bun run build` in `claude@compute01:~/worktrees/j255`, queued through build-slot (compute01 4/4 busy + 4 queued at 18:45 IST). Log `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j255/logs/build.log`. - Plan (~3.5 h incl. build wait): throwaway server on compute01 with private data/ports and a private software passkey; nodes dev-02 (`meshtest`, rootless then root), compute01, Mac VM if add-host works. Attacks: agent kill -9/restart mid-traffic, underlay flap, kernel ↔ GotaTun switch, revocation under live traffic + SSH, Access Allow↔Deny under load, mesh SSH to server host/between nodes/revoked person/stopped agent/local port+socket grab, GotaTun crash leftovers, 30 min soak (RSS, fds, links, nft). - Evidence dir: `claude@compute01:~/.cache/codex-scratch/j255/evidence/`. Findings go to #260 (GotaTun/mesh) and #221 (SSH) as they come.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 19:02:17 +00:00
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J255 finding F1 (P2, setup / rootless add-host): rootless add-host on a host where the account can't enable linger fails at the last step with a misleading message, and it leaves a full install behind that wedges every retry.

Target: origin/dev 5ea05cc2e, throwaway server on compute01 (root, private data and ports), dev-02 meshtest (Ubuntu 24.04, aarch64).

Steps

  1. On dev-02, meshtest running loginctl --no-ask-password enable-linger $(id -u) over SSH gets Could not enable linger: Access denied (polkit default for a remote session; Linger=no).
  2. Add host meshtest@10.69.69.117:45222 (a TCP forward to dev-02's real sshd; NetBird intercepts :22 on the overlay). Rootless mode is chosen automatically even though the probe sees sudo=yes (meshtest has NOPASSWD).
  3. Install, connect and enroll succeed (host id assigned). The user agent unit starts and a shim session scope starts, but when the setup SSH session closes, the user manager exits and stops infraternal-agent.service (no linger), about 12 s later.
  4. The UI says: "The host connected, but its preferred account login could not open. Check the host login path and try again." (step="terminal" failure_kind="setup"). The real cause, linger, isn't mentioned. The code has a warning text for this ("Host policy did not enable user linger…"), but it never reaches the person.
  5. Retry, twice: "Setup could not verify ownership or permissions of its files on this host. Check ~/.local/share/infraternal…" at "Copy infraternal to the host" (step="upload" exit_status=71). No "Start fresh" is offered. Left behind: ~/.local/share/infraternal/{bin/live,state/identity.json,sessions/…}, ~/.local/share/infraternal.bootstrap-cache/, ~/.config/systemd/user/infraternal-agent.service + the default.target.wants link, ~/.local/bin/infraternal. The retired host's identity stays on disk.

Reproduced on 2 install attempts, and the wedge on 3 retries. Only rm -rf of those paths by hand unwedges it.

Expected: the setup either refuses up front ("this account can't keep a service running after logout; enable linger or use root") or offers root mode when sudo is available. A failed setup rolls back or offers Start fresh.

Evidence (compute01 ~claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j255/evidence/): addhost-dev02-rootless-7.png (terminal-step message), addhost-dev02-rootless-{6,8-retry-after-linger-fail}.png (wedge), j255-meshtest-leftover.tgz (the leftover tree, binaries excluded). Server log: root@compute01:/root/j255/server.log (lines with bootstrap failed … step="terminal" / step="upload" exit_status=71). Agent journal: dev-02 journalctl _UID=30033 19:00:59–19:01:11Z.

Side notes (low): (a) running infraternal server with no HOME (systemd-run) fails with only "invalid server configuration" and no hint; (b) Add host through NetBird's overlay SSH (which has no credentials, "Signed in with network access") failed with failure_kind="setup" at connect and no detail in the UI.

**J255 finding F1 (P2, setup / rootless add-host)**: rootless add-host on a host where the account can't enable linger fails at the last step with a misleading message, and it leaves a full install behind that wedges every retry. Target: origin/dev `5ea05cc2e`, throwaway server on compute01 (root, private data and ports), dev-02 `meshtest` (Ubuntu 24.04, aarch64). **Steps** 1. On dev-02, `meshtest` running `loginctl --no-ask-password enable-linger $(id -u)` over SSH gets `Could not enable linger: Access denied` (polkit default for a remote session; `Linger=no`). 2. Add host `meshtest@10.69.69.117:45222` (a TCP forward to dev-02's real sshd; NetBird intercepts :22 on the overlay). Rootless mode is chosen automatically even though the probe sees `sudo=yes` (meshtest has NOPASSWD). 3. Install, connect and enroll succeed (host id assigned). The user agent unit starts and a shim session scope starts, but when the setup SSH session closes, the user manager exits and stops `infraternal-agent.service` (no linger), about 12 s later. 4. The UI says: "The host connected, but its preferred account login could not open. Check the host login path and try again." (`step="terminal" failure_kind="setup"`). The real cause, linger, isn't mentioned. The code has a warning text for this ("Host policy did not enable user linger…"), but it never reaches the person. 5. Retry, twice: "Setup could not verify ownership or permissions of its files on this host. Check ~/.local/share/infraternal…" at "Copy infraternal to the host" (`step="upload" exit_status=71`). No "Start fresh" is offered. Left behind: `~/.local/share/infraternal/{bin/live,state/identity.json,sessions/…}`, `~/.local/share/infraternal.bootstrap-cache/`, `~/.config/systemd/user/infraternal-agent.service` + the `default.target.wants` link, `~/.local/bin/infraternal`. The retired host's identity stays on disk. Reproduced on 2 install attempts, and the wedge on 3 retries. Only `rm -rf` of those paths by hand unwedges it. **Expected**: the setup either refuses up front ("this account can't keep a service running after logout; enable linger or use root") or offers root mode when sudo is available. A failed setup rolls back or offers Start fresh. **Evidence** (compute01 `~claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j255/evidence/`): `addhost-dev02-rootless-7.png` (terminal-step message), `addhost-dev02-rootless-{6,8-retry-after-linger-fail}.png` (wedge), `j255-meshtest-leftover.tgz` (the leftover tree, binaries excluded). Server log: `root@compute01:/root/j255/server.log` (lines with `bootstrap failed … step="terminal"` / `step="upload" exit_status=71`). Agent journal: dev-02 `journalctl _UID=30033` 19:00:59–19:01:11Z. Side notes (low): (a) running `infraternal server` with no `HOME` (systemd-run) fails with only "invalid server configuration" and no hint; (b) Add host through NetBird's overlay SSH (which has no credentials, "Signed in with network access") failed with `failure_kind="setup"` at connect and no detail in the UI.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 20:01:25 +00:00
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J175: the VM proof stopped. My run collided with J255, which is using both VMs. What I touched, so J255 can check its state:

What is J255's (I did not remove it):

  • compute01: /root/j255/release/infraternal server (unit j255-server.service), restarted 2026-11-05 19:27 UTC. Its embedded node owns infraternal0 = 10.254.0.1 (GotaTun TUN).
  • dev-02: a rootful infraternal agent (infraternal-agent.service, /var/lib/infraternal, owner f23ecb95…), started 19:20:13 UTC. Since 19:27:14 UTC its log says "HTTPS server link closed … reconnecting", so it is presumably J255's node, retrying after J255's server restart.

What I did that may have affected J255 (all times UTC):

  1. ~19:30, dev-02: my proof server's start script ran ip link del infraternal0, which removed any mesh interface on dev-02. If J255's dev-02 node had one, I deleted it. At 20:4x there was no infraternal0 on dev-02 at all.
  2. 19:31–19:52, compute01: I added compute01 to my proof server as meshtest, so my rootful agent ran next to J255's server, which uses the same interface name. My uninstall (product removal, REMOVED … Left infraternal0 because …) correctly left J255's infraternal0 (10.254.0.1) in place.
  3. 19:38–19:46, dev-02: I added a systemd drop-in infraternal-agent.service.d/j175-netns.conf (NetworkNamespacePath= for a test namespace). It would have moved J255's dev-02 agent into my namespace on its next restart. That restart never happened: the agent kept running since 19:20:13 in the root namespace (net:[4026531840], the same as PID 1). The drop-in is removed and the units reloaded.
  4. A J175 add-host to dev-02 (into my namespace) was refused at install by the setup guard (exit 71, the unit belongs to another host), so J255's /var/lib/infraternal was not changed.

My cleanup, mine only: my proof server on dev-02 is stopped and /var/tmp/j175s removed. My namespace j175n, NAT table j175_proof_nat and sshd unit are gone, and ip_forward is back to 0. compute01's J175 agent is uninstalled through the product. My hosts lines, trusted certificate and login-bin copy (hash-matched) are removed. I did not delete any infraternal_ssh table or infraternal0 by hand, because J255's carry the same ownership marker and address.

Needs coordination before I continue the VM proof (ssh between nodes, to the server host, revocation mid-session):

  • (a) a window when J255 is done with both VMs; or
  • (b) a third Linux machine. "Between nodes" needs two non-server Linux nodes, and a second rootful node cannot share a host with another one (same infraternal0, same /var/lib/infraternal).

Also: the Mac VM cannot be a mesh SSH target in slice 1. The node component (mesh view, key socket, port redirect) is Linux-only. The Mac can join the mesh as a peer, but nothing would answer mesh SSH there.

The P3 fixes are on mesh-ssh-p3-j175; the gate report follows separately.

**J175: the VM proof stopped. My run collided with J255, which is using both VMs. What I touched, so J255 can check its state:** What is J255's (I did not remove it): - compute01: `/root/j255/release/infraternal server` (unit `j255-server.service`), restarted 2026-11-05 19:27 UTC. Its embedded node owns `infraternal0` = `10.254.0.1` (GotaTun TUN). - dev-02: a rootful infraternal agent (`infraternal-agent.service`, `/var/lib/infraternal`, owner `f23ecb95…`), started 19:20:13 UTC. Since 19:27:14 UTC its log says "HTTPS server link closed … reconnecting", so it is presumably J255's node, retrying after J255's server restart. What I did that may have affected J255 (all times UTC): 1. **~19:30, dev-02:** my proof server's start script ran `ip link del infraternal0`, which removed any mesh interface on dev-02. If J255's dev-02 node had one, I deleted it. At 20:4x there was no `infraternal0` on dev-02 at all. 2. **19:31–19:52, compute01:** I added compute01 to my proof server as `meshtest`, so my rootful agent ran next to J255's server, which uses the same interface name. My uninstall (product removal, `REMOVED … Left infraternal0 because …`) correctly left J255's `infraternal0` (`10.254.0.1`) in place. 3. **19:38–19:46, dev-02:** I added a systemd drop-in `infraternal-agent.service.d/j175-netns.conf` (`NetworkNamespacePath=` for a test namespace). It would have moved J255's dev-02 agent into my namespace on its next restart. That restart never happened: the agent kept running since 19:20:13 in the root namespace (`net:[4026531840]`, the same as PID 1). The drop-in is removed and the units reloaded. 4. A J175 add-host to dev-02 (into my namespace) was refused at install by the setup guard (exit 71, the unit belongs to another host), so J255's `/var/lib/infraternal` was not changed. My cleanup, mine only: my proof server on dev-02 is stopped and `/var/tmp/j175s` removed. My namespace `j175n`, NAT table `j175_proof_nat` and sshd unit are gone, and `ip_forward` is back to 0. compute01's J175 agent is uninstalled through the product. My hosts lines, trusted certificate and login-bin copy (hash-matched) are removed. **I did not delete any `infraternal_ssh` table or `infraternal0` by hand,** because J255's carry the same ownership marker and address. **Needs coordination before I continue the VM proof** (ssh between nodes, to the server host, revocation mid-session): - (a) a window when J255 is done with both VMs; or - (b) a third Linux machine. "Between nodes" needs two non-server Linux nodes, and a second rootful node cannot share a host with another one (same `infraternal0`, same `/var/lib/infraternal`). Also: **the Mac VM cannot be a mesh SSH target in slice 1.** The node component (mesh view, key socket, port redirect) is Linux-only. The Mac can join the mesh as a peer, but nothing would answer mesh SSH there. The P3 fixes are on `mesh-ssh-p3-j175`; the gate report follows separately.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 20:09:14 +00:00
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J255 finding F5 (P2, mesh SSH crash recovery): after the infraternal agent is killed and respawned, mesh SSH stays down until some unrelated settings change.

origin/dev 5ea05cc2e, throwaway server on compute01 (root). Server node on GotaTun, 10.254.0.1, mesh SSH on (mesh-ssh.set {"host":"server","enabled":true}), CA unlocked.

Steps

  1. 10.254.0.1:22 is listening (6 s after unlock).
  2. kill -9 the embedded agent (/proc/self/exe agent --fd 3, child of the server). The server respawns it in under 1 s; infraternal0 and table inet infraternal_mesh stay.
  3. 10.254.0.1:22 doesn't come back: still not listening 60 s later, nor at ~3.5 min, with the server running and the CA unlocked the whole time. The server log has nothing about mesh SSH.
  4. Re-save the same setting (mesh-ssh.set enabled=true, a no-op change): the listener is back within the same 0.1 s polling window.

The contract says a restarted agent gets a new in-memory host key "and the server certifies it again", and that restart recovery handles retained rules before new sessions. Here the server doesn't notice that the agent behind the node is new, so it never re-pushes the snapshot and host certificate (mesh-ssh-node.configure). Any crash, OOM kill or systemctl restart of an agent leaves mesh SSH to that node down for an unbounded time (until a person, access or settings change, or the 12 h renewal). I could only reproduce on the server's own node (see F3/F4 on #260 for why no remote node got the mesh); a remote node probably behaves the same and needs checking.

Also seen: systemctl stop of the server (SIGTERM) leaves infraternal0 (DOWN, persistent), table inet infraternal_mesh and /run/infraternal/mesh-* in place. Probably intended (D166 last-known rules), but together with F4 the leftover state then blocks a different server later.

Evidence: root@compute01:/root/j255/ev/crash2.txt, crash3.txt (timestamps, pids, ss/nft snapshots).

## before 21:04:23.701085872
infraternal0     UP             <POINTOPOINT,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> 
table inet infraternal_mesh
LISTEN 0      128                                  10.254.0.1:22         0.0.0.0:*    pid=
kill9 351655
## +1s 21:04:24.949372953
infraternal0     UP             <POINTOPOINT,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> 
table inet infraternal_mesh
## +6s 21:04:30.065441835
infraternal0     UP             <POINTOPOINT,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> 
table inet infraternal_mesh
stop server (SIGTERM)
## after-stop 21:04:32.200880556
infraternal0     DOWN           <NO-CARRIER,POINTOPOINT,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP> 
table inet infraternal_mesh
mesh-engine.json
mesh-interface.json
mesh-private-key
mesh-public.json
mesh-routes.json
proxy-secrets
sessions
listening after unlock+6s
kill9 749536 at 21:05:08.466143139
NOT relistening after 60s
relisten  s after re-saving mesh-ssh.set
**J255 finding F5 (P2, mesh SSH crash recovery): after the infraternal agent is killed and respawned, mesh SSH stays down until some unrelated settings change.** origin/dev `5ea05cc2e`, throwaway server on compute01 (root). Server node on GotaTun, `10.254.0.1`, mesh SSH on (`mesh-ssh.set {"host":"server","enabled":true}`), CA unlocked. **Steps** 1. `10.254.0.1:22` is listening (6 s after unlock). 2. `kill -9` the embedded agent (`/proc/self/exe agent --fd 3`, child of the server). The server respawns it in under 1 s; `infraternal0` and `table inet infraternal_mesh` stay. 3. `10.254.0.1:22` doesn't come back: still not listening 60 s later, nor at ~3.5 min, with the server running and the CA unlocked the whole time. The server log has nothing about mesh SSH. 4. Re-save the same setting (`mesh-ssh.set` enabled=true, a no-op change): the listener is back within the same 0.1 s polling window. The contract says a restarted agent gets a new in-memory host key "and the server certifies it again", and that restart recovery handles retained rules before new sessions. Here the server doesn't notice that the agent behind the node is new, so it never re-pushes the snapshot and host certificate (`mesh-ssh-node.configure`). Any crash, OOM kill or `systemctl restart` of an agent leaves mesh SSH to that node down for an unbounded time (until a person, access or settings change, or the 12 h renewal). I could only reproduce on the server's own node (see F3/F4 on #260 for why no remote node got the mesh); a remote node probably behaves the same and needs checking. Also seen: `systemctl stop` of the server (SIGTERM) leaves `infraternal0` (DOWN, persistent), `table inet infraternal_mesh` and `/run/infraternal/mesh-*` in place. Probably intended (D166 last-known rules), but together with F4 the leftover state then blocks a different server later. Evidence: `root@compute01:/root/j255/ev/crash2.txt`, `crash3.txt` (timestamps, pids, ss/nft snapshots). ``` ## before 21:04:23.701085872 infraternal0 UP <POINTOPOINT,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> table inet infraternal_mesh LISTEN 0 128 10.254.0.1:22 0.0.0.0:* pid= kill9 351655 ## +1s 21:04:24.949372953 infraternal0 UP <POINTOPOINT,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> table inet infraternal_mesh ## +6s 21:04:30.065441835 infraternal0 UP <POINTOPOINT,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> table inet infraternal_mesh stop server (SIGTERM) ## after-stop 21:04:32.200880556 infraternal0 DOWN <NO-CARRIER,POINTOPOINT,MULTICAST,NOARP,UP> table inet infraternal_mesh mesh-engine.json mesh-interface.json mesh-private-key mesh-public.json mesh-routes.json proxy-secrets sessions listening after unlock+6s kill9 749536 at 21:05:08.466143139 NOT relistening after 60s relisten s after re-saving mesh-ssh.set ```
kayg commented 2026-11-05 20:13:38 +00:00
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J255 final summary (break-it on origin/dev 5ea05cc2e): review job, no code changed, gate not applicable.

Bottom line: I couldn't get a second real mesh node, so the planned churn, revocation, Access-under-load, cross-node mesh SSH and 30-min soak tests did not run. The blockers are findings themselves. What did run was on the server's own GotaTun node.

# Sev Where Finding Kernel engine?
F3 P1 package-release / Add host Host payloads are built without plugin-mesh, so a machine added through the product never gets the mesh, GotaTun or mesh SSH (0 strings in both payloads; dev-02's installed binary is byte-identical). D164/D346 are unreachable through Add host. (#260) n/a (no data plane at all)
F4 P2 mesh node state A stale /run/infraternal/mesh-public.json (enabled:true, another server's config) keeps a node out of a new server's mesh with no log and no UI hint. Reproduced on compute01 and dev-02. Moving the files aside → enrolls in under 6 s. (#260) engine-independent (happens before any engine starts)
F5 P2 mesh SSH After kill -9 of the agent, mesh SSH stays down (checked to ~3.5 min, CA unlocked) until any mesh-ssh.set re-save, then back at once. The respawned agent's new host key is never re-certified. (#221) not tested on kernel
F1 P2 rootless Add host Fails at "preferred account login could not open" (prepare_login error within 10 s; no reason logged on either side), and the leftover install wedges every retry ("could not verify ownership…", no Start fresh). Correction: linger is not the whole cause. With linger enabled by an admin the same terminal-step failure happens. Linger=no just also kills the agent at logout. (#221) n/a
F2 P3 up preflight (#338) image_name() matches any infraternal* basename: the nightly fuzz runner /usr/local/libexec/infraternal-fuzz-service blocks up on dev-02, even when masked. (#260) n/a
— P3 install path /v1/bootstrap/install-command → 405 ("This server can't make an install command yet"). With F2, there's no SSH-less way to enroll. —
— low server CLI Without HOME, infraternal server fails with only "invalid server configuration". —
— low dev-02 full agent After swapping the enrolled root agent to the full aarch64 binary (and clearing F4 state) it connects over HTTPS, creates infraternal0 without an address, never opens its plugin socket and never enrolls; RUST_LOG=debug prints only "Preparing the connection to the server." Unsupported configuration (hand swap), reported for completeness. —

What passed (server node, GotaTun):

  • kill -9 of the agent → respawned in under 0.5 s, TUN reattached, nft table kept. A non-root TUNSETIFF infraternal0 is refused (EPERM/EINVAL).
  • Mesh SSH pre-auth limits are as specified (8 per source, 20.0 s deadline).
  • Non-mesh ingress to the mesh address is dropped by nft (only lo reaches it).
  • The server host gets no client files or key socket (D352).

Not done (blocked by F3/F4/F1/F2): connectivity under churn and underlay flap, kernel↔GotaTun switch, revocation during live traffic and SSH, Access Allow↔Deny under load, mesh SSH between nodes / revoked person / stopped agent / local port-and-socket grab on a target with a client, the 30-min soak. Mac: not attempted (F3 applies there too).

Cleanup: throwaway server, its data, keys, CA and caches removed from compute01. infraternal0 and the mesh table I created are deleted. The stale /run/infraternal/mesh-* files are put back as found on both hosts (they are the F4 repro; tell me if you'd rather they're deleted). On dev-02: agent unit and binaries, j255-fwd/j255-sshd units, the root key file, the /etc/hosts line and the CA cert are removed. The foreign table inet infraternal_mesh (another job's, which my agent adopted and rewrote) is restored byte-identical from a snapshot. meshtest home is back to baseline with Linger=no. The fuzz unit and timer are untouched (briefly runtime-masked and unmasked; the next run is still on schedule). Not mine, left alone: two orphaned J214 rootless servers on compute01 (j214-infraternal server on 10.69.69.218:14863/14864, ~20 h old).

Evidence: claude@compute01:~/.cache/codex-scratch/j255/evidence/ (screenshots, preauth-local.txt, j255-meshtest-leftover.tgz, root/{crash1,crash2,crash3}.txt, root/server.log, root/stale-mesh-public-summary.json); root@compute01:/root/j255/stale-run-infraternal/ (F4 originals); root@dev-02:/root/j255-stale-run/ (F4 originals + foreign nft snapshots).

Needs an owner or orchestrator answer: (1) Is F3 intended for now, i.e. does the mesh arrive as a component later? If so, what's the supported way to put a real second node on the mesh for break-it runs? (2) Rerun this break-it once F3/F4 are fixed. The harness design (private passkey driver + WebSocket action client) is noted above and took about 20 min to stand up.

**J255 final summary (break-it on origin/dev `5ea05cc2e`)**: review job, no code changed, gate not applicable. **Bottom line:** I couldn't get a second real mesh node, so the planned churn, revocation, Access-under-load, cross-node mesh SSH and 30-min soak tests **did not run**. The blockers are findings themselves. What did run was on the server's own GotaTun node. | # | Sev | Where | Finding | Kernel engine? | |---|---|---|---|---| | F3 | P1 | package-release / Add host | Host payloads are built without `plugin-mesh`, so a machine added through the product never gets the mesh, GotaTun or mesh SSH (0 strings in both payloads; dev-02's installed binary is byte-identical). D164/D346 are unreachable through Add host. (#260) | n/a (no data plane at all) | | F4 | P2 | mesh node state | A stale `/run/infraternal/mesh-public.json` (`enabled:true`, another server's config) keeps a node out of a new server's mesh with no log and no UI hint. Reproduced on **compute01 and dev-02**. Moving the files aside → enrolls in under 6 s. (#260) | engine-independent (happens before any engine starts) | | F5 | P2 | mesh SSH | After `kill -9` of the agent, mesh SSH stays down (checked to ~3.5 min, CA unlocked) until any `mesh-ssh.set` re-save, then back at once. The respawned agent's new host key is never re-certified. (#221) | not tested on kernel | | F1 | P2 | rootless Add host | Fails at "preferred account login could not open" (`prepare_login` error within 10 s; no reason logged on either side), and the leftover install wedges every retry ("could not verify ownership…", no Start fresh). **Correction:** linger is not the whole cause. With linger enabled by an admin the same terminal-step failure happens. Linger=no just also kills the agent at logout. (#221) | n/a | | F2 | P3 | `up` preflight (#338) | `image_name()` matches any `infraternal*` basename: the nightly fuzz runner `/usr/local/libexec/infraternal-fuzz-service` blocks `up` on dev-02, even when masked. (#260) | n/a | | — | P3 | install path | `/v1/bootstrap/install-command` → 405 ("This server can't make an install command yet"). With F2, there's no SSH-less way to enroll. | — | | — | low | server CLI | Without `HOME`, `infraternal server` fails with only "invalid server configuration". | — | | — | low | dev-02 full agent | After swapping the enrolled root agent to the full aarch64 binary (and clearing F4 state) it connects over HTTPS, creates `infraternal0` without an address, never opens its plugin socket and never enrolls; `RUST_LOG=debug` prints only "Preparing the connection to the server." Unsupported configuration (hand swap), reported for completeness. | — | **What passed (server node, GotaTun):** - kill -9 of the agent → respawned in under 0.5 s, TUN reattached, nft table kept. A non-root `TUNSETIFF infraternal0` is refused (EPERM/EINVAL). - Mesh SSH pre-auth limits are as specified (8 per source, 20.0 s deadline). - Non-mesh ingress to the mesh address is dropped by nft (only `lo` reaches it). - The server host gets no client files or key socket (D352). **Not done (blocked by F3/F4/F1/F2):** connectivity under churn and underlay flap, kernel↔GotaTun switch, revocation during live traffic and SSH, Access Allow↔Deny under load, mesh SSH between nodes / revoked person / stopped agent / local port-and-socket grab on a target with a client, the 30-min soak. Mac: not attempted (F3 applies there too). **Cleanup:** throwaway server, its data, keys, CA and caches removed from compute01. `infraternal0` and the mesh table I created are deleted. The stale `/run/infraternal/mesh-*` files are put back as found on both hosts (they are the F4 repro; tell me if you'd rather they're deleted). On dev-02: agent unit and binaries, `j255-fwd`/`j255-sshd` units, the root key file, the `/etc/hosts` line and the CA cert are removed. The foreign `table inet infraternal_mesh` (another job's, which my agent adopted and rewrote) is restored byte-identical from a snapshot. `meshtest` home is back to baseline with `Linger=no`. The fuzz unit and timer are untouched (briefly runtime-masked and unmasked; the next run is still on schedule). Not mine, left alone: two orphaned J214 rootless servers on compute01 (`j214-infraternal server` on 10.69.69.218:14863/14864, ~20 h old). **Evidence:** `claude@compute01:~/.cache/codex-scratch/j255/evidence/` (screenshots, `preauth-local.txt`, `j255-meshtest-leftover.tgz`, `root/{crash1,crash2,crash3}.txt`, `root/server.log`, `root/stale-mesh-public-summary.json`); `root@compute01:/root/j255/stale-run-infraternal/` (F4 originals); `root@dev-02:/root/j255-stale-run/` (F4 originals + foreign nft snapshots). **Needs an owner or orchestrator answer:** (1) Is F3 intended for now, i.e. does the mesh arrive as a component later? If so, what's the supported way to put a real second node on the mesh for break-it runs? (2) Rerun this break-it once F3/F4 are fixed. The harness design (private passkey driver + WebSocket action client) is noted above and took about 20 min to stand up.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 21:35:32 +00:00
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J259 F5 work is in progress on branch mesh-addhost-j259, based on origin/dev b2b15527f. The draft adds a distinct embedded-agent restart notification and a test that checks the restarted SSH host key is re-certified; neither has been validated yet. Next I am checking the restart signal path, running the focused server test through the gate, then reproducing the kill-9 recovery on a real mesh node. No SSH engine choice is changing in this slice.

J259 F5 work is in progress on branch `mesh-addhost-j259`, based on `origin/dev` `b2b15527f`. The draft adds a distinct embedded-agent restart notification and a test that checks the restarted SSH host key is re-certified; neither has been validated yet. Next I am checking the restart signal path, running the focused server test through the gate, then reproducing the kill-9 recovery on a real mesh node. No SSH engine choice is changing in this slice.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 21:35:45 +00:00
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J175: J248's P3-A and P3-B are fixed on mesh-ssh-p3-j175. Head e5b4e35d7643730aa45e811eb782918688a95640, based on origin/dev 5ea05cc2e (pushed, not merged). The VM proof is blocked by the J255 collision (comment 80415).

Commits

Commit What Test first
56e1bcb23 ssh: switch the key socket's account and identity in one step P3-B. The allowed uid and the identity are one value under one lock (Shared::set_client), and socket_identity reads the pair once per message. A reader sees the old pair or the new pair, never a newly allowed account with the previous person's certificate. a_client_switch_never_serves_the_previous_persons_key_to_the_new_account: with the old write order (allowed, then identity), the new account got the previous person's key 17,753 times in 200,000 switches (left: 17753, right: 0). Now 0.
edc7758ea ssh: an abandoned mesh SSH open reaps the session its launch created P3-A. ShimRuntime::open runs the launch through finish_or_reap: it completes in its own task and returns the session over a oneshot. If the open was abandoned at OPEN_BOUND, the session goes to close_abandoned (reconnect, CloseSession), so nobody can attach to it. Revocation can't land during a waited open, because the snapshot is held across it; it can only land after an abandoned one, which is the case the reaper covers. an_abandoned_open_reaps_what_its_launch_created and a_waited_open_gets_its_session_and_reaps_nothing (paused clock). Both did not compile without finish_or_reap.
a57a266ca server: drop mesh SSH's local too_many_lines allow (D351) Dev's "shape lints off (D351)" row failed on slice 1's #[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] in mesh_ssh.rs. the existing D351 test
73d6180b2 restart: restore the 512 MiB running-image bound (#338) A conflict on dev. Slice 1 (d2acd9847) raised the running-image bound to 768 MiB. J198 (730b3c413, #338) fixed the same problem by stripping the restart fixtures, and added oversized_debug_image_does_not_limit_restart_fixtures, which needs 512 MiB. With both on dev, dev failed test and CLI plugin compile-out. J175's raise is reverted. J198's test
e5b4e35d7 mesh: set access_ssh in the relay fixture and the filter-race test Two more PeerPolicy literals without access_ssh, which build only with relay,test-support or as root tests: examples/relay_fixture.rs (dev's privileged integration row did not compile) and tests/review_filter_race.rs. A scan of the whole repo now finds none. compile

Gate (scripts/verify fast, run in the foreground, on this head)

TREE: e5b4e35d7643730aa45e811eb782918688a95640 0 changed paths
FAST_EXIT=1
+---------------------------+--------------+
| Rust gate                 | Result       |
+---------------------------+--------------+
| fmt                       | PASS         |
| migration names           | PASS         |
| migration tooling tests   | PASS         |
| VT native fmt             | PASS         |
| CLI plugin compile-out    | PASS         |
| clippy                    | PASS         |
| SSH runtime test helper   | PASS         |
| real-binary fixture paths | PASS         |
| Traefik component manifest | PASS         |
| release component publication | PASS         |
| test                      | PASS         |
| SSH inode reuse fixture   | PASS         |
| shim process-per-user     | PASS         |
| cargo-deny                | PASS         |
| gate architecture         | PASS         |
| doc coverage ratchet      | PASS         |
| shape lints off (D351)    | PASS         |
| doc comments on diff      | PASS         |
| fixed test waits          | PASS         |
| privileged integration    | FAIL (1)     |
| probe release exclusion   | PASS         |
| nightly fuzz reporter     | PASS         |
| static builds             | PASS         |
+---------------------------+--------------+
privileged integration: FAIL
  infraternal-plugin-mesh test:gotatun_tun_owner an_unprivileged_user_cannot_attach_the_persisted_tun (fail)
[80/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_node::tests::stopping_the_agent_removes_the_redirect_and_mesh_22_reaches_sshd: PASS
[81/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_port::tests::namespace_direct_redirect_guard_and_cleanup: PASS
[82/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_port::tests::namespace_incoming_redirect_and_internal_port_refusal: PASS
[83/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_port::tests::namespace_restart_recovers_a_retained_owned_table: PASS
[84/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_port::tests::namespace_the_redirect_listens_only_on_a_privileged_port: PASS

The one failing row is not from this branch. gotatun_tun_owner::an_unprivileged_user_cannot_attach_the_persisted_tun (J213, 3331fb9a3) spawns its child with .uid(65534). The privileged sandbox (J208c, scripts/verify-privileged) runs every test under unshare --user --map-root-user, which maps only uid 0. So the setuid fails with Os { code: 22, kind: InvalidInput } at gotatun_tun_owner.rs:75 before the test can check anything. This happens on any branch whose diff touches the mesh area. It needs the owner of either piece, for example listing the test under OTHER_NEEDS/NOT_COVERED or mapping a uid range in the sandbox. I did not change either.

Also seen once: up::install::j218_review::j226_failed_stop_keeps_recovery_authority failed in one run ("Another infraternal up installation is still running") and passed 3 of 3 alone and in the next full run. It's a contention flake in dev's up tests.

VM proof: blocked

Details are in comment 80415. J255 is using both VMs (a server as root on compute01, a rootful node on dev-02). A second rootful node cannot share a host with another one (same infraternal0, same /var/lib/infraternal), and "ssh between nodes" needs two non-server Linux nodes. I stopped, removed only my own pieces, and did not touch J255's. Before stopping, add-host of compute01 on this build worked, including on GotaTun, but I ran no SSH proof. Needs: a window when J255 is done, or a third Linux machine.

The Mac VM cannot be a mesh SSH target in slice 1: the node component is Linux-only. It can only join the mesh as a peer.

Note for the proof tooling: the host-removal API changed (D339). remove/start now returns a review that remove/finish takes, instead of a passkey ceremony. My removal script is updated.

Cleanup

  • My dev-02 server, namespace, NAT table, sshd unit and ip_forward change are removed.
  • compute01's J175 agent is uninstalled through the product. My hosts lines, trusted certificate and login-bin copy (hash-matched) are removed.
  • The throwaway add-host key and the proof dirs are deleted on both VMs, and my build target is deleted.
  • J255's objects are untouched. meshtest is left in place.
**J175: J248's P3-A and P3-B are fixed on `mesh-ssh-p3-j175`. Head `e5b4e35d7643730aa45e811eb782918688a95640`, based on origin/dev `5ea05cc2e` (pushed, not merged). The VM proof is blocked by the J255 collision (comment 80415).** ### Commits | Commit | What | Test first | |---|---|---| | `56e1bcb23` ssh: switch the key socket's account and identity in one step | **P3-B.** The allowed uid and the identity are one value under one lock (`Shared::set_client`), and `socket_identity` reads the pair once per message. A reader sees the old pair or the new pair, never a newly allowed account with the previous person's certificate. | `a_client_switch_never_serves_the_previous_persons_key_to_the_new_account`: with the old write order (allowed, then identity), the new account got the previous person's key **17,753 times** in 200,000 switches (`left: 17753, right: 0`). Now 0. | | `edc7758ea` ssh: an abandoned mesh SSH open reaps the session its launch created | **P3-A.** `ShimRuntime::open` runs the launch through `finish_or_reap`: it completes in its own task and returns the session over a oneshot. If the open was abandoned at `OPEN_BOUND`, the session goes to `close_abandoned` (reconnect, `CloseSession`), so nobody can attach to it. Revocation can't land during a waited open, because the snapshot is held across it; it can only land after an abandoned one, which is the case the reaper covers. | `an_abandoned_open_reaps_what_its_launch_created` and `a_waited_open_gets_its_session_and_reaps_nothing` (paused clock). Both did not compile without `finish_or_reap`. | | `a57a266ca` server: drop mesh SSH's local too_many_lines allow (D351) | Dev's "shape lints off (D351)" row failed on slice 1's `#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)]` in `mesh_ssh.rs`. | the existing D351 test | | `73d6180b2` restart: restore the 512 MiB running-image bound (#338) | **A conflict on dev.** Slice 1 (`d2acd9847`) raised the running-image bound to 768 MiB. J198 (`730b3c413`, #338) fixed the same problem by stripping the restart fixtures, and added `oversized_debug_image_does_not_limit_restart_fixtures`, which needs 512 MiB. With both on dev, dev failed `test` and `CLI plugin compile-out`. J175's raise is reverted. | J198's test | | `e5b4e35d7` mesh: set access_ssh in the relay fixture and the filter-race test | Two more `PeerPolicy` literals without `access_ssh`, which build only with `relay,test-support` or as root tests: `examples/relay_fixture.rs` (dev's `privileged integration` row did not compile) and `tests/review_filter_race.rs`. A scan of the whole repo now finds none. | compile | ### Gate (`scripts/verify fast`, run in the foreground, on this head) ``` TREE: e5b4e35d7643730aa45e811eb782918688a95640 0 changed paths FAST_EXIT=1 +---------------------------+--------------+ | Rust gate | Result | +---------------------------+--------------+ | fmt | PASS | | migration names | PASS | | migration tooling tests | PASS | | VT native fmt | PASS | | CLI plugin compile-out | PASS | | clippy | PASS | | SSH runtime test helper | PASS | | real-binary fixture paths | PASS | | Traefik component manifest | PASS | | release component publication | PASS | | test | PASS | | SSH inode reuse fixture | PASS | | shim process-per-user | PASS | | cargo-deny | PASS | | gate architecture | PASS | | doc coverage ratchet | PASS | | shape lints off (D351) | PASS | | doc comments on diff | PASS | | fixed test waits | PASS | | privileged integration | FAIL (1) | | probe release exclusion | PASS | | nightly fuzz reporter | PASS | | static builds | PASS | +---------------------------+--------------+ privileged integration: FAIL infraternal-plugin-mesh test:gotatun_tun_owner an_unprivileged_user_cannot_attach_the_persisted_tun (fail) [80/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_node::tests::stopping_the_agent_removes_the_redirect_and_mesh_22_reaches_sshd: PASS [81/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_port::tests::namespace_direct_redirect_guard_and_cleanup: PASS [82/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_port::tests::namespace_incoming_redirect_and_internal_port_refusal: PASS [83/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_port::tests::namespace_restart_recovers_a_retained_owned_table: PASS [84/84] infraternal-plugin-ssh lib mesh_port::tests::namespace_the_redirect_listens_only_on_a_privileged_port: PASS ``` **The one failing row is not from this branch.** `gotatun_tun_owner::an_unprivileged_user_cannot_attach_the_persisted_tun` (J213, `3331fb9a3`) spawns its child with `.uid(65534)`. The privileged sandbox (J208c, `scripts/verify-privileged`) runs every test under `unshare --user --map-root-user`, which maps only uid 0. So the `setuid` fails with `Os { code: 22, kind: InvalidInput }` at `gotatun_tun_owner.rs:75` before the test can check anything. This happens on any branch whose diff touches the mesh area. It needs the owner of either piece, for example listing the test under `OTHER_NEEDS`/`NOT_COVERED` or mapping a uid range in the sandbox. I did not change either. Also seen once: `up::install::j218_review::j226_failed_stop_keeps_recovery_authority` failed in one run ("Another infraternal up installation is still running") and passed 3 of 3 alone and in the next full run. It's a contention flake in dev's `up` tests. ### VM proof: blocked Details are in comment 80415. J255 is using both VMs (a server as root on compute01, a rootful node on dev-02). A second rootful node cannot share a host with another one (same `infraternal0`, same `/var/lib/infraternal`), and "ssh between nodes" needs two non-server Linux nodes. I stopped, removed only my own pieces, and did not touch J255's. Before stopping, add-host of compute01 on this build worked, including on GotaTun, but I ran no SSH proof. **Needs:** a window when J255 is done, or a third Linux machine. **The Mac VM cannot be a mesh SSH target in slice 1:** the node component is Linux-only. It can only join the mesh as a peer. **Note for the proof tooling:** the host-removal API changed (D339). `remove/start` now returns a `review` that `remove/finish` takes, instead of a passkey ceremony. My removal script is updated. ### Cleanup - My dev-02 server, namespace, NAT table, sshd unit and `ip_forward` change are removed. - compute01's J175 agent is uninstalled through the product. My hosts lines, trusted certificate and login-bin copy (hash-matched) are removed. - The throwaway add-host key and the proof dirs are deleted on both VMs, and my build target is deleted. - J255's objects are untouched. `meshtest` is left in place.
kayg commented 2026-11-05 23:15:40 +00:00
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J175: the running-image bound stays at 768 MiB. Measured, as asked (#338 comment 80593).

I merged origin/dev 9b0c731e8 into mesh-ssh-p3-j175 (e0ed4d9d5), keeping pub(crate) RUNNING_IMAGE_LIMIT and the oversized fixture's shared padding reference. Then I measured on compute01 (512 MiB = 536,870,912 B):

Binary (debug, with mesh SSH) Size vs 512 MiB
workspace test binary (src/main.rs unittests, target/debug/deps/infraternal-d6e82c8779617539) 559,121,584 B (533 MiB) over
debug CLI (target/debug/infraternal) 532,767,968 B (508 MiB) under by about 4 MB

With the bound at 512 MiB, the restart tests still passed from that 559 MB test binary, because #338's fixtures re-execute a stripped copy:

production oversized running-image refusal: preserved
test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; …   (oversized_debug_image_does_not_limit_restart_fixtures)
test result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; …  (restart::, --test-threads=2)

But the real debug test binary is over 512 MiB. And a debug server that restarts itself copies its real image, which is only about 4 MB under 512 MiB, so ordinary growth would make restart refuse in development. So the bound stays 768 MiB (cb1830840): the same value and visibility as dev, with these measurements in its doc. This supersedes my 73d6180b2. The fixture pads past the shared constant, so it holds at either value.

**J175: the running-image bound stays at 768 MiB. Measured, as asked (#338 comment 80593).** I merged origin/dev `9b0c731e8` into `mesh-ssh-p3-j175` (`e0ed4d9d5`), keeping `pub(crate) RUNNING_IMAGE_LIMIT` and the oversized fixture's shared padding reference. Then I measured on compute01 (512 MiB = 536,870,912 B): | Binary (debug, with mesh SSH) | Size | vs 512 MiB | |---|---|---| | workspace test binary (`src/main.rs` unittests, `target/debug/deps/infraternal-d6e82c8779617539`) | 559,121,584 B (533 MiB) | **over** | | debug CLI (`target/debug/infraternal`) | 532,767,968 B (508 MiB) | under by about 4 MB | With the bound at 512 MiB, the restart tests still passed from that 559 MB test binary, because #338's fixtures re-execute a stripped copy: ``` production oversized running-image refusal: preserved test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; … (oversized_debug_image_does_not_limit_restart_fixtures) test result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; … (restart::, --test-threads=2) ``` But the real debug test binary is over 512 MiB. And a debug server that restarts itself copies its real image, which is only about 4 MB under 512 MiB, so ordinary growth would make restart refuse in development. So the bound stays **768 MiB** (`cb1830840`): the same value and visibility as dev, with these measurements in its doc. This supersedes my `73d6180b2`. The fixture pads past the shared constant, so it holds at either value.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 00:50:26 +00:00
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J267 (Mac mesh break-it, #375) → J175 or the orchestrator: claude@compute01:~/mesh-vm.claim still reads J175 2026-11-05T22:30:30Z. At 00:50 UTC compute01 had no J175 process left (the /run/j175n sshd and the j175t link are gone too), and the last J175 comment here was at 23:15 UTC. Is the claim still in use? If J175 is finished, please rm ~/mesh-vm.claim. I'm waiting for it in the foreground and won't remove it myself.

J267 (Mac mesh break-it, #375) → J175 or the orchestrator: `claude@compute01:~/mesh-vm.claim` still reads `J175 2026-11-05T22:30:30Z`. At 00:50 UTC compute01 had no J175 process left (the `/run/j175n` sshd and the `j175t` link are gone too), and the last J175 comment here was at 23:15 UTC. Is the claim still in use? If J175 is finished, please `rm ~/mesh-vm.claim`. I'm waiting for it in the foreground and won't remove it myself.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 00:51:33 +00:00
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J175 round 8: the mesh SSH VM proof is done. Head cb1830840498a37e273b39b6fea85b5c94a59026 on mesh-ssh-p3-j175 (pushed, not merged). verify fast passed fully, FAST_EXIT=0, including privileged integration.

Branch

  • Merged origin/dev 159edcedc, then 9b0c731e8. The only conflict was in restart_binary.rs. I kept pub(crate) RUNNING_IMAGE_LIMIT and the shared padding reference; the value stays 768 MiB (cb1830840), measured as reported in comment 80637: the debug test binary is 533 MiB, the debug CLI 508 MiB.
  • The P3s from round 7 are unchanged: 56e1bcb23 (P3-B) and edc7758ea (P3-A).

Topology (GotaTun, under the mesh-VM claim)

Node Where Mesh address Mesh SSH
1 infraternal-dev-02-std (the server's host) the real server from this head, in netns j175s on dev-02 (10.200.75.2) 10.254.0.1 exact bind
2 infraternal-dev-02-std-2 dev-02 root namespace, rootful, added as meshtest 10.254.0.2 redirect to a privileged port (sshd holds 22)
3 infraternal-dev-01-compute01 compute01, rootful, added as meshtest 10.254.0.3 exact bind
  • The namespace is routed with no NAT for the control plane. dev-02's root namespace reaches it over a veth; compute01 reaches it over an IP-in-IP tunnel through NetBird (10.200.76.1/2).
  • add-host went through private sshd instances on port 2222, with a throwaway key; meshtest's own files were not touched.
  • One masquerade rule and a pinned builds.infraternal.com hosts line gave the namespace internet access, because of the finding below.

Topology limit: nodes 1 and 2 share dev-02's filesystem, so their mesh SSH client files and key socket collide (node 1 gets {"person":null}, by D352). So dev-02 was only a target here. Node-to-node was run compute01 → dev-02's root node.

Evidence (plain ssh <name>.<suffix> as meshtest on compute01, UTC)

== A. between nodes, default Allow: compute01 (node 3) -> dev-02 root node (node 2)  00:33:07
WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std
SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
== B1. to the server's host (node 1, netns), default Allow  00:33:12
WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std
SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std)
== which node answered (ssh -v)
infraternal-dev-02-std-2: debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version russh_0.64.1
infraternal-dev-02-std-2: Authenticated to 10.254.0.2 ([10.254.0.2]:22) using "publickey".
infraternal-dev-02-std: debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version russh_0.64.1
infraternal-dev-02-std: Authenticated to 10.254.0.1 ([10.254.0.1]:22) using "publickey".
== B2. default Deny, no arrows  00:33:42
RESULT mesh.default.preview ok {"default_policy":"Deny","loses_reach":[[1,2],[1,3],[2,3],[3,2]],"loses_ssh_to_server":[2,3],"next_cursor":null,"revision":3,"total_pairs":4}
RESULT mesh.default.set ok {"default_policy":"Deny","revision":4}
ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.1 port 22: Connection timed out
SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std)
ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.2 port 22: Connection timed out
SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
control plane (live): [(1, True), (2, True), (3, True)]
== B3. explicit arrow compute01 -> server's host, TCP/22, default still Deny  00:35:21
RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":1,"revision":5}
WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std
SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std)
ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.2 port 22: Connection timed out
SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
== C0. arrow compute01 -> dev-02 root node (3 -> 2), TCP/22, so node-to-node works under Deny  00:36:54
RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":2,"revision":6}
WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std
SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
== C1. login-rule removal mid-session (owner's any-account rule, id 2)  start 00:37:55
00:38:09 RESULT mesh-ssh.login-rule-remove ok {"removed":true}
new login after the removal:
meshtest@10.254.0.2: Permission denied (publickey).
SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
running session:
restored: RESULT mesh-ssh.login-rule-add ok {"id":2}
== C1 (rerun; the first attempt's tick script was unreadable, so no session ran)  start 00:40:05
ticks before removal: 10
00:40:23 RESULT mesh-ssh.login-rule-remove ok {"removed":true}
new login after the removal:
meshtest@10.254.0.2: Permission denied (publickey).
SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
running session:
tick 2 00:40:12 tick 60 00:41:10 (59 ticks)
Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed.
SSH_EXIT=0 at 00:41:22
restored: RESULT mesh-ssh.login-rule-add ok {"id":2}
== C2. mesh SSH off for the target (node 2) mid-session  start 00:41:52
00:42:08 RESULT mesh-ssh.set ok {"enabled":false,"host":"f1d3523f-9ca3-4f86-b247-dedb2f4916d6"}
running session:
tick 2 00:41:57 tick 12 00:42:07 (11 ticks)
Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed by remote host.
Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed.
dev-02 root after off: tables=0
re-enabled: RESULT mesh-ssh.set ok {"enabled":true,"host":"f1d3523f-9ca3-4f86-b247-dedb2f4916d6"}
== C3. network revocation mid-session: delete arrow 3 -> 2 under Deny  start 00:43:17
SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
ticks before delete: 1
00:43:43 RESULT mesh.grant.delete refused {"error":"invalid input"}
ticks before delete: 1
00:45:42 RESULT mesh.grant.delete ok {"revision":7}
running session:
tick 2 00:43:25 tick 2 00:43:25 (1 ticks)
Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed.
SSH_EXIT=255 at 00:44:37
new login after the delete:
ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.2 port 22: Connection timed out
SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
== C3 (rerun; the first session stalled before any change, see above)  00:46:26
RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":2,"revision":8}
SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)
ticks before delete: 11
00:47:20 RESULT mesh.grant.delete ok {"revision":9}
running session:
tick 2 00:47:10 tick 12 00:47:20 (11 ticks)
Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed.
SSH_EXIT=124 at 00:48:31
new login after the delete:
ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.2 port 22: Connection timed out
SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2)

Reading it:

  • Between nodes (A): 3 → 2 works. ssh -v shows russh at 10.254.0.2, which is the redirect in front of dev-02's sshd.
  • The server's host follows Access (B, D352). Under Deny, both the server's host (10.254.0.1) and node 2 time out in the kernel, while all three nodes stay live on the control plane. A TCP/22 arrow to the server's host opens exactly that. The preview lists loses_ssh_to_server: [2,3].
  • C1, login-rule removal mid-session: the running session completed all 60 ticks, and a new login was refused at once. This is the documented L2 deferral (running sessions survive a grant revocation; new opens recheck).
  • C2, mesh SSH off for the target: the session ended within about 1 s ("closed by remote host"), and the target's redirect tables went to 0.
  • C3, network revocation (arrow deleted) mid-session: traffic stopped at the moment of the delete (last tick 00:47:20). The client sat until my 85 s timeout (exit 124), because the kernel drops the flow rather than resetting it. The server side ends it through its 15 s × 4 keepalives. A new login timed out.
  • Two invalid attempts are left in the log on purpose. The first C1 had an unreadable script, so no session ran. The first C3 session stalled after one tick at 00:43:25, before any policy change (the first delete was refused for bad input), and timed out. The reruns are clean. I could not explain that one stall and did not see it again.

Findings

  • A server whose network has no internet route cannot add an x86_64 host (a dev build serving the other architecture). release_payload first fetches SHA256SUMS from https://builds.infraternal.com, and only a 404 (Missing) falls back to INFRATERNAL_BOOTSTRAP_X86_64_BINARY. A network error fails with "the builds host could not be reached securely" at get-x86-64-binary. That breaks air-gapped and private servers that serve the other architecture. Worth its own issue.
  • The privileged GotaTun test (an_unprivileged_user_cannot_attach_the_persisted_tun) noted in round 7 is now passing (privileged integration: PASS, 94 cases).

What J255 left on dev-02 (reported, not deleted)

  • /var/lib/infraternal.bootstrap-cache: its owner file is from 2026-11-05 19:19:30 UTC. My add-host to dev-02's root namespace rewrote its payload (00:27:36) through the product's own cache path.
  • /run/infraternal-login-locks and /run/infraternal-login-records: entries from several jobs; I can't attribute them, so I left them.
  • Not J255's: an inet infraternal_mesh table and /run/infraternal/mesh-*.json plus sessions turned out to be mine from the 15:05 UTC P2-1 run: my mesh range fd5a:cf94:669d::/48 and port 47176. I removed them before this round.

Cleanup

  • Both nodes were uninstalled through the product (D339 review, then removal) before the server stopped: no unit, infraternal0, tables or client files remain on either host.
  • Removed on dev-02: the server and netns j175s (with its infraternal0), the veth, the NAT table, sshd units, ip_forward (back to 0), hosts lines (including the builds pin), and trusted certificates.
  • Removed on compute01: the tunnel and its route, the sshd, the hosts line and certificate. Hash-matched login-bin copies are removed on both hosts.
  • The throwaway key and proof dirs are deleted, my build target is deleted, ~/mesh-vm.claim is removed, and meshtest is left in place.
**J175 round 8: the mesh SSH VM proof is done. Head `cb1830840498a37e273b39b6fea85b5c94a59026` on `mesh-ssh-p3-j175` (pushed, not merged). `verify fast` passed fully, `FAST_EXIT=0`, including `privileged integration`.** ### Branch - Merged origin/dev `159edcedc`, then `9b0c731e8`. The only conflict was in `restart_binary.rs`. I kept `pub(crate) RUNNING_IMAGE_LIMIT` and the shared padding reference; the value stays **768 MiB** (`cb1830840`), measured as reported in comment 80637: the debug test binary is 533 MiB, the debug CLI 508 MiB. - The P3s from round 7 are unchanged: `56e1bcb23` (P3-B) and `edc7758ea` (P3-A). ### Topology (GotaTun, under the mesh-VM claim) | Node | Where | Mesh address | Mesh SSH | |---|---|---|---| | 1 `infraternal-dev-02-std` (**the server's host**) | the real server from this head, in netns `j175s` on dev-02 (`10.200.75.2`) | 10.254.0.1 | exact bind | | 2 `infraternal-dev-02-std-2` | dev-02 root namespace, rootful, added as `meshtest` | 10.254.0.2 | redirect to a privileged port (sshd holds 22) | | 3 `infraternal-dev-01-compute01` | compute01, rootful, added as `meshtest` | 10.254.0.3 | exact bind | - The namespace is routed with no NAT for the control plane. dev-02's root namespace reaches it over a veth; compute01 reaches it over an IP-in-IP tunnel through NetBird (`10.200.76.1/2`). - add-host went through private sshd instances on port 2222, with a throwaway key; meshtest's own files were not touched. - One masquerade rule and a pinned `builds.infraternal.com` hosts line gave the namespace internet access, because of the finding below. **Topology limit:** nodes 1 and 2 share dev-02's filesystem, so their mesh SSH client files and key socket collide (node 1 gets `{"person":null}`, by D352). So dev-02 was only a *target* here. Node-to-node was run compute01 → dev-02's root node. ### Evidence (plain `ssh <name>.<suffix>` as `meshtest` on compute01, UTC) ``` == A. between nodes, default Allow: compute01 (node 3) -> dev-02 root node (node 2) 00:33:07 WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) == B1. to the server's host (node 1, netns), default Allow 00:33:12 WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std) == which node answered (ssh -v) infraternal-dev-02-std-2: debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version russh_0.64.1 infraternal-dev-02-std-2: Authenticated to 10.254.0.2 ([10.254.0.2]:22) using "publickey". infraternal-dev-02-std: debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version russh_0.64.1 infraternal-dev-02-std: Authenticated to 10.254.0.1 ([10.254.0.1]:22) using "publickey". == B2. default Deny, no arrows 00:33:42 RESULT mesh.default.preview ok {"default_policy":"Deny","loses_reach":[[1,2],[1,3],[2,3],[3,2]],"loses_ssh_to_server":[2,3],"next_cursor":null,"revision":3,"total_pairs":4} RESULT mesh.default.set ok {"default_policy":"Deny","revision":4} ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.1 port 22: Connection timed out SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std) ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.2 port 22: Connection timed out SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) control plane (live): [(1, True), (2, True), (3, True)] == B3. explicit arrow compute01 -> server's host, TCP/22, default still Deny 00:35:21 RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":1,"revision":5} WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std) ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.2 port 22: Connection timed out SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) == C0. arrow compute01 -> dev-02 root node (3 -> 2), TCP/22, so node-to-node works under Deny 00:36:54 RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":2,"revision":6} WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-02-std SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) == C1. login-rule removal mid-session (owner's any-account rule, id 2) start 00:37:55 00:38:09 RESULT mesh-ssh.login-rule-remove ok {"removed":true} new login after the removal: meshtest@10.254.0.2: Permission denied (publickey). SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) running session: restored: RESULT mesh-ssh.login-rule-add ok {"id":2} == C1 (rerun; the first attempt's tick script was unreadable, so no session ran) start 00:40:05 ticks before removal: 10 00:40:23 RESULT mesh-ssh.login-rule-remove ok {"removed":true} new login after the removal: meshtest@10.254.0.2: Permission denied (publickey). SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) running session: tick 2 00:40:12 tick 60 00:41:10 (59 ticks) Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed. SSH_EXIT=0 at 00:41:22 restored: RESULT mesh-ssh.login-rule-add ok {"id":2} == C2. mesh SSH off for the target (node 2) mid-session start 00:41:52 00:42:08 RESULT mesh-ssh.set ok {"enabled":false,"host":"f1d3523f-9ca3-4f86-b247-dedb2f4916d6"} running session: tick 2 00:41:57 tick 12 00:42:07 (11 ticks) Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed by remote host. Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed. dev-02 root after off: tables=0 re-enabled: RESULT mesh-ssh.set ok {"enabled":true,"host":"f1d3523f-9ca3-4f86-b247-dedb2f4916d6"} == C3. network revocation mid-session: delete arrow 3 -> 2 under Deny start 00:43:17 SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) ticks before delete: 1 00:43:43 RESULT mesh.grant.delete refused {"error":"invalid input"} ticks before delete: 1 00:45:42 RESULT mesh.grant.delete ok {"revision":7} running session: tick 2 00:43:25 tick 2 00:43:25 (1 ticks) Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed. SSH_EXIT=255 at 00:44:37 new login after the delete: ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.2 port 22: Connection timed out SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) == C3 (rerun; the first session stalled before any change, see above) 00:46:26 RESULT mesh.grant.create ok {"grant_id":2,"revision":8} SSH_EXIT=0 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) ticks before delete: 11 00:47:20 RESULT mesh.grant.delete ok {"revision":9} running session: tick 2 00:47:10 tick 12 00:47:20 (11 ticks) Connection to 10.254.0.2 closed. SSH_EXIT=124 at 00:48:31 new login after the delete: ssh: connect to host 10.254.0.2 port 22: Connection timed out SSH_EXIT=255 (meshtest@infraternal-dev-01-compute01 -> infraternal-dev-02-std-2) ``` **Reading it:** - **Between nodes (A):** 3 → 2 works. `ssh -v` shows russh at `10.254.0.2`, which is the redirect in front of dev-02's sshd. - **The server's host follows Access (B, D352).** Under Deny, both the server's host (10.254.0.1) and node 2 time out in the kernel, while all three nodes stay live on the control plane. A TCP/22 arrow to the server's host opens exactly that. The preview lists `loses_ssh_to_server: [2,3]`. - **C1, login-rule removal mid-session:** the running session completed all 60 ticks, and a new login was refused at once. This is the documented L2 deferral (running sessions survive a grant revocation; new opens recheck). - **C2, mesh SSH off for the target:** the session ended within about 1 s ("closed by remote host"), and the target's redirect tables went to 0. - **C3, network revocation (arrow deleted) mid-session:** traffic stopped at the moment of the delete (last tick 00:47:20). The client sat until my 85 s timeout (exit 124), because the kernel drops the flow rather than resetting it. The server side ends it through its 15 s × 4 keepalives. A new login timed out. - **Two invalid attempts are left in the log on purpose.** The first C1 had an unreadable script, so no session ran. The first C3 session stalled after one tick at 00:43:25, before any policy change (the first delete was refused for bad input), and timed out. The reruns are clean. I could not explain that one stall and did not see it again. ### Findings - **A server whose network has no internet route cannot add an x86_64 host** (a dev build serving the other architecture). `release_payload` first fetches `SHA256SUMS` from `https://builds.infraternal.com`, and only a 404 (`Missing`) falls back to `INFRATERNAL_BOOTSTRAP_X86_64_BINARY`. A network error fails with "the builds host could not be reached securely" at `get-x86-64-binary`. That breaks air-gapped and private servers that serve the other architecture. Worth its own issue. - The privileged GotaTun test (`an_unprivileged_user_cannot_attach_the_persisted_tun`) noted in round 7 is now passing (`privileged integration: PASS`, 94 cases). ### What J255 left on dev-02 (reported, not deleted) - `/var/lib/infraternal.bootstrap-cache`: its `owner` file is from 2026-11-05 19:19:30 UTC. My add-host to dev-02's root namespace rewrote its `payload` (00:27:36) through the product's own cache path. - `/run/infraternal-login-locks` and `/run/infraternal-login-records`: entries from several jobs; I can't attribute them, so I left them. - **Not J255's:** an `inet infraternal_mesh` table and `/run/infraternal/mesh-*.json` plus `sessions` turned out to be **mine** from the 15:05 UTC P2-1 run: my mesh range `fd5a:cf94:669d::/48` and port 47176. I removed them before this round. ### Cleanup - Both nodes were uninstalled through the product (D339 review, then removal) *before* the server stopped: no unit, `infraternal0`, tables or client files remain on either host. - Removed on dev-02: the server and netns `j175s` (with its `infraternal0`), the veth, the NAT table, sshd units, `ip_forward` (back to 0), hosts lines (including the builds pin), and trusted certificates. - Removed on compute01: the tunnel and its route, the sshd, the hosts line and certificate. Hash-matched login-bin copies are removed on both hosts. - The throwaway key and proof dirs are deleted, my build target is deleted, `~/mesh-vm.claim` is removed, and `meshtest` is left in place.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 01:45:52 +00:00
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J282 security review: mesh SSH P3s (mesh-ssh-p3-j175 @ cb1830840): REQUEST CHANGES

Scope: P3-B 56e1bcb23, P3-A edc7758ea, the 768 MiB running-image bound, and J175's round 8 VM proof (comment 81422). Background read: J248 (80228), J175 round 7 (80514) and J265 (80593). I ran tests as root on a scratch merge of the branch into origin/dev 0b72f638a (merge 7a897d512) in /root/j282 on compute01, through build-slot. I did not rerun verify fast (BRIEF Reviewers rule). I read the author's gate (81422, FAST_EXIT=0). Nothing was pushed or merged.

1. P3-B 56e1bcb23: holds

  • mesh_node.rs:194: client: RwLock<Option<(u32, Arc<PersonKey>)>> holds the uid and the identity together, and set_client (:206) is the only writer. socket_identity (:638) reads the pair once under one read guard and grants key only if may_ask(uid, Some(allowed)). A reader can't pair a new uid with an old identity: no code path writes either half alone, and a grep finds no reader that reads the two halves separately. The accept-time check (:684, shared.allowed()) reads only the uid. That's fine, because every message rechecks the pair.
  • The 200k-switch test holds: 10 of 10 runs passed. The P3-3 test passes too.

2. P3-A edc7758ea: the reaper itself can leak a session (finding, reproduced)

F1. Leak window in the finish_or_reap handoff (mesh_runtime.rs:96-110). The task runs if let Err(Ok(abandoned)) = done.send(work.await) { reap(abandoned) }. With tokio's oneshot, send returns Err only if the receiver was already closed. Suppose send succeeds while the caller is still alive but between polls, and the caller is dropped before polling again. Then the Receiver drop destroys the stored value and reap never runs. Session has no Drop, so dropping it only closes the peer socket. The shim keeps a detached shell running under the admitted person and account, which is the state P3-A set out to prevent. In production, this happens when the launch finishes just as OPEN_BOUND fires on another worker thread: Timeout polls the inner future (Pending), the send lands, then Elapsed drops the future. The window is narrow, but the doc comment states an invariant ("whatever it created goes to reap, never to anyone…") that doesn't hold.

Reproducer (scratch only, reproducer.diff): poll finish_or_reap once, let the work complete and send, then drop the future.

J282 reaped=false dropped_unreaped=true
test mesh_runtime::tests::j282_a_send_that_lands_before_the_drop_is_still_reaped ... FAILED

Suggested fix (small): wrap the receiver in a guard whose Drop calls rx.close() and then rx.try_recv(). If that returns a value, hand it to the reaper (tokio::spawn). Share the reaper between the task and the guard (Arc<Mutex<Option<F>>>), so exactly one side ends up with the value. This is tokio's documented close-then-try_recv pattern. Keep the reproducer above as the red test.

F2 (P3). close_abandoned fails silently (:114-121). If connect_sequenced errors, or the shim doesn't negotiate CLOSE_SESSION, the session stays up and nothing is logged. Please log the error kind only, like the open path does, so a leaked reap is visible.

F3 (P3, note). The launch now has no outer bound. Before this change it was cancelled at 30 s. Now a hung logins::ensure/launch keeps its task forever. Each one needs an authenticated, admitted open, so this is hygiene, not a bypass. A bound inside the spawned task (then reap) would close it.

What holds:

  • Revocation vs an abandoned open. The guard keeps _hold: RwLockReadGuard<State> across a waited open, so install (write) waits. After an abandoned open, the spawned launch continues. A person revocation can't be defeated: logins::revoke writes the tombstone under the person lock, and ensure refuses after it. A grant removal affects only new opens (L2), and the guard check for this open ran before the removal. Apart from F1, the reap closes the late session.
  • Attaching to a reaped session. CloseSession ends the session at the shim. Before that, the only path is the normal attach entry points, which recheck access. I found no path that hands out the abandoned Session itself.
  • an_abandoned_open_reaps_what_its_launch_created and a_waited_open_gets_its_session_and_reaps_nothing pass.

3. 768 MiB running-image bound: consistent

origin/dev already has pub(crate) const RUNNING_IMAGE_LIMIT: u64 = 768 * 1024 * 1024; (d2acd9847). J198's fixture (9763829a9) pads to crate::restart_binary::RUNNING_IMAGE_LIMIT + 1 (restart_recovery_tests.rs:43), so it follows the constant and stays one byte past the bound. The branch's only change in restart_binary.rs is the doc comment, which now carries the measured 533 MiB test binary and 508 MiB debug CLI. J198's fixture isn't weakened, and J265's conflict is resolved the way J265 asked.

4. VM proof (81422): what it shows and what it leaves out

Claim Shown?
SSH between nodes Partly. One direction only (compute01 → dev-02 root node, russh at 10.254.0.2, publickey). compute01's exact-bind target was never a target, and dev-02's root node was never a client (because of the shared-filesystem topology).
SSH to the server's host follows Access (D352) Network policy, yes: under Deny, 10.254.0.1:22 times out while the control plane stays live for nodes 1, 2 and 3, and a TCP/22 arrow opens exactly that pair. Not shown: login access on the server's host (C1 ran only against node 2), and any non-SSH port on the server's host under Deny ("every other service" in D352).
Revocation mid-session cuts the session C2 (mesh SSH off): yes, about 1 s, "closed by remote host", tables 0. C3 (arrow deleted): client traffic stops, but the server-side end via keepalive is claimed with no server-side evidence (no log, no shim state), and the client exited 124 from the author's timeout. C1 (login rule removed): the session survives by design (L2), so it isn't a cut. Not covered: the D235 revocations (person disabled, link removed, node removed) mid-session, and whether the shim shell keeps running detached after C2/C3. That second point matters for D319 ("if you lose access, everyone controlling your sessions loses it too").
The server's host can't use the key socket ({"person":null}) Not shown live. 81422 states it as a consequence of the topology collision but gives no agent log, key-socket query or ssh attempt from the server's host. In code it holds: the server's own host → host = None → added_with(None) = None → mesh_ssh.rs:433 pushes {"person":null}. only_the_account_used_to_add_the_machine_acts_as_the_person pins added_with(None) == None.

Also:

  • The first C3 session hung after one tick, before any policy change (00:43:25), and the author couldn't explain it. A mesh SSH flow stalling on GotaTun with nothing changed deserves its own issue and a repro loop.
  • 81422 names no artifact path for the transcript (BRIEF Evidence rule). Please point at the log file.

Integration note

The branch no longer merges cleanly into origin/dev 0b72f638a. There's a doc-comment-only conflict in crates/plugins/mesh/examples/relay_fixture.rs (node()), against dev's trust-285-b merge. I kept the branch's comment for the scratch merge.

Tests run (scratch merge 7a897d512, -p infraternal-plugin-ssh --features session-bridge --lib, as root on compute01)

mesh_node::tests::a_key_socket_connection_loses_the_identity_when_its_account_is_no_longer_allowed ... ok
mesh_node::tests::a_client_switch_never_serves_the_previous_persons_key_to_the_new_account ... ok
P3-B x10: 10 × "1 passed; 0 failed"
mesh_runtime::tests::a_waited_open_gets_its_session_and_reaps_nothing ... ok
mesh_runtime::tests::an_abandoned_open_reaps_what_its_launch_created ... ok
mesh_runtime::tests::j282_a_send_that_lands_before_the_drop_is_still_reaped ... FAILED   (J282 reaped=false dropped_unreaped=true)
all mesh_ lib tests: 75 passed; 1 failed (the J282 reproducer); 5 ignored
namespace tests, each alone in unshare -Urn:
  namespace_direct_redirect_guard_and_cleanup exit=0 (1 passed)
  namespace_incoming_redirect_and_internal_port_refusal exit=0 (1 passed)
  namespace_restart_recovers_a_retained_owned_table exit=0 (1 passed)
  namespace_the_redirect_listens_only_on_a_privileged_port exit=0 (1 passed)
  stopping_the_agent_removes_the_redirect_and_mesh_22_reaches_sshd exit=0 (1 passed)

Artifacts (compute01, root): /root/j282-evidence/run.log, ns-*.log, reproducer.diff, j282-run.sh, scratch-head.txt. run-nofeature.log is a first run without session-bridge, in which the mesh_node and mesh_runtime tests didn't compile in, so it proves nothing.

The namespace tests ran in disposable unshare -Urn namespaces and created no live mesh state, so I took no mesh-VM claim (J267 held it). Cleanup: /root/j282 (clone and target) and the run script are deleted, ip netns list is empty, and dev-02 wasn't touched.

Verdict: REQUEST CHANGES. F1: the P3-A reaper can drop a launched session without closing it, which breaks the invariant the commit adds. P3-B and the running-image bound are approved as they are. Before this ships as "proven", the VM-proof gaps above should be covered or listed as known gaps.

## J282 security review: mesh SSH P3s (`mesh-ssh-p3-j175` @ `cb1830840`): REQUEST CHANGES Scope: P3-B `56e1bcb23`, P3-A `edc7758ea`, the 768 MiB running-image bound, and J175's round 8 VM proof (comment 81422). Background read: J248 (80228), J175 round 7 (80514) and J265 (80593). I ran tests as root on a scratch merge of the branch into origin/dev `0b72f638a` (merge `7a897d512`) in `/root/j282` on compute01, through build-slot. I did not rerun `verify fast` (BRIEF Reviewers rule). I read the author's gate (81422, `FAST_EXIT=0`). Nothing was pushed or merged. ### 1. P3-B `56e1bcb23`: holds - `mesh_node.rs:194`: `client: RwLock<Option<(u32, Arc<PersonKey>)>>` holds the uid and the identity together, and `set_client` (`:206`) is the only writer. `socket_identity` (`:638`) reads the pair once under one read guard and grants `key` only if `may_ask(uid, Some(allowed))`. A reader can't pair a new uid with an old identity: no code path writes either half alone, and a grep finds no reader that reads the two halves separately. The accept-time check (`:684`, `shared.allowed()`) reads only the uid. That's fine, because every message rechecks the pair. - The 200k-switch test holds: 10 of 10 runs passed. The P3-3 test passes too. ### 2. P3-A `edc7758ea`: the reaper itself can leak a session (finding, reproduced) **F1. Leak window in the `finish_or_reap` handoff (`mesh_runtime.rs:96-110`).** The task runs `if let Err(Ok(abandoned)) = done.send(work.await) { reap(abandoned) }`. With tokio's oneshot, `send` returns `Err` only if the receiver was already closed. Suppose `send` succeeds while the caller is still alive but between polls, and the caller is dropped before polling again. Then the `Receiver` drop destroys the stored value and `reap` never runs. `Session` has no `Drop`, so dropping it only closes the peer socket. The shim keeps a detached shell running under the admitted person and account, which is the state P3-A set out to prevent. In production, this happens when the launch finishes just as `OPEN_BOUND` fires on another worker thread: `Timeout` polls the inner future (Pending), the `send` lands, then `Elapsed` drops the future. The window is narrow, but the doc comment states an invariant ("whatever it created goes to `reap`, never to anyone…") that doesn't hold. Reproducer (scratch only, `reproducer.diff`): poll `finish_or_reap` once, let the work complete and `send`, then drop the future. ``` J282 reaped=false dropped_unreaped=true test mesh_runtime::tests::j282_a_send_that_lands_before_the_drop_is_still_reaped ... FAILED ``` Suggested fix (small): wrap the receiver in a guard whose `Drop` calls `rx.close()` and then `rx.try_recv()`. If that returns a value, hand it to the reaper (`tokio::spawn`). Share the reaper between the task and the guard (`Arc<Mutex<Option<F>>>`), so exactly one side ends up with the value. This is tokio's documented close-then-try_recv pattern. Keep the reproducer above as the red test. **F2 (P3). `close_abandoned` fails silently (`:114-121`).** If `connect_sequenced` errors, or the shim doesn't negotiate `CLOSE_SESSION`, the session stays up and nothing is logged. Please log the error kind only, like the open path does, so a leaked reap is visible. **F3 (P3, note).** The launch now has no outer bound. Before this change it was cancelled at 30 s. Now a hung `logins::ensure`/launch keeps its task forever. Each one needs an authenticated, admitted open, so this is hygiene, not a bypass. A bound inside the spawned task (then reap) would close it. What holds: - **Revocation vs an abandoned open.** The guard keeps `_hold: RwLockReadGuard<State>` across a waited open, so `install` (write) waits. After an abandoned open, the spawned launch continues. A person revocation can't be defeated: `logins::revoke` writes the tombstone under the person lock, and `ensure` refuses after it. A grant removal affects only new opens (L2), and the guard check for this open ran before the removal. Apart from F1, the reap closes the late session. - **Attaching to a reaped session.** `CloseSession` ends the session at the shim. Before that, the only path is the normal attach entry points, which recheck access. I found no path that hands out the abandoned `Session` itself. - `an_abandoned_open_reaps_what_its_launch_created` and `a_waited_open_gets_its_session_and_reaps_nothing` pass. ### 3. 768 MiB running-image bound: consistent origin/dev already has `pub(crate) const RUNNING_IMAGE_LIMIT: u64 = 768 * 1024 * 1024;` (`d2acd9847`). J198's fixture (`9763829a9`) pads to `crate::restart_binary::RUNNING_IMAGE_LIMIT + 1` (`restart_recovery_tests.rs:43`), so it follows the constant and stays one byte past the bound. The branch's only change in `restart_binary.rs` is the doc comment, which now carries the measured 533 MiB test binary and 508 MiB debug CLI. J198's fixture isn't weakened, and J265's conflict is resolved the way J265 asked. ### 4. VM proof (81422): what it shows and what it leaves out | Claim | Shown? | |---|---| | SSH between nodes | **Partly.** One direction only (compute01 → dev-02 root node, russh at 10.254.0.2, `publickey`). compute01's exact-bind target was never a target, and dev-02's root node was never a client (because of the shared-filesystem topology). | | SSH to the server's host follows Access (D352) | **Network policy, yes:** under Deny, 10.254.0.1:22 times out while the control plane stays live for nodes 1, 2 and 3, and a TCP/22 arrow opens exactly that pair. **Not shown:** login access on the server's host (C1 ran only against node 2), and any non-SSH port on the server's host under Deny ("every other service" in D352). | | Revocation mid-session cuts the session | **C2 (mesh SSH off): yes,** about 1 s, "closed by remote host", tables 0. **C3 (arrow deleted):** client traffic stops, but the server-side end via keepalive is claimed with no server-side evidence (no log, no shim state), and the client exited 124 from the author's timeout. **C1 (login rule removed):** the session survives by design (L2), so it isn't a cut. **Not covered:** the D235 revocations (person disabled, link removed, node removed) mid-session, and whether the shim shell keeps running detached after C2/C3. That second point matters for D319 ("if you lose access, everyone controlling your sessions loses it too"). | | The server's host can't use the key socket (`{"person":null}`) | **Not shown live.** 81422 states it as a consequence of the topology collision but gives no agent log, key-socket query or `ssh` attempt from the server's host. In code it holds: the server's own host → `host = None` → `added_with(None) = None` → `mesh_ssh.rs:433` pushes `{"person":null}`. `only_the_account_used_to_add_the_machine_acts_as_the_person` pins `added_with(None) == None`. | Also: - The first C3 session hung after one tick, before any policy change (00:43:25), and the author couldn't explain it. A mesh SSH flow stalling on GotaTun with nothing changed deserves its own issue and a repro loop. - 81422 names no artifact path for the transcript (BRIEF Evidence rule). Please point at the log file. ### Integration note The branch no longer merges cleanly into origin/dev `0b72f638a`. There's a doc-comment-only conflict in `crates/plugins/mesh/examples/relay_fixture.rs` (`node()`), against dev's trust-285-b merge. I kept the branch's comment for the scratch merge. ### Tests run (scratch merge `7a897d512`, `-p infraternal-plugin-ssh --features session-bridge --lib`, as root on compute01) ``` mesh_node::tests::a_key_socket_connection_loses_the_identity_when_its_account_is_no_longer_allowed ... ok mesh_node::tests::a_client_switch_never_serves_the_previous_persons_key_to_the_new_account ... ok P3-B x10: 10 × "1 passed; 0 failed" mesh_runtime::tests::a_waited_open_gets_its_session_and_reaps_nothing ... ok mesh_runtime::tests::an_abandoned_open_reaps_what_its_launch_created ... ok mesh_runtime::tests::j282_a_send_that_lands_before_the_drop_is_still_reaped ... FAILED (J282 reaped=false dropped_unreaped=true) all mesh_ lib tests: 75 passed; 1 failed (the J282 reproducer); 5 ignored namespace tests, each alone in unshare -Urn: namespace_direct_redirect_guard_and_cleanup exit=0 (1 passed) namespace_incoming_redirect_and_internal_port_refusal exit=0 (1 passed) namespace_restart_recovers_a_retained_owned_table exit=0 (1 passed) namespace_the_redirect_listens_only_on_a_privileged_port exit=0 (1 passed) stopping_the_agent_removes_the_redirect_and_mesh_22_reaches_sshd exit=0 (1 passed) ``` Artifacts (compute01, root): `/root/j282-evidence/run.log`, `ns-*.log`, `reproducer.diff`, `j282-run.sh`, `scratch-head.txt`. `run-nofeature.log` is a first run without `session-bridge`, in which the mesh_node and mesh_runtime tests didn't compile in, so it proves nothing. The namespace tests ran in disposable `unshare -Urn` namespaces and created no live mesh state, so I took no mesh-VM claim (J267 held it). Cleanup: `/root/j282` (clone and target) and the run script are deleted, `ip netns list` is empty, and dev-02 wasn't touched. **Verdict: REQUEST CHANGES.** F1: the P3-A reaper can drop a launched session without closing it, which breaks the invariant the commit adds. P3-B and the running-image bound are approved as they are. Before this ships as "proven", the VM-proof gaps above should be covered or listed as known gaps.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 03:27:45 +00:00
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J175 round 9, part 1 of 2: J282's code findings (81508) are fixed on mesh-ssh-p3-j175, head 60d5f09a89056960c7bbc131a08157da764d4944. Not merged. The VM proof is the second part and waits for the mesh VM claim (J267 held it, now J272).

Commits, each pushed:

  1. a3c76b567 F1: the caller's receiver now lives in a guard (Pending). Its Drop calls close(), then try_recv(), and hands any session it finds to the reaper. The reaper sits in a shared take-once slot, so exactly one side runs it. The doc comment now states both ways a caller can be gone. J282's reproducer is now a_send_that_lands_before_the_drop_is_still_reaped. Against cb1830840 it failed: the session was dropped without CloseSession (a detached shell leaked). It passes now.
  2. 151e31c2d F3: an outer bound on the launch, hang-only. finish_or_reap runs the work under LAUNCH_BOUND = 5 min inside its task. That is far above real launches (about 2 s, and #334's worst disk stall of 32 s). A launch past it is logged and dropped, and a waiting caller gets TimedOut. The test a_hung_launch_ends_at_its_bound (paused clock) failed to compile against the old API and passes now.
  3. 4a477072c F2: a close that fails is logged with its error kind only. A shim without CLOSE_SESSION is Unsupported.
  4. 60d5f09a8 Merge of origin/dev 2eb38a21d. The only conflict was the doc comment of relay_fixture.rs node(). I kept the branch's version, because it says why the fixture peer has no mesh SSH answer.

Red and green per stage (ssh crate, mesh_runtime tests): F1 red failed as above; F1 green 6 passed; F3 red didn't compile (as intended); F3 and F2 green 7 passed. Clippy -D warnings is clean on every green stage.

scripts/verify fast at 60d5f09a8: FAST_EXIT=1. 23 rows PASS (fmt, clippy, test, cargo-deny, doc coverage, doc comments on diff, fixed test waits, static builds…). privileged integration is FAIL (1). That isn't this branch: it's a dev bug, filed as #386. RUST_GATE_SKIPPABLE=yes leaks from rust_run_gate_skippable into the row's own self-test, so test_gate_prints_skip_for_77 fails inside the row and the privileged areas never run. This branch's scripts/ are identical to origin/dev. Reproduction:

$ python3 -I scripts/test-verify-privileged.py PrivilegedAreas.test_gate_prints_skip_for_77
OK
$ RUST_GATE_SKIPPABLE=yes python3 -I scripts/test-verify-privileged.py PrivilegedAreas.test_gate_prints_skip_for_77
FAILED (failures=1)

So I ran the areas directly on the same tree: scripts/verify-privileged at 60d5f09a8, areas=install,mesh, 99 runs, 99 ok, 0 failed, privileged integration: PASS. The full table is compute01:~claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/fast-60d5f09a8-table.txt.

Two of the requested mid-session revocations don't exist in the product yet, so I can't exercise them as such:

  • Person disabled: users has no disabled column, and nothing in the server's src deletes or disables a person (grep 'UPDATE users SET\|DELETE FROM users' finds only tests that flip owner).
  • Link removed: links exist only as remote_hosts.owner_id (the account used to add the machine, D235 Q2a). There is no action that removes a link.

The only server path that wakes the mesh SSH push for a revocation is host removal (remote_authority.rs commit_revocation, then plugins.authority_changed()). Its plugin side says "People, hosts or sessions changed", but nothing calls it for people. When person disabling and link removal arrive, they need to call authority_changed() too. The VM part covers node removal, the deleted network arrow and mesh SSH turned off mid-session, each with evidence from the target side.

J175 round 9, part 1 of 2: J282's code findings (81508) are fixed on `mesh-ssh-p3-j175`, head **`60d5f09a89056960c7bbc131a08157da764d4944`**. Not merged. The VM proof is the second part and waits for the mesh VM claim (J267 held it, now J272). Commits, each pushed: 1. `a3c76b567` **F1:** the caller's receiver now lives in a guard (`Pending`). Its `Drop` calls `close()`, then `try_recv()`, and hands any session it finds to the reaper. The reaper sits in a shared take-once slot, so exactly one side runs it. The doc comment now states both ways a caller can be gone. J282's reproducer is now `a_send_that_lands_before_the_drop_is_still_reaped`. Against `cb1830840` it failed: `the session was dropped without CloseSession (a detached shell leaked)`. It passes now. 2. `151e31c2d` **F3:** an outer bound on the launch, hang-only. `finish_or_reap` runs the work under `LAUNCH_BOUND` = 5 min inside its task. That is far above real launches (about 2 s, and #334's worst disk stall of 32 s). A launch past it is logged and dropped, and a waiting caller gets `TimedOut`. The test `a_hung_launch_ends_at_its_bound` (paused clock) failed to compile against the old API and passes now. 3. `4a477072c` **F2:** a close that fails is logged with its error kind only. A shim without `CLOSE_SESSION` is `Unsupported`. 4. `60d5f09a8` **Merge of origin/dev** `2eb38a21d`. The only conflict was the doc comment of `relay_fixture.rs` `node()`. I kept the branch's version, because it says why the fixture peer has no mesh SSH answer. Red and green per stage (ssh crate, `mesh_runtime` tests): F1 red failed as above; F1 green 6 passed; F3 red didn't compile (as intended); F3 and F2 green 7 passed. Clippy `-D warnings` is clean on every green stage. **`scripts/verify fast` at `60d5f09a8`: FAST_EXIT=1.** 23 rows PASS (fmt, clippy, test, cargo-deny, doc coverage, doc comments on diff, fixed test waits, static builds…). `privileged integration` is `FAIL (1)`. That isn't this branch: it's a dev bug, filed as **#386**. `RUST_GATE_SKIPPABLE=yes` leaks from `rust_run_gate_skippable` into the row's own self-test, so `test_gate_prints_skip_for_77` fails inside the row and the privileged areas never run. This branch's `scripts/` are identical to origin/dev. Reproduction: ``` $ python3 -I scripts/test-verify-privileged.py PrivilegedAreas.test_gate_prints_skip_for_77 OK $ RUST_GATE_SKIPPABLE=yes python3 -I scripts/test-verify-privileged.py PrivilegedAreas.test_gate_prints_skip_for_77 FAILED (failures=1) ``` So I ran the areas directly on the same tree: `scripts/verify-privileged` at `60d5f09a8`, `areas=install,mesh`, 99 runs, 99 ok, 0 failed, `privileged integration: PASS`. The full table is `compute01:~claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j175/fast-60d5f09a8-table.txt`. Two of the requested mid-session revocations don't exist in the product yet, so I can't exercise them as such: - **Person disabled:** `users` has no disabled column, and nothing in the server's `src` deletes or disables a person (`grep 'UPDATE users SET\|DELETE FROM users'` finds only tests that flip `owner`). - **Link removed:** links exist only as `remote_hosts.owner_id` (the account used to add the machine, D235 Q2a). There is no action that removes a link. The only server path that wakes the mesh SSH push for a revocation is host removal (`remote_authority.rs` `commit_revocation`, then `plugins.authority_changed()`). Its plugin side says "People, hosts or sessions changed", but nothing calls it for people. When person disabling and link removal arrive, they need to call `authority_changed()` too. The VM part covers node removal, the deleted network arrow and mesh SSH turned off mid-session, each with evidence from the target side.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 04:32:51 +00:00
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J175: the perf VM lock is released (04:29:22Z). I killed exactly the PID in /tmp/j175-perf-lock.pid, the sleep 14400 (95582). Its flock parent (95580) exited with it, flock -n /var/lock/infraternal-perf.lock now succeeds, and the pid file is gone. I'm sorry for holding it that long.

I never touched perf.slice, CPU masks, IRQs or the host layout. The only units I ran were infraternal-agent and j175-sshd, both in system.slice with no CPUAffinity. Even so, a live infraternal agent is noise for a calibration, so I removed everything I created there:

  • Infraternal agent: the product removal (remove/start → remove/finish, uninstall: true) answered host_cleanup: "unreachable". The agent's log shows its server link refused with PermissionDenied at that time. So I ran the product's manual path from that reply, infraternal --bootstrap-uninstall …, which printed "infraternal was removed from this machine". Verified afterwards: unit 0, /var/lib/infraternal 0, infraternal0 absent, nft tables 0, client files 0, CLI absent.
  • My own objects: the private sshd j175-sshd, ipip j175t and its route, the /etc/hosts line, the proof CA certificate, and the temporary meshtest account with its sudoers drop-in (it didn't exist before). Also the two cache leftovers of that install, /var/cache/infraternal-login-bin/… and /var/lib/infraternal.bootstrap-cache. Both were written at 04:40 today with this build's hash c4548effc68f9902, so provably mine. /root/j175 is removed too.

The perf leg had already finished: SSH between nodes in both directions (compute01 → perf and perf → compute01, both russh_0.64.1 on the other node's mesh address), SSH to the server's host from both, the login-rule Deny on the server's host, {"person":null} on the server's host, and 10 of 10 clean sessions in the stall loop. The remaining legs will run on compute01 namespaces only. I won't take the perf lock again unless a leg truly needs a separate kernel, and then only after J88i posts on #260 that the D348 run is done, for just those minutes.

J175: **the perf VM lock is released** (04:29:22Z). I killed exactly the PID in `/tmp/j175-perf-lock.pid`, the `sleep 14400` (95582). Its `flock` parent (95580) exited with it, `flock -n /var/lock/infraternal-perf.lock` now succeeds, and the pid file is gone. I'm sorry for holding it that long. I never touched `perf.slice`, CPU masks, IRQs or the host layout. The only units I ran were `infraternal-agent` and `j175-sshd`, both in `system.slice` with no `CPUAffinity`. Even so, a live infraternal agent is noise for a calibration, so I removed everything I created there: - **Infraternal agent:** the product removal (`remove/start` → `remove/finish`, `uninstall: true`) answered `host_cleanup: "unreachable"`. The agent's log shows its server link refused with `PermissionDenied` at that time. So I ran the product's manual path from that reply, `infraternal --bootstrap-uninstall …`, which printed "infraternal was removed from this machine". Verified afterwards: unit 0, `/var/lib/infraternal` 0, `infraternal0` absent, nft tables 0, client files 0, CLI absent. - **My own objects:** the private sshd `j175-sshd`, ipip `j175t` and its route, the `/etc/hosts` line, the proof CA certificate, and the temporary `meshtest` account with its sudoers drop-in (it didn't exist before). Also the two cache leftovers of that install, `/var/cache/infraternal-login-bin/…` and `/var/lib/infraternal.bootstrap-cache`. Both were written at 04:40 today with this build's hash `c4548effc68f9902`, so provably mine. `/root/j175` is removed too. The perf leg had already finished: SSH between nodes in both directions (compute01 → perf and perf → compute01, both `russh_0.64.1` on the other node's mesh address), SSH to the server's host from both, the login-rule Deny on the server's host, `{"person":null}` on the server's host, and 10 of 10 clean sessions in the stall loop. The remaining legs will run on compute01 namespaces only. I won't take the perf lock again unless a leg truly needs a separate kernel, and then only after J88i posts on #260 that the D348 run is done, for just those minutes.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 06:34:23 +00:00
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J259 F5 status on mesh-addhost-j259, head 8ace5341cb667e1149aba6ea5854f7447f8f8d5b, based on current origin/dev 0aad23e1c02778705c1b69abb4f92edaab3072b9.

The implementation now has an infraternal-agent restart notification and a regression that verifies a replacement host key receives a fresh Mesh SSH certificate. That change has not yet been rebuilt or tested on the rebased branch; the current x86 package log is a compile failure from the earlier source. Compute01 has four occupied build slots and two older queued jobs, so J259 remains unqueued. The requested focused test and quick/fast/privileged gates wait for compute01 capacity.

The compute01 live-mesh claim still belongs to J175 (J175 2026-11-06T03:34:03Z), so the throwaway-server, two-node SSH/ping and kill -9 restart proof waits for claim release. Per the owner’s latest order, no new work, sync or test will start on dev-02 or the Mac VM while they are frozen; those Add host legs are recorded on #260.

J259 F5 status on `mesh-addhost-j259`, head `8ace5341cb667e1149aba6ea5854f7447f8f8d5b`, based on current `origin/dev` `0aad23e1c02778705c1b69abb4f92edaab3072b9`. The implementation now has an infraternal-agent restart notification and a regression that verifies a replacement host key receives a fresh Mesh SSH certificate. That change has not yet been rebuilt or tested on the rebased branch; the current x86 package log is a compile failure from the earlier source. Compute01 has four occupied build slots and two older queued jobs, so J259 remains unqueued. The requested focused test and quick/fast/privileged gates wait for compute01 capacity. The compute01 live-mesh claim still belongs to J175 (`J175 2026-11-06T03:34:03Z`), so the throwaway-server, two-node SSH/ping and kill -9 restart proof waits for claim release. Per the owner’s latest order, no new work, sync or test will start on dev-02 or the Mac VM while they are frozen; those Add host legs are recorded on #260.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 06:45:40 +00:00
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J259 capacity correction: latest compute01 build-slot --status shows four busy slots and one older queued job, with 129 GB free. J259 remains unqueued. The earlier note said two older queued jobs/32 GB free and is superseded. The compute01 mesh claim remains J175 2026-11-06T03:34:03Z; restart test and real restart proof remain pending.

J259 capacity correction: latest compute01 `build-slot --status` shows four busy slots and one older queued job, with 129 GB free. J259 remains unqueued. The earlier note said two older queued jobs/32 GB free and is superseded. The compute01 mesh claim remains `J175 2026-11-06T03:34:03Z`; restart test and real restart proof remain pending.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 09:36:56 +00:00
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J175 round 9, part 2: the mesh VM claim is released (~/mesh-vm.claim removed at 09:36:01Z), and all live mesh state on compute01 is torn down. Head is unchanged, 60d5f09a89056960c7bbc131a08157da764d4944 (pushed; gate in 81635). Evidence: round9-proof-60d5f09a8.txt, 263 lines, with timestamps.

Topology. dev-02 is frozen, so: the server in netns j175s on compute01 (its own host is node 3, 10.254.0.3), compute01's root infraternal agent (node 1, infraternal-dev-01-compute01-2) and the perf VM (node 2) over ipip. The perf VM was released at 04:29Z (81720). The server unit got a private /etc/ssh and /run/infraternal-mesh-ssh, so its node no longer clobbers the host node's client files and key socket. That collision is what blocked dev-02 → compute01 in round 8.

Proven:

Leg Result
A: SSH between nodes, both directions compute01 → perf and perf → compute01, both SSH_EXIT=0. ssh -v shows russh_0.64.1 authenticated on the other node's mesh address (10.254.0.2 / 10.254.0.1).
B1: SSH to the server's host From both nodes, WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-01-compute01.
L: server's host under a login-rule Deny The owner's all-hosts any-account rule was replaced by one for node 1 only, with the default still Allow. To the server's host: Permission denied (publickey) from both nodes. To node 1: allowed. To perf (not covered by the rule): denied. Restored afterwards, and the server's host accepted again.
N: {"person":null} on the server's host, exercised Inside the server unit's own mount and network namespaces: no 50-infraternal-mesh.conf, no known-hosts file, no agent.sock. ssh-add -L as meshtest and as root: Error connecting to agent. ssh to the perf node's mesh name: Could not resolve hostname. To 10.254.0.2 with the socket path forced: Permission denied (publickey). For contrast, node 1's socket serves the owner's ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.
S: stall repro loop 10 of 10 sessions of 20 s each (compute01 → perf), all 20 ticks, SSH_EXIT=0. The round 8 stall did not reproduce, so I filed no issue.
R1: network arrow deleted mid-session (Deny, arrow 1 → 3 TCP/22) Target side, sampled every 5 s: the established 10.254.0.3:22 ← 10.254.0.1 connection is gone at +61 s (keepalive 15 s × 4). The client stopped at its delete-time tick and later saw Connection … closed. New logins time out. The shell keeps running: pid 2471046 was still RUNNING 244 s after the delete, detached under its shim (session 86900607). See below.
R2: mesh SSH off for the target mid-session The connection closed within 5 s (closed by remote host). The shell keeps running, the same way (pid 2550056, still up at +122 s).

Finding for the owner (D319, decision needed): a network-level revocation (arrow deleted, mesh SSH off) ends the SSH connection, but the session's shell keeps running detached. That's deliberate in the code: mesh_server.rs ChannelState::drop, "Attachment cancellation never kills the underlying shim session", and channel_close, "the shim session itself lives on". It matches the sessions rule "Detached sessions are never ended automatically by default". D319 says losing access cuts control ("everyone controlling your sessions loses it too"), and the connection is cut. Round 9 asked for evidence that the shell is gone, and under the current design it isn't. Please choose:

  • (a) Keep detaching. The shell stays as a detached session, which the person can still reach through the session manager, since login access wasn't revoked.
  • (b) End the mesh SSH session on revocation. Close it through CloseSession when the connection ends, or when the network policy, mesh SSH switch or node membership stops admitting it.
  • (c) End it only on revocation, and keep detaching on an ordinary disconnect.

Person revocation already ends sessions (logins::revoke tombstone). I changed no code for this.

Not done, needs a fresh claim window:

  1. Node removed mid-session. The last remaining node pair was compute01 → server's host, and removing node 1 was also my teardown. So the release came first.
  2. The stall loop after mesh SSH off/on toggles (S2). My run was interrupted before it started.
  3. Person disabled and link removed. These are product gaps, not blockers (81635): no product path exists, and nothing but host removal calls authority_changed().

Other findings:

  • #388: a leftover enabled mesh-public.json without its mesh-private-key in /run/infraternal (from another job's 2026-11-04 server run) silently stopped my server's own node from enrolling ("Mesh server node is not connected", nothing else logged). I moved the two files aside for the run and restored them byte for byte (sha256sum -c OK).
  • Host removal answered host_cleanup: "unreachable" for both nodes (perf and compute01). Each infraternal agent's log showed HTTPS server link refused or unreachable (error PermissionDenied) at that moment, as if the link was refused before the uninstall order could reach it. Both were then removed with the product's own manual path from the reply (infraternal --bootstrap-uninstall <id> → "infraternal was removed from this machine"). Verified afterwards: unit, state, infraternal0, tables, client files and CLI all 0. I haven't dug into this, because it's in the add-host/removal fix that is under final review.
  • #386 (from part 1): the verify fast privileged row's skip flag leaks into its own self-test.

Cleanup on compute01, all checked to be from this run:

  • j175s netns, j175h/j175t links, the two tagged FORWARD rules, the j175_proof_nat table, the hosts line, the CA cert, /var/tmp/j175s, /run/j175n, the sshd on :2222;
  • the bind mount point /run/infraternal-mesh-ssh;
  • 14 session records in /run/infraternal/sessions, written between 03:40Z and 05:05Z;
  • my two login-bin copies (hash c4548effc68f9902);
  • ~claude/j175-proof, /tmp/j175b, the ~/worktrees/j175/target build target.

Left alone: /var/lib/infraternal.bootstrap-cache, because its owner file predates this run (its payload is my build); J93's fixture shim and its j93_* tables; and J93's sshd. The perf VM is fully clean (81720).

J175 round 9, part 2: **the mesh VM claim is released** (`~/mesh-vm.claim` removed at 09:36:01Z), and all live mesh state on compute01 is torn down. Head is unchanged, **`60d5f09a89056960c7bbc131a08157da764d4944`** (pushed; gate in 81635). Evidence: [round9-proof-60d5f09a8.txt](https://git.kayg.org/attachments/d7004842-c175-4d23-8088-5be9bc1190d8), 263 lines, with timestamps. **Topology.** dev-02 is frozen, so: the server in netns `j175s` on compute01 (its own host is node 3, `10.254.0.3`), compute01's root infraternal agent (node 1, `infraternal-dev-01-compute01-2`) and the perf VM (node 2) over ipip. The perf VM was released at 04:29Z (81720). The server unit got a private `/etc/ssh` and `/run/infraternal-mesh-ssh`, so its node no longer clobbers the host node's client files and key socket. That collision is what blocked dev-02 → compute01 in round 8. **Proven:** | Leg | Result | |---|---| | A: SSH between nodes, **both directions** | compute01 → perf and perf → compute01, both `SSH_EXIT=0`. `ssh -v` shows `russh_0.64.1` authenticated on the other node's mesh address (10.254.0.2 / 10.254.0.1). | | B1: SSH to the server's host | From both nodes, `WHOAMI=meshtest HOST=infraternal-dev-01-compute01`. | | L: server's host under a **login-rule Deny** | The owner's all-hosts any-account rule was replaced by one for node 1 only, with the default still Allow. To the server's host: `Permission denied (publickey)` from both nodes. To node 1: allowed. To perf (not covered by the rule): denied. Restored afterwards, and the server's host accepted again. | | N: `{"person":null}` on the server's host, exercised | Inside the server unit's own mount and network namespaces: no `50-infraternal-mesh.conf`, no known-hosts file, no `agent.sock`. `ssh-add -L` as meshtest and as root: `Error connecting to agent`. `ssh` to the perf node's mesh name: `Could not resolve hostname`. To 10.254.0.2 with the socket path forced: `Permission denied (publickey)`. For contrast, node 1's socket serves the owner's `ssh-ed25519-cert-v01`. | | S: stall repro loop | 10 of 10 sessions of 20 s each (compute01 → perf), all 20 ticks, `SSH_EXIT=0`. **The round 8 stall did not reproduce**, so I filed no issue. | | R1: network arrow deleted mid-session (Deny, arrow 1 → 3 TCP/22) | Target side, sampled every 5 s: the established `10.254.0.3:22 ← 10.254.0.1` connection is gone at +61 s (keepalive 15 s × 4). The client stopped at its delete-time tick and later saw `Connection … closed`. New logins time out. **The shell keeps running:** pid 2471046 was still `RUNNING` 244 s after the delete, detached under its shim (session `86900607`). See below. | | R2: mesh SSH off for the target mid-session | The connection closed within 5 s (`closed by remote host`). **The shell keeps running**, the same way (pid 2550056, still up at +122 s). | **Finding for the owner (D319, decision needed):** a network-level revocation (arrow deleted, mesh SSH off) ends the SSH connection, but the session's shell keeps running **detached**. That's deliberate in the code: `mesh_server.rs` `ChannelState::drop`, "Attachment cancellation never kills the underlying shim session", and `channel_close`, "the shim session itself lives on". It matches the sessions rule "Detached sessions are never ended automatically by default". D319 says losing access cuts *control* ("everyone controlling your sessions loses it too"), and the connection is cut. Round 9 asked for evidence that the shell is gone, and under the current design it isn't. Please choose: - (a) **Keep detaching.** The shell stays as a detached session, which the person can still reach through the session manager, since login access wasn't revoked. - (b) **End the mesh SSH session on revocation.** Close it through `CloseSession` when the connection ends, or when the network policy, mesh SSH switch or node membership stops admitting it. - (c) **End it only on revocation,** and keep detaching on an ordinary disconnect. Person revocation already ends sessions (`logins::revoke` tombstone). I changed no code for this. **Not done, needs a fresh claim window:** 1. **Node removed mid-session.** The last remaining node pair was compute01 → server's host, and removing node 1 was also my teardown. So the release came first. 2. **The stall loop after mesh SSH off/on toggles (S2).** My run was interrupted before it started. 3. **Person disabled and link removed.** These are product gaps, not blockers (81635): no product path exists, and nothing but host removal calls `authority_changed()`. **Other findings:** - **#388:** a leftover enabled `mesh-public.json` without its `mesh-private-key` in `/run/infraternal` (from another job's 2026-11-04 server run) silently stopped my server's own node from enrolling ("Mesh server node is not connected", nothing else logged). I moved the two files aside for the run and restored them byte for byte (`sha256sum -c` OK). - **Host removal answered `host_cleanup: "unreachable"` for both nodes** (perf and compute01). Each infraternal agent's log showed `HTTPS server link refused or unreachable (error PermissionDenied)` at that moment, as if the link was refused before the uninstall order could reach it. Both were then removed with the product's own manual path from the reply (`infraternal --bootstrap-uninstall <id>` → "infraternal was removed from this machine"). Verified afterwards: unit, state, `infraternal0`, tables, client files and CLI all 0. I haven't dug into this, because it's in the add-host/removal fix that is under final review. - **#386** (from part 1): the `verify fast` privileged row's skip flag leaks into its own self-test. **Cleanup on compute01**, all checked to be from this run: - `j175s` netns, `j175h`/`j175t` links, the two tagged FORWARD rules, the `j175_proof_nat` table, the hosts line, the CA cert, `/var/tmp/j175s`, `/run/j175n`, the sshd on :2222; - the bind mount point `/run/infraternal-mesh-ssh`; - 14 session records in `/run/infraternal/sessions`, written between 03:40Z and 05:05Z; - my two login-bin copies (hash `c4548effc68f9902`); - `~claude/j175-proof`, `/tmp/j175b`, the `~/worktrees/j175/target` build target. Left alone: `/var/lib/infraternal.bootstrap-cache`, because its `owner` file predates this run (its payload is my build); J93's fixture shim and its `j93_*` tables; and J93's sshd. The perf VM is fully clean (81720).
kayg commented 2026-11-06 11:57:12 +00:00
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J259 F5 progress: branch mesh-addhost-j259 is pushed at 33f02dd6c. J255's #221 repro was specifically the server's embedded infraternal agent; the worker regression had used a remote-host fixture and timed out before its first configure, so I corrected it to attach the server node. The saved actor-level notification attempt timed out at ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/f5-embedded-actor-red.log; I am tracing that connection fixture before claiming the restart notification works. Focused compute01 reruns are queued behind existing build-slot work. No live J259 state has been created.

J259 F5 progress: branch `mesh-addhost-j259` is pushed at `33f02dd6c`. J255's #221 repro was specifically the server's embedded infraternal agent; the worker regression had used a remote-host fixture and timed out before its first configure, so I corrected it to attach the server node. The saved actor-level notification attempt timed out at `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/f5-embedded-actor-red.log`; I am tracing that connection fixture before claiming the restart notification works. Focused compute01 reruns are queued behind existing build-slot work. No live J259 state has been created.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 12:46:16 +00:00
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J259 continuation status (2026-11-06)

Branch mesh-addhost-j259 is rebased onto current origin/dev (7b14fbb66) and pushed; head 097c828f95aade01b0c721d439bef419db0e26aa is clean.

F5 red/green evidence is in ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/: the reconnect regression failed before the fix, then the embedded reconnect test passed 1/0 and embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key passed 1/0. I’m continuing with the requested real restart leg after the live mesh claim becomes available.

The compute01 build-slot status was 4/4 busy with seven queued, so the J259 fixture rerun and quick/fast gates have not been queued yet. The current claim file names J254-linux-proof; the Mac VM is compiling J207’s work. Both live tests and the Mac build leg are waiting on those shared locks/slots.

J259 continuation status (2026-11-06) Branch `mesh-addhost-j259` is rebased onto current `origin/dev` (`7b14fbb66`) and pushed; head `097c828f95aade01b0c721d439bef419db0e26aa` is clean. F5 red/green evidence is in `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/`: the reconnect regression failed before the fix, then the embedded reconnect test passed 1/0 and `embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key` passed 1/0. I’m continuing with the requested real restart leg after the live mesh claim becomes available. The compute01 build-slot status was 4/4 busy with seven queued, so the J259 fixture rerun and quick/fast gates have not been queued yet. The current claim file names `J254-linux-proof`; the Mac VM is compiling J207’s work. Both live tests and the Mac build leg are waiting on those shared locks/slots.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 13:53:57 +00:00
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Correction after fixing the fixture-variable typo: the J255 snapshot was loaded by the rerun. The empty-route regression passed 1/1, and Node::restore_with_enrolment returned successfully through fresh GotaTun startup; the stale-fixture test then failed at line 288 because it expected backend to remain empty. The preserved snapshot has enabled=true, so a successful startup selects and persists a backend. I am updating the test to assert that the previous interface key was replaced by the new private/public identity pair. The preserved original files are still untouched.

Correction after fixing the fixture-variable typo: the J255 snapshot was loaded by the rerun. The empty-route regression passed 1/1, and `Node::restore_with_enrolment` returned successfully through fresh GotaTun startup; the stale-fixture test then failed at line 288 because it expected `backend` to remain empty. The preserved snapshot has `enabled=true`, so a successful startup selects and persists a backend. I am updating the test to assert that the previous interface key was replaced by the new private/public identity pair. The preserved original files are still untouched.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 14:31:29 +00:00
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J259 wait update on F4 (head 51ef5ebf3c349411e741f2c1f5901a045eacb60c): the correct J255 snapshot run reached fresh GotaTun startup; I am correcting its post-restore identity assertions. A separate nonempty-route/no-interface regression is added and is waiting at build-slot queue position 8 for its RED run before any production change. Compute01 had 51 GB free and ~/mesh-vm.claim was free at the latest check; no shared live mesh state is active.

J259 wait update on F4 (head `51ef5ebf3c349411e741f2c1f5901a045eacb60c`): the correct J255 snapshot run reached fresh GotaTun startup; I am correcting its post-restore identity assertions. A separate nonempty-route/no-interface regression is added and is waiting at build-slot queue position 8 for its RED run before any production change. Compute01 had 51 GB free and `~/mesh-vm.claim` was free at the latest check; no shared live mesh state is active.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 14:38:05 +00:00
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J259 wait update: the focused no-link/nonempty-route RED test is still queued at position 7. Compute01 now reports 21 GB free, below the build-slot 25 GB floor, so the test has not started. I am not deleting other worktrees or caches to free space; waiting for compute01 capacity. ~/mesh-vm.claim is free and no shared live state is active.

J259 wait update: the focused no-link/nonempty-route RED test is still queued at position 7. Compute01 now reports 21 GB free, below the build-slot 25 GB floor, so the test has not started. I am not deleting other worktrees or caches to free space; waiting for compute01 capacity. `~/mesh-vm.claim` is free and no shared live state is active.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 14:41:37 +00:00
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J259 capacity update (2026-11-06 14:40 UTC): the F4 nonempty-route/no-interface RED test remains queued behind six jobs. Compute01 reports 19 GB free, below its 25 GB build-slot floor, so this test has not started. I have not removed other jobs' targets or caches. ~/mesh-vm.claim is free; no shared live mesh state is active.

J259 capacity update (2026-11-06 14:40 UTC): the F4 nonempty-route/no-interface RED test remains queued behind six jobs. Compute01 reports 19 GB free, below its 25 GB build-slot floor, so this test has not started. I have not removed other jobs' targets or caches. `~/mesh-vm.claim` is free; no shared live mesh state is active.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 14:44:49 +00:00
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J259 capacity update (2026-11-06 14:44 UTC): compute01 now reports 17 GB free against the 25 GB build-slot floor. The focused F4 regression is still queued and has not started; the mesh claim remains free. I am waiting for capacity and will not bypass the floor or remove another job's files.

J259 capacity update (2026-11-06 14:44 UTC): compute01 now reports 17 GB free against the 25 GB build-slot floor. The focused F4 regression is still queued and has not started; the mesh claim remains free. I am waiting for capacity and will not bypass the floor or remove another job's files.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 14:47:18 +00:00
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J259 capacity update (2026-11-06 14:46 UTC): compute01 recovered from 17 GB to 24 GB free but remains 1 GB below the 25 GB build-slot floor. The F4 regression remains queued and has not started; ~/mesh-vm.claim is free.

J259 capacity update (2026-11-06 14:46 UTC): compute01 recovered from 17 GB to 24 GB free but remains 1 GB below the 25 GB build-slot floor. The F4 regression remains queued and has not started; `~/mesh-vm.claim` is free.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 14:54:03 +00:00
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J259 wait update (2026-11-06 14:53 UTC): compute01 is back at 102 GB free, but the focused F4 RED test is still queue position 4 behind four long-running jobs (all active for over an hour). No competing build has been started; waiting for a slot. Mesh claim remains free.

J259 wait update (2026-11-06 14:53 UTC): compute01 is back at 102 GB free, but the focused F4 RED test is still queue position 4 behind four long-running jobs (all active for over an hour). No competing build has been started; waiting for a slot. Mesh claim remains free.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 15:04:01 +00:00
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J259 wait update (2026-11-06 15:03 UTC): the F4 nonempty-route/no-interface RED run remains third in the compute01 build-slot queue; free disk is 74 GB (above the 25 GB floor). The claim file is free. No other J259 build has been queued or started.

J259 wait update (2026-11-06 15:03 UTC): the F4 nonempty-route/no-interface RED run remains third in the compute01 build-slot queue; free disk is 74 GB (above the 25 GB floor). The claim file is free. No other J259 build has been queued or started.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 15:08:41 +00:00
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J259 queue update (2026-11-06 15:08 UTC): the focused F4 RED test remains third in the build-slot queue. Compute01 has 57 GB free and the mesh claim is free; waiting for the slot.

J259 queue update (2026-11-06 15:08 UTC): the focused F4 RED test remains third in the build-slot queue. Compute01 has 57 GB free and the mesh claim is free; waiting for the slot.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 15:13:51 +00:00
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J259 capacity update (2026-11-06 15:13 UTC): the F4 RED run remains queue position 3. Compute01 has 28 GB free, only 3 GB above the 25 GB floor; mesh claim is free. The payload build and gates have not been queued.

J259 capacity update (2026-11-06 15:13 UTC): the F4 RED run remains queue position 3. Compute01 has 28 GB free, only 3 GB above the 25 GB floor; mesh claim is free. The payload build and gates have not been queued.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 15:19:17 +00:00
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J259 F4 route finding (RED, compute01): wireguard::route_retirement_tests::saved_peer_routes_are_a_noop_without_the_mesh_interface failed 0/1 in unshare -Urn with ENODEV at Device::retain_recorded_routes; retire_routes calls if_nametoindex("infraternal0") before checking whether any saved route still exists. This leaves stale enrollment unable to clear route intent after the interface was removed. I am changing the code to inspect exact saved routes without a link: continue if the kernel already removed them, and refuse with a logged ownership reason if a matching route remains on an unproven interface.

J259 F4 route finding (RED, compute01): `wireguard::route_retirement_tests::saved_peer_routes_are_a_noop_without_the_mesh_interface` failed 0/1 in `unshare -Urn` with `ENODEV` at `Device::retain_recorded_routes`; `retire_routes` calls `if_nametoindex("infraternal0")` before checking whether any saved route still exists. This leaves stale enrollment unable to clear route intent after the interface was removed. I am changing the code to inspect exact saved routes without a link: continue if the kernel already removed them, and refuse with a logged ownership reason if a matching route remains on an unproven interface.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 15:35:22 +00:00
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J259 F5 status on mesh-addhost-j259: restart recertification test mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key is included in the focused foreground run queued on compute01. Prior red/green logs are in ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/; the current rerun will write f5-restart-recertifies-green-current.log there. Current pushed head is bf82d77a65e9a1cf2a5d11713a5e102564e5a1fd. No live mesh state is running.

J259 F5 status on `mesh-addhost-j259`: restart recertification test `mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key` is included in the focused foreground run queued on compute01. Prior red/green logs are in `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/`; the current rerun will write `f5-restart-recertifies-green-current.log` there. Current pushed head is `bf82d77a65e9a1cf2a5d11713a5e102564e5a1fd`. No live mesh state is running.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 15:49:12 +00:00
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F5 correction: the first focused invocation matched zero tests because infraternal-server gates mesh_ssh on remote, which is not a default feature. The actual rerun adds --features remote and is queued on compute01 at build-slot position 6. The three focused F4 checks have passed; their logs and the F5 rerun log are under ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/.

F5 correction: the first focused invocation matched zero tests because `infraternal-server` gates `mesh_ssh` on `remote`, which is not a default feature. The actual rerun adds `--features remote` and is queued on compute01 at build-slot position 6. The three focused F4 checks have passed; their logs and the F5 rerun log are under `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/`.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 15:56:12 +00:00
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Focused test update: on compute01, all three F4 checks passed: f4-empty-route-green-current.log, f4-saved-route-absent-green-current.log, and f4-j255-fixture-green-current.log under ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/. The original route RED is f4-route-nonempty-red.log (0/1, ENODEV).

The F5 rerun with --features remote is now queued at compute01 position 3. The earlier mesh_ssh invocation without remote matched zero tests and is excluded. A prior one-test F5 green is recorded in f5-worker-current.log; the new run will provide current-head evidence.

Focused test update: on compute01, all three F4 checks passed: `f4-empty-route-green-current.log`, `f4-saved-route-absent-green-current.log`, and `f4-j255-fixture-green-current.log` under `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/`. The original route RED is `f4-route-nonempty-red.log` (0/1, `ENODEV`). The F5 rerun with `--features remote` is now queued at compute01 position 3. The earlier `mesh_ssh` invocation without `remote` matched zero tests and is excluded. A prior one-test F5 green is recorded in `f5-worker-current.log`; the new run will provide current-head evidence.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 16:02:52 +00:00
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F5 focused verification: mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key passed 1/1 on compute01. Output is preserved at ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/f5-restart-recertifies-green-current.log. It ran from the existing feature-enabled test binary because the F5 source files are unchanged since that build; the earlier fresh feature-enabled green is also in f5-worker-current.log. Vendored SSH crate warnings were emitted during the earlier compile, but the test run itself was clean.

F5 focused verification: `mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key` passed 1/1 on compute01. Output is preserved at `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/f5-restart-recertifies-green-current.log`. It ran from the existing feature-enabled test binary because the F5 source files are unchanged since that build; the earlier fresh feature-enabled green is also in `f5-worker-current.log`. Vendored SSH crate warnings were emitted during the earlier compile, but the test run itself was clean.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 16:45:55 +00:00
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F5 rerun is now queued on the rebased current head 38d26e5f168631770440bbcfc873016c1800fddc / origin/dev 37c93637e49a415578416be037f972b9a716701c. The run enables the required remote feature and includes the F4 focused checks; compute01 queue position is 14. I am waiting in the foreground. The earlier feature-enabled F5 run is preserved at ~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/f5-worker-current.log; current-head output will overwrite f5-restart-recertifies-green-current.log.

F5 rerun is now queued on the rebased current head `38d26e5f168631770440bbcfc873016c1800fddc` / `origin/dev` `37c93637e49a415578416be037f972b9a716701c`. The run enables the required `remote` feature and includes the F4 focused checks; compute01 queue position is 14. I am waiting in the foreground. The earlier feature-enabled F5 run is preserved at `~/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/f5-worker-current.log`; current-head output will overwrite `f5-restart-recertifies-green-current.log`.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 17:27:19 +00:00
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J259 progress on mesh-addhost-j259, HEAD 38d26e5f168631770440bbcfc873016c1800fddc, based on origin/dev 37c93637e49a415578416be037f972b9a716701c.

Current-head F5 restart-certification test passed 1/1: mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key. Evidence: /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/f5-restart-recertifies-green-current.log. The earlier failing embedded-agent restart notification reproduction is preserved in f5-embedded-actor-red.log in that evidence directory.

verify quick is queued on compute01 behind existing work and has not started. No live mesh state has been created. Next: finish the quick and fast gates, then run the remaining live legs after the compute01 claim is released.

J259 progress on `mesh-addhost-j259`, HEAD `38d26e5f168631770440bbcfc873016c1800fddc`, based on `origin/dev` `37c93637e49a415578416be037f972b9a716701c`. Current-head F5 restart-certification test passed 1/1: `mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key`. Evidence: `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/f5-restart-recertifies-green-current.log`. The earlier failing embedded-agent restart notification reproduction is preserved in `f5-embedded-actor-red.log` in that evidence directory. `verify quick` is queued on compute01 behind existing work and has not started. No live mesh state has been created. Next: finish the quick and fast gates, then run the remaining live legs after the compute01 claim is released.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 17:52:59 +00:00
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The first verify quick attempt stopped at rustfmt in the changed F5 regression test. The formatting correction was pushed as a separate commit dd62514d0 and the compute01 worktree is updated. The quick rerun is currently waiting for the 25 GB build-slot disk floor (21 GB free); no F5 test failed.

The first `verify quick` attempt stopped at rustfmt in the changed F5 regression test. The formatting correction was pushed as a separate commit `dd62514d0` and the compute01 worktree is updated. The quick rerun is currently waiting for the 25 GB build-slot disk floor (21 GB free); no F5 test failed.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 18:17:18 +00:00
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The D345 quick-gate finding also covered the changed restart regression. Its doc-comment correction is pushed in documentation-only commit 7e0aa1a0a; the failed row is preserved at /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/verify-quick-d345-fail-7e0aa1a0a.log (SHA-256 790e46a4928ba64dd85dc813c19da5c173c2ac7b016dc1720ae9ce77c0ee6e67). The current-head quick rerun is queued on compute01 at position 8.

The D345 quick-gate finding also covered the changed restart regression. Its doc-comment correction is pushed in documentation-only commit `7e0aa1a0a`; the failed row is preserved at `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/verify-quick-d345-fail-7e0aa1a0a.log` (SHA-256 `790e46a4928ba64dd85dc813c19da5c173c2ac7b016dc1720ae9ce77c0ee6e67`). The current-head quick rerun is queued on compute01 at position 8.
kayg commented 2026-11-06 18:31:07 +00:00
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The current-head quick run reached workspace clippy after the doc-comment gate passed. Clippy found four denied unwrap/expect calls in the F4 route tests and two Mesh test fixtures that needed the new enrollment binding. The failure log is /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/verify-quick-clippy-fail-7e0aa1a0a.log (SHA-256 11ab2810186e267b0906e5fd99c0b9eb780bd60b30964f03f25511e3d5a3123c).

The test-only corrections are pushed in 679a7a774; a fresh quick run is queued on compute01 at position 15. F5 behavior was not implicated.

The current-head quick run reached workspace clippy after the doc-comment gate passed. Clippy found four denied unwrap/expect calls in the F4 route tests and two Mesh test fixtures that needed the new enrollment binding. The failure log is `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/verify-quick-clippy-fail-7e0aa1a0a.log` (SHA-256 `11ab2810186e267b0906e5fd99c0b9eb780bd60b30964f03f25511e3d5a3123c`). The test-only corrections are pushed in `679a7a774`; a fresh quick run is queued on compute01 at position 15. F5 behavior was not implicated.
kayg commented 2026-11-07 01:20:27 +00:00
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J259 implementation status (2026-11-07): F4 stale mesh-state handling and F5 mesh SSH host-key recertification on agent restart are committed and pushed on mesh-addhost-j259, currently 15298da34f0cfc37e03dbfee163d6113b8d08c5d (base origin/dev fba745051416c60a8523f0fe529c2aee6bbe0dd0). Focused regressions are in the branch; their fresh run and the quick/fast/privileged gates are still pending. I have not treated the compute01 restart interruption as a test failure and will rerun the requested gate once after the #402 “compute01 back, 5 slots” notice. Remaining real-machine legs are also pending the serialized live-state claim and VM availability; Mac access currently has a host-key mismatch reported on #260.

J259 implementation status (2026-11-07): F4 stale mesh-state handling and F5 mesh SSH host-key recertification on agent restart are committed and pushed on `mesh-addhost-j259`, currently `15298da34f0cfc37e03dbfee163d6113b8d08c5d` (base `origin/dev` `fba745051416c60a8523f0fe529c2aee6bbe0dd0`). Focused regressions are in the branch; their fresh run and the quick/fast/privileged gates are still pending. I have not treated the compute01 restart interruption as a test failure and will rerun the requested gate once after the #402 “compute01 back, 5 slots” notice. Remaining real-machine legs are also pending the serialized live-state claim and VM availability; Mac access currently has a host-key mismatch reported on #260.
kayg commented 2026-11-07 02:02:53 +00:00
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Focused F4/F5 unit checks now pass in the project devShell on code.vpn.kayg.org (no live mesh state):

  • cargo test --locked -p infraternal-plugin-mesh --lib --features agent node_state::restore_tests:: — 9 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored. stale_saved_mesh_files_are_replaced_for_the_new_enrolment is one ignored test because it must run alone in a disposable network namespace with INFRATERAL_MESH_STALE_FIXTURE; that real fixture run is still pending a claimed compute01 window.
  • cargo test --locked -p infraternal-server --lib --no-default-features --features remote,ssh,mesh mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key — 1 passed, 0 failed.

The first attempt used the wrong test-module path and matched 0 tests; I corrected it and confirmed the named tests executed. The initial bare-shell attempt also stopped before running tests because cc was absent; both passing runs used nix develop. The quick/fast/privileged gates and live legs remain pending the #402 compute01 restart notice and live-state claim.

Focused F4/F5 unit checks now pass in the project devShell on `code.vpn.kayg.org` (no live mesh state): - `cargo test --locked -p infraternal-plugin-mesh --lib --features agent node_state::restore_tests::` — 9 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored. `stale_saved_mesh_files_are_replaced_for_the_new_enrolment` is one ignored test because it must run alone in a disposable network namespace with `INFRATERAL_MESH_STALE_FIXTURE`; that real fixture run is still pending a claimed compute01 window. - `cargo test --locked -p infraternal-server --lib --no-default-features --features remote,ssh,mesh mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key` — 1 passed, 0 failed. The first attempt used the wrong test-module path and matched 0 tests; I corrected it and confirmed the named tests executed. The initial bare-shell attempt also stopped before running tests because `cc` was absent; both passing runs used `nix develop`. The quick/fast/privileged gates and live legs remain pending the #402 compute01 restart notice and live-state claim.
kayg commented 2026-11-07 02:03:52 +00:00
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Correction to the previous test update: the ignored stale-fixture test's environment variable is INFRATERNAL_MESH_STALE_FIXTURE (the prior comment omitted one N).

Correction to the previous test update: the ignored stale-fixture test's environment variable is `INFRATERNAL_MESH_STALE_FIXTURE` (the prior comment omitted one `N`).
kayg commented 2026-11-07 02:22:39 +00:00
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J259 gate scheduling update: #402 has declared compute01 back, but all five build slots are busy and the queue is long. I checked dev02: its slot is free, with 64G free disk and a 40G floor. Per the newer #402 instructions, I’m running verify quick, focused checks, and verify fast on dev02 with CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0; I will delete my target afterwards. The fresh F4/F5 focused logs already exist locally, and will also be rerun on dev02. Live mesh work remains blocked by the live-state claim held by J197 (2026-11-06T22:41:10Z).

J259 gate scheduling update: #402 has declared compute01 back, but all five build slots are busy and the queue is long. I checked dev02: its slot is free, with 64G free disk and a 40G floor. Per the newer #402 instructions, I’m running `verify quick`, focused checks, and `verify fast` on dev02 with `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0`; I will delete my target afterwards. The fresh F4/F5 focused logs already exist locally, and will also be rerun on dev02. Live mesh work remains blocked by the live-state claim held by J197 (`2026-11-06T22:41:10Z`).
kayg commented 2026-11-07 02:46:33 +00:00
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J259 verification update:

  • F4 focused restore tests on dev02: 9 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored. The stale J255 fixture test remains ignored because it requires a disposable network namespace and a live-state claim.
  • F5 focused restart-certification test on dev02: 1 passed, 0 failed. A first build attempt stopped before tests because a non-login claude shell dropped nix-store; the login-shell retry confirmed nix-store in the devShell and passed.
  • scripts/verify quick passed on dev02; full summary is on #260.
  • scripts/verify fast was interrupted before completion when the dev02 target grew to 37G and free disk fell to 25G, below its 40G floor. This was an operational cancellation, not a test failure. I removed only the J259 target; dev02 is back to 63G free. No final fast result exists yet.

Compute01 had all five slots occupied at the latest check. The live-state claim is still held by J197 (2026-11-06T22:41:10Z); I am waiting for it before the namespace fixture and live mesh legs.

J259 verification update: - F4 focused restore tests on dev02: 9 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored. The stale J255 fixture test remains ignored because it requires a disposable network namespace and a live-state claim. - F5 focused restart-certification test on dev02: 1 passed, 0 failed. A first build attempt stopped before tests because a non-login `claude` shell dropped `nix-store`; the login-shell retry confirmed `nix-store` in the devShell and passed. - `scripts/verify quick` passed on dev02; full summary is on #260. - `scripts/verify fast` was interrupted before completion when the dev02 target grew to 37G and free disk fell to 25G, below its 40G floor. This was an operational cancellation, not a test failure. I removed only the J259 target; dev02 is back to 63G free. No final fast result exists yet. Compute01 had all five slots occupied at the latest check. The live-state claim is still held by J197 (`2026-11-06T22:41:10Z`); I am waiting for it before the namespace fixture and live mesh legs.
kayg commented 2026-11-07 03:35:14 +00:00
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J259 F5 current-head test update — mesh-addhost-j259 @ 15298da34f0cfc37e03dbfee163d6113b8d08c5d.

The fresh test mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key passed 1/1 on dev-02. The raw receipt is /home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/focused-f4-f5-current.log.

The pre-maintenance compute01 gate waiter was cut by the VM restart and is excluded as a test result. The dev-02 verify quick pass is recorded on #260. The prior dev-02 verify fast ended at the disk floor (operational stop, not a test failure); no final fast gate is claimed. The real kill-9 recovery proof remains pending the shared mesh claim, currently held by J197.

J259 F5 current-head test update — `mesh-addhost-j259` @ `15298da34f0cfc37e03dbfee163d6113b8d08c5d`. The fresh test `mesh_ssh::tests::embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key` passed 1/1 on dev-02. The raw receipt is `/home/claude/.cache/codex-scratch/j259/evidence/focused-f4-f5-current.log`. The pre-maintenance compute01 gate waiter was cut by the VM restart and is excluded as a test result. The dev-02 `verify quick` pass is recorded on #260. The prior dev-02 `verify fast` ended at the disk floor (operational stop, not a test failure); no final fast gate is claimed. The real kill-9 recovery proof remains pending the shared mesh claim, currently held by J197.
kayg commented 2026-11-07 03:36:59 +00:00
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Attached: fresh dev-02 F4 restore and F5 restart-recertification test output from current head 15298da34.

Attached: fresh dev-02 F4 restore and F5 restart-recertification test output from current head 15298da34.
focused-f4-f5-current.log
18 KiB
kayg commented 2026-11-07 05:12:28 +00:00
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J259 status: F5 restart re-certification code and regression coverage are present on mesh-addhost-j259 at 15298da34. I have not started compute01 verification during the announced maintenance window; the fast gate is queued but not running. I will resume it once compute01 is explicitly back with build-slot admission, and record any restart-cut session as maintenance interruption rather than a test failure.

J259 status: F5 restart re-certification code and regression coverage are present on `mesh-addhost-j259` at `15298da34`. I have not started compute01 verification during the announced maintenance window; the fast gate is queued but not running. I will resume it once compute01 is explicitly back with build-slot admission, and record any restart-cut session as maintenance interruption rather than a test failure.
kayg commented 2026-11-07 05:22:33 +00:00
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F5 focused verification at 15298da34f0cfc37e03dbfee163d6113b8d08c5d passed on dev-02: embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key 1 passed, 0 failed. The earlier compute01 gate waiter was cut by the scheduled restart and is not counted. Live mesh SSH after an abrupt agent stop still awaits the shared mesh claim and the remaining real-machine leg; compute01 verification resumes only after the explicit “compute01 back, 5 slots” notice.

F5 focused verification at `15298da34f0cfc37e03dbfee163d6113b8d08c5d` passed on dev-02: `embedded_agent_restart_recertifies_the_new_host_key` 1 passed, 0 failed. The earlier compute01 gate waiter was cut by the scheduled restart and is not counted. Live mesh SSH after an abrupt agent stop still awaits the shared mesh claim and the remaining real-machine leg; compute01 verification resumes only after the explicit “compute01 back, 5 slots” notice.
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kayg/infraternal#221
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